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Abstract 
 
Since a global War on Drugs was waged around forty years ago, many things changed in the 
Americas. Overall, by 2013, the manufacture, distribution and sale of illegal drugs widespread 
throughout these continents. Along with this rising market, the rising severity of convictions and 
expanded incarceration of the War on Drugs efforts led to increasingly overloaded penal systems. 
In this unequal region of the world, illegal drug markets expanded hand in hand with violence. 
 
Because of being the most widely cultivated, trafficked and used illicit drug, a new generation of 
cannabis policies seems to be emerging from this critical state of affairs, either pushed by popular 
referendums or as an attempt to lower the burden on the criminal justice system. In some cases, 
cannabis use offences were pulled out of the criminal sphere into the administrative one, in order 
to create a more suitable legal framework for policy interventions. In The Netherlands, cannabis 
ǁĂƐ ĚĞ ĨĂĐƚŽ ůĞŐĂůŝǌĞĚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ĚŝƐƉĞŶƐĂƌŝĞƐ ĞƵƉŚĞŵŝƐƚŝĐĂůůǇ ĐĂůůĞĚ  “ĐŽĨĨĞĞƐŚŽƉƐ ? ? ƌĞůǇŝŶŐ ŽŶ Ă
discretionary enforcement of the law. Recent United States referendum-driven changes to legalize 
cannabis selling have forced to a conspicuous inconsistency between nationally endorsed 
prohibitions and locally arranged regulations. Within this increasingly diverse policy landscape, 
Uruguay surprised the world in December 2013, becoming the first nation in extensively regulating 
cannabis. Behind the approval of this law, an odd and conflictive combination of national civil 
society representatives, legislative and executive power entrepreneurs and transnational networks 
conflated, to make cannabis regulation happen. 
 
Based on a ten years following of this political process, in this thesis, the nuts and bolts of 
Uruguayan reform are exposed. I show how political actors framed the problem of illegal cannabis 
in different ways and how this had significant connotations for the adoption of alternative policy 
designs. Causal process tracing is used to relate these dissimilar approaches to politics moral 
foundations and macro level factors, such as the rapid secularization process that Uruguay was 
going through or the resilience of increasing crime rates in economically prosperous societies. 
Further on, I show how this politically led change helps to understand important peculiarities of the 
implementation process. Accordingly, the selection of this case study attempts to contribute to the 
ongoing debate around how to improve drug policy under the assumption that in order to suggest 
alternative policies or alternative ways of making policy, it is essential to try to understand how 
policy is made in the first place. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
Cannabis markets are here to stay. According to the World Health Organisation, by 2017 cannabis is 
by far the most widely cultivated, trafficked and used illicit drug. Half of all drug seizures worldwide 
are cannabis seizures. The geographical spread of those seizures is also global, covering practically 
every country of the world. About 147 million people, that is 2.5% of the world population, have 
consumed cannabis in the last year compared with 0.2% consuming cocaine and 0.2% opiates (WHO, 
2017). While cannabis users represent between 75% and 80% of the total illegal drug users worldwide, 
by 2013, 24% of the total cannabis users of the world live in the Americas -and as high as 81% of those 
live in North America (OEA, 2015). In Europe, the last estimates show that cannabis accounts for the 
ůĂƌŐĞƐƚƐŚĂƌĞ ŝŶǀĂůƵĞŽĨ ƚŚĞĐŽŶƚŝŶĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ŝůůŝĐŝƚĚƌƵŐŵĂƌŬĞƚ ?ĂŶŶĂďŝƐŽĨĨĞŶĐĞƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ĨŽƌĐůŽƐĞ ƚŽ
three-quarters of all drug-related offences, the bulk of which are for use or possession for personal 
use (EMCDDA, 2016). 
 
Compared to other types of illegal drugs, cannabis is relatively easy to produce. Cannabis female plants 
produce flowers or "buds" that are rich in tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), the main active component 
that can be used for psychoactive purposes. The cannabis plant booms in different climates and 
altitudes, from the sea level up to 3000 meters high, and it can be grown in every geographic zone. 
Cultivated outdoors, cannabis has an annual life period that goes from spring to autumn. Indoors, up 
to three harvests per year can be produced. The yield of a single plant depends on the quality of the 
cannabis and its THC concentration. All type of information around cannabis cultivation, germination, 
harvest and drying can be easily found in Internet. There is a wide range of growing techniques known, 
some of them highly sophisticated in order to improve the size, quality and potency of the flower, or 
to breed plants in order to get new aromas and flavours. Cannabis seeds and specialised equipment 
for growing can be easily purchased in the web as well (OEA, 2013) 
 
When the THC enters the blood stream and reaches the brain, it binds to cannabinoid receptors which 
results in changes in the levels of various neurotransmitters, especially dopamine and norepinephrine. 
The most widely referred psychoactive effects of cannabis use are euphoria and relaxation, although 
self-reported studies expose considerable variation in the effects experienced by different individuals. 
Other reported effects of using cannabis are a general alteration of conscious perception, feelings of 
well-being, joviality, social and sexual facilitation and disruption of linear memory. Anxiety and loss of 
motivation are the most frequently reported side effects. The most common short-term somatic 
effects are increased heart rate, dry mouth, reddening of the eyes, a reduction in intra-ocular pressure 
and muscle relaxation (Ashton, 2001; Hathaway, 2003; Green, Kavanagh, & Young, 2003). Most 
frequently is consumed by inhalation, either smoking or vaporising it, although it is also consumed 
through edibles, ingestible oils, tinctures and topicals, among others. When smoked, the short-term 
effects of cannabis manifest within seconds, typically lasting for above an hour, varying by the person 
and the strain of cannabis. It has a delayed and prolonged effect when orally ingested (Ashton, 2001). 
 
Both harms and benefits for health have been reported in the literature for using cannabis. On the 
one hand, cannabis has addictive potential, carcinogenic properties  Wespecially when mixed with 
tobacco-, can have a negative interaction with diseases such as schizophrenia, and may produce 
cognitive impairment associated with early onset and long term intensive use (Murray et al., 2007). 
On the other hand, cannabis also has long-standing therapeutic applications; it is included in the oldest 
Chinese pharmacopeia known. Currently, cannabinoids have approved therapeutic applications. As 
ƐƚĂƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞtŽƌůĚ,ĞĂůƚŚKƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ?hƉĚĂƚĞŽĨĐĂŶŶďŝƐĂŶĚŝƚƐŵĞĚŝĐĂůƵƐĞ P 
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 “the psychoactive cannabinoid, THC (e.g., within Marinol®), has approval for either its anti- 
emetic and appetite stimulating properties or as a treatment for multiple sclerosis in Canada, 
Denmark and the United States, and Sativex®,  a  combination  of  THC  and  CBD,  has  
approval for spasticity in 25 countries. Preclinical research has suggested other potential 
therapeutic applications for non-psychoactive phytocannabinoids. For example, CBD has 
putative therapeutic applications for treating psychosis, affective and seizure disorders, 
inflammation, and neurodegenerative disease. Delta-9-tetrahydrocannabivarin, another 
phytocannabinoid, may also be useful for treating epilepsy and obesity. ? ?DĂĚƌĂƐ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? 4)
 
In December 2013, the Uruguayan parliament voted for becoming the first country in the world to 
legally regulate the import, export, growth, cultivation, harvest, production, acquisition, storage, 
commercialisation, distribution and consumption of cannabis. This cannabis regulation law was so 
controversial that the widely known newspaper The Economist ĚĞĐŝĚĞĚƚŽĚĞĐůĂƌĞhƌƵŐƵĂǇĂƐ ‘dŚĞ
ŽƵŶƚƌǇŽĨƚŚĞzĞĂƌ ?ĨŽƌŝƚƐ “path-breaking reform that do not merely improve a single nation but, if 
emulated, might benefit the world ? ?The Economist, 18/12/2013). 
 
ZĞŐĂƌĚůĞƐƐ ŽĨ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ŽǁŶ ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂů ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ĂƌŽƵŶĚ ƚhe matter, it is unquestionable that this legal 
change deeply challenged the way in which governments traditionally deal with cannabis. Whereas 
cannabis market prohibition is currently the norm worldwide, the approved Uruguayan law no19172 
aims at a social integration of cannabis, looking for a new balance between formal and informal drug 
control mechanisms. The new law defines what the different types of cannabis use are  Wi.e. 
recreational, medical, scientific, and industrial- and the related institutional regulatory settings (see 
the diagram on p.9). It outlines three objectives set for the new legal framework: to reduce drug 
ƚƌĂĨĨŝĐŬŝŶŐ ƌĞůĂƚĞĚ ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ? ƚŽ ƉƌŽŵŽƚĞ ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ ƵƐĞƌƐ ? ŚĞĂůƚŚ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŽ ƉƌŽŵŽƚĞ Ă ĨĂŝƌ ůĂǁ
enforcement. In order to achieve these objectives, four policy tools are commanded: (i) problematic 
drug use education and prevention; (ii) problematic drug ƵƐĞƌƐ ? treatment, rehabilitation and re-entry; 
(iii) police action over the illegal cannabis trade and (iv) a legal cannabis market system. 
 
This new law states that the planting, growing, harvest and commercialization of cannabis is 
prohibited unless it is done under certain circumstances. Thus, only Uruguayan residents older than 
eighteen years of age can ask to be registered in the ad hoc Institute for the Regulation and Control 
of Cannabis (IRCCA) as cannabis users at the post office. The law states a purchase limit for non-
medical cannabis of forty grams per month to be sell in pharmacies, six plants for domestic cultivation 
and ninety-nine plants for collective cultivation in social cannabis clubs. The law 19172 and its further 
regulatory framework also establish a number of conditions for cannabis use. Whereas in the retailing 
system only a few cannabis strains are available, no strain restrictions apply to personal cultivation. 
It is prohibited to smoke in indoor public spaces, to drive under the influence, and to advertise 
cannabis. In the cases where the established possession limits are surpassed, ŝƚŝƐƵƉƚŽƚŚĞũƵĚŐĞ ?Ɛ
discretion to establish the existence of a crime, in accordance to the evidence found. 
 
Thus, two types of violations to the law are included. For the administrative ones, the IRCCA is the 
organism in charge of monitoring compliance. The penalties imposed can range from plants 
destruction to an economic fine and the suspension of the habilitation. For the penal ones, the 
Uruguayan police forces -especially through the National Direction for Illegal Drugs Traffinking 
Repression- retain their responsibility. Complementary, the law also commands the constitution of 
an Executive Power Monitoring and Evaluation Unit, to produce annual reports on the ůĂǁ ?Ɛ 
progression for the legislative body. 
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Figure 1. Uruguayan Cannabis Regulation main features 
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
 
As path dependency theorists point out, once in place, institutions tend to persist. One political choice 
will close off alternative options and lead to the establishment of institutions that generate self- 
reinforcing path dependent processes (Pierson, 2004; Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007). In other words, 
regulating cannabis is as atypical as prohibiting it once legal. Therefore, knowing and understanding 
the point of origin of this drug policy reform is crucial to understanding the dependent path. Within 
an international context increasingly sceptical about the cannabis prohibition orthodoxy, insights 
gained from this atypical change are quite relevant for policy-making, since the Uruguayan example 
ŵŝŐŚƚ  “inform the design and implementation of any future cannabis policies ?  ?WĂƌĚŽ ?  ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ?  ? ) ?
Accordingly, the selection of this case study attempts to contribute to the ongoing debate around how 
to control cannabis under the assumption that in order to suggest alternative policies or alternative 
ways of making policy, it is essential to try to understand how policy is made (Hill, 2009). 
 
General aim and research questions 
 
Thus, this thesis is generally aimed at understanding the political and social process that led to the 
approval of the Uruguayan cannabis regulation law in December 2013. More specifically, it attempts 
to answer the following research questions: 
x Who were the main actors involved in the Uruguayan cannabis reform and how they 
networked?
x Why was cannabis regulated in Uruguay; that is, how were the problem of illegal cannabis and 
the suitable political solution framed?
x How did cannabis regulation come to prominence and set policy agendas?
x What are the implications of these stages for the implementation of the law and for cannabis 
policymaking?
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In order to answer these research questions, gaining access to the actual political debates and 
deliberations that precede decision-making and action taking is as crucial as difficult, as former studies 
about drug policy-making have shown (Stevens, 2011). On the one hand, the political decision making 
process is much more complex, less linear and less rational than we may assume, involving far more 
actors than politicians alone. On the other hand, political decisions are usually surrounded by secrecy 
and important incentives may exist for actors to either overemphasise or understate their own role in 
cannabis regulation, as well as some of the conflicts, collusions and agreements involved in the 
process. As Taleb argues (2004), it is difficult to overstate the epistemological importance and 
challenge of an ex post explanation of this unexpected policy development and analyse the role that 
relatively hazardous events may actually have in historical transformations. 
 
All these points to the critical importance ŽĨ  ‘ďĞŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞ ?ǁŚĞŶĂŶĂůǇƐŝŶŐƚŚĞhƌƵŐƵĂǇĂŶĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ
regulation case. Thus, I decided to engage in this research project because since 2007 I have been both, 
academically and politically engaged with drug policy reform in Uruguay. As an activist, I publically 
supported cannabis legal regulation, helped to organise conferences and demonstrations around the 
topic, attended meetings with decision makers, with political representatives of every political party 
and with international organisations working in the country. This personal background allowed me a 
ƉĞĐƵůŝĂƌŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇƚŽĂŶĂůǇƐĞƚŚŝƐĐĂƐĞǀĞƌǇŵƵĐŚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ ‘ŝŶƐŝĚĞ ?ŽĨƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůǁŽƌůĚ ?ƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐ
important advantages and limitations for my research work. 
 
Among the latter, I believe that the most important one was not being able of performing a detached 
attitude in several instances of my fieldwork as qualitative methods handbooks advice. Thus, many 
times I had to work out an internal dilemma between allowing the natural course of action to report 
it as accurate as possible, or intervening in a meeting, giving an opinion and trying to alter those 
possible roads for action. Sometimes it was very hard for me to realise how participant my observation 
should be. 
 
At the same time, the main advantage of this standpoint was gaining access to data that it is hardly 
available merely through retrospective interviews. Furthermore, what I personally judge as the two 
most important contributions of my research thesis were possible due to my activist background. The 
first one is methodological, involving the network analysis of the reformers coalition. It was mainly due 
to my previous knowledge about the field that I was able to track down evidence of joint participation 
of political actors in cannabis regulation-related activities. Thus, this research thesis represents a step 
ĨŽƌǁĂƌĚ ŝŶ ŽƵƌ ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƐƚƌŽŶŐ ĂŶĚ ĚŝǀĞƌƐĞ ĂĚǀŽĐĂĐǇ ĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ ? ƚŚĂƚ ƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐ ǁŽƌŬƐ
identified but failed to analyse at this level of formalisation. The other contribution motivated by my 
activist background is theoretical, and regards the inclusion of a moral politics perspective to study 
drug policy change. I started to explore this theory as an attempt to seek critical distance from the 
assumptions that have shaped my perceptions and convictions about the topic. Having concluded the 
thesis, I feel that been engaged in that enterprise was similar to walking through a one-way road, for 
it challenged my views about activism and policy change in unexpectedly extensive ways. 
 
That is the main reason why I decided to organise the presentation of my work about cannabis 
regulation in Uruguay in the present way. I will start characterising the changing international context 
in which Uruguayan cannabis regulation took place. In this chapter, I will provide a brief historical 
account of the inclusion of cannabis as a highly dangerous substance in the International Drugs 
Conventions Regime. I will show how this prohibition was adapted to Uruguayan cultural specificity, 
setting some longs standing foundations of the exceptionally liberal approach to drugs where, unlike 
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much legislation in Latin America, cannabis use was never punished by law. Further on, I will argue 
that the problem of illegal drugs markets significantly changed for Latin America from 1990s onward. 
In this period, the conflation of an increasing punitive drug control approach with ever-increasing drug 
use rates made the drugs problem to climb up political agendas. Thus, the beginning of the twenty 
first century brought an unprecedented concern about crime and drug trafficking related violence 
throughout Latin America. Finally, I will review the main innovative cannabis regulation experiences 
developed around the world. This will allow me to characterise the Uruguayan case as a new type of 
breakthrough within the increasingly prevalent systems of cannabis decriminalisation, because of 
being the first nationally endorsed law including not only personal cultivation mechanisms but also a 
strongly state oriented commercialisation system. 
 
Having identified cannabis regulation as an atypical policy change, in chapter three, I will introduce 
the theoretical approaches selected for understanding the puzzling and dynamic web of decisions 
involved in the Uruguayan political process. I will first present moral politics perspective as the general 
theoretical approach to study how ideas, symbols and rhetoric on the one hand, and policy content 
and instruments on the other, evolved through imposition, negotiation and compromise to make 
cannabis reform happen. Following, I will introduce middle ground policy-making theories that have 
been used to study previous drug policy reform cases around the world. Here, I will discuss in some 
depth the relevance of including factors such as hierarchical belief systems, attention shifts and events 
 ‘ĞǆƚĞƌŶĂů ?ƚŽƚŚĞĚƌƵŐƉŽůŝĐǇƐƵďƐǇƐƚĞŵŝƚƐĞůĨƚŽƐƉĞĐŝĨǇ ƵƌƚŚĞƌƚŚĞĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŽƌǇŵŽĚĞů ?ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŝĂƚŝŶŐ
between atypical and incremental type of changes. I will show how this framework can be enhanced 
by addressing more precisely the role of politics moral foundations for a better account of the cultural 
variations in drug policy making, as well as the role of religion as an alternative source of resistance 
and promotion of change. Lastly, I will argue for the incorporation of an international dimension for a 
better comprehension of how national and sub-national drug control cultures interact with global 
influences that have historically significantly affected the available pathways for cannabis 
policymaking. 
 
In chapter four, I will present the qualitative research design selected, locating within case causal 
process as the main epistemological tool to understand why and how cannabis was regulated in 
Uruguay. I will describe the data collection methods used, such as participant observation, open semi- 
structured interviews and documents, and the triangulation techniques employed to enhance the 
ĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƐ ? robustness. Following, I will explain how I conformed my population of interest by combining 
purposive and chain-referral sampling methods and discuss important ethical and methodological 
issues faced to gain access to this political elite level group. Lastly, I will describe the narrative and 
network analysis procedures displayed to organise and formalise the data thus collected. 
 
Chapter five is devoted to analysing the empirical information gathered around the sources of the 
conflict that shaped the filling up of the Uruguayan political debate. I analyse the role of structural 
variables such as the rapid secularisation process characterising the cannabis demand as a 
generational conflict related with the polarised second demographic transition in Uruguay. I introduce 
the idea that the cannabis legalisation movement started to flourish organically and highly 
disarticulated as a demand, gaining political leverage with the pace of its increasing use rates. In this 
chapter, I also show how cannabis activism conforms as a new type of political entrepreneur inserted 
in a wider reform movement  WƚŚĞ  ‘ŶĞǁ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ? ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ĂŐĞŶĚĂ- that included abortion rights and 
>'d/ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?&ŝŶĂůůǇ ?/ĂŶĂůǇƐĞŵŽƌĞƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇƚŚĞƌŽůĞŽĨhƌƵŐƵĂǇĂŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ƌĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ
defining the Uruguayan as a religious world case of moral policy change. 
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In chapter six, the focus turns to the controversial role of the executive power in the debate. I will 
ƌĞůĂƚĞƚŚĞĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƐŚŝĨƚŽĨƚŚŝƐĂĐƚŽƌǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞŽĨ ‘ƉĂƌĂĚŽǆŽĨĐƌŝŵĞ ?ŝŶhƌƵŐƵĂǇ ?ĂŶĚƐŚŽǁ
how the irruption of the executive opened a chaotic moment by which cannabis broke into the macro 
political agenda. Thus, by analysing the politics moral foundations I will explain why, 
counterintuitively, the confluence of the government and civil society to regulate cannabis was so 
conflictive in this case. 
 
In chapter seven, I deal with the role of international policy transfer dynamics that allowed the political 
debate to overcome the communicational chaos previously analysed. Thus, I present evidence by 
which knowledge of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political 
system were incorporated into the domestic debate, informing and shaping the subsequent 
development of Uruguayan cannabis reform. I analyse specifically the role of international actors in 
three key areas of the political process, as the definition of the Uruguayan regulatory design, political 
campaigning and the international conventions arena. 
 
Having exposed the role of national civil society representatives, the Uruguayan executive power 
members and international civil society representatives, in chapter eight I offer a network analysis 
based on the shared participation of these actors in cannabis related events, as in a reformers 
coalition. Thus, I analyse the role of both individuals and groups of actors, as brokers and 
entrepreneurs in the debate. I also show how key actors for the implementation of the law remained 
surprisingly apathetic throughout this process. 
 
I finalise my empirical analysis questioning the derivations of the political process that made the 
approval of the law possible for the implementation stage. Thus, in chapter nine, I discuss the 
weaknesses of the law as a guide for policy reform, reviewing the main progressions and blockers 
found for the development of a legal framework for recreational and medical cannabis. I further show 
how the secrecy regarding the implementation rationale and the unaccountability of the main actors 
responsible for it, have conformed as important factors wakening the legal certainty under the new 
framework. 
 
I conclude this thesis reviewing the main findings around my research questions, exposing the 
theoretical derivations of this research work for the understanding of drug policymaking problems 
from a cross-cultural perspective. I will review the main limitations of the study and recommend a 
future research agenda to gain a deeper and wider understanding of cannabis policy change. 
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Chapter 2. A changing international landscape 
 
Although atypical, the Uruguayan cannabis regulation reform was not an isolated drop in a 
prohibitionist sea. As psychoactive substances markets expand and more resources have been 
accumulated to understand how they work, a progressively richer debate has established about how 
to better control them. Still, prohibitionist orthodoxy remains as the main supply side control 
approach of the international drug control regime, setting the longstanding foundations of cannabis 
prohibition. 
 
 
2.1. The international drug control regime: long-standing 
foundations of cannabis prohibition 
 
The international drug control regime as it is known today presents a large degree of continuities with 
the first International Opium Convention adopted in The Hague, 1912, under the sponsorship of the 
League of Nations. Yet, the decision to subject cannabis -or Indian hemp as it was known back then- 
to international legislation was a rather unexpected output of the Geneva Second Opium Convention 
of 1925 (Kendell, 2003). Like the Hague agreement, the 1925 convention was originally about 
controlling drug supply, in view of measures to limit the amounts of opium, morphine and cocaine to 
be traded and manufactured in the world. Conversely, demand control remained outside of diplomatic 
considerations (Carstairs, 2005). 
 
As explained by Kendell (2003), the decision to assimilate cannabis with opium and cocaine as highly 
dangerous substances was firstly introduced by the Egyptian representative and further adopted 
quickly, with scant discussion and receiving little attention, at least in Western Europe and North 
ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ? ǁŚŽŵ Ăƚ ƚŚĂƚ ƉŽŝŶƚ ŚĂƌĚůǇ ŬŶĞǁ ĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽďůĞŵ ?ƚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŝŵĞ ? ƚŚĞ  ‘/ŶĚŝĂŶ ,ĞŵƉ ?
cultivation to produce hashish was a relatively restrained tradition of southern Asian and North African 
regions, at odds with the Muslim religious ban applied to wine and other intoxicants. Furthermore, a 
generation before the Second Opium Conference, it was the government of India who commissioned 
 “what was probably the most extensive and well-documented investigation of the effects of cannabis 
ever carried out ? (Kendell, 2003, p. 149), in response to a question posed in the House of Commons in 
>ŽŶĚŽŶ ?ĚƵƌŝŶŐ/ŶĚŝĂŶŽĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶďǇƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚĐŽůŽŶŝĂůŝƐƚĞŵƉŝƌĞ ?dŚĞŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƐĮŶĂůĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ
was that: 
 “total prohibition of the cultivation of the hemp plant for narcotics, and of the manufacture, sale 
or use of the drugs derived from it, is neither necessary nor expedient. Instead, it recommended 
continuing the existing policy of control and restriction, aimed at suppressing the excessive use 
and restraining the moderate use ? ?<ĞŶĚĞůů ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? 150). 
 
Still, the concerns of the Egyptian diplomatic lobby about its association with deviant behaviours and 
insanity found strong support among Chinese and American representatives, which saw in the 
Egyptian petition an opportunity to further advance their own reformist crusade against drugs and 
alcohol consumption. In this way, and without any formal dissent, Indian hemp entered into the 
international framework subject to the highest repressive measures. 
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With the 1912 Hague International OƉŝƵŵ ĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ? ƐŝŐŶĞĚ ďǇ hƌƵŐƵĂǇ ŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ? Ă  “shy but 
ƉĞƌƐŝƐƚĞŶƚ ‘ĐŽŵďĂƚ ?ƚŽĐŽŶƚƌŽůůĞĚƐƵďƐƚĂŶĐĞƐĂƚĂƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ?ŵĞĚŝĐĂů ?ƉŽůŝĐĞĂŶĚŵĂƐƐŵĞĚŝĂůĞǀĞů ?ǁŝƚŚ
arguments and pressures that resound until today ? (Garat, 2012, p. 21) started in the country, setting 
the long-standing foundations of Uruguayan drug prohibition. Compared to other legislations in Latin 
America and the world, drug policy analysts have usually characterised Uruguay as relatively liberal. 
 
As explained by the Uruguayan historian Barrán (1995), the secularisation process that Uruguay was 
going through, along with the presidencies from the Partido Colorado at the beginning of the 
ƚǁĞŶƚŝĞƚŚ ĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ ? ďĞĐŽŵĞ ŬĞǇ ƉŝĞĐĞƐ ƚŽ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ ƚŚŝƐ  ‘ůŝďĞƌĂů ? ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ƚŽ ĚƌƵŐƐ ĂŶĚ ŽƚŚĞƌ
victimless crimes policies in the country. The Uruguayan political system has historically organized 
itself around a strong bipartisanism of the Partido Nacional and Partido Colorado, which count 
themselves as two of the oldest in the Occidental Hemisphere. With defined territorial affinities, the 
Partido Nacional has been the representative of rural areas, with a predominantly conservative 
ideology in the social sphere and a predominantly liberal one in the economic sphere. In opposition, 
the Partido Colorado typically represented urban areas, with workers and industrial bourgeoisie as its 
social base. Ideologically, they predominantly combined a liberal understanding of social life with a 
strongly state oriented economical appƌŽĂĐŚ ?zĞƚ ?ƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞhƌƵŐƵĂǇĂŶƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?
exceptionally long-standing importance relates to their relative levels of internal ideological 
dispersion, forming a pluralist presidentialist democracy of compromise between both coalitions 
(LĂŶǌĂƌŽ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ ?ĂƐĂĚǁĂƌĨŝŶĂŐŝĂŶƚ ?ƐůĂŶĚ ?ƚŚĞhƌƵŐƵĂǇĂŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĐƵůƚƵƌĞŚĂƐƚǇƉŝĐĂůůǇ
attempted to achieve pragmatic balances in order to survive as a nation. Uruguay is the smallest 
independent country in Latin America, with the last census marking a population of less than 3 million 
and a half, while its neighbours Argentina and Brazil account for 40.117.096 (INDEC, 2010) and 
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ŵŝůůŝŽŶ ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇ  ?/' ?  ? ? ? ? ) ? /Ŷ ƚŚŝƐ ƐŵĂůů Ă Ě  “hyper-integrated ? ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? ƐŽĐŝĂů
conflicts never reached the high intensity normal to its neighbours, and political strains ultimately 
found a negotiated, middle road solution (Real de Azua, 1964; 1984). 
 
The southern urbanised port and capital city, Montevideo, is the centre of political power due to its 
higher population rates, with international immigration as the most important push factor for 
population growth until 1930, especially from Italy and Spain. Towards the end of the nineteenth 
century, at the same time as most Occidental European countries and thirty years before the rest of 
Latin America, Uruguay went through its first demographic transition: modern mentalities and 
behaviours were incorporated, reflecting changes in family, gender relations and reproductive 
behaviours, that led to falling death and birth rates (Varela, 2008). In this historical context, political 
secularisation became a key variable in the electoral arena. The Catholic Church was relatively weak 
in Uruguay compared to other Latin American countries and had precarious economic resources. In 
the cities, both anti-Catholic Italian migrants and British freemasonry -strongly rejected by the Catholic 
Church for its rationalistic approach to life-, had strong influence among intellectual circles and have 
had a documented importance in the political history of the country until today1 (Barrán 1995, Amado 
2007, 2011a, 2011b). The demographic census conducted in 1908 reflected this situation, showing 
that Catholics accounted for 44% of those interviewed, a number significantly lower than in the rest 
of the continent (Alvariza & Cruz, 2014). 
 
 
 
1 In fact, Uruguay have had Masonic presidents coming from every political party: the current president Tabaré 
Vázquez from the Frente Amplio (2005 W2009 and 2015 W2019); Daniel Fernández Crespo and Luis Giannattasio 
from the Partido Nacional (1963 W1967) and Gabriel Terra, from the Partido Colorado (1931 W1938). 
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The José Batlle y Ordóñez presidencies from the Partido Colorado at the beginning of the twentieth 
century played a key role in the secularised modernisation of the state. The second National 
Constitution, sanctioned in 1919, crystallised the aims of the moment, and Uruguay became one of 
the first Latin American countries to formally separate the State and the Church. Furthermore, authors 
such as Da Costa (2011), Caetano (2013) and Alvariza and Cruz (2014) have pointed out that for the 
hƌƵŐƵĂǇĂŶĐĂƐĞ ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ  ‘laicidad ?ďĞĐĂŵĞĂĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝǀĞĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝǀĞƉĂƌƚŽĨŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ? /ƚŝƐ
interesting to note here that laicidad is a word that does not have a direct translation into English; 
roughly translated as laity, it only has cultural relevance in countries with strong influence of Catholic 
confessions (Da Costa, 2011). Laity differentiates itself from secularisation because of its historical 
root; whereas the latter refers to the protestant reform that ended the Europeans wars of religion 
(The Peace of Westphalia), the former relates to the fights between Church and State during the 
French revolution. Accordingly, secularisation labels a wider social process by which European 
societies internally differentiated, reframing religiosity as a private institution. Conversely, laity points 
more specifically to a conflict between the political and religious spheres, which may reach a frontal 
anticlericalism (Martínez, 2013). Thus, for example, in contrast to secularised countries such as 
Belgium, The Netherlands or Germany, the Uruguayan state does not economically support religious 
institutions and explicitly prohibits the teaching of religion in public schools since 1909. 
 
However, for the Uruguayan case specifically, historians also note that laity included an antagonism 
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƌĞůŝŐŝŽŶĂŶĚĂ “civil faith ?ŝŶĂƉĂƚĞƌŶĂůŝƐƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚƐŚŽƵůĚůŽŽŬĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐŐŽŽĚ
independently of parties and ideologies (Da Costa, 2011). During the late 1920s and the 1930s, the 
Uruguayan state expanded its regulatory practices to a wide range of private activities in order to 
buffer potential social conflicts (Yaffe, 2001). Thus,  “state and public affairs melt with each other, and 
citizens see in the State the big protector and supplier of goods and services necessary for life ?
(Andacht, 1992, p. 8). In this hyper-integrated society, local bourgeoisie conceived pleasure as 
something legitimate but that needs to be controlled, and problematic legal and illegal drug users 
started to be framed not as sinners that should be punished but as sick people that needed to be 
treated. Thus, priests were replaced by doctors, psychiatrists and lawyers as the legitimate authorities 
ƚŽ ĚĞĂů ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ŝƐƐƵĞ ? ũƵƐƚŝĨǇŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƐƚĂƚĞ ?Ɛ ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ĨƌŽŵ Ă ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ
protector of public health (Barran, 1995). Nevertheless,  “it is hard to distinguish who stigmatised them 
more, religious or scientific knowledge ? (Barrán, 1995, p. 26). The 1934 Public Health Ministry organic 
ůĂǁĚĞĨŝŶĞĚŝƚƐǁŽƌŬĂƐĂ “policing of social vices ? ?'ĂƌĂƚ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? )ĂŶĚŝŶ ? ? ? ?ĂůĂǁǁĂƐƉƌŽŵŽƚĞĚ
ƚŽƐĞƚƵƉĂƐƚĂƚĞŵŽŶŽƉŽůǇŽŶ  “coca, opium, morphine, cocaine, hashish and every substance with 
psychoactive action ? ?>Ăǁ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ) ?ǁŝƚŚĂƌĞƚĂŝůŝŶŐƐǇƐƚĞŵƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƉŚĂƌŵĂĐŝĞƐ ?WƌŝǀĂƚĞĚƌƵŐ
commerce remained completely prohibited. Since this secularisation process was a crosscutting social 
trend, the same type ŽĨƉŽůŝĐǇĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĐĂŶďĞŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚǁŝƚŚŽƚŚĞƌ ‘ƐŽĐŝĂůǀŝĐĞƐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞƚŝŵĞ ?/ŶƚŚŝƐ
period, for example, sex work and gambling were also regulated with state monopolies under the 
guidance of Public Health authorities (Barran, 1995). 
 
Thus, during the first half of the twentieth century the long-standing foundations of cannabis 
prohibition were settled, in a context of the ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛ first demographic transition that translated into 
a secularised state modernisation. Opposing religion as a main moral regulation institution, the 
political elites of the time relied on Science and the State as the rightful authorities to protect public 
ŚĞĂůƚŚ ĨƌŽŵĚƌƵŐƵƐĞĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌ  ‘ƐŽĐŝĂůǀŝĐĞƐ ? ?dŚƵƐ ?ĂƉƵďůŝĐŵŽŶŽƉŽůǇ ĨŽƌĐŽĐĂ ?ŽƉŝƵŵ ?ŵŽƌƉŚŝŶĞ ?
cocaine, hashish and every substance with psychoactive action was created with a retailing system 
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƉŚĂƌŵĂĐŝĞƐ ?ƐĂ “policing of social vices ? ?ƚŚĞWƵďůŝĐ,ĞĂůƚŚDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇǁĂƐƚŚĞŬĞǇŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ
responsible of delineating the terms and limits of cannabis prohibition. 
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2.2. Contemporary illegal drugs geopolitics: the American context 
 
After World War II, the responsibility for the international drug control machinery turned to the United 
Nations (UN), in a historical context of a newfound leadership status of the United States of America 
(Andreas & Nadelman, 2006; Bewley-Taylor, Blickman, & Jelsma, 2014). Whereas the international 
drug control regime was relatively successful in restraining and controlling legal drug production, 
illegal drugs markets significantly changed after the 1960s, consolidating as a pressing priority in the 
Occidental world. Use rates of cannabis, synthetic drugs (notably methamphetamine, amphetamine 
and ecstasy) and cocaine generally jumped from 1960s onwards in the global north countries, and 
from 1990s on in the global south, turning from a youth counterculture phenomena to a relatively 
common habit among new generations (Escohotado, 1983; Scheerer, 1997; UNODC, 2009; OEA, 
2015). 
 
Accordingly, the 1961 UN single convention on narcotic drugs, the 1971 convention on psychotropic 
substances and the 1988 convention against illicit traffic in narcotics and psychotropic substances, 
ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ĞŶŚĂŶĐĞĚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƉƌŽŚŝďŝƚŝŽŶŝƐƚ ? ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĚƌƵŐƐ ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ƌĞŐŝŵĞ ? ƐĞƚƚŝŶŐ
subsequent ĚĞĂĚůŝŶĞƐƚŽ “ĞůŝŵŝŶĂƚĞŽƌƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇƌĞĚƵĐĞ ?ƚŚĞŐůŽďĂůŝůůŝĐŝƚĚƌƵŐ ?ƐŵĂƌŬĞƚƐ ?:ĞůƐŵĂ ?
2015). 
 
Even though supply side control remained as the dominant focus of international considerations, 
during this period demand control in the form of treatment and criminalization of the individual user 
began to appear (Carstairs, 2005). In line with the previous agreements, in the 1961 Single Convention 
ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ ƌĞŵĂŝŶĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ůŝƐƚ ŽĨ  “ŚŝŐŚůǇ ĂĚĚŝĐƚŝǀĞ ƐƵďƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ĂŶĚ ůŝĂďůĞ ƚŽ ĂďƵƐĞ ǁŝƚŚ ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇ
dangerous properties and hardly any therapeutic ǀĂůƵĞ ? ? ? with heroin and cocaine (UNODC, 2015). To 
the signatary countries (i.e. most countries of the world), the Convention enforces an obligation to 
apply the most stringent level of control and criminal sanctions to combat all the aspects of cannabis 
production, possession and trafficking. In order to supervise the enforcement of the international law 
at the national level, an International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) was created, strongly supported 
by the US (Bewley-Taylor, 2003), to undertake the responsibility of issuing annual reports analysing 
the statistical information provided by individual countries and calling upon governments to ĨƵůĮů their 
obligations under the conventions. 
 
Furthermore, supported by the Christian rooted US conservative  ‘ŶĞǁ ƌŝŐŚƚ ? ? in 1971 President Richard 
EŝǆŽŶ ƉƌŽĐůĂŝŵĞĚ ŝŶ Ă ůĂŶĚŵĂƌŬ ƉƌĞƐƐ ĐŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ƚŚĂƚ ĚƌƵŐ ĂďƵƐĞ ǁĂƐ  “ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?Ɛ ƉƵďůŝĐ ĞŶĞŵǇ
ŶƵŵďĞƌŽŶĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĨŝŐŚƚĂŶĚĚĞĨĞĂƚƚŚŝƐĞŶĞŵǇ ?ŝƚǁĂƐŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇƚŽǁĂŐĞ “ĂŶĞǁ ?Ăůů- 
ŽƵƚŽĨĨĞŶƐŝǀĞ ? PĂŶĂĐƚƵĂůtĂƌŽŶƌƵŐƐ  ?EŝǆŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?dŚĞƚŚƌĞĞŵĂŝŶƉŝůůĂƌƐŽĨƚŚŝƐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇǁĞƌĞ P
firstly, the elimination of drugs through reduction in production, destruction of harvests, seizure of 
drugs at different points in the reĨŝŶĞŵĞŶƚ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚĞƌĚŝĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ĚƌƵŐƐ ? ƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?
Secondly, the elimination of traffickers by prosecution and confiscation of any assets, which would 
ůĞĂĚƚŽƚŚĞĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌ ‘ŵŽŶĞǇůĂƵŶĚĞƌŝŶŐ ? ?ĚĞůKůŵŽ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?dŚŝƌĚůǇ, the 
adoption of incarceration as the key weapon of this war, through the imposition of mandatory 
 
 
2 After the discovery of the psychoactive compounds of cannabis in 1963 -the delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol 
(THC) - , it is only this component what is included in the Schedule. 
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minimums, reducing the use of alternatives to prison sentences to a minority and increasing the 
lengths of prison sentences for those convicted of drug offenses (Lynch, 2012). Thus, a generalised 
shift during the 1980s toward a more punitive culture of drug control was deployed leading to a new 
mass incarceration era (Garland, 2001). 
 
Yet, in contrast to the early 1970s, when the problem was heroin and the targets Asian countries, in 
the 1980s attention focused mainly on Latin America and the Caribbean as the only source and major 
transfer point for all the cocaine, most of the cannabis, and significant amounts of heroin consumed 
in the United States (Del Olmo, 1993). Against a Cold War backdrop and with conservative civil-military 
dictatorships installed across the continent with the explicit support of the United States (Marchesi & 
zĂĨĨĠ ?  ? ? ? ? ?zĂĨĨĠ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?>ĂƚŝŶŵĞƌŝĐĂƐƚĂƌƚĞĚƚŽďĞŬŶŽǁŶĂƐƚŚĞ  ‘US backyard ? ?ƌĞĨĞƌƌŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞ
strong political and economic influence of the country north of the border (Weintraub, 1992), for 
which the War on Drugs framework was not an exception but a case in point (Durán-Martínez, 2015). 
In this way, the US military participation in Latin America to eradicate drug trafficking became 
prominent, conceding more than 95% of its international cooperation budget to this affair (Labrousse, 
2006). Furthermore, countries such as Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador and 
Venezuela further urged the United Nations to declare drug tƌĂĨĮĐŬŝŶŐĂĐƌŝŵĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚ
to consider renewed measures against it, as provisions on money laundering, asset seizure, 
agreements on mutual legal assistance and diversion of precursor chemicals (Carstairs, 2005). 
 
The 1976 South American Agreement on Narcotic and Psychotropic Substances (ASEP) defined the 
blueprint for a legislative harmonisation to the 1961 and 1971 international conventions in the region 
(Garat, 2012). Accordingly, the national law was subsequently updated in Uruguay in 1974, settling 
ƚŚĞ “foundation for drug policy in the country for the next 30 years ? ?tĂůƐŚ ?ZĂŵƐĞǇ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ) ?
Strict prison sentences ranging from three to fifteen years were introduced to punish illegal drugs 
sellers and producers, and illegal drugs based medicines vanished from pharmacies. However, in 
contrast to most other regional legislations of the period, the Uruguayan historical approach of 
framing the consumer as a sick person prevailed and drug use remained decriminalized (Reta, 1973). 
The road chosen was one of an intentional non-ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ ?ůĞĂǀŝŶŐŝƚƵƉƚŽƚŚĞũƵĚŐĞ ?Ɛ
 “moral conviction ? ?>Ăǁ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ?ƌƚ ? ? ? )ǁŚĞŶĚƌƵŐƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŝŽŶƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚƐŽůĞůǇ
for personal use, and to a ĚŽĐƚŽƌƐ ? committee to deliberate the possibility to command the drug ƵƐĞƌ ?Ɛ
compulsory treatment. 
 
In 1988, an Uruguayan National Drugs Committee was created within the executive power to 
ĞƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĂůůǇ ĚĞĂů ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ƉƌĞƐƐŝŶŐ ŝƐƐƵĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĚƌƵŐƐ ŵĂƌŬĞƚƐ ?  “with the objective of addressing 
efficiently tŚĞĨŝŐŚƚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĂďƵƐŝǀĞĚƌƵŐƵƐĞĂŶĚĚƌƵŐƚƌĂĨĨŝĐŬŝŶŐ ?(N° 346/999). Directly dependent 
on the Presidency, the National Drugs Committee is composed of representatives of the Ministeries 
of Interior, Foreign Affairs, Economy, National Defence, Education and Culture, Labour and Social 
Security, Public Health, Tourism and Social Development. The National Drugs Committee Secretary 
was meant to be in charge of defining Uruguayan War on Drugs guidelines and to coordinate the 
implementation of drug policy by the member Ministeries. 
 
The rising severity of convictions and expanded incarceration of the War on Drugs efforts in South 
America led to increasingly overloaded penal systems (Nowak, 2009; Méndez, 2013; WOLA / TNI, 
2010). In the case of Uruguay, drug offences accounted for 2% of the prison population in 1999 and 
by 2013 the proportion rose to 13%; whereas the general imprisoned population grew 15% 
throughout this period, the increment rate for drug related offenses more than doubled at 39% 
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(Bardazano, 2014). During this period, a number of related laws were passed aimed at updating 
Uruguayan legislation according to the 1990 and 1998 UN General Assembly Sessions on Drugs 
ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? dŚƵƐ ? ŝŶ  ? ? ? ? Ă ŶĞǁ  ‘EĂƌĐŽƚŝĐƐ ? ůĂǁ ǁĂƐ ĂƉƉƌŽǀĞĚ  ?Ŷo 17016 ) ĂĚĚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?
economic order as a protected legal property, on top of the protection of public health, including drug 
related financial crimes in the legal framework (WOLA / TNI, 2010). A differentiation between 
organized and unorganized drug trafficking was introduced, raising penalties for organised groups 
members. In the following years, an anti-money laundering board was formed, nine related laws were 
approved and two criminal courts specialising in organized crime were created in 2009. 
 
However, the repressive efforts ultimately failed to stop the expansion of the illegal drug markets and 
the beginning of the twenty first century brought an unprecedented concern about crime and drug 
trafficking related violence throughout Latin America (Lagos & Dammert, 2012). Empirical evidence 
consistently shows that crime incidence is highly concentrated in the world, and identified Latin 
America as one of the most violent regions on the planet, currently reaching epidemic proportions 
according to World Health Organization standards (Briceño-León, Villaveces, & Concha-Eastman, 2008; 
Imbusch et al., 2011; UNODC, 2014). Accounting for only 8% of the global population, one third of 
world homicides take place in Latin America and the Caribbean, and fourteen of the twenty most 
murderous countries on the planet are located in this region (Eisner, 2015, p. 5). As the graphic below 
shows, South America in particular can be considered a worldwide outlier since it has been one of the 
few regions where homicide rates have increased in the last few years without being the homeland of 
war related episodes, besides the War on Drugs. 
 
 
Figure 2. Homicide rates by sub region (2008  ? 2012) 
 
Source: (UNODC, 2013) 
 
The comparative literature on violence across the American continent posits that organized crime, 
drug trafficking and the war on drugs are key factors for explaining the high homicide rates in certain 
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parts of the region. Yet, when comparing the situation within the continent and with other parts of 
the world, it becomes clear that the relationships between different drug markets and violence are 
not straight-forward (Fajnzylber, Lederman, & Loayza, 2002; Eisner, 2015; Rivera, 2015; Garzón, 2016; 
Snyder & Durán-Martinez, 2009). Thus, although the Andean region leads the world in cocaine 
production, there are important contrasts between high prevalence of lethal violence in Colombia (33 
homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 2012) and the comparatively low homicide rates in Peru (6.5 per 
100,000) and Ecuador (11 per 100,000). At the same time, trafficking routes in Central America - 
especially the so-ĐĂůůĞĚ ‘ŶŽƌƚŚĞƌŶƚƌŝĂŶŐůĞ ?ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ?ů^ĂůǀĂĚŽƌ ?'ƵĂƚĞŵĂůĂĂŶĚ,ŽŶĚƵƌĂƐ )- feature 
murder rates above 30 per 100,000, but countries like Costa Rica and Panama have less than 15 per 
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?^ƚŝůů ?ƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŵƉĂƌĂƚŝǀĞůǇ ‘ƐĂĨĞ ?ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐƌĞƉŽƌƚ Ě ǀ ƌǇŚŝŐŚƌĂƚĞƐŽĨĐŽĐĂŝŶĞŝŶƚĞƌĚŝĐƚŝŽŶŝŶ
2013 as compared to low rates in their more violent neighbours in the triangle. Moreover, countries 
such as Afghanistan, the leading heroin producer in the world, registers a homicide rate of 3.5 per 
100,000 inhabitants, and Morocco, one of the leading exporters of hashish, has a homicide rate of 1.4 
per 100,000 inhabitants (Garzón-Vergara E. , 2016, p. 3). 
 
The literature on illegal drug markets in Latin America is abundant for countries such as Colombia 
 ?'ĂǀŝƌŝĂ ?  ? ? ? ? ? dŚŽƵŵŝ ?  ? ? ? ? ? <ĞŶŶĞǇ ?  ? ? ? ? ? DĞũŦĂ  ? ZĞƐƚƌĞƉŽ ?   ? ? ? ? ĂŝƚĐŚ ?  ? ? ? ? ) ĂŶĚ DĞǆŝĐŽ 
(Lupsha, 1995; Edberg, 2001; Campbell, 2005; Astorga & Shirk, 2010; Olson, Shirk, & Selee, 2010; 
Beittel, 2012; Robles & Calderón, 2015), but it is much scarcer for the Southern Cone countries. The 
studies reviewed point out that whereas during the 1970s and 1980s drug trafficking as a problem was 
fairly focused within the Andean and Mesoamerican area, the drug trafficking panorama changed in 
ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚǁĂǇƐŽǀĞƌƚŚĞůĂƐƚĨĞǁǇĞĂƌƐ ?&ŝƌƐƚůǇ ?Ă ‘ďĂůůŽŽŶĞĨĨĞĐƚ ?ŚĂƐďĞĞŶƌĞůĂƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞƐƵďƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ
of different areas of drug cultivation and of drug smuggling routes throughout the hemisphere. The 
balloon effect concerns the idea that when law enforcement is increased in certain regions and 
manages to effectively reduce the illegal drugs production, a correlated increase in other parts of the 
region is observed. The balloon effect has been used to explain the evolution of the cocaine production 
in the Andean area. According to the UNODC figures, when coca production repressive efforts 
strengthened in Peru and Bolivia (that in early 1990s concentrated 87% of production potential 
worldwide), production rose in Colombia and by 2010 it was this last country which made up 79% of 
the cocaine production potential. When the US sponsored Plan Colombia was put in place (from 1999 
onwards), the boomerang returned, and the decrease in the Colombian coca cultivation area was 
ŽĨĨƐĞƚďǇŶĞǁŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞƐŝŶWĞƌƵĂŶĚŽůŝǀŝĂ ?ůŽŶŐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞďĂůůŽŽŶĞĨĨĞĐƚ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ĐŽĐŬƌŽĂĐŚĞĨĨĞĐƚ ?ŚĂƐ
been used to explain the increasing dispersion and fragmentation of organized drug trafficking groups 
or networks as an effect of the increment in repression efforts. The cockroach effect refers to the 
division and displacement of criminal networks from one locality to others within a given country or 
from one country to another in search of safer havens and more pliable state authorities (Bagley, 
2012). Thus, for example, at the level of trafficking networks, today more countries in South America 
appear as transit points in trafficking routes than in the 1970s and 1980s. While at the beginning of 
the War on Drugs most of the routes connected Colombia to US via maritime routes in the Caribbean, 
nowadays Central America, Mexico as well as the Southern Cone countries have increased their 
importance as transit points (Durán-Martínez, 2015; Miraglia, 2015; De Simone, 2014; Garat, 2016). 
 
Overall, the literature considers drug trafficking as the most advanced manifestation of organised 
crime in the region and political corruption as the main threat to democratic development. Authors 
such as Garzón (2012), for ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚĐƵƌƌĞŶƚƚŝŵĞƐĂƌĞĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞĚďǇĂ  ‘ƌĞďĞůůŝŽŶ ?ŽĨ
criminal networks in the continent. This rebellion is associated to the increased fragmentation level 
and territorial disputes among criminal groups, the increase in retaliations against public actors going 
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alongside endemic corruption and a refinement in the intertwinement between the illegal and legal 
economy. Confronted with the rebellion of the criminal networks, by 2012, only 5% of Latin Americans 
consider that current drug control policies have benefited them in some way. Yet, in those countries 
where drug trafficking has not penetrated that much, people still believe that the State may be able to 
tackle the problem. The more serious the drug trafficking problem is perceived in a country, the less 
trust there is that the State can solve it. As Lagos and Dammert conclude (2012, p. 50)  “ĂƐ an indicator 
ŽĨĂĨĂŝůĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞ ?ǁĞĐŽƵůĚŶŽƚŚĂǀĞĨŽƵŶĚĂŵŽƌĞĐŽƌƌĞůĂƚĞĚ ‘ƉƌŽǆŝ ?ƚŚĂŶĚƌƵŐ trafficking incidence ? ? 
 
Within this critical context, an increasingly assertive role started to be played by Latin American 
ůĞĂĚĞƌƐ ? ƚƌĞĂĚŝŶŐ Ă ƚƌŽƵďůĞĚ ƚƌĂĐŬ  “from acquiescence to rebellion ? ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĚƌƵŐ
control arena (Durán-Martínez, 2015). In 2009, former presidents of Brazil (Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso), Colombia (César Gaviria) and Mexico (Ernesto Zedillo) nucleated along with other 17 well- 
known independent personalities, pushing for an in-depth paradigm shift in the strategy to deal with 
the drug problem in Latin America (Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy, 2009). In 
2011, after a long-standing conflict on Andean coca leaf chewing traditional uses, the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia decided to critically withdraw from the UN conventions to re-adhere the following 
year, but reserving itself the right to use coca leaf in its natural state for cultural and medical purposes. 
United States, United Kingdom, Sweden, Italy and Canada objected ŽůŝǀŝĂ ?Ɛ right to traditional use of 
coca (Telleria Escobar, 2014). A year later, under the initiative of three historically devoted War on 
Drugs soldiers as Colombia, Guatemala and Mexico, and with the support of 95 other UN member 
states, the General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) was called for 3 years earlier than originally 
planned  “ƚŽ ŝŵĂŐŝŶĞ ? ƉƌŽƉŽƐĞ ĂŶĚ ĂŐƌĞĞ ŐůŽďĂůůǇ ŶĞǁ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐ ƚŽ ĨĂĐĞ ƚŚĞ ĚƌƵŐ ƉƌŽďůĞŵ ŵŽƌĞ
effectively. With an open mind to new approaches that may help us to recover the control; because 
drug markets are currently regulated but by criminal organizations ?  ?ZĞǇĞƐ ? hE ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ŽŶ
Narcotic Drugs 58th session, March 2015). Over this period, not only a growing group of like-minded 
revision oriented states have been calling for a regime review to allow larger room for policy 
innovations, but also transnational activism networks became an important factor advocating for drug 
policy change, circulating ideas about how countries might amend, modify, denunciate, or disregard 
the treaties (Keck & Sikkink, 1999). Yet, as previous experiences alternative to the prohibitionist 
approach have shown, shifting the international drug control regime has proven to be fraught with 
difficulties. 
 
 
2.3. Alternatives to the prohibitionist approach 
 
Confronted by the continued signs of resilience of illegal drug markets, not only Uruguay but also a 
number of governments have followed a somewhat more tolerant approach to drug use, either 
pushed by popular referendums or as an attempt to lower the burden on the criminal justice system. 
Currently, countries as diverse as Portugal, Australia, Belgium, Luxemburg, Switzerland, Germany, 
Denmark, Latvia, Slovenia, Malta, Spain and Croatia in Europe; Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
Peru and Mexico in Latin America and Jamaica in the Caribbean, among others, have decriminalised 
using or possessing small amounts of cannabis and, in some places, the cultivation of a few plants at 
home. 
 
DŽƐƚŽĨƚŚĞƐĞĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞƐƚŽƚŚĞtĂƌŽŶƌƵŐƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůǇĞŶĚŽƌƐĞĚĂƐĚƌƵŐ ?Ɛ
 ‘ŚĂƌŵƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?tools (Newcombe et al., 1992). The harm reduction perspective is based on the idea 
that the way we relate to drugs not only depends on the pharmacological properties of the 
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psychoactive substance itself, but also on individual traits of the user mindset -as their past experience 
and physical and psychological conditions- and the setting, that is, the social environment that 
compose the 'drug scene'. Thus, harm results not only from drug use, but also potentially from 
measures taken to combat it, which affect its setting (Korf, Riper, & Bullington, 1999). Favoured 
policies embrace efficiency and effectiveness in the use of public resources and realism in the success 
criteria -which involve modest improvements at the margin rather than utopian goals such as the 
eradication of drug consumption. 
 
During the  ? ? ? ? ?Ɛ harm reduction gained rapid legitimacy in the US and Occidental Europe as a policy 
approach for controlling HIV infections among injecting drug users. Since then, the kind of 
programmes developed within this framework included needle exchange -directly targeting those at 
risk of AIDS/HIV-, methadone treatment and heroin maintenance, to ensure high access to treatment 
for the drug dependent, peer based prevention, safe use messages, drug checking services and the 
ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨ “ǌŽŶĞƐŽĨƚŽůĞƌĂŶĐĞ ?ĨŽƌĚƌƵŐŵĂƌŬĞƚƐ ?dŚŝƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĂůƐŽďƵŝůƚƵƉƚŚĞƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ
cannabis is less dangerous to health compared to other legal and illegal drugs (Stimson, 2000). Thus, 
decriminalisation ŽĨ ĚƌƵŐ ƵƐĞ  ?ŵĂŝŶůǇ ďƵƚ ŶŽƚ ŽŶůǇ ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ ) ?  “although it is seldom legislated is 
informally practised by many countries, if only partially and for practical reasons ? (Dorn, 1992, p. 111). 
 
A vast branch of international literature around drug policy has focused on identifying the similarities 
and differences among policy designs, as well as some of the expected and unexpected consequences 
that might be associated with them in terms of availability, prices, quality of the products, crime, 
health, etc. (see, among others, MacCoun & Reuter, 2011; LSE, 2014; Pacula & Sevigny, 2014; Caulkins 
& Kilmer, 2015; Hall & Lynskey, 2016; Choo & Emery, 2017; Felix & Portugal, 2017; Wong & Manning, 
2017). The main conclusion arrived is that the data available in most countries are inadequate for 
rigorously evaluating the changes in drug policy. Evidence is weak, remain largely descriptive and no 
baseline data was set before or after the changes, which could led to meaningful comparisons through 
time and across jurisdictions. The systematic information collected by administrative institutions and 
population surveys largely focuses on general prevalence rates but the effects of different policy 
approaches are also shaped by how it affects quantity consumed, mode of consumption and the 
consumption of other psychoactive substances. Besides of that, there are other outcomes of interest 
to be considered such as the size of the illicit markets, the effects on government budgets, public 
safety and criminal justice outcomes, legitimacy of the law, corruption and people´s right to self- 
determination. However, is even less what we know about the political and social processes that made 
cannabis innovations possible, the focus of this work. Hence, the present section reviews specifically 
the causal narratives built around some paradigmatic previous innovative experiences and what 
tensions they had to compromise to allocate themselves within international conventions, 
informing cannabis policy making from below. 
 
 
De facto retailing system: the Dutch Coffeeshops 
 
The first and traditional case in point regarding cannabis policy divergence is the Dutch legal reform 
of 1976 and the further development of the coffeeshops retailing system. Authors such as De Kort 
(1995) and Grund & Breeksema (2013) have pointed to a wider structural process at the base of this 
policy change, where drug use first came to the Dutch public consciousness in the much broader 
ĐƵůƚƵƌĂůĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨƚŚĞĚŝǀĞƌƐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨůŝĨĞƐƚǇůĞƐĂŶĚǀĂůƵĞƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ ?dŚƵƐ ? “during the 1960s and 
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1970s, the Netherlands changed from a rather closed and segregated society, organized along 
ideological and religious lines, to a more secular and individualized social order ? (Grund & Breeksema, 
2013, p. 55). In this setting, cannabis use firstly became a symbol of a counterculture, playing a role in 
a broader social and political movement that made the stretching of the borders of personal liberty 
its explicit aim, against a backdrop of a surprisingly repressive stand enforced towards cannabis users 
(Korf et al., 1999). Hence, not only cannabis use but also a wide variety of moral constraints and 
normative expectations about lifestyle and sexual behaviours were politically challenged. During the 
1970s cannabis use became normalised, expanding among lower-class youth, marginal youth, and 
ethnic minorities. At the same time, people in their 30s and 40s, already economically and socially 
integrated, continued their use outside any specific socio-cultural group. Yet, as economic conditions 
worsened, leaving a growing streak of unemployment behind, by the second half of the 1970s heroin 
entered the scene as  “the first drug to be experienced as a social problem in Dutch ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? ?it  “ďĞĐĂŵĞ
the object of the first moral drug panic in the Netherlands ? ?'ƌƵŶĚ ?ƌĞĞŬƐĞŵĂ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ) ?dŚŝƐ
moral shock related with a renewed concern about the link between drug use and crime, redefining 
the drug problem into something more than a public health problem. 
 
In this context, and ahead of popular opinion (Korf et al., 1999), a diverse coalition of liberal youth 
groups (such as the Junkie Unions), professionals and political administrators successfully pushed for 
Ă “politically oriented approach to the law ? ?sĂŶ^ǁĂĂŶŝŶŐĞŶ ?ĂŝƚĐŚ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ) ?/ŶƐƉŝƌĞĚďǇƚŚĞ
increasing number of victimless crime related cases and in a wider context of increasing crime rates 
and an overloaded penal system ?ĂƚŽůĞƌĂŶƚĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ  ? ‘ŐĞĚŽŽŐďĞůĞŝĚ ?) towards behaviours such as 
soft drugs use, abortion, euthanasia, pornography and sex work was already in place before formally 
introducing legal changes. In 1968, two commissions were to set a blueprint for revisiting Dutch drug 
policy under this framework. These were the Hulsman Commission, established by the National 
Federation of Mental Health Organizations, and the Baan Commission, called by the governmental 
Secretary of Health. Their final reports were presented in 1971 and 1972 respectively. 
 
Both reports crystallised the aims of the moment, calling for a moral free approach to drugs (Cohen, 
1994). This amoral approach to drugs included a Revised Opium Act with a scheduling system different 
to the one consecrated in the international regime previously reviewed. This Act ruled that cannabis 
ĂŶĚďĂƌďŝƚƵƌĂƚĞƐǁĞƌĞƐŽĨƚĚƌƵŐƐŝŶǀŽůǀŝŶŐ ‘ĂĐĐĞƉƚĂďůĞƌŝƐŬƐ ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞĂƐŚĂƌĚĞƌĚƌƵŐƐƐƵĐŚĂƐŚĞƌŽŝŶŽƌ
ĐŽĐĂŝŶĞǁĞƌĞƐƚŝůůĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚĂƐŝŶǀŽůǀŝŶŐ ‘ƵŶĂĐĐĞƉƚĂďůĞƌŝƐŬƐ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞŝƌƵƐers and the wider society. 
For harder drugs, the penalties were considerably increased following a very similar penal approach 
to the rest of Europe. Thus, repression towards traffickers intensified, even if involving small 
quantities, and especially when linked to other types of crime (Van Swaaningen & Zaitch, 1996). For 
ƐŽĨƚ ĚƌƵŐƐ ? ďƵŝůĚŝŶŐ ƵƉ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇ ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵů ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ƚŽůĞƌĂƚĞĚ ǇŽƵƚŚ ĐůƵďƐ ?  ‘house 
ĚĞĂůĞƌƐ ?3, a cannabis coffeeshops scheme was framed as a pragmatic, market separation measure, to 
break the formation of deviant sub-cultures by pulling cannabis away from the rest of the harder drugs 
commerce. Nevertheless, the Baan Commission also acknowledged that cannabis regulation would be 
inconsistent with Holland's international legal commitment to the Single Convention of 1961, further 
reasoning that waiting for possible but uncertain treaty changes was too impractical for achieving the 
short-term policy goals (Cohen, 1994). To bypass this obstacle, a de facto legalisation was put in place 
 
3 ĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĂůĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŽĨĐŽĨĨĞĞƐŚŽƉƐ ?ǇŽƵƚŚĐůƵďƐ ? ‘ŚŽƵƐĞĚĞĂůĞƌƐ ?ǁĞƌĞŶŽƚƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚĞĚas long as they 
met the following criteria: no overt advertising; no hard drugs; no nuisance; no underage clientele; and no large 
quantities (Korf, 2002). 
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through a principle of expediency that assigns the lowest judicial priority to the investigation and 
prosecution of cannabis for personal use. The judiciary would then tolerate the possession of up to 
five cannabis plants for domestic cultivation, and the purchase of up to 5 grams from authorized 
 ‘ĐŽĨĨĞĞƐŚŽƉƐ ? ?ĂĞƵƉŚĞŵŝƐŵĨŽƌĐĂĨĠ-like places where the sale and sometimes also the consumption 
of cannabis has been tolerated (Leeuw, 1994). Standing mostly silently against these changes, Dutch 
society lacked moral entrepreneurs opposing the reform (Leeuw & Haen Marshall, 1994; Scheerer, 
1978). Thus, as Korf (2002) argues, although they were not originally intended to exist, coffeeshops 
have consolidated as the widest known example of the Dutch harm reductionist approach to drugs. 
 
Still, the constrictions imposed by international conventions resulted in a contradictory scenario for 
ƚŚĞ ĐŽĨĨĞĞƐŚŽƉƐ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ŬŶŽǁŶ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘back-door problem ?  ?<ŽƌĨ ?  ? ? ? ? ) ŐŝǀĞŶ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ĐƵůƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶ ?
processing, and wholesale provision of cannabis continues to be strictly prohibited and enforced as 
per national law. ůƚŚŽƵŐŚĂŵĂǆŝŵƵŵŽĨ ? ? ?ŐƌĂŵƐ ‘ŝŶƐƚŽĐŬ ?ŝƐƚŽůĞƌĂƚĞĚ ?ĐŽĨĨĞĞƐŚŽƉƐĐĂŶƐƚŝůůďĞ
prosecuted for sourcing the cannabis into their locality. In fact, a large increase in the number of plants 
seized in the Netherlands has been reported, reflecting possible changes in law enforcement priorities 
(EMCDD, 2017). Furthermore, the coffeeshops are not endorsed as a national policy but it is instead 
the local communities the ones that own the legal instruments to regulate the number of coffeeshops, 
including the option of not allowing cannabis selling at all. Overall, in the mid-1990s an effort was 
made for restricting coffeeshops, which significantly declined from about 1500 to 846 in 1999. By 
2014, there were 614 dispensaries working in the country, approximately half of them situated in the 
four biggest cities; Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht (Boekhout van Solinge, 1999; 
Koopmans, 2011; Bewley-Taylor et al., 2014; Van Ooyen-Houben et al., 2015). 
 
ǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĂƌŽƵŶĚƚŚĞĐŽĨĨĞĞƐŚŽƉƐƌĞƚĂŝůŝŶŐƐǇƐƚĞŵƚĞŶĚƐƚŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ
ŵĂƌŬĞƚƐ ?ĂŝŵƐŽĨŬĞĞƉŝŶŐĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐĚĞƚĂĐŚĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚe rest of the illegal drugs trade, while records on 
drugs prevalence remain generally in line with European trends (Korf, 2008; Chatwin, 2016). Regarding 
the quality of the cannabis available, each coffeeshop decides which and how many cannabis strains 
are sold. Whereas until the mid-1980s most of the cannabis used in the Netherlands was resin 
imported predominantly from Morocco, domestically grown herbal cannabis became more and more 
popular and nowadays is the product sold most often in coffee shops. In average, the monitoring of 
THC/CBD concentrations shows that the potency of domestically grown herbal cannabis began to 
increase in the 1990s, going from 8.5% in 1999 to more than 20% in 2004, and it has been declining 
since then. In recent years, the average THC content in locally grown samples has Ňuctuated between 
15 and 17% (Freeman, et al., 2018). Yet, as an illicit drug, cannabis is not subject to quality or product 
control by Ducth authorities. 
 
Collective personal production: Spanish Social Cannabis Clubs 
 
In Spain, social activism took cannabis decriminalisation a step further in the political debates through 
the foundation of the Social Cannabis Clubs (SCCs) model. According to Spanish law, cannabis 
cultivation is not a criminal act when undertaken for personal consumption, and yet no formal 
regulation is issued regarding how many plants a user may have or what type of evidence is needed 
to consider its commercialisation, opening a significant discretionary gap on how to enforce cannabis 
prohibition. Thus, Social Cannabis Clubs have been endorsed as a way of non-ƉƌŽĮƚƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ
distribution of cannabis among a closed circuit of adult cannabis users. Overall, the literature available 
reports a large degree of heterogeneity regarding their concrete methods and venues of operation, 
cultivation techniques and distribution schemas, depending on the local legal, political and cultural 
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standards; ranging from very small clubs of dozens of members to very large enterprises of hundreds 
(Barriuso, 2011; ENCOD, 2013; Decorte, 2015; Decorte et al., 2017). 
 
Like in the Dutch case, authors such as Romaní (2005), Barriuso (2011) and Pere (2015) have pointed 
to the increasing normalisation of cannabis as the base of this reform, tracing it from the first  “ŚĂƐŚŝƐŚ
ĐƵůƚƵƌĞƐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?Ɛ ?^ƉĂŝŶŚĂƐŚĂĚƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇŚŝŐŚƌĂƚĞƐŽĨƉƐǇĐŚŽĂĐƚŝǀĞƐƵďƐƚĂŶĐĞƐƵƐĞŝŶŐĞŶĞƌĂů
and of cannabis in particular, compared to other European countries. Cannabis use in the last month 
risen from 4.6% in 1997 to 6.6% in 2013 and, by 2017, Spain is by far the European country that most 
cannabis resin seizes in the continent (EMCDD, 2017; OEDT, 2015) 
 
Supported by a diverse coalition of cannabis activists, scholars and professionals, a number of 
grassroots initiatives for collective cultivation were endorsed over the 1990s, opening successive 
cracks in the ƉƌŽŚŝďŝƚŝŽŶŝƐƚƐ ? wall until the first formal Social Cannabis Club was founded in Barcelona, 
in 2001. Growing within legislative grey areas of use decriminalisation, Social Cannabis Clubs have 
spread fast not only in Spain but also elsewhere, illustrating the importance of cannabis activism as 
transference agents. Thus, the appearance of this model has also been observed in countries such as 
Belgium, England (Decorte, 2015), France, Switzerland (Blickman, 2014), Argentina and Chile (Bewley- 
Taylor et al. ?  ? ? ? ? ) ? ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?  “the ambivalence between cannabis integration and repression 
continues to hold ? ?ZŽŵĂŶş ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? )ĂƐůĞŐĂůĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƐƌĞůĂƚĞĚƚŽĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ ůƵďƐĂƌĞƐƚŝůů recurring. 
 
On one hand, Spanish national law remains strongly aligned with the prohibitionist approach of the 
international drug control regime, and thus the number of cannabis use and possession administrative 
offenses has kept constantly increasing in the last years (Pere, 2015, p. 105). Cannabis Clubs depend 
in this way on the local enforcement of such legal frameworks and the ũƵĚŐĞ ?Ɛ personal interpretation 
of international conventions. 
 
KŶƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌŚĂŶĚ ?ŝŶƌĞĐĞŶƚǇĞĂƌƐĂ ‘ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐďŽŽŵ ?ŚĂƐďĞĞŶĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚŝŶƚŚĞůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞ ?ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇ
ŝŶƚŽƵƌŝƐƚŝĐƉůĂĐĞƐƐƵĐŚĂƐĂƌĐĞůŽŶĂ ?ƌĞůĂƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞ “massive and almost indiscriminate opening of 
clubs. ( ? ? DĂŶǇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞŵ ? ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ƵŶĚĞƌ Ă ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶĂďůĞ ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ ǁŚĞƌĞ ƚŚĞ ůĞŐĂů ŐƌĞǇ ǌŽŶĞ ŽĨ
cannabis use decriminalisation is used to hide criminal practices of commercialisation under the facade 
of a non-profit cannabis club ? (Pere, 2015, p. 100). Thus, once constituted as an alternative, the same 
poorly defined legal conditions that were strategically used by activism to boost cannabis clubs are, at 
the same time, their greatest weakness (Barriuso, 2011). 
 
In this regard, the Spanish political system has remained relatively apathetic about pushing cannabis 
reform forward by formalising cannabis clubs. As noted by Pere (2015) in spite of the fact that 
according to polls, 52.2% of the Spanish population support some type of legal access to cannabis, its 
regulation has remained off the political national agenda. In fact, by 2014, only 0.1% of the Spanish 
regard illegal drug commerce as a public problem at all, and thus neither the leftist Socialist Party 
(PSOE) nor the conservative Popular Party (PP) governments have included cannabis reform in their 
programmes (Pere, 2015, p. 99). On the contrary, cannabis restrictions were further reinforced in the 
 ? ? ? ?ƌĞǀŝĞǁŽĨƚŚĞ “ŝƚŝǌĞŶ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ?ůĂǁĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞWWŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚƵƐŽŶůǇƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůůǇ-based 
regulation proposals have reached the political agenda. 
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Market regulations: US inside job 
 
On the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, the Americas, traditionally the home ground of War on Drugs 
policies, have in fact become one of the most active continents passing less restrictive cannabis 
models at the local level. By 2013, the United States experience itself shows how flexible international 
conventions interpretations can be while endorsed at the local level. 
 
Bewley-Taylor, Blickman and Jelsma (2014), for example, locate the US trajectory as a key engine in a 
ƚƌĞŶĚ  ‘from soft to hard defections ? ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ƐƚĂƚƵƐ ƋƵŽ ? dŚĞƐĞ ĂƵƚŚŽƌƐ
identify three stages in this process. The first occurred during 1970s and related with the repression 
of cannabis use. Fuelled by the crucial role of judicial actors denouncing the incompatibility of use 
criminalisation with freedom and privacy Constitutional rights (i.e. Alaska Supreme Court, 1975) a 
number of U.S. states relaxed their policies regarding possession and decriminalized personal use in 
ƚŚŝƐĚĞĐĂĚĞ ?WƌŝƐŽŶǁĂƐƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇƐƵďƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĚďǇ “fines, drug education, treatment or assigning 
the lowest priority to various cannabis offences for law enforcement. ? ?ĞǁůĞǇ-Taylor et al., 2014, p. 
28). 
 
Twenty years later, in the 1990s, a second trend of legalising medical cannabis in states across the US 
began, when in 1996 California passed a voter initiative that legalised medical use, possession, and 
cultivation with a doctor´s approval. Oregon and Washington followed two years later. By 2012, 17 
states and the District of Columbia have adopted different versions of medical cannabis legal 
regulation, 10 of those laws being passed directly by direct democracy mechanisms  Win initiative or 
referenda elections (Bewley-Taylor et al., 2014). 
 
Still, like authors such as Lynch (2012) have shown, in parallel to the relaxation of laws, a  ‘ŶĞƚ ǁŝĚĞŶŝŶŐ ?
effect have resulted in a greater number of individuals being controlled by the criminal justice system 
in this country. Cannabis law offenses increased significantly over this period, accounting for half of 
the total drug-related arrests. Between 1990 and 2002, it was estimated that 79% of the increase in 
drug arrests were for cannabis possession alone, accounting for 39.9% of all drug arrests in 2002, while 
cannabis sales and cultivation offences accounted for only 5.4% the same year (Ramchand et al., 
2006). Thus, the net widening effect reflects the greater ease with which police can process minor 
cannabis offences. Concerns about the discriminatory social biases in drug law enforcement have been 
consistently posed in the literature, as well. This is because, as with drug violations in general, African 
and Spanish Americans continue to show higher arrest rates for cannabis possession, despite the fact 
that by all available numbers, minorities are not any more likely to use cannabis than their white 
counterparts (Drucker, 2002; Iguchi et al., 2005; Provine, 2007; Curry & Corral-Camacho, 2008; Hartley 
& Armendariz, 2011). 
 
In this context, a third new era of cannabis policy innovations started in 2012 when, championed by 
advocates from civil society and the business community, referendum-driven changes in Colorado and 
Washington took many legislators and policy-makers by surprise, becoming the first jurisdictions in 
the world in legalising the processing, sale, distribution, possession and consumption of cannabis 
(Pardo, 2014). During this stage, a new cascade of hard defections was facilitated by direct democracy 
mechanisms further pushing the creation of regulatory frameworks for recreational cannabis use in 
Oregon, Alaska, and Washington D.C. in 2014, and in California, Maine, Massachusetts and Nevada in 
2016. Underpinning this stream of popular reforms, a steady and persistent change in public opinion 
positions can be traced. According to Gallup, since 1993 public support for some sort of cannabis 
legalisation has been increasing and, from 2013 on, has averaged above the majority level. The key 
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variable correlating with this change is age; younger Americans are more in favour of legalizing while 
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older Americans are least likely to do so. Yet, as result of generational replacement, older generations 
are nowadays more supportive than they were in the past (Gallup, 21/10/2015). 
 
As I discuss in more central chapters of this thesis, because of their importance for the Uruguayan 
process, in this literature review I opt for highlighting the first two regulation frameworks working in 
the United States: Washington and Colorado cases. Cannabis reforms started in 2000 in Colorado 
when voters passed Amendment 20 for the legalisation of the possession of up to six plants and selling 
of small amounts of cannabis for medical purposes. Although its regulation developed slowly, by 2009 
a significant expansion of medical dispensaries could be observed in this state. Standing on the 
ƐŚŽƵůĚĞƌƐŽĨ ƚŚŝƐ ƌĞĂĚŝůǇĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚ ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ? ŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ?ŵĞŶĚŵĞŶƚ  ? ?  “To Regulate Marijuana Like 
Alcohol ?ƉĂƐƐĞĚǁŝƚŚ  ? ?A?Žf the votes. The production system in place borrows from the medical 
model in its vertical integration, meaning that retailing shops must also produce at least 70% of the 
total quantity sold, for the sake of its control (Brohl et al., 2013; Crick et al., 2014; Montañés, 2014; 
Pardo, 2014). 
 
tĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ ?ƐƉĂƐƐĂŐĞŽĨ/ŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞ ? ? ?ǁŝƚŚ ? ? ? ?A?ŽĨƚŚĞǀŽƚĞƐǁĂƐŵŽƌĞŽĨĂƐƵƌƉƌŝƐĞ ?/ŶƚŚŝƐƐƚĂƚĞ ?
ƚŚĞůĞŐĂůĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬŽŶůǇƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚĂŶ ‘ĂĨĨŝƌŵĂƚŝǀĞĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ?ĨŽƌĂŵĞĚŝĐĂůĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐƵƐĞƌƚŚĂƚĐŽƵůĚďĞ
raised at trial, but did not prevent the arrest, search, and prosecution of patients. State authorities 
were generally reluctant to develop the medical cannabis market further, hence, medical outlets were 
not licenced or registered, operating in a legal grey area. In this case, sponsored by a number of 
politicians and high profile supporters, a well-funded, thoroughly thought out public campaign was 
ůĞĚĨŽƌ ‘A New Approach ?ƚŽƌĞĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ ?hŶůŝŬĞŽůŽƌĂĚŽ ?ǀĞƌƚŝĐĂůŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƐƚŽƌĞƐŝƐ
not allowed. Alternatively, Washington legal framework developed a three-tier supply licence system 
for production, processing and retail of cannabis exclusively -similar to the one already working for 
alcohol; although subsequently the state allowed for production and processing to be integrated. 
Additionally, the law imposed a 25% tax at each level of supply, which was further transformed into a 
 ? ?A?ƚĂǆŽŶĂůůƚŚĞ “ƚĂǆĂďůĞƐĂůĞƐ ?ŽĨĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐĂŶĚŝƚƐĚĞƌŝǀĂƚĞƐ ?ƵůƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůĐŽŶƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶ
is not allowed in any form (Crick et al., 2014; Pardo, 2014). The agency in charge of its control is the 
ƐƚĂƚĞ ?Ɛ>ŝƋƵŽƌŽĂƌĚǁŚŽĂůƌĞĂĚǇŚĂĚŝŶƉůĂĐĞĂƚŝŐŚƚ ? “even conservative ? ?ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌǇĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬĨŽƌ
alcohol selling (Garza & Simmons, 2013, p. 6). 
 
It took over a year for both states to set up the regulatory framework that would enable the opening 
of the first cannabis stores in 2014. As explained by Kleiman (2016), although both Colorado and 
Washington had similar initial conditions regarding medical cannabis supply, they were different in 
the degree of public involvement in the markets. Whereas medical outlets in Colorado were state 
licensed and somewhat regulated, the participation of unlicensed retailers and growers was more 
prominent in Washington. Thus, Colorado was able to create a commercial-supply system simply by 
issuing new licenses to some existing licensees,  while  Washington  had  to  start  more  or  less  
from scratch which translated in significant timing differences for the implementation stage. In both 
states, anyone aged 21 years or older can purchase cannabis for any reason. Both states also have 
thresholds for the amount of cannabis products that can be purchased at one time. 
 
The differences in Colorado and Washington starting points regarding the cannabis market, as well as 
their regulatory designs have been correlated with dissimilar self-reported past month cannabis use 
evolution. While at the US national level past-month cannabis prevalence for those aged 12 or older 
increased by 4.8 %, from 7.96 % in 2013/2014 to 8.34% in 2014/2015 in Colorado the increment was 
of 11% over this period, from 14.93% to 16.57%, and in Washington decreased by 12%, from 12.79 % 
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to 11.22% (Kilmer, 2017). Still, beyond general use rates, total use days, total grams consumed, what 
types of cannabis products are used (e.g. flowers, edibles, oils) and the typical potency per dose 
consumed, are all important unknown factors when trying to evaluate health consequences of 
different regimes. 
 
 
Figure 3. Past-month cannabis prevalence Washington, Colorado and the US (2002 - 2015) 
 
Source: Kilmer, 2017, p. 12 
 
 
The advent of these referendum driven legal changes made the United States to lose the credibility to 
defend the global prohibitionist approach that once championed (Felbab-Brown & Trinkunas, 2016). 
At the same time as the US federal government remains aligned with the international convention 
status quo, more and more evidence is generated in this country on how a wide arrange of cannabis 
control approaches work, politically and empirically, changing deeply the contemporary geopolitics of 
the drugs problem. 
 
Uruguay; a breakthrough in the process? 
 
A review of recent developments in the drug policy field indicates that a mixed approach to this 
market, where is not prohibition itself but a selective combination of repression and harm reduction 
oriented initiatives what better characterises the current international policy framework. Thus, for 
example, despite harsh criticism in the beginning, leading to the proposed abolition of the use of the 
term harm reduction in the mid-1990s, by the 2000s the head of the UNODC himself  “ĞǀĞŶĐŽ-opted 
the term to describe the efforts of the international drug control system ? ?ĂƌƐƚĂŝƌƐ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ) ?^ƚŝůů ?
this increasing legitimation of harm reduction as a policy perspective came with some costs. 
Since supply side control measures were always emphasised to the detriment of demand policies at 
the international cooperation schema, harm reduction reforms have largely restrained to the 
ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƵƐĞƌƐƉŚĞƌĞĂƚƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůůĞǀĞů ?ƐĂŝƚĐŚ ? ? ? ?  )ƉŽŝŶƚƐŽƵƚ ?ƌĞƐƚƌĂŝŶĞĚƚŽƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌ ?Ɛ
world, harm reduction approach is already part of official practices within a prohibitionist framework, 
not as a critical alternative but as a complementary tool of a war against drug producers and 
traffickers. Furthermore, despite widespread decriminalization efforts towards cannabis, the number 
of cannabis users prosecuted by the criminal justice system has actually increased in the last years. 
 
Authors such as van het Loo et al. (2002) Room and Reuter (2012), Lynch (2012) and Chatwin (2017), 
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among others, have pointed to the constrains imposed by the international convention framework to 
explain this counter intuitive result. Since minor penalties are actually easier to enforce, the decision 
of governments of turning drug use from a penal to an administrative offense in order to not frontally 
contravene the international status quo resulted in a  ‘ǁŝĚĞŶŝŶŐ of the ŶĞƚ ? ? bringing more people into 
contact with the criminal system. Even in the two extreme cases of decriminalisation reviewed, the 
facto retailing system via coffeeshops and collective personal production via social cannabis clubs, the 
models remain in a precarious semi-legal position that did not entirely prevented legal conflicts in the 
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞƐĞ ƐĐŚĞŵĂƐ ? dŚĞ  “ŚĂůĨ ďĂŬĞĚ ? ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞƐĞ ĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚƐ ŚĞůƉƐ ƚŽ
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚǁŚǇ ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚ “ĐŽŶƚƌŽǀĞƌƐŝĂůǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚĞƌŶĂƌĐŽƚŝĐƐƌĞŐŝŵĞ ?ƚŚĞŝƌĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐǁĞƌĞ
nonetheless regarded as idiosyncratic and did not precipitate system-ǁŝĚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚƐ ? ?&ĞůďĂď-Brown & 
Trinkunas, 2016, p. 4). 
 
Unlike the previous innovative experiences reviewed, the Uruguayan law did not necessarily attempt 
to accommodate itself within the International Drug Control Regime scope. It is the first national level 
law that implicitly recognises and regulate different cannabis uses; recreational, medical, industrial 
and scientific. It allows domestic cultivation, social cannabis clubs and a state-centred selling schema. 
By doing this, the Uruguayan government aimed at paving the way for a Latin American conversion 
from acquiescence to rebellion against the international status quo. Hence, insights gained from this 
atypical policy change might be fruitful for global learning, by adding knowledge about different 
methods and contexts of ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐŵĂƌŬĞƚƐ ? regulation. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
/ŶƚŚŝƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ?/ƌĞǀŝĞǁĞĚƐŽŵĞůŽŶŐƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƚƌĞŶĚƐŽĨƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƉƌŽŚŝďŝƚŝŽŶŝƐƚ
approach to drugs. I started providing a brief historical account of how cannabis was assimilated to 
opium and cocaine as a highly dangerous substance and thus subject to the highest repressive 
measures. However, I also showed how supply side control measures were always emphasised to the 
detriment of demand policies at the international cooperation schema. I further contended that 
although this international drug control regime did have a decisive influence on domestic policies, the 
Uruguayan cultural characteristic of laity has historically played a role in the policymaking process, 
shaping drugs  Wand other victimless ĐƌŝŵĞƐ ?- legal frameworks. Thus, unlike most of the legislations of 
the time, in Uruguay users have always been conceived as sick people in need of treatment and thus 
not amenable to punishment by law. 
 
I then argued that the illegal drugs problem changed significantly from 1960s on, climbing up in the 
Occidental political agendas. Firstly, because of the expansion of illegal drugs consumption in the 
Global North countries and in the south from 1990s onwards. Secondly, because a War on Drugs was 
internationally endorsed, a war which turned Latin America into one of the most violent regions in the 
world. At this stage, a military-based approach to drugs trafficking, ultimately aimed at creating a 
drugs-free world, and incarceration as a deterrence tool toward users, were pushed forward at the 
international cooperation schema. In views of harmonising domestic legislations to international 
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policy guidance, an International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) was created, strongly supported by 
the US, to produce statistical information and call upon governments to fulfil their obligations under 
conventions. Thus, the regional update of legislations in the 1970s and in the 1990s resulted in 
increased penalties for drug related crimes. 
 
Still, and not without controversy, confronted by the resilience of the drugs markets, a number of 
countries have been challenging the international drug control regŝŵĞ ?Ɛ ŽƌƚŚŽĚŽǆǇ ďǇ Ă ƐĞůĞĐƚŝǀĞ
application of cannabis prohibition. Thus, in Europe, Dutch coffeeshops rely on a discretionary 
enforcement of the law, de facto legalising cannabis by establishing consensual guidelines to assign 
the lowest judicial priority to the investigation and prosecution of cannabis for personal use. In other 
cases, as Portugal or Jamaica, cannabis use offences were pulled out of the criminal sphere into the 
administrative one, in order to create a more suitable legal framework for policy interventions without 
radically questioning international conventions. Further on, US referendum-driven changes in a 
number of states rely on a conspicuous inconsistency, if not contradiction, between nationally 
endorsed prohibitions and locally arranged regulations. 
 
These different models of cannabis regulation are distinctive not only due to the content of their 
normative framework, but also because of the political and social processes that made them possible 
in the first place. They are outputs ŽĨ ƐŝŶŐƵůĂƌ  ‘ĐĂƵƐĂů ĐŽŶĨŝŐƵƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?  ?ZĂŐŝŶ ?  ? ? ? ? ) ŽĨ ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐ ?
events and actors that struggled in each historical moment to shape the decision making process, 
defining the problem of cannabis use and attaching solutions to it. Overall, in the last sixty years, 
cannabis use spread throughout occidental societies, turning from a counter cultural symbol 
endorsing ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ freedom in the 1960s to a massive incarceration problem in the new century. This 
process of normalisation of cannabis interacted in different ways with issues such as the moral shocks 
in reaction to heroin use in the 1980s and 1990s, which as it was reviewed usually allowed the drug 
problem to reach political agendas. In the cases of the Netherlands, Spain and the US, a new type of 
political actor, consisting of cannabis and liberal youth activism as well as cannabis businesspersons, 
were reported to have important roles in the political process, leading to cannabis centred 
innovations. Within the increasingly prevalent wave of cannabis reform, the Uruguayan case meant 
a new type of breakthrough in the process because of being the first nationally endorsed 
legislation including not only personal cultivation schemas but also a tightly state controlled 
commercialisation system. 
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Chapter 3. Theoretical perspectives to understand cannabis 
policy making 
 
Uruguayan cannabis market regulation is a case of atypical drug policy change, since the new legal 
framework aims at facilitating the best public safety and health conditions possible for this market to 
develop, and not to just restraining it, as cannabis prohibition does. It is, also, an interesting 
criminological problem. This because whereas most criminology assumes deviancy as a property 
inherent in any given deviant activity, cannabis regulation is a good example of how crime is a label 
conferred upon it by others. Thus, by studying cannabis regulation one might shed light over the 
power struggles around justice decisions as well as exposing the biased  Wand many times directly 
classist, racist and sexist- functioning of the criminal justice system. 
 
However, as noted by authors such as Jones & Newburn (2006) and Matthews (2014), the study of the 
actual policy-making dynamics in criminal justice is relatively rare in criminology, leaving policymaking 
studies for political scientists, who have largely not shown a great deal of interest in this field. 
&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ? ǁŝƚŚ ŶŽƚĂďůĞ ĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐ  “when criminologists do talk about policy-making, in much 
criminological work there is a tendency to assume that the intentions of policy makers are contiguous 
with policy outcomes: policy instruments frequently being read as a straightforward representation of 
ƉŽůŝĐǇ ŵĂŬĞƌƐ ? ĂŝŵƐ ĂŶĚ ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ ? /Ŷ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?  ? ? ? ŝƚ ŝƐ ŽĨƚĞŶ Ă ŵĞƐƐǇ result of unintended 
consequences, serendipity and chance ? ?:ŽŶĞƐ ?EĞǁďƵƌŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ) ?/ŶƚŚŝƐƌĞŐĂƌĚ ?ƚŚŝƐƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ
aims to contribute to the criminology field taking the alternative stand of questioning why and how a 
concrete behaviour ceased to be defined as a crime by law, unpacking the policymaking hazards of 
atypical change in Uruguayan cannabis policy. 
 
In this project, previous works have productively illuminated the interplay between morality and drugs 
policy making. However, most of this research has been better adapted when aiming at explaining the 
increasing punitiveness in drug and crime control approaches (Becker, 1963; Young, 1971; Baratta, 
1986; Hulsman, 1986; Del Olmo, 1989; Scheerer, 1997). Thus, for example, the extremely fertile 
concepts of  ‘ŵŽƌĂů ƉĂŶŝĐƐ ? (Young, 1971; Cohen, 1972) and  ‘ŵŽƌĂů ĞŶƚƌĞƉƌĞŶĞƵƌƐ ? (Becker, 1963) have 
mostly been researched as factors leading to restrictive drug policy outputs, usually associated with a 
penal populism political context (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994; McRobbie & Thornton, 1995; Hawdon, 
2001; Lundström, 2011). In this way, a common sense seems to have established among drug policy 
analysts opposing a moral-based War on Drugs to a moral-free Harm Reduction schema. 
 
In what follows, I aim to criticise the argument that an amoral approach to drug policy reform is either 
possible or desirable. Alternatively, I will propose that explicitly addressing the moral foundations of 
drug policy is a more fruitful stand to better account for cannabis reform from a cross-cultural 
perspective. I will first introduce the moral politics perspective for a more adequate understanding of 
the role of culture in highly controversial justice issues. Secondly, I will present the policy analysis 
perspective that differentiates between incremental and atypical reforms to explain policy-making 
and discuss its usefulness and shortcomings for analysing the Uruguayan case. Thus, I will expound 
how policy change literature may benefit by including more specifically politics moral foundations 
theory to better account for cross-cultural variations in political debates. Thirdly, I will focus on the 
intersection between the local and the global context in the explanation of this particular process, 
incorporating the policy transfer perspective for a better account of how cannabis policies are 
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imported from the developed world and adapted to the cultural singularities of Uruguay´s cannabis 
problem. I will conclude posing the major ways in which my research attempts to contribute to the 
current understanding of the Uruguayan cannabis regulation case. 
 
3.1. Moral politics perspective: debating morally controversial issues 
 
Should the state punish those who interrupt their pregnancy or should it guarantee legal access to 
abortion? Should the state socially protect sex workers, just tolerate them, or punish those involved 
in prostitution? Should the citizens have the right to keep and bear arms for their own defence? Should 
be people allowed to use tobacco, alcohol, cannabis, cocaine, LSD or MDMA? And to sell any of them? 
While there is not much controversy about defining a set of behaviours that directly produce harm to 
others as criminal offences, such as robbery, assault, etc., there is a special type of acts that 
ĐƌŝŵŝŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞĨƌĂŵĞƐĂƐ ‘ǀŝĐƚŝŵůĞƐƐĐƌŝŵĞƐ ? ?ĨŽƌ ǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĂůĐŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐŝƐƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇ
less clear, bringing into question our ideas of justice, principles of harm and state intervention into 
our private lives and practices (Braithwaite, 1989; Meier & Geis, 1997). Victimless crimes are 
behaviours where there is no easy way to define whom is the offender and whom is the victim, 
because there is a mutual agreement between both sides to engage in this act (Braithwaite, 1989; 
Meier & Geis, 1997). To make things more complicated, different foundational moral values may be 
triggered when you think about somebody that uses psychoactive substances illegally  W ‘ƚŚĞǀŝĐƚŝŵ ? ?- 
and the one that sells them  W ‘ƚŚĞŽĨĨĞŶĚĞƌ ? ?ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐůǇ ?ĂƐŝƚǁĂƐƌĞǀŝĞǁĞĚin the previous chapter 
ĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ?ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŽƉƚŝŽŶƐŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶĞŶĚŽƌƐĞĚǁŽƌůĚǁŝĚĞƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐĚƌƵŐƐ ?
legal frameworks, ranging from total prohibition, use decriminalisation, personal or collective 
production, and, more rarely, entirely regulated markets. 
 
Empirical research about victimless crimes has shown some interesting special features that seem to 
characterise these political debates. The first thing to note, with honesty, is that it is very hard for 
people to change deeply their minds about them. Does not matter if in favour or against, it is highly 
unlikely that any statistic or datum does not matter how scientifically sound, will change significantly 
your opinion about a topic such as cannabis regulation throughout your adult life. Usually, the few 
 “ĐŽŶǀĞƌƚĞĚ ? ƉĞŽƉůĞ ? ǁŝůů ŚĂǀĞ ĐŚĂŶŐĞĚ ƚŚĞŝƌ ŵŝŶĚ ĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞƐĞ ƚǇƉĞ ŽĨ ƚŽƉŝĐƐ ? ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ
interaction with other people, particularly if there is an attachment of affection, admiration, or a 
desire to please the other person (Haidt, 2012). 
 
Still, people are likely to have a strong opinion about them. As public opinion surveys show (Bottinelli 
& Buquet, 2010; Zuasnabar, 2013; Bioidi et al. 2015), when asked about topics such as cannabis, 
abortion or gay marriage, there is a very lŽǁůĞǀĞůŽĨ ‘ŶŽŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ ?ĐŽŵƉĂƌĞĚƚŽŽƚŚĞƌŝƐƐƵĞƐ ?tŚĞƌĞĂƐ
in most other political controversies surveyed the  ‘ŶŽ ŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ ? represents around 20% of the answers, 
ĨŽƌƚŚĞƐĞƚŽƉŝĐƐƚŚĞƌĂƚĞŝƐůĞƐƐƚŚĂŶ ? ?A? ?&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ? “the pollsters observe that in other topics the 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ ƚĂŬĞ ƚŚĞŝƌ ƚŝŵĞ ƚŽ ƌĞĨůĞĐƚ ? ĂƉƉĞĂƌƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ǁĞůů ? / ƚŚŝŶŬ ƚŚĂƚ ? ? ? ǁŚĞƌĞĂƐ ŝŶ ŝƐƐƵĞƐ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ
abortion the answer is, most of the times, instantaneous, which shows a consolidated pre-established 
position ? ?ŽƚƚŝŶĞůůŝ ?ƵƋƵĞƚ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? 25). 
 
Using the metaphor of an elephant and a rider, Jonathan Haidt (2012) proposes that to aim at 
understanding this type of political controversies one needs first to address that:  “Intuitions come first, 
strategic reasoning second; people make moral judgments quickly and emotionally. Moral reasoning 
is mostly a post hoc search for reasons to justify the judgments people had already made  ? ? ? I ĐĂŶ ?ƚ 
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ĐĂůůĨŽƌƚŚĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇƚŽƉƵŶŝƐŚǇŽƵƐŝŵƉůǇďĞĐĂƵƐĞ/ĚŽŶ ?ƚůŝŬĞǁŚĂƚǇŽƵĂƌĞĚŽŝŶŐ ?/ have to point to 
something outside of my own preferences, and that pointing is our moral reasoning ? ?,ĂŝĚƚ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ?
51). The elephant is the moral judgment; it is sparked rather quickly and intuitively. The rider is the 
moral reasoning; responsible of fabricating sensible justifications of our gut feelings. 
 
Thus, for example, cannabis prohibitionists would tend to emphasise the problem definition derived 
from cannabis use itself, as their addictive potential, carcinogenic properties, interaction with diseases 
such as schizophrenia and cognitive impairment associated with early onset and long term intensive 
use, among others (Murray et al., 2007). In the same way, beliefs about the link between cannabis use 
and other undesirable behaviours might be posed, as for example irresponsible attitudes about 
sexuality (Kurzban, 2010), use of other legal and illegal drugs (Kandel et al., 1978; Cohen & Sas, 1997; 
MacCoun & Reuter, 2001) and involvement in crime (Wilson & Kelling, 1982). From this point of view, 
prohibition not only restrains the cannabis market compared to regimes that are more permissive but 
also, at a more symbolic level, gives citizens the message of what values should be validated as a 
community, such as having healthier lifestyles. On the other hand, legalisers would privilege the 
problems that cannabis prohibition implies, as the consolidation of criminal enterprises of cannabis 
supply, prison-overcrowding, circulation of uncontrolled quality substances and social stigma, among 
others (Buxton et al. ? ? ? ? ? ) ?&ƌŽŵƚŚŝƐƉŽŝŶƚŽĨǀŝĞǁ ?ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐƵƐĞŝƐĂ ‘ŶŽƌŵĂů ?ƐŽĐŝĂůďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ?ǁŝƚŚ
positive and negative consequences as many other behaviours (Boekhout van Solinge, 1999). 
Therefore, it is not the use itself as much as the market conditions what the law should aim to target. 
 
This is not to say that prohibitioners and legalisers are not open to reason, however, the elephant - 
the moral arena- is far more powerful than the rider -the reasoned judgment-. Thus, for example, in 
their analysis of the Portuguese drugs decriminalisation case of 2001, Hughes and Stevens thoroughly 
noted how the evaluation of this policy depends largely on the production, selection and 
interpretation of the data availaďůĞ ?WŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐĂƐĚŝǀĞƌƐĞĂƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŝŶŐWŽƌƚƵŐĂůĚĞĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ “a 
resounding success ? Žƌ  “a disastrous failure ?  ?,ƵŐŚĞƐ  ? ^ƚĞǀĞŶƐ ?  ? ? ? ? ? Ɖ ?  ? ) ĐĂŶ ďĞ ĨŽƵŶĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ
political debate. In part, this is explained by the fact that at the moment the reform took place, data 
on the extent of the drug problem was not even available in Portugal. As a case in point, the first 
national survey of drug use was not conducted until 2001 (van het Loo, van Beusekom, & Kahan, 2002; 
Hughes, 2007). If the Portugal decriminaůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ŚĂƐ ĐŽŶĨŽƌŵĞĚ ĂƐ Ă  ‘battleground for 
ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝŶŐ ŝĚĞĂƐ ? ?as Hughes and Stevens show, is because in most of the cases, through moral 
reasoning people use empirical data to justify further pre-established positions. However, as Kilmer 
and Pacula (2017) most recently concluded for the cannabis case specifically, the data that is actually 
available in most countries is inadequate for rigorously evaluating the changes in cannabis supply laws. 
Hence, if moral foundations are the glue binding and blinding political actors behind such dissimilar 
claims as a resounding success or a disastrous failure, to understand why cannabis production ceased 
to be defined as a crime per law in Uruguay, it is key to explore what moral foundations are and how 
they might change. 
 
&ƌŽŵĂĐƌŝŵŝŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂůƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?DĞŝĞƌĂŶĚ'ĞŝƐ ? ? ? ?  )ĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚ “the idea of harm is one of the 
key elements involved in an understanding of why certain behaviours are forbidden by criminal law 
and are subject to punishment by the state  ? ? ? ƌŝŵŝŶĂů ůĂǁ ĚƌĂǁƐ ŝƚƐ ĚŝĐƚĂƚĞƐ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ŵŽƌĂů
preferences of those in a position to determine its content. Beliefs about morality interact with beliefs 
ĂďŽƵƚŚĂƌŵŝŶĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞƌŽƐƚĞƌŽĨ ‘ǀŝĐƚŝŵůĞƐƐ ?ŽĨĨĞŶƐĞƐ ? ?DĞŝĞƌ ?'ĞŝƐ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ) ?&ŽůůŽǁing 
the approach taken by the social psychologist Haidt in his analysis of American culture wars, this 
ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚƚĂŬĞƐĂĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƐƚĂŶĚĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ “there is more to morality than harm and fairness ? 
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(Haidt, 2012, p. 109). &ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ? ŝƚ ŝƐ ĐŽŶƚĞŶĚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ  “the WEIRDer you are [as for Western, 
Educated, Industrialised, Rich and Democratic], the more you perceive a world full of separate objects, 
rather than relationships and contexts. You will have less sociocentric morality, which means that you 
place the needs of individuals before those of groups and institutions ? ?,ĂŝĚƚ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ). Within 
drug policy literature, this  ‘ĞƚŚŝĐƐ of ĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇ ? is usually exemplified by the liberal tradition rooted in 
:ŽŚŶ^ƚƵĂƌƚDŝůů ?ƐƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚ P “The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over 
any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, 
either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant ? ?Dŝůů ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? I.9). 
 
However, in most other societies, and within religious and conservative moral matrices within WEIRD 
societies, there is mainly a prevalence of an  ‘ĞƚŚŝĐ of ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ? placing limits on ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ autonomy 
while endorsing order, stability and traditions (Haidt, 2012). Thus, cannabis law might be perceived as 
a defence of ƐŽĐŝĞƚŝĞƐ ? cohesion, and since drug use is risky and harmful, people cannot simply have a 
right to use drugs. 
 
Within this general framework, Haidt proposes six politics moral foundations developed as 
adaptations to long-standing threats and opportunities in social life. Two of these foundations; liberty 
vs. oppression and care vs. harm have been found to be generally associated with progressive 
victimless crimes political positions. Alternatively, conservative policy positions are usually related 
with a wider spectre of moral foundations; involving ideas of fairness vs. cheating, loyalty vs. betrayal, 
authority vs. subversion and sanctity vs. degradation. While the moral domain varies across and within 
cultures, within any given culture cannabis politics controversies would involve competing ways to link 
cannabis to one of these foundations. 
 
Thus, the  ‘ůŝďĞƌƚǇ vs. ŽƉƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ ? foundation was originally developed to resist aggressive domination. 
It triggers a motivation to unite as equals with other oppressed individuals to resist tyranny and 
ŽƉƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?dŚĞĚƌƵŐƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĚĞďĂƚĞ ?ŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐŵŽƌĂůĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĂďŽƵƚƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐĨƌĞĞĚŽŵƚŽƵƐĞ
cannabis. This appeal is nicely exemplified in the renowned Spanish liberal philosopher Antonio 
ƐĐŽŚŽƚĂĚŽ ‘>ĞĂƌŶŝŶŐĨƌŽŵĚƌƵŐƐ ?ďŽŽŬĞƉŝŐƌĂƉŚ P “tŝƚŚŝŶŵǇƐŬŝŶƐƚĂƌƚƐŵǇĞǆĐůƵƐŝǀĞũƵƌŝƐĚŝĐƚŝŽŶ ?/ ?ŵ
the only one to choose what can or cannot cross that border. / ?ŵ a sovereign state and my skin margins 
are much more sacred than the political boundaries of any country ?  ?ƐĐŽŚŽƚĂĚŽ ?  ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ?  ? ) ?dŚŝƐ
anonymous quote is usually considered a drugs legalisation slogan in that it contraposes individual 
freedom to use substances against the oppression of national traditions and values. 
 
^ĞĐŽŶĚůǇ ? ƚŚĞ  ‘ĐĂƌĞ ǀƐ ? ŚĂƌŵ ? ĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶ ǁŽƌŬƐ ƚŽ ŵĞĞƚ ƚŚĞ ĂĚĂƉƚŝǀĞ ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞ ŽĨ ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ
caring for the vulnerable. It primes us to care, nurture, protect and interact. Care is usually appealed 
to by prohibitionist rhetoric arguing for cannabis prohibition to protect young people from drug abuse. 
Conversely, along with liberty, it is easy to see how care is also an important moral foundation for the 
political rhetoric surrounding harm reduction, marking the necessity of caring for people and their 
right to health improvements regardless of cannabis consumption. 
 
dŚĞ ‘ĨĂŝƌŶĞƐƐǀƐ ?ĐŚĞĂƚŝŶŐ ?ĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶĨŽĐƵƐĞƐŽŶŝƐƐƵĞƐŽĨƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇĂŶĚƌĞĐŝƉƌŽĐŝƚǇ ?/ƚƌĞůĂƚĞƐ
ǁŝƚŚ ŵŽƌĂů ĞŵŽƚŝŽŶƐ ƚŚĂƚ ŵĂŬĞ ƵƐ ƉůĂǇ  “ƚŝƚ ĨŽƌ ƚĂƚ ? ? ǁĞ ĨĞel pleasure, liking and friendship when 
people show signs that they can be trusted to reciprocate. We feel anger, contempt, and sometimes 
disgust when people try to cheat us or take advantage (Haidt, 2012). It appeals to elements of fairness, 
justice and trustworthiness for moral judgments. The fairness vs. cheating foundation is key to 
understand important issues of  “mutual mistrust in the medical care of drug users ? (Merrill et al., 
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2002, p. 327), where neither the physician nor the drug user is perceived as morally trustworthy by 
the other. Alternatively, the (dis)proportionality of sentencing for drug offences has become a critical 
issue in drug policy debates. As noted by Lai (2012),  “proportionality is a critical consideration in many 
governmental reviews of drug laws and policies. In recent years, there has been greater discussion on 
the principle of proportionality in sentencing policies for drug offences. The governments of Argentina, 
Ecuador, Brazil, the United Kingdom (UK), South Africa and New Zealand all have initiated reviews of 
drug laws that consider proportionality as an important standard that sentencing frame works should 
meet. The European Union has also used proportionality arguments in its harmonisation efforts of 
sentencing levels for drug trafficking offences ? ?>Ăŝ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? 2). 
 
The  ‘ůŽǇĂůƚǇ vs. ďĞƚƌĂǇĂů ? foundation responds to the adaptive challenge of forming cohesive coalitions, 
boosting group pride, rage at traitors, patriotism and self-sacrifice. Loyalty is a key politics moral 
foundation because it mobilises people behind a project or proposal. As with every war, loyalty and 
betrayal have been essential to the War on Drugs rhetoric, as posed by US former president Richard 
Nixon himself:  “in order for this program to be effective, it is necessary that it be conducted on a basis 
in which the American people all join in it ?  ?WĞƚĞƌƐ  ?tŽŽůůĞǇ ?  ? ? ? ? ) ?ƐŶŽƚĞĚďǇĂƵƚŚŽƌƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ
ŚƌŝƐƚŝĞ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ĚƌƵŐƐĂƌĞƐƵŝƚĂďůĞŵŽƌĂůĞŶĞŵŝĞƐƚŽƵŶŝƚĞƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌƐŝĚĞ ?ƐŝŶĐĞ “a good enemy is one 
seen as being so important that those fighting him/her can demand absolute loyalty as well as the use 
of extra-ordinary powers; criticism becomes treacherous ? ?ŚƌŝƐƚŝĞ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? 44). 
 
The  ‘ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ vs. ƐƵďǀĞƌƐŝŽŶ ? foundation aims at forging beneficial relationships within hierarchies. It 
relates with feelings of respect and fear. The existence of respected leaders many times allows to 
resolve some disputes and suppress much of the violent conflict that erupts when there are empty 
thrones, as research on drug trafficking organised networks have empirically shown (Garzón, 2016). 
As with loyalty to the War on Drugs cause, reassuring authority has been emphasised as a key moral 
ĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƉƌŽŚŝďŝƚŝŽŶŝƐƚƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ?dŚƵƐ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ĚƌƵŐĂŶĚĐƌŝŵĞĐƌŝƐŝƐ ? ?'ĂƌůĂŶĚ ? ? ? ? ? )ƚŚĂƚďĞŐĂŶŝŶ
ƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ƐǁĂƐĚĞĨŝŶĞĚďǇƚŚĞŵĂŝŶƐƚƌĞĂŵƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐĂƐĂ “ĐƌŝƐŝƐŽĨĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ? ?
the result of a too permissive and hedonist ethos of modern society. For the neoconservatives in 
power, the law was seen as a tool for a  ‘ƌĞŵŽƌĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ? of society, to set the limits and confront those 
who transgressed them (Bennett, 1989). As illustrated by the authors of the Broken Windows theory 
ĂƌŐƵŝŶŐĨŽƌĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐƉƌŽŚŝďŝƚŝŽŶ P “This wish to "decriminalize" disreputable behaviour that "harms no 
one"- and thus remove the ultimate sanction the police can employ to maintain neighbourhood order ?  
is a mistake. Arresting a single drunk or a single vagrant who has harmed no identifiable person seems 
unjust, and in a sense it is. But failing to do anything about a score of drunks or a hundred vagrants 
may destroy an entire community ? ?tŝůƐŽŶ ?<ĞůůŝŶŐ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? 5). 
 
KƌŝŐŝŶĂůůǇ ƚƌŝŐŐĞƌĞĚ ƚŽ ĂǀŽŝĚ ŝŶƚŽǆŝĐĂŶƚƐ ĂŶĚ ƉƌĞǀĞŶƚŝŶŐ ŝŶĨĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ƚŚĞ  ‘ƐĂŶĐƚŝƚǇ ǀƐ ? ĚĞŐƌĂĚĂƚŝŽŶ ?
founĚĂƚŝŽŶƌĞƐŽƵŶĚƐǁŝƚŚŝĚĞĂƐŽĨƉƵƌŝƚǇĂŶĚǀŝƌƚƵŽƐŝƚǇ ?/ƚŵĂŬĞƐƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐƐ ‘ƵŶƚŽƵĐŚĂďůĞ ? ?ďŽƚŚŝŶ
a bad way, because of being dirty, sick or polluted, and in a good way, to show respect and to prevent 
degradation. Rhetorically, it is usually connected with metaphors of elevation and fall, as in the idea 
ŽĨ ‘ƚŚĞƐƉŝƌĂůŽĨĚĞĐůŝŶĞ ?ǁŚĞƌĞĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐŝƐƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚĂƐĂĨŝƌƐƚƐƚĞƉƚŽŚĂƌĚĞƌĚƌƵŐƐĂŶĚĞǀĞŶƚƵĂůůǇŽĨ
ĂĚĞĐĂǇ ?&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ?ƚŚŝƐƐĂŶĐƚŝƚǇǀƐ ?ĚĞŐƌĂĚĂƚŝŽŶŵŽƌĂůĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶŚĂƐďĞĞŶĨŽƵŶĚƚŽďĞ “crucial 
for understanding the American culture wars, particularly over biomedical issues ? (Haidt, 2012, p. 177). 
Interestingly enough, other cultural groups also strongly base their political discourse on this 
foundation, locating, on the contrary, cannabis as a key vehicle for purity and virtuosity -reaching the 
ƐƚĂƚƵƐŽĨĂ ‘ŚŽůǇŚĞƌď ?-, as in the Rastafarian religion (Benard, 2007). 
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Religion as a source of resistance and promotion of victimless crimes changes 
 
This correlation between religion and political positions over victimless crimes made authors such as 
Engeli et al. (2013) question more widely the role of this variable in victimless crimes changes. What 
these authors found was that one basic assumption in the existent empirical studies addressing this 
issue is that the secularisation process that many occidental countries are going through should lead, 
sooner or later, to a permissive policy shift. This hypothesis was then typically tested trying to correlate 
some religiosity measure informed by the World Values Surveys (WVS) to moral politics reforms. Thus, 
for example, a pioneering study about the impact of culture on acceptance of soft drugs, including 
ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ ? ĂĐƌŽƐƐ ƵƌŽƉĞ ĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ P  “residents in nations with higher levels of human 
development also demonstrate higher levels of expressionism culture and both are more tolerant 
ƚŽǁĂƌĚ ĚĞǀŝĂŶĐĞ ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ĂŶĚ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ůŝĨĞƐƚǇůĞƐ ? ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ ƐŽĨƚ ĚƌƵŐ ƵƐĞ ?  ? ? ? ŶŽƚŚĞƌ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ
finding is that religiosiƚǇŚĂƐƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐĞĨĨĞĐƚŽŶƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ ?ƐĂĐĐĞƉƚĂŶĐĞŽĨƐŽĨƚĚƌƵŐƐ ?
 ? ? ? ZĞůŝŐŝŽƐŝƚǇ ĞǀĞŶ ƌĞŵĂŝŶƐ Ă ĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ ĨĂĐƚŽƌ ŽĨ ĂƐĐĞƚŝĐ ĚĞǀŝĂŶĐĞ ĞǀĞŶ ĂŵŽŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŵŽƐƚ
industrialised nations in the world ? ?ĂŽ ?ŚĂŽ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ) ?/ŶŽƚŚĞƌǁŽƌĚƐ ?ƚŚĞ autonomy ethics 
prevalent in WEIRD people tend to favour more permissive regulations in cannabis as in a number of 
related victimless crimes areas, whereas  “more religious, less educated and less individualistic are less 
tolerant of soft drug use and other types of ascetic deviance such as prostitution and homosexuality ?
(Cao & Zhao, 2012, p. 303). 
 
However, comparing a number of European countries on topics such as same-sex marriages, abortion, 
new reproductive technologies, stem cells research and euthanasia, Engeli et al. found that the move 
towards permissiveness poses more of a puzzle than a simple shift. More specifically, it is argued that 
ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ĐĂƵƐĂů ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŽƌƐ ?  “religion and secularization do not impact on regulation 
directly, but are filtered through a policy dynamic in which the essential factor is whether or not the 
ƉĂƌƚǇƐǇƐƚĞŵĐŽŶƚĂŝŶƐĂĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚůŝŶĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶƐĞĐƵůĂƌĂŶĚĐŽŶĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůƉĂƌƚŝĞƐƚŽƉŽůŝƚŝĐŝǌĞ ?victimless 
crimes (Engeli et al., 2013, p. 1). This secularisation trend may or may not influence political outputs, 
depending on whether the specific conflict is installed among the political system. 
 
/ŶƚŚĞ ‘ƐĞĐƵůĂƌǁŽƌůĚ ?-as they labelled the cases of United Kingdom and Denmark-, these issues are 
often seen as being essentially non-political but individual ethical questions. Thus, the composition of 
parties in government is not central to understanding cannabis reforms, which largely depend on 
issue-specific coalitions with no unifying tendency towards permissive regulation across the different 
sub-ĨŝĞůĚƐŽĨǀŝĐƚŝŵůĞƐƐĐƌŝŵĞƐ ?ĂƐĂďŽƌƚŝŽŶŽƌƐĞǆǁŽƌŬ ?ŽŶǀĞƌƐĞůǇ ?ŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ƌĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐǁŽƌůĚ ?-as they 
labelled the cases of the Netherlands and Spain-, the party system embodies a significant conflict 
between secular and confessional oriented parties. Here, the opening of political windows when 
confessional parties are not in government becomes an important causal contributor and the varying 
degrees of secularization can explain cross-national differences in political outputs, since it provides 
secular parties with electoral support for increasingly permissive regulation. Furthermore, the 
different victimless crimes issues are likely to follow a similar policy process (Engeli et al., 2013). 
 
In this way, moral theory offers a first important insight into the cultural dimension of cannabis 
debates. This perspective can be used to explore how the problem of illegal cannabis was framed in 
Uruguay in terms of conflicting moral foundations, pointing to religion and secularisation as 
alternative sources of resistance and promotion of change at the macro level. In this regard, it is worth 
noting that criminological empirical research has systematically conceptualised religion as a 
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 “ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ĨĂĐƚŽƌƚŚĂƚƌĞƐƚƌĂŝŶƐƉĞŽƉůĞĨƌŽŵƵƐŝŶŐĚƌƵŐƐ ?ĂůŐĂůĂƌƌŽŶĚŽ/ĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ŚŝƚǁŽŽĚet 
al., 2008; Johnson & Jang, 2010; Bioidi M. et al., 2015), but has not provided an adequate insight to 
the wider role of religion in the cannabis policy making process. 
 
In this thesis, cannabis regulation is generally defined as a special type of policy change that involves 
a deep questioning of the way we understand a political issue. Hence, it is unlikely to be the result of 
a merely rational evaluation of interests, information and knowledge available but conversely an 
arena where moral emotions are being under question. In what follows, I will present three middle 
ground theories of policy change that articulate with this premise, under the assumption that as a 
general rule people tend to dismiss or reframe events contrary to our own core values. Thus, I will 
discuss particularly factors such as advocacy coalitions united by belief systems hierarchically 
organised, public attention ƐŚŝĨƚƐĂŶĚĞǀĞŶƚƐ ‘ĞǆƚĞƌŶĂů ?ƚŽƚŚĞĚƌƵŐƉŽůŝĐǇƐƵďƐǇƐƚĞŵŝƚƐĞůĨ ? 
 
 
3.2. Policy analysis perspective: understanding atypical changes 
 
In her research on drug policy change in Portugal and Australia, Hughes (2007) argues that despite the 
recognition that policies are driven by both incremental and atypical reforms, there are few theories 
that seek to differentiate and explain both processes. The three most notable exceptions that will be 
used in this thesis are Kingdon's Multiple StreaŵƐƚŚĞŽƌǇ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ƚŚĞ ‘WƵŶĐƚƵĂƚĞĚƋƵŝůŝďƌŝƵŵDŽĚĞů ?
(True et al., 2007) and the Advocacy Coalition Framework developed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
(1993). Incremental reform is the norm, but atypical change is also possible. Yet, since atypical changes 
imply a deep questioning of the way we understand a political issue, they are unlikely to be the result 
of a merely rational evaluation of interests, information and knowledge available. Conversely, they 
are seen as an arena where emotional and value biases are equally important causal contributors. 
Hence, this literature argues for the necessity of including these types of constraints in the 
information-processing capacities when trying to explain atypical change. 
 
The starting point in Multiple Streams theory comes from a rather simple observation: the mere 
existence of a problem is unlikely to provoke atypical changes unless the problem is recognised, the 
political climate is receptive, and a policy proposal or solution is available. Each of these streams spurs 
or constrains policy change by placing a proposal on or off the agenda (Kingdon, 1995). 
 
More specifically, problems are defined as public matters requiring attention, which may or may not 
get defined as important. Given that no objective fact constitutes a problem in and of itself, it is 
important to analyse the sources of the issues that are added to the political agenda, as well as the 
perceptions and values of the actors concerned which shape how a problem is defined. Thereby, 
exploring the translation of individual issues into social problems and then into public problems  Wor 
matters of political controversy. 
 
How problems are defined and publicly recognized is not only important by itself but also because it 
shapes suitable solutions to it. More generally, policies are proposals for change based on the 
accumulation of knowledge and development of interest among specialists in a policy sector. As 
scepticism regarding the success of the prohibitionist approach has grown, new voices started to 
assert the necessity of debating and evaluating alternative solutions to the drugs problem. Yet, as 
reviewed in the previous chapter (see section 2.3), there is not necessarily a consensus regarding what 
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ƚŚĞ  ‘ďĞƐƚ ? ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌǇ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ Ăƌe and different types of systems have been experimented with 
worldwide. 
 
Lastly, the political process determines the pertinent actors involved in the debate, and how these 
actors try to influence the perception of the problems and provide specific solutions to them. There is 
an ongoing controversy in the literature about Uruguayan reform regarding this issue. Authors such 
as Pardo (2014) and Repetto (2014) have defined Uruguayan cannabis regulation mainly as a top- 
down initiative. Thus, for example, in the comparative analysis of Washington, Colorado (US) and 
hƌƵŐƵĂǇĂŶĐĂƐĞƐŝƚŝƐƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞ “three important things to note about Uruguay [is that 
the] regulatory reform is a government-led initiative, not a public referendum. According to polls, the 
public is not in favour of this policy change ? ?WĂƌĚŽ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ) ?ŽŶǀĞƌƐĞůǇ ?ĂƵƚŚŽƌƐƐƵĐŚĂƐĂƐƚƌŽ
(2014), Walsh and Ramsey (2015), Von Hoffmann (2015) and Arocena and Aguiar (2017) have 
contended for a more protagonist role of civil society, highlighting the importance of actors other than 
politicians themselves to fully understand the regulation process. 
 
Having differentiated between problem definition, solution building and political process (actors and 
strategies), understanding cannabis regulation requires analysing the circumstances under which 
these different streams combine to make a policy happen. Furthermore, the linking of these streams 
depends on the presence of policy windows and policy entrepreneurs (Kingdon, 1995). 
 
Policy windows refer to contexts of opportunity for advocates to press home their ideas, either 
triggered by the appearance of a particularly problematic, visible or compelling problem or by 
happenings in the political stream -such as a new administration in power (John, 1998). Capitalising 
upon these emerging opportunities requires the presence of policy entrepreneurs to link the three 
streams, attaching and re-framing policy proposals to fit emerging circumstances. In other words, it is 
about finding an available, rather ƚŚĂŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘ďĞƐƚ ? ƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶ  ?,ƵŐŚĞƐ  ? ? ? ? ) ? WƌĞǀŝŽƵƐ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ŚĂƐ
identified the importance of this type of actor leading cannabis reform both at the governmental level 
-as in the case of the Netherlands- or within civil society -as in the cases of Spain and the US-. Like a 
ƐƵƌĨĞƌ ? “entrepreneurs are ready to paddle, and their readiness combined with their sense for riding 
the wave and using the forces beyond their control contributes to success ? ?<ŝŶŐĚŽŶ ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ) ? 
 
dŚĞ ‘WƵŶĐƚƵĂƚĞĚƋƵŝůŝďƌŝƵŵDŽĚĞů ? ?dƌƵe et al., 2007) bears some resemblance to the previous one, 
yet questions the streams approach in three major ways: emphasising the emotive elements of 
problem definition, the role of mobilisation, and the attention shifts provoked by the issue's expansion 
into the macro political agenda. From this perspective, atypical change is built not only over a 
disagreement in the proper way to describe or understand the cannabis problem, as Multiple Streams 
theory implies, but also in the set of images attached to it  Wthat is, a mixture of empirical information 
and emotive appeals. In terms of politics moral foundations theory introduced above, cannabis 
problem definition would involve competing ways to link cannabis to certain moral foundations. More 
precisely, it is expected for conservative policy positions to be related with ideas of fairness, loyalty, 
authority and sanctity. Conversely, defining cannabis as a liberty and care problem will be expected 
to be associated with more progressive political positions. 
 
AĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ  ‘WƵŶĐƚƵĂƚĞĚ ƋƵŝůŝďƌŝƵŵDŽĚĞů ? ? ŝƚ ŝƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŵŽďŝůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ Ă ƉƌĞ-established 
image and the corresponding policy venue where authoritative decisions about cannabis policy are 
made can be redefined. There are two main methods for this: (i) mass mobilisation, aimed at 
successively broadening advocacy efforts to mobilise larger and larger groups, beginning with 
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specialists and working to eventually include the general public; and (ii) strategic venue shifting. In this 
ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ? ƉŽůŝĐǇ ĞŶƚƌĞƉƌĞŶĞƵƌƐ ƵƐĞ ŵŽƌĞ ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ ŵĞĂŶƐ ŽĨŵŽďŝůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŬĞǇ ƐĞĐƚŽƌƐ ĂŶĚ  “venue 
shopping by strategically minded political actors ? ?ĂƵŵŐĂƌƚŶĞƌ ?:ŽŶĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ) ?/ĨƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵů ?
mobilisation destabilizes a current policy equilibrium by ĞǆƉĂŶĚŝŶŐŽƌƐŚŝĨƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƐĐŽƉĞŽĨĐŽŶŇŝĐƚ
beyond its traditional venue (Robinson, 2014). 
 
Yet, Jones (1994) argues that atypical cannabis change does not spring from rapid flip-flops of 
preferences or from basic irrationality (choosing to go against your own preferences); they spring from 
shifts in attention. Typically, cannabis policy-making operates out of the political spotlight, dominated 
by a single interest with a policy monopoly, which has a definable institutional structure responsible 
for the decision-making in an issue area. Thus, for example, as reported by Garat (2012) the 1976 
South American Agreement on Narcotic and Psychotropic Substances that defined the regional 
blueprint for a legislative harmonisation to the 1961 and 1971 international conventions was made 
behind closed doors and without much public discussion around it. Whereas doctors, lawyers and 
police forces had a leading role shaping this legal framework, cannabis users themselves hardly had a 
voice in the political process, a fact also noted for other countries (see for example Stevens, 2011; 
Arana & Del Olmo, 1996). When mobilisation occurs, new participants become interested in the 
debate, the agreed-upon images and authoritative venues become contested, and eventually a policy 
shift may occur towards macro-political institutions. When an issue is on the macro-political agenda, 
small changes in objective circumstances can cause large changes in policy, in a process of positive 
feedback (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993). 
 
In this way, whereas the idea of Multiple Streams policy windows implies entrepreneurs negotiating 
and re-framing policy proposals to fit emerging circumstances, Punctuated Equilibrium argues that 
atypical changes break into the macro-ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂŐĞŶĚĂƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĂ ‘ĐŚĂŽƚŝĐŵŽŵĞŶƚŽĨƉƵŶĐƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?
These chaotic moments of punctuation, characterised as communication turmoil, are usually a 
disproportionate response to the specific event that triggered it, fuelled by heightened attentiveness 
by the media and broader public, and disputes over new dimensions of the debate becoming more 
salient. However, since attention spans are limited, controversy over an issue is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for atypical reform to happen; if the citizens excluded from a monopoly  Wi.e. 
cannabis users- remain apathetic, the institutional arrangement usually remains constant, and policy 
is likely to change only slowly and incrementally in a process of negative feedback. Thus, from this 
perspective, it is only when an issue breaks into the public light and the ways in which the problem is 
defined become contested by the involvement of new actors in the political arena, that atypical 
change becomes possible (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993). 
 
In contrast with the reviewed theories, the last middle ground theory used in this thesis  Wthe Advocacy 
Coalition Framework developed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith in 1993- contends that political 
processes are driven not only by individual actors but mainly by groups coordinating actions over time, 
for atypical change to happen. 
 
Previous works on drug policy have successfully applied this concept to analyse policy change. It has 
ďĞĞŶĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚďǇ<ƺďůĞƌŝŶŚŝƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨƚŚĞ^ǁŝƐƐŚĂƌŵƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶƌĞĨŽƌŵ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ĂŶĚďǇ,ƵŐŚĞƐ ?
ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŽŶƚǁŽ “ŚĂƌŵŵŝŶŝŵŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐ ? ?,ƵŐŚĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ) ?ĚƌƵŐƵƐĞĚĞĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶ
Portugal and the Australian Illicit Drug Diversion Initiative. Von Hoffmann (2015), Castro (2014) and 
Repetto (2014) have also found evidence of this type of dynamic in their analysis of the Uruguayan 
ĐĂƐĞ ?sŽŶ,ŽĨĨŵĂŶ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ “a strong and diverse advocacy coalition, consisting of 
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cannabis activists, legislators, members of  the executive  and  international  actors,  came  into  
being and successfullǇ ƉƵƐŚĞĚ ĨŽƌ ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ ƌĞĨŽƌŵ ? WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ DƵũŝĐĂ ?Ɛ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ǁĂƐ ĐƌƵĐŝĂů ? ďƵƚ
ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐůĞŐĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐŶŽƚ ‘ŚŝƐ ? ? ? ?ǀŽŶ,ŽĨĨŵĂŶŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? 11). 
 
ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ƚŚŝƐ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?  ‘ĂĚǀŽĐĂĐǇ ĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶƐ ? ƐŚĂƌĞ Ă ŚŝĞƌĂƌĐŚŝĐĂůůǇ ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĞĚ ƚŚƌĞĞ ůĞǀĞů ďĞůŝĞĨƐ
system that defines how a given public problem and the suitable solution to it are framed. More 
specifically, advocacy coalitions will tend to share a deep core of fundamental normative and 
ontological axioms, which define a vision of the individual, society and the world. Different normative 
foundations will be associated with a policy core of causal perceptions, basic strategies and policy 
positions for achieving those deep core beliefs. Lastly, secondary aspects would comprise 
instrumental considerations on how to implement the policy core (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). 
 
In this thesis, I propose that by engaging moral foundations theory we can take the advocacy coalitions 
ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬĂƐƚĞƉĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ?ƐƉĞĐŝĨǇŝŶŐǁŚĂƚƚŚĞĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĚĞĞƉĐŽƌĞĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞĂŶĚŚŽǁ they 
vary across and within societies. As Figure 3 displays, this reformulated version of the Advocacy 
ŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶƐ ?ďĞůŝĞĨƐǇƐƚĞŵƉůĂĐĞƐƚŚĞƐĞƐŝǆŵŽƌĂůĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ĚĞĞƉĐŽƌĞ ?ŐůƵĞƚŚĂƚƵŶŝƚĞƐĂŶĚ
divides groups, binding and blinding political actors. The moral foundations apply for all political areas, 
and within any given culture, cannabis politics controversies would involve competing ways to link 
cannabis to these foundations. As it was previously discussed, believing that cannabis use is ultimately 
a personal freedom or alternatively an authority problem is a political stand highly unlikely to be 
changed by scientific evidence or knowledge available. These different normative foundations will be 
associated with a  ‘ƉŽůŝĐǇ ĐŽƌĞ ? of causal perceptions, basic strategies and policy positions for achieving 
those deep core beliefs, specific to the policy area of interest. Thus, if cannabis use is framed as a 
personal freedom matter then logically cannabis policies cannot be targeted to punish its users, but 
to benefit them through health improvements. If, on the contrary, it is framed as an authority 
problem, then the law may be considered as a tool to reassure the limits of what is right and wrong 
to do. Thereby, if cannabis is risky and harmful people cannot have a right to use it. Changes at this 
level are still difficult but can occur, particularly by compelling close experiences or continued serious 
ĂŶŽŵĂůŝĞƐ ŽŶ ĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚ ƉŽůŝĐǇ ŽƵƚƉƵƚƐ ? >ĂƐƚůǇ ? ƚŚĞ  ‘ƐĞĐŽŶĚĂƌǇ ĂƐƉĞĐƚƐ ? ƌĞůĂƚĞ ǁŝƚŚ ŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚĂů
decisions on how to implement those goals. If, for example, cannabis is appealed to as a holy herb and 
not just as a regular consumer good, then a legal regulation with private profit restrictions might be 
considered necessary. Instrumental decisions are specific to the drugs area and its susceptibility to 
change is moderately easy, usually involving technical and administrative issues. Within and between 
advocacy coalitions, policy brokers are actors mediating in the debate, undertaking the important role 
ŽĨŬĞĞƉŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚǁŝƚŚŝŶĂĐĐĞƉƚĂďůĞůŝŵŝƚƐ ?ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐĨŽƌƌĞĂĐŚŝŶŐƐŽŵĞ ‘ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞ ?ƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƚŽ
the problem among the parts for the coalition not to dissolve. 
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Figure 4. Structure of the Belief System of Advocacy Coalitions 
 
 Deep (Normative) Core Near (Policy) Core Secondary Aspects 
 
Defining 
characteristics 
Politics moral foundations: 
liberty, care, fairness, 
loyalty, authority and 
sanctity 
Fundamental policy 
positions concerning the 
basic strategies for achieving 
normative axioms of deep 
core 
Instrumental decisions 
and information searches 
necessary to implement 
policy core 
 
Scope 
Part of basic personal 
philosophy. Applies to all 
political areas 
Applies to policy area of 
interest (and perhaps a few 
more) 
Specific to policy 
area/subsystem of 
interest 
 
Susceptibility to 
change 
 
Very difficult; akin to a 
religious conversion 
Difficult, but can occur if 
experience reveals serious 
anomalies 
Moderately easy; this is 
the topic of most 
administrative and 
legislative policymaking 
Source: Adapted from Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999, p. 31) 
 
Since the belief system is hierarchically organised, actors tend to reject information that questions 
core beliefs; hence, policy-oriented learning is most likely to concern only secondary aspects of a belief 
system. Thus, for atypical drug policy change to happen, the presence of  ‘ĞǆƚĞƌŶĂů ĞǀĞŶƚƐ ? that change 
power relations within a subsystem or shift public attention (and thus resources) toward or away from 
a policy subsystem become necessary. These external events are loosely categorised as: (i) major 
socioeconomic changes; (ii) changes in public opinion; (iii) changes in the systemic governing coalition; 
and (iv) policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems. Yet, even if defined as external, it is not 
these events by themselves but their interpretation and exploitation with greater or lesser skill by the 
coalition that matters, for policy change to happen (Kubler, 2001; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). 
 
In this thesis, I will argue that although previous research on drug policy change has provided a 
convincing picture of the importance of advocacy coalitions for the cannabis reform, they portray an 
overly optimistic narrative of the collective dynamics involved, overlooking both the conflicts within 
groups as well as the strategies displayed to deal with them. More generally, although atypical change 
theories have the virtue of pointing to values and beliefs as an important factor informing drug policy 
making, this is a category that has been theoretically ƵŶĚĞƌƐƉĞĐŝĮĞĚ in the literature. Most of the time, 
researchers just assume it exists, yet they overlook its actual empirical derivations (Ripberger et al., 
2014). As it was explained, this thesis aims to make a theoretical contribution in this regard by 
engaging with the moral politics perspective as a way to specify further missing elements in atypical 
ĐŚĂŶŐĞƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐ ?ĂƐƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞŶƚĂŶĚĐƵůƚƵƌĂůǀĂƌŝĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĚǀŽĐĂĐǇŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĚĞĞƉĐŽƌĞďĞůŝĞĨƐ ?ĂŶĚ
alternative sources of resistance and promotion of change. 
 
 
3.3. Policy transfer perspective: the role of international actors 
 
Moral politics and atypical change perspectives are important theoretical insights to understand cross- 
cultural variations in drug policy development. Yet, as it should have come across from the literature 
review (chapter 2), the cannabis debate is a two-level political arena. National and sub-national drug 
control cultures interact in different ways with global influences that have significantly affected the 
available pathways for cannabis policymaking. 
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On the one hand, international treaties have been used as a powerful tool for the expansion of 
cannabis prohibition and the War on Drugs framework from the countries of the north to those in the 
south. As noted by Jones and Newburn (2006), a generalised shift during the 1980s toward a more 
punitive culture of drug control has received widespread criminological attention in Latin America as 
elsewhere. Drug policy analysts have repeatedly pointed to the importation of ideas and legal 
frameworks from abroad, particularly from the United States, when explaining this general shift. Thus, 
for example, authors such as Jock Young (2003), Bewley-Taylor (2003), Youngers and Rosin (2004), 
K ?DĂůůĞǇ ? ? ? ? ? )and Durán-Martínez (2016), to mention a few, have consistently showed how North 
American political actors were key for the adoption of the war on drugs metaphor, and incarceration 
as the key weapon of this war, in a number of different countries. 
 
On the other hand, increasing critiques of such treaties emerge at the same time as an array of 
divergent experiences of drugs regulation start to develop at the local level. Furthermore, one of the 
main alternatives to this punitive approach, harm reduction, is also a well-travelled concept. Since its 
development in Europe, Australia and North America two decades ago, harm reduction has been 
increasingly accepted by many governments and the international community as a policy proposal 
(Stimson, 2007). 
 
Regarding cannabis policy more specifically, previous works have already identified a number of 
significant similarities and differences between recent regulation frameworks. In his research on the 
Uruguayan case, for example, von Hoffman states that although the existing literature conceptualized 
hƌƵŐƵĂǇ ?Ɛ ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ĂƐ ĂŶ ĂůŵŽƐƚ ĞǆĐůƵƐŝǀĞůǇ ĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐ ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽŶ ? ĂŶ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
ĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶ ŶĞĞĚƐ ƚŽ ďĞ ŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞĚ ŝŶ ĂŶ ĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŽƌǇ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ? DŽƌĞ ƉƌĞĐŝƐĞůǇ ?  “the changing 
international context, epistemic communities, transnational activism and positive international 
response contributed to the success of cannabis policy reform ? ?ǀŽŶ,ŽĨĨŵĂŶŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ) ?zĞƚ ?ƚŚĞ
concrete mechanisms of policy transfer in this field remain relatively unexplored. Overall, as proposed 
by Nelken (2010) and Jones & Newburn (2006) in their works on international policy convergence and 
national punitiveness patterns, most of this literature is more concerned with who is in charge of 
policy transfer and where it may lead, while there is much less focus on discussing how it is even 
possible (Nelken, 2010; Jones & Newburn, 2006). 
 
The analysis of policy transfer mechanisms regards the intentional actions of significant actors to 
ĞŶŐĂŐĞŝŶĂ “process by which knowledge of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and 
ideas in one political system (past or present) are used in the development of policies, administrative 
arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political system ? (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000, p. 5). Here, 
the term  ‘ƵƐĞ ? is particularly important because the apparent similarity of policies adopted in different 
jurisdictions is not a sufficient guaranty of policy transfer, since it might have occurred simply by 
chance, as result of parallel endogenous policy developments or even as a tool for legitimizing 
decisions that political actors had already made. Thus, it is not always easy to empirically determinate 
ƚŚĞĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŽĨƉŽůŝĐǇƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌ ?ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŶŐĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůŝŶŇƵĞŶĐĞƐĨƌŽŵĞŶĚŽŐĞŶŽƵƐƉŽůŝĐǇĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ
and ŝƚƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ‘ĐƌŽƐƐ-ĨĞƌƚŝůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?/ƚŝƐŶŽƚŽŶůǇŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŽŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇƐŝŐŶŝĮĐĂŶƚƐŝŵŝůĂƌŝƚŝĞƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶ
Uruguayan cannabis reform and reforms occurred in other jurisdictions but also to detect the agents 
who have transferred this knowledge and made politicians aware of them, exploring the reasons why 
Uruguayan legislative actors utilized such knowledge (Jones & Newburn 2006). 
 
Typically, research on policy transfer has primarily focused on the role of official actors and networks 
in this type of process. More recently, a growing body of work has been enhancing our understanding 
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of non-governmental actors and transnational activism as transference agents (Stone, 2000; Keck & 
Sikkink, 1999). Since non-governmental actors cannot impose policies on a political system, their place 
in policy transfer dynamics is not self-evident, usually playing a role akin to that of policy 
entrepreneurs, encouraging policy lesson-drawing and advocacy efforts. 
 
Further on, it is important to question by what means and why policy transfer is possible, exploring 
the existence of structural, contextual, institutional and cultural factors that may block or enable this 
kind of process (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000; Jones & Newburn, 2006; O'Malley, 1999). In this regard, 
Bennett (1991) outlines four possible types: emulation, harmonization, elite networking and policy 
communities, and penetration. Only the last one entails a non-cooperative mechanism of transference 
involving the imposition of a particular political pathway by some powerful agent. Thus, emulation 
implies the deliberate use of lessons of a program used in another society, whereas harmonization 
concerns the efforts of intergovernmental organizations to develop processes of international 
integration to synchronize common policies. Finally, elite networking refers to the coordination of 
governmental and non-governmental actors sharing information about a common problem and 
possible political solutions to it. Overall, the difference between these types is a matter of degree. 
 
In the context of this research, policy transfer is discussed as both a causal contributor that might help 
to understand why cannabis regulation was possible in Uruguay. I will discuss the specific policy 
transfer mechanisms, blockers and facilitators that might have been underpinning the diffusion of 
cannabis innovations that the literature centred on policy design has empirically identified but fails to 
analyse. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
Cannabis regulation is an atypical and surprising reform, in that it not only involves a questioning of 
policy tools but also interrogates deeply the moral foundations of policy making. Unlike most of the 
cannabis control models developed in the world, the Uruguayan new legal framework aims at 
facilitating the best public safety and health conditions possible for this market to develop, and not to 
just restraining it, as cannabis prohibition does. 
 
Because of the high moral controversy surrounding this decision, this type of change is not expected 
to come as an endogenous policy learning process. Thus, the present thesis aims to contribute to the 
criminology field by discussing why and how a concrete behaviour ceased to be defined as a crime by 
law, exposing the interplay between morality and law-making. 
 
Theoretically, it aims at a specific understanding of drug policymaking by engaging moral politics, 
atypical change and international policy transfer perspectives to explain Uruguayan cannabis 
ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?DŽƌĞƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇ ?ĂƌĞǀŝƐŝƚĞĚĂĚǀŽĐĂĐǇĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶƐ ?ďĞůŝĞĨƐǇƐtem framework was proposed, 
ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ ,ĂŝĚƚ ?Ɛ ƐŝǆŵŽƌĂů ĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĨŽƌ Ă ďĞƚƚĞƌĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ĚĞďĂƚĞƐ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ĂŶĚ ĂĐƌŽƐƐ
societies. An ethics of autonomy was related to progressive political stands on cannabis and other 
victimless crimes, generally emphasising elements of liberty and care in policy reforms. Conversely, 
an ethics of community was associated to conservative positions, endorsing prohibition as an 
ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ŝƐƐƵĞƉůĂĐŝŶŐ ůŝŵŝƚƐŽŶƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇǁŚŝůĞĞŶĚŽƌƐŝŶŐŽƌĚĞƌ ?ƐƚĂďŝůŝƚǇĂŶĚƚƌaditions. 
Additionally, the role of religion and secularisation in victimless crimes political processes was 
ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚŝŶƐŽŵĞĚĞƉƚŚ ?ƉŽŝŶƚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŽĨƚǁŽĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ‘ǁŽƌůĚƐ ?ŽĨĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐƌĞĨŽƌŵƐ ?ƚŚĞ 
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secular type, characterised by issue-specific coalitions where the composition of parties in 
government is not central to understanding cannabis reforms. In the religious type, different 
victimless crimes issues are likely to follow a similar policy process. In this case, varying degrees of 
secularization and the absence of a confessional party at the government are important factors to 
understand cross-national differences in political outputs. Hence, at the macro level, structural and 
contextual variables such as a secularisation processes affecting public opinion on cannabis, changes 
in the systemic governing coalition, the appearance of new political actors, and policy windows 
opened during the electoral competition creating chaotic moments of punctuation were all 
highlighted as relevant factors to explore in the Uruguayan case. 
 
At the micro level, the constitution of advocacy coalitions around cannabis reform, as well as the 
presence of policy brokers and entrepreneurs mediating the conflict and re-framing the policy 
proposals to fit emerging circumstances were identified as important concepts to research. Lastly, the 
study of the political process itself necessitates exploration of the pertinent actors involved in the 
debate, and the mobilisation strategies used to change the power balances within the illegal drug 
policy subsystem. It involves the analysis of how the image of illegal cannabis was framed in Uruguay 
as a mixture of empirical information and emotive appeals, and how this shaped the policy design to 
resolve the problem. 
 
Lastly, the role of international actors and experiences is under question, looking at how the 
international accumulation of knowledge about cannabis legal regulations might have been 
transferred to Uruguay, and what were the main blockers and facilitators for political actors to engage 
in this process. 
 
Thus, having outlined the theoretical strategy to understand Uruguayan cannabis regulation, the 
following chapter delves into the corresponding methodological challenges attached to this case 
study. 
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Chapter 4. Methodological framework 
 
The present chapter outlines the methodological strategy selected for the study of Uruguayan 
cannabis regulation. I will start by introducing qualitative case analysis and causal process tracing as 
the general approach guiding the fieldwork process and its subsequent analysis. I will review the main 
strengths and limitations derived from the research design and introduce the strategies deployed to 
enhance the internal validity of my findings, as the examination of other policy options that were 
available and considered by the Uruguayan parliament in the period under study. 
 
Following, I will present the data sources that the analysis of the case relies on. I will locate participant 
observation as the privileged tool for studying cannabis policymaking in the place where policy is 
made. I will differentiate the two main periods of participant observation aiding this research; one 
starting before the arrangement of the PhD (2007  W 2013) and the second corresponding to this 
research fieldwork (2014  W 2016). Over this eight-year period, a significant network of around 50 
informants was built; some of these were long-term personal relationships with whom I kept regular 
contact throughout the research process. Open semi-structured interviews were a central data source 
used to thoroughly review the position of the research participants over certain topics. It was a 
particularly important method to explore opposition to the reform. Alongside a topic list, a history 
calendar including dates of important events occurred between January 2011 and December 2013 
was used as a guide during interviews to enhance the temporal validity of the data thus collected. 
Analysis of previous interviews conducted for a documentary on the topic was used as a triangulation 
method to review the position of a number of research participants through time. Lastly, a diverse set 
of public and private secondary data was also employed, consisting of legislative transcripts, political 
ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ? ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞƐ ?ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂůĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƐ ?ŶĞǁƐ ?ĂŶĚƉƵďůŝĐĐŽŶŐƌĞŐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? manifestos. 
 
The next step will be defining the population of interest and sampling procedures followed to identify 
my research participants, combining purposive and chain-referral methods. Thus, six types of actors 
of interest were distinguished: legislative power members, executive power members, judicial power 
members, Uruguayan civil society representatives, International civil society representatives and a 
group of professionals ranging from journalists specialised in the topic to members of the academy 
 ?ĂŶŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĂŶ ?ĂƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐŝƐƚ ?ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ) ? /ǁŝůůĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞƚŚŝƐ  ‘ĞůŝƚĞ ůĞǀĞů ?ŐƌŽƵƉĂƐĂŶŽǀĞƌ- 
researched population due to the extraordinary interest that Uruguayan cannabis regulation attracted 
world-wide, and the consequences that followed for entering and leaving fieldwork. In this context, I 
will argue for attending to reciprocity in method in order to gain access and enhance the 
trustworthiness of the research results. I will also discuss some important ethical issues that arose 
while researching the policy-making process, including my role as a drug policy reform activist and the 
validation strategies deployed to use data that occurred before my PhD fieldwork. 
 
Lastly, I will delve into the procedures employed for data analysis. I will introduce the thematic codes 
of interest defined organising the data collection and explain how they related to the research 
questions. I will also present the strategy followed for the inclusion of religion as an emerging code 
that evolved as a category of interest as I started to delve into the data collected. I will explain how 
the narrative analysis of these codes interacted with time as a key analytical dimension. Lastly, I will 
explain how a network analysis of the reformer advocacy coalition was constructed within this 
framework, based on the shared participation of actors in cannabis regulation related events. I will 
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conclude by summing up the array of tools presented and their relationship with the research 
questions guiding the study. 
 
 
4.1. Research design: within-case causal process tracing 
 
As the theoretical framework selected describes it, Uruguayan cannabis regulation is an atypical policy 
change. It is atypical because it was surprising to observe for the first time a country explicitly 
challenging the prohibitionist international drug control conventions status quo in order to deploy a 
regulated market in which Uruguayan residents older than 18 could buy or grow their own cannabis 
legally. In this way, unlike most of the criminological work centred on understanding deviance 
amplification in the form of increasing punitiveness, the Uruguayan case represents a unique 
opportunity to study why and how a behaviour ceased to be defined as a crime by law. 
 
The literature on cannabis models is abundant, both centred on the Uruguayan case or comparing it 
with other designs worldwide (Boidi et al., 2015; Pardo, 2014; Montañés, 2014; Room, 2014; Kilmer 
et al., 2013). However, our knowledge of the social processes that made these different models 
possible is still relatively limited and largely descriptive. This circumstance might be explained by the 
methodological difficulties faced for studying political elite level populations. Identifying the overt and 
covert actors involved, gaining access to them as well as to the moments where policymaking is 
actually made, is not an easy task for researchers. Moreover, even when possible, it takes time to build 
the trust necessĂƌǇƚŽĂǀŽŝĚ ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůǇĐŽƌƌĞĐƚ ?ĂŶƐǁĞƌƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?,ĞŶĐĞ ?ƚŚŝƐ
qualitative case study is specifically devoted to understanding how and why cannabis was regulated 
in Uruguay by subsequently asking: 
x Who were the main actors involved in the Uruguayan cannabis reform and how they 
networked as advocacy coalitions?
x Why was cannabis regulated in Uruguay; that is, how were the problem of illegal cannabis and 
the suitable political solution framed?
x How did cannabis regulation come to prominence and set policy agendas?
x What are the implications of these stages for the implementation of the law and, more broadly, 
for cannabis policymaking?
 
As defined by Blatter and Blume (2008), case studies are characterised by their thickness, derived from 
ƚŚĞ ďƌĞĂĚƚŚ ŽĨ ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ƚŚĂƚ ĐĂŶ ďĞ ďƌŽƵŐŚƚ ƚŽ ďĞĂƌ ŝŶ ŽƌĚĞƌ ƚŽ ĚĞƉŝĐƚ Ă ĨƵůů  ‘ƐƚŽƌǇůŝŶĞ ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
Uruguayan cannabis regulation process (Amenta, 2009; Byrne, 2009). As a form of research, case study 
gains credibility by thoroughly triangulating the descriptions and interpretations of the actors 
involved, not just in a single stance but continuously throughout the period of study. Thus, a case 
ƐƚƵĚǇŝƐĨĞĂƚƵƌĞĚďǇ “researchers spending extended time on site, personally in contact with activities 
and operations of the case, reflecting, and revising descriptions and meanings of what is going on ?
(Stake, 2005, p. 450). Among them, causal process tracing is a style of case study that takes the 
temporal validity of the causal arguments to centre stage. Thus, it aims at advancing time ordered 
conjectures about complex interactions between causal factors, motivations, actions and events. In 
this context, the relative importance of a given piece of evidence is assessed by reflecting on the 
necessity and sufficiency of the causal claims for inferential purposes (Mahoney, 2012; Collier, 2011). 
The validity of this type of research design relies largely on the possibility of studying cannabis policy- 
making where policy-making is made, since political actors are capable of learning from past events, 
47  
developing different rationalisations of the process experienced throughout time. Additionally, the 
time gap between the occurrence of the output and the different studies potentially bears some well- 
known memory biases, such as the distortion and telescoping effects, losing the fine grain via the 
passage of time (Sutton, 2010). 
 
An important limitation of case studies regards the lack of counterfactual examples aiding to identify 
the role of converging local and international factors in the explanation of this legal change (Mjoset, 
2009; Goertz & Mahoney, 2009; Ragin, 1987). What would have happened if Uruguayan former 
president Mujica did not support cannabis regulation? Or, conversely, what would have happened if 
Mujica was the president of another Latin American country, for example? Would cannabis still be 
regulated in this hypothetical case? Counterfactual thinking aids in the evaluation of how necessary 
or sufficient the events included in the causal narrative are. The two strategies displayed for reducing 
this bias related with the lack of a counterfactual example were the arrangement of interviews with 
international experts, especially from other Latin American countries, in order to contrast some of the 
conclusions arrived at with the political processes occurring in other places. Additionally, I reviewed 
other policy options that were available and considered by the Uruguayan parliament in the period 
under study to clarify the role of different types of political actors (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007). 
 
More precisely, the legislative period under study is compounded by four parliamentary stages: first 
the cannabis law proposal is discussed in small  ‘ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƐ ? of either the upper  ? ‘Senadores ? ) or the 
ůŽǁĞƌ ? ‘Diputados ? )ĐŚĂŵďĞƌ ?/ŶƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƐ ?ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐĂ Ě ĞǆƉĞƌƚƐĐĂŶďĞĐĂůůĞĚƚŽ
express their positions on the topic under question, aiding the legislators to arrive to proposals how 
to improve a legal framework. Since 2011, two laws regarding cannabis were presented at the lower 
ĐŚĂŵďĞƌ ?Ɛ ‘ĚĚŝĐƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌŝŵƉĂĐƚŝŶhƌƵŐƵĂǇĂŶƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ P “Cannabis regulation for 
its consumption ? ůĂǁŽĨĞĐĞŵďĞƌ  ? ? ? ? ? ƐƉŽŶƐŽƌĞĚďǇhƌƵŐƵĂǇĂŶĐŝǀŝůƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ  “Cannabis 
monopoly for its selling ?ůĂǁŽĨƵŐƵƐƚ ? ? ? ? ?ƐƉŽŶƐŽƌĞĚďǇhƌƵŐƵĂǇĂŶǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞWŽǁĞƌ ?/ĨĂƉƉƌŽǀĞĚ
in the Commission, the law proposal is considered at the plenary session of the chamber. Yet, the law 
finally approved at the plenary session of the lower chamber, on the 31 of July 2013, was a third one 
called  “Cannabis Control and ZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ? law no 19172. Its consideration at the upper chamber started 
Ăƚ ƚŚĞ  ‘WƵďůŝĐ ,ĞĂůƚŚ ? ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ? ŽŶ ĞĐĞŵďĞƌ  ? ? ? ŝƚǁĂƐ ĂƉƉƌŽǀĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƉůĞŶĂƌy session, 
becoming a new element of the Uruguayan legal system. 
 
Along with the actual law, voted at the parliament, its regulatory framework elaborated by the 
Executive Power is important complementary material to understand how the new law works in the 
practice. The Executive Power presented the complementary regulatory framework in the following 
years: on recreational uses, including domestic cultivation, cannabis clubs and selling (Nº 120/014, 
06/05/2014); on Industrial Hemp (Nº 372/014, 16/12/2014); on Scientific and Medical uses (Nº 
46/015, 04/02/2015); and on alcohol, cannabis and other drugs consumption in work environments 
(Nº 128/016, 02/05/2016). 
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Figure 5. Cannabis legislative process 
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
 
This strategy of continuously contrasting other policy options that were available and considered by 
the Uruguayan parliament in the period under study provided a good opportunity to examine and 
ƌĞůĂƚĞ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ ďĞŚŝŶĚ ĞĂĐŚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ůĂǁ ?Ɛ ƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐ ? ĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ leading research 
questions: Who were the actors involved and how they networked as advocacy coalitions? Why did 
they want to regulate cannabis? And how did they manage to set policy agendas? 
 
 
4.2. Data and Methods 
 
This case study followed a qualitative strategy that attempted the triangulation of different sources 
based on participant observation, open semi-structured interviews and documents as main data 
collection methods. The objective was to compare and contrast different visions and positions on the 
topic as well as grasping the importance of time and timing in the political debate, arranging successive 
data collection instances with the same research participants. Formal and informal interviews, 
participant observation and relevant documents were then cross-checked as data sources to enhance 
ƚŚĞ ĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƐ ? ƌŽďƵƐƚŶĞƐƐ ? ĂŝŵŝŶŐ Ăƚ ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĐƌĞĚŝďŝůŝƚǇ ŽĨ ĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƐ ƚŚĂƚ ĂƌĞ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚ ĂĐƌŽƐƐ
multiples sources or revealing the weakness of some sources that might otherwise have been viewed 
as reliable (Tansey, 2007). 
 
Participant observation was a particularly important data source to determinate who the main actors 
involved in the Uruguayan cannabis policy reform were, to construct the sampling frame for network 
analysis, and to investigate how the problem of illegal cannabis and the suitable solution to it was 
framed. Along with the interviews conducted, it was also central for exploring why the regulation law 
came to prominence and set policy agendas. Documentary analysis was an important source of 
triangulation, especially regarding the Executive Power position on the topic, but also for reflecting on 
the implications of the political process for the future implementation of the law and for the global 
debate. 
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Participant observation 
 
As former studies have noted, in the field of policy analysis, participant observation is a rare and 
unique opportunity to provide a detailed picture of the actual social world of the policy-making 
process (Stevens, 2011). This kind of data collection method provides a privileged insight to assess the 
 ‘ƌĞĨůĞǆŝǀĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨĐŽŶĚƵĐƚ ?ƚŚĞĚŽƵďƚƐ ?ĐŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚƚĞŶƐŝŽŶƐŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĂů
environments of the political process (Hammersley & Atkinson 2007). Participant observation has 
been a powerful methodological tool in criminological fieldwork since its origins, with the strong 
influence of the Chicago School tradition. Cultural and critical criminology have championed this 
methodological practice, challenging some well-established preconceptions about the boundary 
separating researcher from research subjects, and re-framing participant observation as part of a 
larger goal of communicating with others -readers, viewers, community members- in the interest of 
progressive social change (Ferrell, 2009). 
 
Sustained by this tradition, two main periods of participant observation can be differentiated as data 
sources for this research. One starting before the arrangement of the PhD (2007  W 2013), facilitated 
by my membership in Proderechos (Pro-rights), a Uruguayan social organisation closely involved in the 
cannabis regulation debate. This personal background allowed me to develop an extensive network 
of long-term personal relationships and a peculiar opportunity to analyse this case very much from 
ƚŚĞ ‘ŝŶƐŝĚĞ ?ŽĨƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůǁŽƌůĚ ?ƵƌŝŶŐƚŚŝƐƐƚĂŐĞ ?/ attended a number of meetings with political 
representatives of every political party; the Informal Dialogues on cannabis regulation organized by 
the Uruguayan Drugs Committee, the Transnational Institute and WOLA; meetings of the National 
Coordinator for Marijuana Regulation; the Responsible Regulation campaign; meetings of the 
 ‘ĂĚǀŝƐŽƌǇŐƌŽƵƉ ?ĨŽƌĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶĐĂůůĞĚďǇƚŚĞEĂƚŝŽŶĂůƌƵŐƐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ?ƚŚĞFrente Amplio 
programmatic session on the Drugs issue, and the cannabis regulation implementation workshops in 
Denver, Colorado, arranged by the Drug Policy Alliance, among others. As I will discuss more in detail 
below, this background was key for identifying and accessing to my population of study as well as to 
a wide range of documents and meetings notes. Although highly valuable, the data thus gathered did 
not follow a structured methodological strategy, which limited the type of information collected. 
 
The second period of participant observation corresponds to the PhD fieldwork (2014  W 2016), when 
two types of participant observation activities were arranged. Firstly, I participated regularly in 
meetings of the NGO Proderechos ?ƚŚĞ “DŽŶŝƚŽƌŝŶŐĂŶĚǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇĨŽƌƚŚĞĂŶŶĂďŝƐ>Ăǁ ?
project sponsored by national and international civil society organizations in cooperation with the 
Uruguayan National Drugs Committee, and a social cannabis club growing site. Non-regular activities 
included events such as participating in meetings with civil servants, public demonstrations, research 
presentations, seminars and workshops on cannabis regulation. I followed two general criteria in 
order to decide what non-regular activities to prioritise. Firstly, the ones against cannabis regulation, 
in order to better grasp the dynamics within the opposition to the reform. Secondly, the activities 
jointly sponsored by the government, the international and national civil society organisations. The 
rationale behind this was my interest in exploring the policy transfer processes at play in the 
Uruguayan case, along with the tensions and cooperation mechanisms between these actors. 
Additionally, I tried to cover a wide range of grass roots activities to grasp the cannabis growers and 
ƵƐĞƌƐ ? views on the law, aiming to explore the possible obstacles and facilitators to its implementation. 
 
As noted by the Uruguayan historian Sempol (2013), the rapprochement between science and 
activism is a longstanding tradition in Latin America. This does not necessarily mean  ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐŝǌŝŶŐ ? 
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science, but rather being critical about the  ‘ŝĚĞĂů of ŶĞƵƚƌĂůŝƚǇ ? that  “certifies as value-neutral, normal, 
natural, and therefore not political at all the existing scientific policies and practices through which 
powerful groups can gain the information and explanations that they need to advance their priorities ?
(Harding, 1992, p. 569). Conversely, objectivity was pursued by seeking critical distance from the 
assumptions that have shaped my perceptions and convictions about the topic, discarding pleasing 
interpretations that cannot pass elementary tests of evidence and logic, and making an effort to enter 
sympathetically into the perspectives of my research participants regardless of their own position on 
the issue. 
 
Still, how my pre-existing -and ongoing- role as a drug policy reform activist may have influenced the 
present research? Firstly, I had much more knowledge about the people supporting cannabis 
regulation than about the opposition to reform. The common background with drug policy reformers 
made easier for me to enter intŽĨůƵŝĚĐŽŶǀĞƌƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚĂŶĚĞǀĞŶĐŽŶĨƌŽŶƚ ƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?
views over several topics. Alternatively, I had to be very careful reassuring the difference between me 
as a researcher and as a member of Proderechos, to try to obtain reliable data about the conflicts of 
other actors with this particular organisation. Secondly, in some participant observation activities I felt 
that I was not able to perform a detached attitude to allow the natural course of action, because it 
was expected from me to intervene in a meeting, to define a position and to give an opinion about 
desirable roads for action. In instances like this, it was very hard for me to disentangle how participant 
my participant observation should be. Thirdly, as a political activist, the selection of the whole 
approach of this thesis is strongly politically oriented. During fieldwork, prominence was given to 
politically involved actors and public campaigns. The analytical framework leading data analysis is 
based on three explanatory models from Political Science. If this thesis exists is because I believe that 
successive concerted action can change policies. 
 
In this ten-year enterprise, I developed a significant network of around 50 informants (see annex 1), 
some of them based on long-term personal relationships with whom I kept regular contact throughout 
this process. I took field notes, wrote memos, recorded conversations, and engaged in informal talks 
that allowed me to continuously explore and triangulate views over different topics. Overall, I believe 
that the data collected through participant observation significantly widened my access to insights 
about the political process, and particularly about sources of conflict, cooperation and controversy 
between different types of political actors, that the interviews and documents analysed tended to 
neglect. 
 
Semi-structured interviews 
 
Open semi-structured interviews were a central data source in order to review thoroughly the position 
of the research participant over certain topics, to explore emerging themes and to triangulate and 
validate data collected through other methods during my fieldwork. It was a particularly important 
method to explore the opposition to the reform. A guide with topics was used (see annex 2) during 
the interviews, in order to cover every dimension of analytical interest. This method allowed adapting 
the thrust of core questions in accordance with its pertinence to the particular actor interviewed, and 
to seek clarification and elaboration on the answers given, entering into a dialogue with the 
respondent (Legard et al., 2003). 
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Overall, members of the executive and legislative power were the ones hardest to get access to. In 
most of these cases, the interview was conducted at their office in the parliament. In this particular 
setting, the interviews were usually shorter than in other settings, and in some cases frequently 
interrupted by phone calls or inquiries from the parliamentariĂŶ ?Ɛ assistants. My previous experience 
in the topic allowed me to gather valuable complementary data to contrast and triangulate tools, but 
affected by a selection bias. 
 
In order to improve the reliability of the data collected and its further analysis, a history calendar 
including dates of important events which occurred during the political process was used as a guide 
during interviews (see annex 3). Life event calendars is a widely used method in social sciences to 
collect retrospective information about a range of topics. Still, most of these applications have 
occurred across disparate disciplines outside of criminology. It was designed to account for the role 
of cognition in response behaviour, reducing memory biases by manipulating how memories are 
tƌŝŐŐĞƌĞĚŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ ?ƌĞĐĂůůŵŽƌĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇ ?^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐĨŽƌĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐŝŶŐƌĞĐĂůů
with the life events calendar method have included using  ‘ďŽƵŶĚŝŶŐ ĐƵĞƐ ? to provide reference points 
ĨŽƌĨƵƌƚŚĞƌŵĞŵŽƌǇƌĞƚƌŝĞǀĂůĂŶĚŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŶŐ “ƐĞƋƵĞŶĐŝŶŐ ?ƚŽĨƵƌƚŚĞƌŝůůƵŵŝŶĂƚĞĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƚŚĞŵĞ
of interest (Sutton, 2010). In the context of this research, the use of this method proved to be useful 
for data collection, for the participants to recall the political process more efficiently, to recall the 
sequencing of intertwined events, and to use the timing of the most salient events to recall less-salient 
ones (Axinn et al., 1999). Additionally, the events calendar was also useful at the stage of data analysis, 
to analyse the relationships between ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĞǀĞŶƚƐ ?ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐĂŶĚ ‘ĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůĨĂĐƚŽƌƐ ?ǁŝƚŚ
the political process, enhancing the internal validity of the research design. 
 
Analysis of previous interviews 
 
Analysis of existing secondary data is one of the main research resources in social science. Data 
gathering is both costly and time consuming, for the researcher and for the participants. Oftentimes, 
the data already gathered by other researchers or institutions is under-analysed, missing an important 
chance to extend the understanding of social phenomena by providing a new interpretation of it. 
While there is a well-established tradition of conducting quantitative secondary analysis, qualitative 
interviews are seldom reanalysed. When possible, using existing data provides a good opportunity to 
study past opinions on issues related to the research questions, and to complement already 
completed analysis by focusing on specific issues (Heaton, 2008). 
 
Between October and December 2013, that is, at the same time that the cannabis law was undergoing 
the legislative vote, 15 semi-structured interviews with politicians, national and international activists 
ĂŶĚĐŝǀŝůƐĞƌǀĂŶƚƐǁĞƌĞƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬĞŶ ?ƐƉŽŶƐŽƌĞĚďǇƚŚĞůŽĐĂůE'K “Proderechos ? ?ĨŽƌĂĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚĂƌǇ
film aimed at describing the political process towards cannabis regulation4. Interviewees were 
selected through purposive sampling, according to their prominence in the political debate. All the 
participants consented to the public use of the information provided. These interviews were especially 
useful to grasp the evolution of the opinions of those interviewed in successive periods of time, 
contrasting this information with my own subsequent interviews and participant observation. 
 
 
 
4 Odriozola, Federika (2016): Cannabis en Uruguay. For more information: 
http://www.cannabisenuruguay.com/ 
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Documents analysis 
 
Documents analysis was also used in this research. Documents are important pieces of information; 
they ƌĞƉŽƌƚĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƐ ? ‘ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůǀĞƌƐŝŽŶƐ ? ?ĐŽŶŶĞĐƚĂĐƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚĞǀĞŶƚƐ ?ĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ?ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƐ
and conclusions (Bowen, 2009). Primary data from participant observation and open interviews was a 
key aid to sort through the abundance of evidence, prioritizing the most important documents and 
accessing to private or semiprivate documents. As common sense dictates, it is easier to find 
something when you know where to look. 
 
The written documents analysed included the transcripts of the legislative debate related to the 
different cannabis laws presented in parliament, the Strategy for Life and Coexistence document 
elaborated by the Uruguayan Executive Power, and the transcripts of radio hearings from former 
Uruguayan president DƵũŝĐĂ ?Ɛ radio programme Habla el Presidente (The President speaks), where his 
rationale for regulating cannabis is explained thoroughly (20/12/2012; 24/01/2013; 14/03/2013; 
07/05/2013; 01/08/2013; 06/08/2013). Transcripts of the National Drugs Committee meetings and 
the National Strategy on the Drugs Problem 2001  W 2015 and 2016  W 2020 were also reviewed, as were 
ƚŚĞhƌƵŐƵĂǇĂŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞƐĨŽƌƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽƚƌĂĐĞ
down the incorporation of the topic and evolution of the institutional positions. I also included 
briefings and reports elaborated by international civil society, as the Informal Dialogues on Drug Policy 
organised by Transnational Institute (TNI) and Washington Office for Latin America (WOLA) and 
several workshops related to the topic elaborated by Drug Policy Alliance (DPA). Most of these 
documents are public and available online on the respective organisations web pages. Additionally, 
ƚŚĂŶŬƐƚŽŵǇƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?ĐŽůůĂďŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?/ŚĂĚĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŽĂƌĂŶŐĞŽĨǁƌŝƚƚĞŶƉƌŝǀĂte meetings 
memorandums, workshops reports and public demonstrations manifestos that were important pieces 
of information as well. 
 
 
4.3. Sampling 
 
The selection of within-case causal process tracing as the general approach for the study of cannabis 
regulation in Uruguay has important connotations regarding the most suitable sampling procedures. 
As introduced above, 
 “the goal of process tracing is to obtain information about well-defined and specific events and 
processes, and the most appropriate sampling procedures are thus those that identify the key 
political actors ?  ƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽŚĂǀĞŚĂĚƚŚĞŵŽƐƚŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐŽĨŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ? ? ? ?
Consequently, random sampling runs against the logic of the process tracing method, as it risks 
excluding important respondents from the sample purely by chance. [Conversely] the ultimate 
goal is to reduce randomness as much as possible, and thus non-probability sampling approaches 
are the most appropriate ? ?dĂŶƐĞǇ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? 765). 
 
This is why in this research, privilege was given to the collection of a wide range of data of a very 
specific elite level set of actors, events, and processes, aimed at disentangling the causal mechanisms 
at play within the case. I tried to triangulate a diverse array of sites of analysis and events observed, 
conducting a number of serial interviews and informal talks with key informants. The population of 
interest was thus formed by combining purposive and chain-referral sampling methods. Purposive 
sampling was used in accordance with the studǇ ?ƐŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐĂŶĚŵǇƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŽĨ the 
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population. In addition, chain-referral techniques were deployed, aiming to avoid omitting politically 
important but publicly less visible actors deemed influential in the cannabis debate by their own peers. 
In this way, six types of actors of interest were identified: 
(i) Legislative Power: on the 17th of April 2010, a special legislative commission on  ‘ĚĚŝĐƚŝŽŶƐ
and their impact in Uruguayan ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? was created, in order to consider the many legislative 
proposals around drugs that had been presented at the parliament. This commission grouped 
together all the political entrepreneurs for and against the reform, and was responsible for 
drafting the bill that converted Uruguay into the first country in the world to regulate 
cannabis in 2013. Based on the legislative transcripts, I built a sampling frame summarising 
the number of times that each politician attended its meetings. Some of them attended every 
meeting and some of them only once or twice. For the selection of the interviewees, privilege 
was given to the ones attending most meetings on both sides - for and against the cannabis 
reform-, assuming that this group was the one most involved in the political process. In total, 
eleven interviews were conducted with members of the legislative power: three representing 
the Partido Nacional, six the Frente Ampio, one the Partido Colorado and one the Partido 
Independiente. 
(ii) Executive Power. Four interviews were conducted with members of the Uruguayan 
executive. One with the General Secretary of the National Drugs Committee, one with the 
first president of the IRCCA, and two with members of the Minister of the Interior. I also 
attended several meetings arranged by the National Drugs Committee and the Minister of 
the Interior for governmental actors to discuss the details of the cannabis law with 
Uruguayan and international civil society. 
(iii) Judicial Power: One interview was conducted with a national prosecutor. As explained 
before, in this thesis, privilege was given to politically involved actors and my research 
participants did not identify judicial power members as strategic actors in the political 
process. 
(iv) National Civil Society: Sixteen interviews were conducted with members of Uruguayan 
civil society groups both for and against the reform, ranging from cannabis activism to drug 
treatment institutions. Additionally, I participated regularly in meetings of the NGO 
Proderechos, and a social cannabis club growing site. 
(v) International Civil Society and cannabis activists: thirteen interviews were conducted 
with representatives of international civil society groups advocating for cannabis reform, 
based in several Latin American countries, Europe and North America. 
(vi) Professionals: Five interviews were arranged with Uruguayan professionals specialised 
in the topic of drugs, including lawyers, a journalist, a sociologist, a historian, a hemp 
entrepreneur and a Uruguayan Pharmacies Union representative. Additionally, I participated 
regularly in meetings of ƚŚĞ  “DŽŶŝƚŽƌŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ ǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶ ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ĂŶŶĂďŝƐ >Ăǁ ?
project sponsored by national and international civil society organizations in cooperation 
with the Uruguayan National Drugs Committee. 
 
Overall, I consider that an adequate balance of perspectives regarding the different types of actors 
involved and their positions on the topic was investigated. Members of the Executive Power were 
hardest to reach, and some of them refused to participate due to time constrains, as the former 
president of the National Drugs Committee, Diego Cánepa or former president Mujica. Doctors and 
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pharmacies representatives as well as members of the judicial sector (judges, prosecutors, etc.) were 
other problematic targets. The strategy for reducing this bias was triangulating data from other 
interviews -in particular with Frente Amplio legislative representatives and lawyers-, documents 
analysis and participant observation, especially within the National Drugs Committee. As a whole, I 
consider that this research work counted with the participation of a rich and diverse sample of political 
actors, which allowed me to reach a reasonable saturation point regarding the different perspectives 
playing a role in the Uruguayan debate. 
 
 
4.4. Gaining access 
 
As former studies about drug policy-ŵĂŬŝŶŐŚĂǀĞƐŚŽǁŶ ?ŐĂŝŶŝŶŐĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŽĂŶ ‘ĞůŝƚĞ-ů ǀĞů ?ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ
and particularly to the actual political debates and deliberations that precede decision-making and 
action, presents a number of difficulties (Stevens, 2011). Political decisions are usually surrounded by 
secrecy and important incentives may exist for political actors to either overemphasise or understate 
their own role in cannabis regulation, as well as considering some of the conflicts, collusions and 
agreements within and between different groups. In fact, it has been largely argued in social sciences 
that one ŽĨƚŚĞŬĞǇĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐŽĨ ‘ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŝŶŐƵƉ ?ŝƐƚŚĂƚƉŽǁĞƌŝƐŶŽƌŵĂůůǇƵƐĞĚƚŽŽƉĞƌĂƚĞďĞǇŽŶĚ
public scrutiny and thus remain unaccountable (Alvesalo-Kuusi & Whyte, 2018) 
 
Access does not only involves the opportunity to talk with certain population of interest but also in 
the right moment, when decisions are made. This because actors are capable of learning from past 
events, developing different rationalisations of the process experienced throughout time. In fact, in 
this research time appeared as an importaŶƚůŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶĂĨĨĞĐƚŝŶŐĨŝĞůĚǁŽƌŬ ?ƐƌĞƐƵůƚƐ ?dŚĞŽƉŝŶŝŽŶĂŶĚ
beliefs of many research participants changed after incorporating new information regarding the 
implementation process. Some people deeply re-evaluated opinions about the political process and 
the role of the different actors involved. Additionally, it made certain actors and groups directly 
involved in the implementation of the law particularly hard to get access to, as the Public Health and 
Interior Ministries. 
 
Furthermore, the novelty and international importance of Uruguayan cannabis regulation brought 
about an important and unexpected consequence for the researchers interested in this case. With the 
approval of the law in December 2013, the country broke into worldwide policy agenda. Suddenly, 
hundreds of journalists and dozens of researchers became keen to know about what Uruguay was 
going through and to have a first-hand testimony of a rather limited set of actors that have been 
involved in this process. Still, if ĞǀĞƌǇďŽĚǇ ?Ɛ time is worth money  Wand the time of political elites seems 
to be rather expensive-, I observed an increasing  ‘ĨĂƚŝŐƵĞ ? in my over-researched participants, as posed 
by Clark (2008), due to the ever increasing demand for interviews. 
 
One of the most important dangers of this research fatigue is the possibility of reification of discourses. 
Because of being asked very similar questions once and again, research participants may start to 
economise by elaborating a one-size-fits-all answer. I had a significant advantage in this regard due to 
my involvement in this process from the beginning. I had long-term knowledge about the case and the 
research participants, which allowed me to contrast the evolution of opinions through time. 
 
Additionally, confronted with a large demand of interviews, the claim  ‘ĨŽƌ the sake of ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ? in order 
to earn the ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ? collaboration may lose some of it effectiveness. In this regard, I came to think 
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that Social Sciences should be more concerned about the idea of reciprocity  Wthat is, the practice of 
exchanging things with others for mutual benefit- in order to make for the sake of science a more 
palatable claim for the ones directly engaged in it. As feminist approaches have largely contended 
(Weems, 2006; Adams, 1998), even if the idea of reciprocity was always an important part of 
qualitative thinking, a framework of mutual give-and-take between researchers and participants 
fostering the research process is not commonly reported in the academic world. Yet, as authors such 
ĂƐ,ĂƌƌŝƐŽŶĞƚĂůŚĂǀĞĂƌŐƵĞĚ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ) P “our experiences and interpretations and our tales from 
ĂŶĚŽĨƚŚĞĨŝĞůĚƐŚĂƉĞĂŶĚĂƌĞƐŚĂƉĞĚďǇŽƵƌƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƐŽĨƌĞĐŝƉƌŽĐŝƚǇ ? ? ? ?dŽŐĞƚŐŽŽĚĚĂƚĂ ? 
thick, rich, description and in-depth, intimate interviews ? we are enjoined to attend to reciprocity in 
our method ? ?dŚƵƐ ?ƌĞĐŝƉƌŽĐŝƚǇŝƐŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚĂƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚŝŶĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŝŶŐƚŚĞǀĂůŝĚŝƚǇ ?ĐƌĞĚŝďŝůŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚ
believability of research by making us, the researchers, trustworthy. Additionally, reciprocity may also 
ƉůĂǇ ĂŶ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ƌŽůĞ ĨŽƌ ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ĂƐ Ă ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ ĞŶĚĞĂǀŽƵƌ ?  “with research activity now at 
unprecedentedly high levels, research relationships that are supportive of future engagements are, 
therefore, increasingly important to the development of any present and future knowledge fields ?
(Clark, 2008, p. 954). 
 
Still, reciprocity and activism are two different things. As a researcher during fieldwork, I needed to 
continuously negotiate and make explicit what I could give and take. Moreover, it is also important to 
note that the idea of reciprocity as a guiding methodological principle does not depend on the 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐŽŶĂƚŽƉŝĐŽƌƚŚĞůĞǀĞůŽĨƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚŵǇŽǁŶŝĚĞĂƐ ?ďĞůŝĞĨƐ
and values. What reciprocity meant was negotiated on an individual basis, depending on the person 
and the type of fieldwork activity involved, usually offering a short jargon free report, systematising 
information available in the specialised literature about cannabis markets and regulation models. 
Offering to take notes during meetings, helping the participants to set goals, and to identify more 
clearly bottlenecks, agreements and dissonances among them was also a welcome strategy. I helped 
identifying and resolving problems of information, advising on how to use the law no 18.381 of  ‘WƵďůŝĐ
/ŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĐĐĞƐƐ ? ?/ĐŽůůĂďŽƌĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚĐƵƌĂƚŝŶŐĂǁĞďƉĂŐĞ5 targeted at adding transparency to the 
regulated cannabis market management, facilitating access to information and investigations about 
it. Overall, after completing my fieldwork, I have concluded that my previous experience as an activist, 
alongside the chosen methodological approach, enhanced more than tarnished the trustworthiness 
of my research, widening my access to data that I would not otherwise have been privy to. 
 
 
4.5. Ethical issues 
 
In terms of ethical issues faced, a first point that I had to work out was how to relate my activist role 
ƚŽŵǇ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌ ƌŽůĞĂŶĚ ?ŵŽƌĞƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇ ?ŚŽǁƚŽĚĞǀĞůŽƉĂĐƌŝƚĞƌŝŽŶŽĨƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ? ŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚ
consent, and what may be defined as private and public information in Social Science. Given that they 
were all politically engaged people, in the case of this research is impossible to make a clear distinction 
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘ƉƵďůŝĐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ ?ĂĐƚŽƌƐ ?Ɛcontended by Alvesalo-Kuusi and Whyte (2018) there are no 
straightforward ethical rules for scrutinising power, and to establish what should be considered as 
privacy and private information when researching up. 
 
 
 
 
5 http://monitorcannabis.uy/ 
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My experience as an activist offered me valuable data for writing a PhD about the topic. In some cases, 
I decided to use some of the notes and experiences from before the beginning of my formal fieldwork, 
such as the analysis of the Global Marijuana March  W the Uruguayan version organised in Montevideo 
ƐŝŶĐĞ  ? ? ? ? ? ƚŚĞ  ‘ĂĚǀŝƐŽƌǇ ŐƌŽƵƉ ? ŵĞĞƚŝŶŐƐ ĐĂůůĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞhƌƵŐƵĂǇĂŶ ƌƵŐƐ ŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ? Žƌ ƚŚĞ
international workshop on cannabis regulation implementation organised in October 2013. The 
strategy followed was whenever possible re-validating the data in new formal or informal interviews 
purposefully arranged during my PhD fieldwork, recalling together past events in order to get 
informed consent for its scientific use. Most people agreed on being referred as participant, 
collaborator of this research -in two cases they asked to remain anonymous. There were certain 
particular cases where I avoided publishing information because I considered it would harm the 
participants involved or because the people involved asked for not to be disclosed. 
 
During the PhD fieldwork, I aimed at being as open as possible about my engagement in this research 
and what its general aim was. Furthermore, Uruguay is a small country and as already mentioned 
many of my research participants were a delimited political elite population with whom I had relatively 
close relationships with. Hence, it was not even an available option to hide the fact that I left the 
country for a long period to engage in this PhD. There were cases when I decided not to disclosure my 
identity as a researcher because either was not practically possible  Wi.e. very brief interactions- or it 
would affect in a significant way the content and dynamic of the meeting. Ex post data triangulation 
was a key strategy for when I was interested in using data collected in this way, and to give people a 
chance to review what they had said. 
 
Further on, in accordance with traditional ƐŽĐŝĂůƐĐŝĞŶĐĞƐ ?ĞƚŚŝĐĂůƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐ ?/ǁĂƐƌĞƐƉĞĐƚĨƵůŽĨƚŚĞ
ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ? will in not answering some question or refusing participation whenever and for whatever 
reason they wished. Likewise, the findings are reported as accurately and truthfully as possible, giving 
special attention not to de-contextualise the opinions of the participants in any moment. Yet, it is 
important to note that in the case of this PhD thesis, most of the fieldwork was conducted in Uruguay 
and therefore not in English but in Spanish, for which a work of translation on my part was required. 
Still, as linguistic researchers have shown (Jacobsson, 2015; Ureña, 2012), the use of more culturally 
motivated metaphorical terms is significantly more common in Spanish than in English. Thus, for the 
ƐĂŬĞŽĨƌĞŵĂŝŶŝŶŐŐĞŶƵŝŶĞƚŽƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚ ?ƐŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ?ŝŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĐĂƐĞƐƚŚĞƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚŝŽŶŵĂĚĞŝƐŶŽƚ
literal but idiomatic. When no suitable translation was possible, the Spanish term remains. 
 
 
4.6. Data analysis 
 
Narrative analysis 
 
The data thus gathered as field notes, documents, interview transcripts and summaries was then 
organised around codes of interests using Nvivo 10 software for qualitative data analysis. To attempt 
to answer who were the main actors involved in the Uruguayan cannabis reform, the category  ‘ĂĐƚŽƌƐ ?
was used to organise data about the links, roles and perceptions of actors involved. It was broken 
down according to the six types of actors of interest defined in the sample, and more specifically to 
the groups or individuals involved. It included data about who were the advocacy coalitions, the 
political brokers and entrepreneurs, and the transference agents. 
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The category actors was then related to the question of what cannabis was regulated for in Uruguay. 
This category included data about the problem definition of illegal cannabis for the different political 
actors involved; the moral foundations appealed to; the different objectives that cannabis regulation 
should pursue; the political tools that should be included in the law, and how to evaluate them. 
 
The question of why cannabis regulation came to prominence and set policy agendas was 
disaggregated into two main categories. One included the political strategies deployed by those actors 
of interest as lobbying efforts, strategic venue shifting, mass mobilisation and public campaigns. It also 
included data about the cognitive agreements of this campaigning in terms of linguistics, framing and 
ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐƐ ?dŚĞŽƚŚĞƌĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚ ‘ĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůĞǀĞŶƚƐ ? ?ƚŚĂƚŝs, events not directly related with the 
Uruguayan cannabis debate but that had an influence in the domestic political process. Some of the 
ƚŽƉŝĐƐŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚǁĞƌĞƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶĚǇŶĂŵŝĐƐ ?ĨƌĞĞďĂƐĞĐŽĐĂŝŶĞ ?ĂŶĚƉƵďůŝĐŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ ? ‘ZĞůŝŐŝŽŶ ? ?
is an example of an emerging analytical code that evolved as a category of interest as I started to delve 
into data collected. Thus, a second wave of interviews was arranged with Latin American informants 
to further explore this topic. 
 
The other two research questions relate to the derivations of the political process for the further 
implementation of the law and for the global debate. Data for this category was organised around 
short and long-ƚĞƌŵŽďƐƚĂĐůĞƐĂŶĚĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚďǇĂĐƚŽƌƐĨŽƌƚŚĞůĂǁ ?ƐŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽn and 
the criteria according to which implementation should be evaluated. It also included opinions on the 
expected impact of the Uruguayan reforms for the international conventions arena as well as for other 
regional and domestic political processes, particularly in Latin America. 
 
Still, as a causal process tracing study, time was another important analytical perspective 
underpinning the research questions. Thus, the analysis categories listed above were subsequently 
related with different periods of the political process in order to assess the relative importance of a 
given piece of evidence by reflecting on the necessity and sufficiency of the causal claims for inferential 
purposes. More specifically, as aforementioned, I continuously contrasted three key steps in the 
ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ?&ŝƌƐƚůǇ ?ƚŚĞĞůĂďŽƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ “ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌŝƚƐĐŽŶƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶ ?
law of December 2011, sponsored by Uruguayan civil society. Secondly, the elaboration of the 
 “ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ monopoly for its ƐĞůůŝŶŐ ? law of August 2012, sponsored by the Uruguayan Executive Power. 
And finally, the approved  “ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ market ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ? law of December 2013. This strategy provided 
Ă ŐŽŽĚ ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇ ƚŽ ĞǆĂŵŝŶĞ ĂŶĚ ƌĞůĂƚĞ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ ďĞŚŝŶĚ ĞĂĐŚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ůĂǁ ?Ɛ ƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐ ?
connecting the leading research questions: Who were the actors involved and how they networked? 
How were the problem of illegal cannabis and the suitable political solution framed? How did 
cannabis regulation come to prominence and set policy agendas? 
 
Network analysis 
 
Social Network Analysis provided a powerful tool to study the conformation of advocacy coalitions in 
the cannabis debate, since it allowed focusing on the links between nodes rather than on the actors 
themselves. Each node being able to represent either an individual, an institution or a group, 
depending on the case. There are different ways of defining a network, and many times this is done 
by combination. The ties between individuals can be made up of a wide sample of relationships that 
go from resource interchange to affective evaluation. The most commonly used criteria are: (i) 
position-based, defined by the membership of certain institutions; (ii) Event-based, defined by the 
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participation in an event of interest; (iii) Relational-based, defined by chain-referral (Wasserman & 
Faust, 1994; Borgatti et al., 2013). 
 
In the context of this research, a network analysis is proffered, tracking down evidence of joint 
participation of political actors (both, individuals and groups) in cannabis regulation-related activities, 
ŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĞǆƉůŽƌĞƚŚĞĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚŝƐ ‘ƐƚƌŽŶŐĂŶĚĚŝǀĞƌƐĞĂĚǀŽĐĂĐǇĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ ? ?ĂƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚ
by previous works, and the development of the interactions among them through time. Furthermore, 
network analysis is a means to shed new light on the structural distribution of the linkages within the 
coalition, in order to analyse the importance of actors that have the ability to bridge gaps between 
agents that are not otherwise connected. Thus, network analysis is used to investigate the existence 
and evolution of advocacy coalitions in the Uruguayan case and the role of specific actors as brokers, 
transfer agents and entrepreneurs. 
 
There are, however, important limitations affecting the reliability of the data gathered for network 
analysis that need to be highlighted. In causal process tracing terms, the network diagrams may be 
interpreted as a  ‘ƐŵŽŬŝŶŐ gun ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ? (Blatter & Blume, 2008); that is, a ƐƵĸĐŝĞŶƚ but not necessary 
ĐƌŝƚĞƌŝŽŶ ĨŽƌ ĂĐĐĞƉƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĐĂƵƐĂů ŝŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ? dŚƵƐ ? ĂƉƉĞĂƌŝŶŐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĚŝĂŐƌĂŵ ŝƐ Ă ƐƵĸĐŝĞŶƚ ďƵƚ not 
necessary condition for being part of the coalition; there may have been other unidentified members 
as well. An additional limitation of network analysis is that it can be a highly time consuming 
methodological tool, whilst it also demanded considerable knowledge of relevant field data to be 
meaningfully constructed. 
 
The period under consideration goes from February 2011 until the approval of the cannabis law in 
December 2013. Throughout this period, the joint participation of political actors in a defined sample 
of cannabis related events of interest was systematised using UCINET 6 software for social network 
analysis, developed by Lin Freeman, Martin Everett and Steve Borgatti. The activities included in the 
analysis range from the organisation group of the Global Marijuana March  W the Uruguayan version, 
to the ad hoc cannabis regulation advisory group summoned by the National Drugs Committee to 
develop the new legal cannabis framework (see annex 4). Thus defined, the links between actors 
represent their attendance to meetings. Actors attending many meetings together will appear closer 
in the diagram. Actors that never attended a meeting together are not connected by links. 
Furthermore, by triangulation of the data collected, weights were attributed to the different types of 
participations in these events, distinguishing between organisers, speakers, and participants at one- 
off activities and active and passive members of serial group meetings. The first distinction was made 
under the assumption that organizing a one-off activity together is an indicator of a closer and more 
decisive link between participants than, for example, to participate as an invited guest. The weights 
for the serial meetings were operationalised as follows: first, setting a benchmark. Attendance at more 
than one meeting of the group would qualify one to appear in the diagram. I made this decision under 
the assumption that if an actor only went to one meeting then they were not substantially involved in 
the coalition. Secondly, for the actors surpassing this benchmark, the number of times they 
participated in the meetings was also weighted, aiming at differentiating the degree of integration of 
each actor within the coalition. Thus, by systematising the presence of different political actors in 
these events, the network analysis diagram presented shows the politicaů ĂĐƚŽƌƐ ? ĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ
actions over time, as defined by the Advocacy Coalition Framework. 
 
As it is analysed in this thesis, the advocacy coalition network diagram offers additional evidence on 
three important aspects for the research questions: first, it informs about who the actors pushing for 
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cannabis regulation were in the Uruguayan debate. Secondly, network analysis helps to expose the 
different roles and groupings of political actors within the coalition as a structure of relationships. 
Thirdly, it reflects the degree of coalition cohesiveness through the number of links connecting actors. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
This study generally aims at understanding why and how the Uruguayan political elite decided to put 
this country in the worldwide headlines becoming the first nation in creating an extensive legal 
framework for the cannabis market. More specifically, it questions who the main actors were behind 
the cannabis reform and how they networked. How the problem of illegal cannabis and its 
corresponding political solution was framed. How it succeeded in setting the legislative agenda and 
what might be the consequences of this political process for the implementation of the law and, more 
generally, for cannabis policymaking. 
 
In this way, this research attempts to offer a new and complementary insight within existing literature 
about drug policy, more centred on policy designs than on the political and social processes that made 
changes possible. In order to compare and contrast different visions and positions on the topic as well 
as enhancing the internal validity of the conclusions arrived participant observation was triangulated 
with interviews and documents, aiming at studying cannabis policymaking there where policy is made. 
dŚƵƐ ? / ĂƚƚĞŶĚĞĚ Ă ůĂƌŐĞ ŶƵŵďĞƌ ŽĨ ĞǀĞŶƚƐ ĂŶĚ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ŵĞĞƚŝŶŐƐ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?
representatives, policy makers and civil society where different issues regarding the creation and 
implementation of the new cannabis law were discussed. Additionally, I conducted around 52 formal 
and informal interviews with key actors of the political process, both for and against the reform, to 
review and elaborate thoroughly the position of the research participant over certain topics of 
interest. Lastly, I systematised and reviewed a diverse set of documents, both of public and private 
access, which included parliamentary transcripts, memorandums of meetings, transcripts of radio 
ŚĞĂƌŝŶŐƐ ĂŶĚ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ? ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞƐ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ  ? ? ? ? ĂŶĚ  ? ? ? ? ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ and public 
demonstrations manifestos, among others. 
 
The adoption of within-case causal process tracing as the general approach to study cannabis 
regulation in Uruguayan led me to reflect on the most suitable sampling procedures to employ. By 
combining purposive and chain-referral sampling I identified six types of actors of interest, involving 
Uruguayan legislative, executive and judicial power members, national and international civil society 
representatives and cannabis activists and a group of professionals; lawyers, a journalist, a sociologist, 
a historian, a hemp entrepreneur and a Pharmacies Union representative. Having defined the 
population of interest, I discussed more specifically ethical issues involved in entering and leaving this 
over-researched political elite level sample, proposing a framework of mutual give-and-take between 
researchers and participants fostering the research process. 
 
The analysis strategy followed, including the rationale underpinning narrative and network analysis of 
the data collected. I described some of the codes used to organise the data around the research 
questions, informed by a temporal dimension. In this way, I compared and contrasted the political 
processes behind other policy options that were available and considered by the Uruguayan 
parliament in the period under study. Lastly, I explained how an event-based network analysis 
comprising information about the shared participation of political actors in different cannabis-related 
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events may enhance our understanding of advocacy coalitions previously identified in the literature 
on the Uruguayan case. Thus, the period under consideration goes from February 2011 until the 
approval of the cannabis law in December 2013, including elite networking activities, public 
demonstrations, seminars and workshops, lobbying and advisory groups, among others. This 
innovative analytical strategy facilitated additional evidence on three important aspects for the 
research questions: who the actors pushing for cannabis regulation were, their different roles and 
groupings of political actors within the coalition as a structure of relationships, and the degree of 
coalition cohesiveness through time. 
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Chapter 5. The filling up of the political debate: a generational pace 
 
There is little controversy about the fact that cannabis has been used for spiritual, medical and 
recreational purposes since early humankind (Li, 1973; Guerra-Doce, 2015). It was only recently that 
cannabis started to be considered by most countries as a public enemy against whom an actual war 
should be waged, and even more recently, a wave of defections attempting to restore the amnesty 
with this plant can be observed. For some people, the Uruguayan decision to regulate cannabis meant 
an inspiring step forward, towards the dawn of a new policy era where the War on Drugs delusion will 
ďĞĨŝŶĂůůǇŽǀĞƌĐŽŵĞ ?&ŽƌŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?hƌƵŐƵĂǇĂŶĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚ ‘ŐŝǀŝŶŐƵƉŽŶĚƌƵŐƐ ?ĂŶĚ
the fight for curbing their use and, consequently, the related health and crime problems derived from 
it. In other words, as Multiple Streams theory highlights, cannabis was not always recognised as a 
problem in and of itself, and even if defined as a problem, ǁĂƐŶ ?ƚ always the target of public attention 
and policymaking. 
 
Therefore, this chapter is aimed at presenting the conflict that shaped the filling up of the Uruguayan 
political debate. I will analyse the sources of the cannabis problem for the section of civil society that 
started to push for its legalisation and managed to add cannabis cultivation for personal use to the 
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ĂŐĞŶĚĂ ? &ŝƌƐƚůǇ ? / ǁŝůů ĂƌŐƵĞ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ƉƌŽďůĞŵ ŽĨ ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ ƵƐĞƌƐ ? ƌĞƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ
translated into a matter of political controversy in the context of a generational conflict, where 
cannabis became part of a wider reform movement  WƚŚĞ ‘ŶĞǁƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂŐĞŶĚĂ- that included 
abortion rights and LGBTI rights. Thus, I will contextualise the emergence of a reformers advocacy 
coalition in Uruguay, that circumstantially comprised cannabis legalisers and harm reduction 
practitioners. 
 
Following, I will show how, in the context of this generational conflict, the exclusion of ´new rights´ 
topics across the political establishment became a key motivation for young activists to establish their 
ŽǁŶ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů  ‘ƐƚĂƌƚ-ƵƉƐ ? ? dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ? / ǁŝůů ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞ ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ ĂĐƚŝǀŝƐŵ ĂƐĂ ŶĞǁ ƚǇƉĞ ŽĨ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů
actor, with an uprising electoral share related with the increasing cannabis use rates. 
 
Lastly, I will discuss why the formerly rejected new rights agenda started to be filtered towards the 
political system. I will focus on the reorganisation of the Uruguayan political system that opened a 
window of opportunity that put Uruguay -one hundred years after ĂƚůůĞ ?Ɛ first secular modernisation 
of the state- at the vanguard of the civil rights agenda once again. I will analyse the interactions 
between civil society and the political system that led to the opening of a political window with the 
2004 Frente Amplio election, facilitated by the replacement of political generations as the main causal 
mechanism underpinning it. I will explain why, despite being a majority, the opposition to cannabis 
reform was weak and disorganised in Uruguay. 
 
Having outlined this first stage in the cannabis regulation process, I will conclude by defining the 
hƌƵŐƵĂǇĂŶ ĂƐ Ă  ‘ƌĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐ ǁŽƌůĚ ? ĐĂƐĞ ŽĨ ŵŽƌĂů ƉŽůŝĐǇ ĐŚĂŶŐĞ  ?ŶŐĞůŝ ? 'ƌĞĞŶ-Pedersen, & Thorup 
Larsen, 2013). As I will analyse further in the following chapters, I will contend that if the Uruguayan 
government would not have led the debate, under pressure by civil society, cannabis regulation would 
only have included personal cultivation mechanisms. 
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5.1. 8UXJXD\DQVHFXODULVDWLRQDQGWKHDGYHQWRIDµULJKWV¶ DJHQGD¶ 
 
Before international seminars on cannabis started to be organised in the fanciest conference rooms 
of Uruguay, before Uruguayan president Mujica even started talking about it, the cannabis legalisation 
ŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ǁĂƐ ďŽƌŶ ŝŶ DŽŶƚĞǀŝĚĞŽ ?Ɛ ƐƚƌĞĞƚƐ ? ĂŶĚ ŝƚ ǁĂƐ ĂŶorphan. It was an orphan because it 
started to flourish organically and highly disarticulated as a demand. 
 
As with every orphan, the day of its birth is hard to define. According to my interviewees, one of the 
first seeds of the cannabis legalisation endeĂǀŽƵƌŽƌŝŐŝŶĂƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞ ? ? ? ? ‘ŶƚŝZĂǌǌŝĂƐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?
movement, when dictatorship and democracy were still melting together and cannabis users were 
one of the preferred target of semi-ůĞŐĂů ƉŽůŝĐĞ ƌĂŝĚƐ ? ĂŵŽŶŐ ŽƚŚĞƌ  ‘ĚĞǀŝĂŶƚ ? ǇŽƵƚŚ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ
homosexuals or punks (Sempol, 2013). Thus, the Anti Razzias Coordination clustered around several 
youth groups reacting against the arbitrary detentions of cannabis users. According to my research 
participants, it was around this time that the first graffiti campaign could be read in Montevideo 
ƐƚƌĞĞƚƐďǇĂƚƚĞŶƚŝǀĞŽďƐĞƌǀĞƌƐ P ‘liberate prisoners for smoking ? ? 
 
Even when using cannabis was not considered a criminal act by law in Uruguay, the image of its users 
as deviant, sick people that needed to be treated was prevailing by the end of the 1980s. According 
to a specialised journalist, for example, during the Uruguayan dictatorship (1973 -  ? ? ? ? ) P “cannabis 
use was systematically associated with unstructured families, violence, prostitution, homosexuality 
and crime involvement ? (Journalist (Id33), interview). In his examination of the antidemocratic origins 
of the South American War on Drugs, a Uruguayan political scientist consulted found that repression 
against drug users was harsh in Uruguay; the anti-subversion and anti-drugs squads were deeply 
intertwined and the illegal repression flowed between the political and the drug policy arena (Political 
scientist (Id38), personal communication). Other members of the academy further supported this 
view, adding that the conflict between an authoritarian police and drug users endured during the 
dictatorship period: 
 “During the 1980s the ĚŝĐƚĂƚŽƌƐŚŝƉ ?Ɛ repression arms were still active and drug users were often 
taken to jail. Even if drug use was decriminalised by law, it was only theoretical and not a fact. 
And if you were taken to prison very often you were tortured. They took them in the razzias; 
the year 88 was famous because of that. At the same time, many users possessing small 
amounts of drugs for personal use or micro distribution ended up imprisoned. I went more than 
once to the worst prisons in Uruguay to see [drug users] patients. They were rough times, it 
was not as we see today, where drug users are treated, by most of the people, with respect and 
ĚŝŐŶŝƚǇ ?ŝŶ ƚŚĂƚŵŽŵĞŶƚƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞůŝŬĞ ?ƚŚĞůĞĨƚŽǀĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞĂŶŐĞƌŽĨ'ŽĚ ? ? ?ŽĐƚŽƌ ?ŝĚ ? ? ) ?
interview). 
 
As it was previously explained when reviewing the contemporary geopolitics (section 2.2), during the 
1980s the drug problem started to change in significant ways in Latin America. Firstly, as the only 
source and major transfer point for all the cocaine, most of the cannabis, and significant amounts of 
heroin consumed in the United States at that period, it became the worldwide focus of internationally 
endorsed prohibitionist policies. Secondly, in a severe social, economic and political context, with US 
supported civil-ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĚŝĐƚĂƚŽƌƐŚŝƉƐŝŶƐƚĂůůĞĚĂĐƌŽƐƐƚŚĞĐŽŶƚŝŶĞŶƚ ?ƌĞƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞ ‘ĚĞǀŝĂŶƚ ?
youth escalated. In Uruguay as in the rest of the southern cone countries, torture and disappearance 
ďĞĐŽŵĞƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇĐŽŵŵŽŶĐƵƌƌĞŶĐǇŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ĨŝŐŚƚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƐƵďǀĞƌƐŝŽŶ ? ?,ŝƐƚŽƌŝĂŶ ?ŝĚ ? ? ) ?ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ ) ?Ɛ
thoroughly demonstrated by Uruguayan historians such as Sempol (2013), even though the main 
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public target of repressive forces were left wing political militants, who become the mainstream 
international concern regarding Human Rights violations, minority groups as homosexuals or drug 
users were additional silent targets of illegal repression. 
 
At the same time, even when the laity approach to drugs prevailed in Uruguay and drug use was 
decriminalized by law, the intentional non-ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ ůĞĨƚ ƵƉ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ũƵĚŐĞ ?Ɛ ǭmoral 
conviction´ when drug possession should be considered solely for personal use. This non- 
determination principle significantly restricted in the practice what private acts remained out of the 
penal sphere, as explained by the lawyers interviewed. A member of civil society also highlighted this 
state of repression against cannabis users when he reviewed his main motivations for getting involved 
in the issue of drug policy reform: 
 “ ?ĂŶŶĂďŝƐ use] was the easy excuse to control, to repress, to frisk and to dismiss groups of young 
ƉĞŽƉůĞ ŐĂƚŚĞƌŝŶŐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƐƚƌĞĞƚƐ  ? ? ? ? ŽƉĞŶŝŶŐ Ă door for police abuse, to a police despotism ?
(National civil society representative (id17), interview). 
 
However, in the analysis of my interviews, it also became clear that this repression problem exceeded 
cannabis use as well as formal control institutions. Likewise the historian Sempol noted in his research 
ŽĨ ƚŚĞ hƌƵŐƵĂǇĂŶ >'d/ ƐŽĐŝĂů ŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ?  “we [the activist youth] went through the dictatorship 
thinking that we were liberated, but there was a fierce authoritarianism already entrenched, 
internalised. Uruguayans specialise in being a police to each other ?  ?^ĞŵƉŽů ?  ? ? ? ? ? Ɖ ?  ? ? ) ? DŽƌĞ
precisely, with the return of democracy by the end of the 1980s, a new generational lifestyle ethic 
started to flourish encompassing Uruguayan second demographic transition. An interviewed member 
of the academy, for example, described the return of democracy by the late 1980s and 1990s, as the 
ƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽŽĨĂǁŝĚĞƌĂŶĚĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚŝŶŐ ‘ĐƵůƚƵƌĂůĐŚĂŶŐĞ ?ƐŝŵŝůĂƌƚŽƚŚĞŽŶĞƵƌŽƉĞŽƌEŽƌƚŚŵĞƌŝĐĂǁĞŶƚ
through in the 1960s and 1970s: 
 “During the 1980s, along with the return of democracy, many things changed in Uruguay. There 
was a massive reclaiming of a number of liberalised customs among teenagers and youth 
sectors that since the 1970s were already imposed in the world, but in Uruguay were drowned 
ďǇ ƚŚĞ ĚŝĐƚĂƚŽƌƐŚŝƉ ? ĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌƐ ƌĞůĂƚĞĚ ƚŽ ƐĞǆ ? ĚƌƵŐƐ ? ŵƵƐŝĐ ? ŽƵƚĨŝƚƐ ? ?  ?,ŝƐƚŽƌŝĂŶ  ?ŝĚ ? ? ) ?
interview). 
 
Thus, for the activists involved in these causes advocating for legalisation, cannabis  Was well as 
abortion and sexual diversity rights- ƐǇŵďŽůŝƐĞĚ Ă ƌĞďĞůůŝŽŶ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ƚŚĞ ŽůĚ  ‘ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚĂďůĞ ĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ ? ?
Rhetorically, the problem was thus not only framed just as one of cannabis but a broader stand against 
ĂŚŝĞƌĂƌĐŚŝĐĂůĂŶĚĂƌďŝƚƌĂƌǇ ‘ƉƵďůŝĐŽƌĚĞƌ ?ǁŚĞƌĞ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ŚĞƚĞƌŽƐĞǆƵĂůrelationships or drinking 
alcohol were honourable but homosexual relationships or cannabis use were tolerated, at best - as 
long as they were kept out of the public eye. The new generations were no longer willing to preserve 
open secrets, such as illegal abortions. With liberty as a key binding moral foundation, a secularised 
 ‘ŶĞǁƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŐĞŶĚĂƌŽƐĞĂƐĂĚŝƐƐŝĚĞŶƚǀŽŝĐĞŝŶĂƐŽĐŝĞƚǇǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞŽŶůǇŚƵŵĂŶ
rights violations considered morally legitimate enough to politicise were the ones related to the 
ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ƉĞƌƐĞĐƵƚŝŽŶĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞĚŝĐƚĂƚŽƌƐŚŝƉ ?ƐĂŵĞŵďĞƌŽĨ
civil society defined it in the interviews, remembering the beginnings of the cannabis legalisation 
endeavour: 
 “What matters about this topic is not cannabis or drugs as such. Cannabis is a spearhead for a 
ĐƵůƚƵƌĂůƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ?tŚĂƚƚŚĞĚƌƵŐƐŝƐƐƵĞĂůůŽǁƐŝƐƚŽŵŽǀĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐĂŵŽƌĞůŝďĞƌĂůƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? 
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Not using drugs, but normalising their use. Because there is also a very important generational 
background: all these topics [drugs, sexual diversity and abortion] are against the old 
generations and in favour of the new ones. And Uruguay is one of the cruellest occidental 
countries regarding its youth, and topics like cannabis allow an empowerment of the new 
generations, showing them that we can defeat conservatives. Even if they own the mass media, 
the power, even if Uruguay has the oldest parliament in Latin America, the oldest president in 
Latin America, not only now but throughout our history ? ?EĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŝǀŝůƐŽĐŝĞƚǇƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ
(id17), interview). 
 
Thus, in this thesis, I propose that a key structural variable that needs to be considered to fully 
understand the Uruguayan cannabis debate is the accelerated secularisation process underpinning 
the referred cultural change. As proposed by moral politics literature reviewed in Chapter 3, this 
secularisation process is conceptualised as a secondary trace -a necessary but not sufficient condition- 
of a wider movement towards an ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ‘ĞƚŚŝĐƐŽĨĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇ ? ?ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐƚŚĞĞůĞĐƚŽƌĂůƐŚĂƌĞĨŽƌ
liberty-based political reforms. Secondary data on Latin American secularisation further supports this 
ƐƚĂŶĚ ?ƐŚŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ “Uruguay is a particularly interesting case because it is the only [Latin American] 
country where there has been an accelerated secularisation process ? ?>ĂƚŝŶŽďĂƌŽŵĞƚƌŽ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ) ?
More specifically, since 1995 there has been a constant decrease in religious believers among new 
generations and since 2006 the number of believers and non-believers is roughly the same. The main 
difference between Uruguay and the rest of Latin American countries is that in most of the continent, 
economic development was not directly correlated with secularisation, as it was in other parts of the 
world. As the graphic below illustrates, in most cases Catholics remain the large majority of the 
population, whereas in others, there has been an offset between Catholic and Evangelist religions. 
Interestingly, the only countries with a rapid increase of non-believers in the last decade were Chile 
and Uruguay (Latinobarometro, 2013). 
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Figure 6. Religions by country, 2013 (p. What is your religion?) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (Latinobarometro, 2013) 
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Thus, similarly to what others have found for the Dutch case (Grund & Breeksema, 2013), cannabis 
use naturalisation first came to the Uruguayan public consciousness as a generational conflict, in the 
much broader cultural context of the liberalisation of lifestyles and value systems that questioned 
victimless crimes legal frameworks. As reflected in secondary data, after dictatorship Uruguay was 
ŐŽŝŶŐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŝƚƐ ‘ƉŽůĂƌŝƐĞĚ ?ƐĞĐŽŶĚĚĞŵŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŚĞƌĞŽŶůǇƚŚĞŵŽƐƚĞĚƵĐĂƚĞĚ middle 
and upper classes were favouring this ethics of autonomy that saw the traditional institutional 
regulation of personal decisions as an imposition (Pellegrino, 2008). As public opinion surveys on the 
topic reflect, secular Uruguayans below 40, with higher educational attainment, living in urban areas, 
were the ones pushing for this liberty-based political reform - ƚŚĞt/ZĞƌƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ŝŶ,ĂŝĚƚ ?ƐƚĞƌŵƐ ? 
 
In parallel to the consolidation of a liberty-based  ‘ŶĞǁ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ? agenda, the 1990s were also the scenario 
of an international harm reduction policy transfer process that started to consolidate in Uruguay from 
ĂƚůůĞ ?ƐŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŽŶǁĂƌĚƐ ?ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞPartido Colorado (2001  W 2005). There is a strong consensus 
in existing literature (Garat, 2013; Walsh & Ramsey, 2015; von Hoffmann, 2015), further supported by 
my research participants, that in this period Uruguayan drug policies went through a deep review; 
turning from an impressively repressive framework with a totally prohibitionist approach to drug use, 
ƚŽƚŚĞĂĚŽƉƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ŚĂƌŵƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?ĂƐƚŚĞŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƉŽůŝĐǇ framework. 
 
As reviewed in the second chapter of this thesis, harm reduction is currently one of the most 
articulated alternatives to the War on Drugs approach. Originally coined in Western Europe, harm 
reduction methods are based on health education and health care, prioritising the reduction of harm 
over the prevention of drug use only, as prohibition does. Although usually presented as an amoral 
approach to drugs, as a policy proposal harm reduction has its mains philosophical roots in 
humanitarianism and libertarianism (Newcombe, 1992). Thus, along with liberty, care for drug users 
started to be considered as a value to be politically endorsed. 
 
This turn was prompted by a number of actors and youth social organisations in direct contact with 
problematic drug users. As a case in point, Julio Calzada -who in 2011 became the Uruguayan General 
Secretary of the National Drugs Committee and one of the main architects of the cannabis regulation 
law-, reflected in an interview about his motivations for getting involved with drug policy reform: 
 “After the dictatorship drug users were taken to the Vilardebó [a prison-like mental health public 
ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚǁĞƌĞ ‘ƚƌĞĂƚĞĚ ?ǁŝƚŚĞůĞĐƚƌŽƐŚŽĐŬƐĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚǇƉĞŽĨƐƚƵĨĨ ? ? ? ?tĞƐƚĂƌƚĞĚƚŽƐĞĞ
that there was a necessary social work that made us distinguish between drug use as a civil rights 
matter from drug use itself; this drug use was not a rebellious act, there were people doing great 
ŚĂƌŵƚŽƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ? ? ? ?Then we started to do something that had no name to us, which was 
working with drug users in their own circumstances. It was more a social than a sanitarian work. 
dŚŝƐ ‘ŚĂƌŵƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?ŵĂƚƚĞƌĐĂŵĞůŽŶŐĂĨƚĞƌ ?ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůůǇǁĞƌĞĂůƌĞĂĚǇĚŽŝŶŐƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ
that eventually ended up being labelled as harm reduction ? ?ǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞƉŽǁĞƌ W National Drugs 
Committee member (id12), interview). 
 
As posed by the interviewee, for the harm reductionist groups working in the country the problem of 
drug use was not framed as Ă Đŝǀŝů ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ŵĂƚƚĞƌ ? ĂƐ Ă ƌĞďĞůůŝŽƵƐ ĂĐƚ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ƚŚĞ ŽůĚ  ‘ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚĂďůĞ
ĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ ? ?ĂƐŝƚǁĂƐĨƌĂŵĞĚďǇĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐĂŶĚŶĞǁƌŝŐŚƚƐĂĐƚŝǀŝƐŵ ?/ŶƚŚŝƐĐĂƐĞ ?ƚŚĞŵĂŝŶďŝŶĚŝŶŐŵŽƌĂů
foundation was protecting and caring for young people that were doing harm to themselves. 
Originally, this politics moral concern rose from the personal experience of working with problematic 
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drug users and did not have a name. It was only during the 1990s, when a number of international 
conferences and exchange programmes with Europe brought the harm reduction repertoire to 
Uruguay, becoming popular especially among social workers due to the existing moral affinities noted 
by Calzada. 
 
ƵƌŝŶŐ ĂƚůůĞ ?Ɛ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ  ? ? ? ? ?  W 2005), a right wing liberal member of the Colorado Party - 
Leonardo Costa- ǁĂƐŶĂŵĞĚŚĞĂĚŽĨƚŚĞEĂƚŝŽŶĂůƌƵŐƐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ? “calling people from civil society 
to work on drugs, opening the doors to harm reduction ? ?ŽĐƚŽƌ ?ŝĚ ? ? ) ?ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ ) ?dŚŝƐƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞ
harm reductionist shift in the advocacy coalition in power was important for the cannabis debate in 
Uruguay because, despite not having cannabis legalisation as a political priority, in terms of politics 
moral foundations theory (Haidt, 2012) harm reductionists are better circumstantial allies for Western 
Educated Industrialised Rich and Democratic (WEIRD) people coalitions than prohibitionists. This is 
because despite mobilizing different moral foundations  Wnamely, cannabis personal cultivation on 
liberty and harm reduction on care- both harm reduction and personal cultivation are focused on the 
user-side of the problem, as opposed to a traditional prohibitionist stance focused on the supply-side 
and based upon loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion or sanctity/degradation foundations. 
Consequently, both personal cultivation and harm reduction frame drug policy mainly as a health issue 
 Wand not a criminal one- and both prioritise interventions over the context of drug use rather than 
over drug use itself. Conversely, whereas cannabis is the high priority target of the legalisation 
movement, for harm reductionists cannabis is very low on the agenda. This is because cannabis 
presents relatively low harms for its users compared to other illegal and legal drugs, in terms of 
indicators such as acute and chronic toxicity, addictive potency and social harm (Nutt et al., 2007; Van 
Amsterdam et al., 2010). Furthermore, in an interview for the media in 2000, Jorge Batlle became the 
first Uruguayan president in office to exercise the opinion that all drugs should be legalised, since the 
drug business is so huge that there will always be people willing to take the risk of getting involved in 
it; therefore it should be dealt with through economic and not just punitive initiatives (Montevideo 
Portal, 05/05/2008). However, his otherwise controversial message echoed in the void. 
 
 
5.2. Cannabis activism as political starts up 
 
ĂƚůůĞ ?ƐĐĂůů ĨŽƌĚƌƵŐƐ ůĞŐĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ŝƐĂŐŽŽĚĞŵƉŝƌŝĐĂůĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨŚŽǁ  ‘ĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůĞǀĞŶƚƐ ?ďǇ
themselves do not constitute political windows, but it is instead their interpretation and exploitation 
with greater or lesser skill by political actors that matters for policy change to happen. More precisely, 
there was a lack of a new type of political actor as proposed by Punctuated Equilibrium Model (section 
 ? ? ? ? ) ? ƚŚĞ ǀĂůƵĞ ?Ɛ ĐŚĂŶŐĞ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝŶŐ ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ ůĞŐĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐ Ɛƚŝůů ŽƌƉŚĂŶ Ăƚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŝŵĞ ? ŚĞŶĐĞ ? ŶŽ
public demonstration or lobbying efforts supporting the proposal were articulated. In this setting, the 
power relations were still so uneven that the anticipated negative reactions controlled the legislative 
agenda, keeping cannabis regulation outside the political window. 
 
The problem was that in the Uruguayan case, during the 2000s, this WEIRD youth started to realise 
that within the political establishment, neither the left nor the right political parties, nor the existent 
Đŝǀŝů ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ŐƌŽƵƉƐ ? ŚĂĚ ĂŶǇ ƌĞĂů ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ŝŶ ŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŶŐ ƚŚŝƐ  ‘ĐƵůƚƵƌĂů ĐŚĂŶŐĞ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞŝƌ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů
repertoire. In a conflictive regional context of neo-liberal ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ ? expansion, Uruguayan political 
concerns restrained to democratic transition issues and the economic agenda. Thus, for example, 
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throughout this decade, as many as seven referendums related to these issues were campaigned by 
the political elite6. 
 
In this particular context, to talk about human rights violations was still directly linked to the political 
ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ƉĞƌƐĞĐƵƚŝŽŶĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞĚŝĐƚĂƚŽƌƐŚŝƉƉĞƌŝŽĚ ?/ŶƚŚĞhƌƵŐƵĂǇĂŶ ‘ŚǇƉĞƌ-ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞĚ ?ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?ƐĞĞ
chapter 2), generational differences were accepted as long as they were not too obvious or too 
outrageous. Thus, the secularised new rights agenda comprising issues such as cannabis regulation, 
abortion regulation or gay marriage challenged a status quo whĞƌĞ  “ŽŶůǇ ƚŚĞ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?
differences were considered to be worthy of occupying the public space, whereas the rest of the topics 
were always considered as something secondary and most of the time even private ? (Sempol, 2013, p. 
32). As a cannabis activist expressed in my interviews: 
 “At the beginning most of the political system had the same thought about drugs as the rest of 
Uruguayan society; as my father or grandmother. That [using cannabis] was something morally 
wrong, that fighting for its ůĞŐĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐŵŽƌĂůůǇǁƌŽŶŐ ?ƚŚĂƚǁĞĚŝĚŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞĂŶǇƌŝŐŚƚƚŽ
consume it and even less right to consider it a right ?  ?EĂƚŝŽŶĂů Đŝǀŝů ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ
(id21), interview). 
 
Within the frame of this generational conflict, cannabis prohibition was considered an important 
ŵĞƐƐĂŐĞ ŝŶ ĂŶĚ ŽĨ ŝƚƐĞůĨ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ ůĞŐĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ǁŽƵůĚ ƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶ ĂĚƵůƚƐ ?
authority to protect young people. A member of a drug treatment institution opined in the interview, 
for example:  “we cannot leave youth free to consume what they want, they are our responsibility after 
all ? ?EĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŝǀŝůƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?ŝĚ ? ? ) ?ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ ) ?ƐĂƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞŽĨƚŚĞůŽǁĞƌĐŚĂŵďĞƌĨŽƌƚŚĞWĂƌƚŝĚŽ
Nacional explained in my interview: 
 “ ?ĨƚĞƌůĞŐĂůŝƐŝŶŐ ?ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ ?ǁŽƵůĚďĞŵŽƌĞaccessible, it is going to be easier. With a law you 
also give ƐŝŐŶĂůƐ ? transmit messages to society. If you say cannabis is legal, you say it is ok. Then 
if you discuss about it with a young person, he is going to tell you, but how is this bad? If it is 
lĞŐĂů ?ĚŽŶ ?ƚďŽƚŚĞƌŵĞ ? ?(Legislative Power  W Partido Nacional member (id2), interview) 
 
Here, cannabis legalisation is seen as a threat to generational authority, a way of subverting the family 
institution and the traditional values that ensure its stability and the hierarchies within it (Haidt, 2012). 
As a member of the upper legislative chamber for the Partido Nacional claimed, opposing the reform 
ŝŶĂƉƵďůŝĐĞǀĞŶƚ P “ ?Regarding cannabis] we need to talk as parents and not from a relativist culture ? 
(Jorge Larrañaga, 23/06/2013). 
 
The analysis of the political ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ? programmes content (Frente Amplio, Partido Nacional and Partido 
Colorado) for the 2004 elections further confirms this stance. I could not find any reference to cannabis 
regulation or other victimless crimes reforms, such as abortion regulation or gay marriage in these 
documents. This initial blockage towards the older political establishment was further confirmed 
through interviews and participant observation. At this stage, the political climate was not receptive, 
 
6 One referendum on partially repealing the law on public enterprises was celebrated in 1992. In August 1994, a 
new referendum was organised for splitting the vote for president, parliament and governors, set wages for 
councillors and the method of payment of pensions. Three months later, in November 1994, a double 
referendum was arranged, one on preventing cuts in pension payments, and one on the proportion of the state 
budget spent on education. In 1996 a referendum was held for an electoral reform and in 1999, there was a new 
double referendum, one on financial autonomy of the judiciary, and one on preventing directors of state-owned 
companies from becoming public servants. 
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hence, was not possible to translate the individual issue of cannabis use repression into social 
problems and then into public problems  Wor matters of political controversy. 
 
The exclusion of ´new rights´ topics such as cannabis, abortion or LGTBI rights by the political 
ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚďĞĐĂŵĞĂŬĞǇŵŽƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌǇŽƵŶŐĂĐƚŝǀŝƐƚƐƚŽĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ‘ƐƚĂƌƚ-ƵƉƐ ? ?
Thus, for example, in 2004 Ovejas Negras (Black Sheeps) currently the most important LGTBI advocacy 
group in Uruguay was created. Around 2005, the first three main Uruguayan organisations advocating 
for cannabis legalisation - ‘WƌŽĚĞƌĞĐŚŽƐ ? ?WƌŽƌŝŐŚƚƐ ? ?  ‘Asociación de Estudios del Cannabis ?  ?h )
[Cannabis Study Association] and Liberalisación del Cannabis [Cannabis Liberalisation] - were set up. 
As we will see throughout this thesis, these three organisations became key political actors in the 
Uruguayan process. 
 
Thus, Proderechos came as a spin-off, a rejuvenation of the Frente Amplio, aimed at updating the 
ůĞĨƚ ?ƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƌĞƉĞƌƚŽŝƌĞ ?Proderechos was interested in disputing the left orthodox by including a 
generational perspective within an ever-increasing gerontocracy. As a case in point of the former, 
from democracies recuperation on, there has been a marked increasing trend in the age of 
Uruguayan presidents, regardless of their political affinity. The Uruguayan political elite is, by 2017, 
one of the oldest in the world (López, 18/11/2016). As a founder member of Proderechos explains: 
 “dŚŝƐŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂĐƚŝǀŝƐƚƐǁĂƐĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƚŚĂŶƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐones, because we felt as legitimate as 
ĂŶŽůĚƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶĂƌǇƚŚĂƚǁĂƐŝŶũĂŝůĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞĚŝĐƚĂƚŽƌƐŚŝƉ ?ƚŚĂƚĨŽƵŶĚĞĚƚŚĞǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?ƵŶŝŽŶŽƌ
ƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶƚĞŵƉůŝŽ ?ƚŽĐůĂŝŵ ‘dŚĞdƌƵĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘dŚĞZŝŐŚƚdŚŝŶŐ ?ƚŽǁŽƌŬĨŽƌ ?ĨƌŽŵĂůĞĨƚŝƐƚƉŽŝŶƚŽĨ
view. When this fight for cannabis legalisation started it was highly unequal within the political 
ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ĂŶĚǇĞƚŽƵƌŵĂŝŶĐŽŶĐĞƌŶǁĂƐŚŽǁƚŽƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚǇŽƵŶŐƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ?ŚŽǁƚŽƐŚŽǁ
to the youth that through politics we could change certain things, even without owning 
economic power. Thus, borrowing from the new European social movements and the greens and 
all that stuff, we wondered what the mobilisation factor could be for the Uruguayan youth. And, 
basically, the only two battles that you could fight back at that time was abortion as a right and 
ĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŽůĞŐĂůĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐĂƐĂƌŝŐŚƚ ?(National Civil Society (id21), interview). 
 
According to my interviews with Latin American civil society representatives, Proderechos has an 
exceptional character within cannabis activism because of avoiding being issue specific. In the 
portfolio of reforms, this group integrate issues as diverse as human rights violations during the last 
Uruguayan dictatorship, women rights (including abortion regulation), LGTBI rights, crime policy 
reform and mental health reform. 
 
The other two groups  WAECU and Cannabis Liberalisation7- ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚ ŵŽƌĞ ĐůĞĂƌůǇ Ă ŐƌŽǁĞƌƐ ?
organisation, centring their problem definition on cannabis exclusively. Both originated by uniting 
concerned cannabis users and growers from Montevideo, who were organising autonomously to 
defend their rights. As explained by my research participants, before cannabis regulation most of the 
cannabis consumed in the country was smuggled as compressed bricks, from Paraguay through Brazil. 
In this context, organisations such as AECU emerge as a key political actor helping to create a cannabis 
growing culture in the country, widening the social base of the legalisation movement: 
 
 
 
7 hǁĂƐĨŽƌŵĞƌůǇŬŶŽǁŶĂƐ ‘WůĂŶƚĂƚƵWůĂŶƚĂ ?[Grown your own plant] and the Liberalisation Movement 
ǁĂƐĨŽƌŵĞƌůǇŬŶŽǁŶĂƐ ‘>ĂWůĂĐŝƚĂ ?[The Little Square]. 
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 “ ?/Ŷ AECU] we are creating growers every day. People first come to us asking for weed, and then 
we give them the first reality ƐŚŽĐŬ PŶŽ ?ůŽŽŬ ?ƚŚŝƐŝƐŶŽƚůŝŬĞƚŚĂƚ ?tĞĚŽŶ ?ƚƐĞůůǁĞĚ ?ǇŽƵŶĞĞĚ
ƚŽŐƌŽǁŝƚĨŽƌǇŽƵƌƐĞůĨ ?ĚŽŝŶŐƚŚŝƐĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ ?tĞŚĂǀĞŵĂŶǇĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚŐƌŽǁĞƌƐĂŶĚƚŚĞǇƐŚĂƌĞ
with each other growing techniques, ƐĞĞĚƐ ? We do indoor and outdoor growing workshops, we 
give ůĞŐĂů ĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ ? /Ŷ ƚŚŝƐ ǁĂǇ ? ĂĨƚĞƌ ƚǁŽ Žƌ ƚŚƌĞĞ ŵŽŶƚŚƐ ? ĂƐ Ă ŵĂƚƚĞƌ ŽĨ ĐŽŶƚĂŐŝŽŶ ?
ĞǀĞƌǇďŽĚǇ ƐƚĂƌƚƐ ŐƌŽǁŝŶŐ ƚŚĞŝƌ ŽǁŶ ǁĞĞĚ ?(National Civil Society representative (id22), 
interview). 
 
The importance of cannabis growers associations for the conformation of a cannabis culture has 
already been documented in previous works (Romaní, 2005; Marín, 2008; Barriuso, 2011; Pere, 2015). 
Through organisations as AECU, cannabis users learn values, attitudes and skills related to cannabis 
growing, forging a membership ǁŝƚŚĂǁŝĚĞƌŐƌŽƵƉ ?'ƌŽǁĞƌƐ ?ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŽĚŝƐƉƵƚĞ
the image of cannabis, as a mixture of empirical information and emotive appeals attached, usually 
promoting responsible consumption practices and harm reduction principles. They are also important 
to articulate a political demand among cannabis growers, brokering with a political establishment 
generally regarded as mistrustful: 
 “Cannabis growers were always far away from the political establishment, from the suit and tie 
people that speak well, that come from abroad and whom many times do not even know what 
a cannabis plant looks like or how to grow it. There is a natural mistrust in this type of people ?
(Journalist (id33), interview). 
 
During the 2010s, as consumption expanded cannabis use normalised in the urban areas of the 
country, turning from a marginal reality to a relatively common habit among new generations. Thus, 
for example, lifetime prevalence of cannabis use quadrupled in Uruguay between 2001 and 2014, 
jumping from 5.3% to 23.3%. By 2016, more than half of population between 18 and 35 years old living 
in Montevideo have tried cannabis (Monitor Cannabis, 2016). After northern richer countries as 
Canada or United States, Uruguay holds one of the highest cannabis use rates in the continent. 
 
Figure 7. Last year prevalence of cannabis by age groups, American continent 
 
Source: (OEA, 2015) 
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As with cannabis use rates, the growth of public demonstrations around cannabis indicate a pattern 
of expansion of the legalisation movement set around 2010. A journalist specialised on the topic, for 
example, observed in my interview: 
 “/ƐƚĂƌƚĞĚƚŽǁŽƌŬŽŶƚŚĞƚŽƉŝĐ ŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ?ďĞĨŽƌĞ /ĚŝĚƐŽŵĞũŽƵƌŶĂůŝƐƚŝĐƚŚŝŶŐƐďƵƚĂďƐŽůƵƚĞůǇ
disconnected from the agenda and from what the mass media was expecting, because drugs 
were not a topic, not at all. It was very hard to publish something about it, and if you wanted 
to do it, it was usually like  ‘ŽŬ ? you want to publish something about cannabis because you are 
ĂƉŽƚŚĞĂĚ ?ŝƐŶ ?ƚŝƚ ? ?There was this problem all the time. But also, really, there was no input to 
do it, because truly there was not any knowledge production around it, nothing was happening. 
But with the Frente Amplio winning, [the new National Drugs Committee secretary] Romani 
starting to talk about it, little by little things started to change ? ?:ŽƵƌŶĂůŝƐƚ ?ŝĚ ? ? ) ? interview). 
 
As remarked on by the interviewee, after the opening of the political window with the Frente ŵƉůŝŽ ?Ɛ
election of 2005, the state of affairs gradually started to change, and cannabis started to climb up the 
political agenda. The respondents identify a qualitative turn in the political process when, in 2007, the 
just created Proderechos, AECU and Cannabis Liberalisation joined in the Cannabis Liberation 
Movement as the main engine behind the Global Marijuana March, Uruguayan version  Wan annual 
rally for cannabis legalisation held every May at different locations across the world since 1999. As 
reported by my research participants, the semi-spontaneous provocations organized in the previous 
year nicely reflect the exponential dynamic of the taboo breaking process: in May 2005  Wtwo months 
after the Frente Amplio ?ƐŶĞǁŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚǁĂƐŝŶŽĨĨŝce- a loosely organised congregation to openly 
smoke cannabis exposed the degree of stigmatisation that could still be observed towards cannabis 
users. The few police officers around just watched, from a prudent distance, how around fifty people, 
many of them with their faces hidden, silently lit up joints together. In a tense atmosphere, no public 
manifesto or political speech was posed. For the following year, 2006, on top of this May smoking 
congregation, a new provocation was organised, this time in the central Independence Square. There, 
however, nervousness about the possible negative social reaction was still the prevalent feeling, as 
one of the activists present reflected: 
 “People would not even dare to say hi to each other... By itself the activity was not very 
successful -not many people were there-, but it was useful because it was a chance for the 
organisations around cannabis legalisation that existed at the time to meet each other and to 
start to plan a bigger activity together ? (National civil society representative (id21), interview). 
 
dŚƵƐ ?Ă “Movimiento por la Liberación del Cannabis ? ?ĂŶŶĂďŝƐ>ŝďĞƌĂƚŝŽŶDŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ?ǁĂƐƐĞƚƵƉŝŶ
the following months to officially organise the first Global Marijuana March, Uruguayan version 
(GMM-Uy from now on). It came as a surprise, even to its organisers, that the GMM-Uy would attract 
such large crowds amongst the Uruguayan youth, transforming it into one of the biggest public 
happenings in the country. As some of the organisers described in their interviews: 
 “We were very surprised by how many people reacted. Seven thousand people is a great deal in 
Uruguay; it is one out of a hundred young people of the entire country; it is one out of fifty of the 
youth of Montevideo city ? ?EĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŝǀŝůƐŽĐŝĞƚǇrepresentative (id17), interview). 
 “[The 2007 GMM-Uy] was something impressive for the social legitimacy of cannabis 
legalisation, not towards the political system yet, but towards the youth; until then, there were 
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organisations, intellectuals but there was not a movement. The GMM-Uy allowed the regular 
young folks to join, to feel part of it ? ?EĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŝǀŝůƐŽĐŝĞƚǇƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ ?ŝĚ ? ? ) ?ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ ) ? 
 
Thus, as noted before, the cannabis legalisation movement started to flourish organically and highly 
disarticulated as a demand, gaining political leverage with the generational pace of its increasing use 
rates. The May GMM-Uy gained rapid popularity and legitimacy as the flagship activity representing 
the demand of cannabis activists, establŝƐŚŝŶŐŝƚƐĞůĨŝŶDŽŶƚĞǀŝĚĞŽ ?ƐůĂŶĚƐĐĂƉĞĂŶĚĂƚƚƌĂĐƚŝŶŐŵŽƌĞ
and more people. Analysis of the GMM-Uy manifestos is used to reflect on how, year after year, the 
legal situation of cannabis users and cultivation for personal consumption remained the core political 
concern. For example, in 2008, in the parade manifesto, the organisers claimed: 
 “We do value that Uruguayan society has been making some steps further. Repression is 
gradually diminishing and most people already have an open attitude. There is more respect 
towards cannabis users than before; prejudices are falling. The outrage towards anyone who 
innocently has a plant in her own house is less frequent, though still occurring. We demand 
freedom for the people that are currently still imprisoned because of growing their own plants 
ĨŽƌƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůƵƐĞ  ? ? ?dŽŽŵĂŶǇhƌƵŐƵĂǇĂŶƐǁŚŽĚŽƐŵŽŬĞĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐƉƌĞĨĞƌ ƚŽŚŝĚĞ ŝƚ ?ĚƵĞ ƚŽ
hypocrisy. It would be nice to  ‘ĐŽŵĞ out of the ĐůŽƐĞƚ ? and say  ‘ǇĞƐ ? I smoke, so ǁŚĂƚ ? ?(Cannabis 
Liberalisation Movement - 2008 GMM manifesto, 03/05/2008). 
 
ƐƚŚĞŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚŽĐŽŶƚĞŶƚƌĞĨůĞĐƚƐ ?ǁŝƚŚ ‘ĨƌĞĞĚŽŵ ?ĂƐĂŬĞǇďŝŶĚŝŶŐŵŽƌĂůĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶ ?hƌƵŐƵĂǇĂŶĐŝǀŝů
society juxtaposed  ‘ŝŶŶŽĐĞŶƚ ? users who grow cannabis for personal use against those guilty of making 
a business out of it. &ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ?ƚŚĞƉůĞĂĨŽƌ  ‘ĐŽŵŝŶŐŽƵƚŽĨƚŚĞĐůŽƐĞƚ ?ĚƌĂǁƐĂƉĂƌĂůůĞůǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ
LGBTI figure of speech of self-disclosure of a behaviour formerly defined by mainstream society as 
deviant. The year after, in May 2009, the GMM-hǇŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĞƌƐ ?ŵŽƚƚŽ ?ŽŶĐĞĂŐĂŝŶ, was centred on 
 “Legal personal cultivation: freedom to plant ? ? Ɛ Ă ŶĞǁ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ĂĐƚŝǀŝƐƚ ? / ǁĂƐ ƉĂƌƚ ŽĨ ƚŚŝƐ ƉĂƌĂĚĞ ?
Cannabis leaf flags and giant joint costumes surrounded me. Here, some concrete traces of the 
integrative  ‘ŶĞǁ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ? agenda emerged as well. At the demonstration, I watched a rainbow flag from 
the LGTBI movement crossing the park, accompanied by plenty of orange hand signs asking for  “Legal 
abortion - Uruguay ? ?ƉĂƌƚŽĨĂĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶƚŚĂƚĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƐŽĐŝĂůŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐǁĞƌĚŝƐƉůĂǇŝŶŐĂƚthat 
time. Similarly, in a clear sign of solidarity across movements, the 2009 gay pride parade celebrated 
ǇĞĂƌůǇ ŝŶ DŽŶƚĞǀŝĚĞŽ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚ ŝŶ ŝƚƐ ŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚŽ Ă ĐůĂŝŵ ĨŽƌ  “cannabis personal cultivation 
depenalisation ? ?ŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŽƌĨŽƌ^ĞǆƵĂůŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ ?ŝǀĞƌƐŝƚy Parade manifesto, 25/09/2009). 
 
^ƚŝůů ?ŝƚŝƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŽƌĞŵĞŵďĞƌƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐƐĞĐƵůĂƌŝƐĞĚ ‘ŶĞǁƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?ĨƌĂŵŝŶŐĚŽĞƐŶŽƚŶĞĞĚƚŽďĞƚŚĂƚ
way by nature, and in fact in most cases it is not. As contrasted in my interviews with Latin American 
activists: 
In ƌŐĞŶƚŝŶĂ ? “the social movement is not united, there is not any articulated strategy among 
them. Cannabis is not visualised as part of a wider reform movement but it is centred on cannabis 
personal cultivation ? ?/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŝǀŝůƐŽĐŝĞƚǇƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ ?id41), interview). 
In Mexico,  “there is not any unifying reform proposal. The drug policy debate is overcrowded but 
it is also paralysed because nobody articulates with each other, so there is no way of reaching 
collective decisions ? ?/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŝǀŝůsociety representative (id46), interview). 
In Brazil,  “the base of the social movement is cannabis activism. We are attempting to articulate 
with other demands, as feminism, sexual diversity, black people, youth, but we still lack a 
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bridging organisation among them and within the political system ? ?/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŝǀŝůƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ
representative (id43, interview). 
Furthermore, in Uruguay also, this way of defining the problem of illegal cannabis as part of a wider 
agenda was not free of controversy, yet it was deliberately sponsored by a sector of the social 
movement. An Uruguayan political scientist reflected about this in a discussion about the topic: 
 “What I like about the new rights activism is that it has been pedagogical. I still remember some 
years ago, that I was listening to the manifesto speech at a Diversity [Gay Pride] Parade. This 
manifesto included a reclaiming of cannabis cultivation for personal use legalisation and a boy 
next to me started to complain: why putting these two things together? Why include cannabis 
legalisation in a LGTBI demonstration? Yet, by now, this question would sound strange: the 
ƐƚƌĂŝŐŚƚĨŽƌǁĂƌĚĂŶƐǁĞƌ ŝƐ ƚŚĂƚďŽƚŚĂƌĞƉĂƌƚŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŶĞǁƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?ĂŐĞŶĚĂ ?  ?WŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚ
(id39), personal communication). 
 
In cŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶ ?ŝŶƚŚŝƐƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ/ĞǆƉŽƐĞĚŚŽǁĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞhƌƵŐƵĂǇĂŶĚŝĐƚĂƚŽƌƐŚŝƉ ?ƚŚĞŶĞǁƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?ĂŐĞŶĚĂ
was rejected across the political establishment leading to the conformation of a new type of political 
actor: the cannabis activist. I characterised cannabis activism as a political start up with a rising 
 ‘ĞůĞĐƚŽƌĂů ? share  Wthe increasing cannabis users and supporters of the secularised  ‘ŶĞǁ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ? agenda. 
Thus, I have argued that for the Uruguayan case specifically, cannabis policy change was framed by 
ĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĚƐĞĐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨĐŝǀŝůƐŽĐŝĞƚǇĂƐƉĂƌƚŽĨĂƐĞĐƵůĂƌŝƐĞĚ  ‘ŶĞǁƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?ĂŐĞŶĚĂ ?ǁŚŝĐŚƐƉĂŶƐƚŽƉŝĐƐ
such as abortion and LGBT rights, with liberty as a key binding moral foundation. In the next section, I 
will analyse the process of incorporation of these new rights into the political ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ agenda, 
as the replacement of old political generations with new generations started to disrupt the political 
ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ƐƚĂƚƵƐ quo. 
 
 
5.3. Installing a conflict in the political system: the 
reorganisation of political parties 
 
In the previous sections, I characterised the cannabis regulation problem as a generational conflict 
within the process of the Uruguayan demographic transition. Thus, I started proposing that one 
ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ‘ĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůĞǀĞŶƚ ? ?^ĂďĂƚŝĞƌ ?:Ğnkins-Smith, 1993) playing a role in the Uruguayan political 
ĚĞďĂƚĞ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ƌĂƉŝĚ ƐĞĐƵůĂƌŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ? ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĞůĞĐƚŽƌĂů ďĂƐĞ ĨŽƌ Ă ǁŝĚĞƌ  ‘ŶĞǁ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?
political reform, where liberty became the key binding moral foundation of the different demands 
involved (Haidt, 2012). However, as moral politics literature suggests, the move towards 
permissiveness poses more of a puzzle than a simple shift (Engeli, Green-Pedersen, & Thorup Larsen, 
2013). Thus, I showed how, at the beginning, this new rights agenda was rejected across the political 
establishment, which become a key motivation for the creation of a new type of political actor: the 
cannabis activism. Accordingly, this section is devoted to explore a key intermediate variable in moral 
politics change, that is, whether or not the party system contains a conflict line between secular and 
confessional parties to politicize morality issues. 
 
Standing on the shoulders of the new visibility achieved by cannabis activism, the lobbying efforts of 
civil society started to reflect a higher permeability within the political system. One of the direct 
ĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ? ? ? ? ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ĐƌŝƐŝƐ ?  “one of the most important ones in the history of the 
country ? ?sŝŐŽƌŝƚŽ ?WĞůůĞŐƌŝŶŽ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ) ?ǁĂƐƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨthe Uruguayan long-standing 
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ďŝƉĂƌƚŝƐĂŶŝƐŵ ?ƐĞĞƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ) ?ƚŚŝƐƚŝŵĞďĂƐĞĚŽŶƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵ ƚŝĐĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶĂ ‘ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ?
block (Partido Colorado and Nacional )ĂŶĚĂ ‘ƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞ ?ŽŶĞ ?Frente Amplio) (Yaffé, 2013). Founded 
in 1971, the Frente Amplio represented a wide and highly fractionalised urban-based coalition 
integrating the minority left wing sectors within the Partido Nacional and Colorado, the Christian 
ĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ?^ŽĐŝĂůŝƐƚĂŶĚŽŵŵƵŶŝƐƚƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ? ƚŚĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĞĚǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?ƵŶŝŽŶĂŶĚƐŽĐŝĂůŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?
The novelty of the time was that the Frente Amplio ĨĞĂƚƵƌĞĚĂŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞůĞĨƚ ?ƐŝĚĞŽůŽŐǇ ?
composing a new type of catch-all local socŝĂůĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ?ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞ “ƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇŝƐďƵŝůƚŽǀĞƌĂ
re-reading of history and a re-invention of tradition ? (Lanzaro, 2010, pág. 51). In parallel, the formerly 
clear antagonisms that differentiated the traditional Partido Nacional and Colorado started to blur, 
both ideologically turning right, and its supporters got relatively used to cross voting among them, 
opposing Frente Amplio. Two electoral trends have been identified in the literature underpinning the 
conformation of this new bipartisanism, which symbolically consolidated with the 2004 Frente Amplio 
national election: a migration of voters from the Partido Colorado to the Frente Amplio since 1977, 
ĂŶĚ Ă  ‘ĚĞŵŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐ ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ? ƐŝŶĐĞ  ? ? ? ? ? ǁŝƚŚ ĂŶ ŽǀĞƌƌĞƉƌĞƐ ŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ Frente Amplio preferences 
amonŐ ƚŚĞ ŶĞǁ ǀŽƚĞƌƐ ? ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇ ? ĂŐĞ ďĞĐĂŵĞ Ă ŶĞǁ ŬĞǇ ĞůĞĐƚŽƌĂů ǀĂƌŝĂďůĞ  ?Ğ
Armas, 2009). Since then, the Frente Amplio has successively won the elections of 2004, 2009 and 
2014 with roughly above 50% of the votes; hence, achieving legislative majority. 
 
As expected by Flanangan and Lee (2003) in their analysis of culture wars in advanced industrial 
democracies, once the economic crisis of 2001 started to be overcome in Uruguay and new 
battlefields were required on the electoral arena, the formerly rejected new rights agenda found a 
renewed interest among political elites. As long as the political agenda on democracy transition and 
economic issues started to be worn out, the political elite had to opt to either deepen the already 
established refŽƌŵƐŽƌůŽŽŬĨŽƌŶĞǁĞůĞĐƚŽƌĂůďĂƚƚůĞĨŝĞůĚƐƚŽĚŝƐƉƵƚĞƚŚĞǀŽƚĞƌ ?ƐƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ Wthat 
is, the new rights agenda. 
 
This interest for victimless crimes legal reforms further accentuated in the second Frente Amplio 
government (2010  W 2015). For the party in power, the new rights agenda started to be seen as an 
opportunity to, on one hand; differentiate itself from the right wing Partido Nacional, and on the other 
hand, to dispute for the Batllista tradition within the Partido Colorado. As I posited in section 2.1 of 
this thesis, the Partido Colorado ?Ɛ ĂƚůůŝƐƚĂ ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶ ? ĚĞĞƉůǇ ƌŽŽƚĞĚ ŝŶ hƌƵŐƵĂǇĂŶ ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? ǁĂƐ
responsible for leading the secularised modernisation of the state at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, putting the country at the worldwide vanguard of the civil rights agenda. Thus, the 
ŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŶĞǁ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ĂŐĞŶĚĂ ĂůůŽǁĞĚ ƚŚĞ ĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ ƉŽǁĞƌ ƚŽ  “ƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƌĞ- 
ĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶĂů ? aims of the left wing government.  ? ? ? The allusions to the  ‘ĂƚůůŝƐŵŽ ? were continuously 
present in the [new rights] parliamentary debates ?  ?^ĞŵƉŽů ?  ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ?  ? ? ? ) ?ƐƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽŽƉƉŽƐĞĚ
reform reflected in my interviews, as part of the new rights agenda, cannabis regulation politicised, 
ĞǆƉŽƐŝŶŐ Ă ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ Ă  ‘ƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞ ? ďůŽĐŬ ĂŶĚ Ă ‘ĐŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞ ? ŽŶĞ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ĂůůŽǁĞĚ ƚŚĞ
translation of the individual issue of cannabis use into a matter of political controversy: 
 “The thing is that in this country [cannabis regulation] has been politicised, thus you are right 
minded and conservative if you are against it, and progressive and left minded if you are in 
favour, and that is stupid ? ?EĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŝǀŝůƐŽĐŝĞƚǇƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ ?ŝĚ ? ? ) ?ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ ) ? 
 “DǇŽƉŝŶŝŽŶŝƐŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ ?ďƵƚŶŽƚĨƌŽŵĂƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞŽĨďĞŝŶŐĂŐŚĂƐƚ ? ?WĂƵƐĞ ?ƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŶŐ ?ŶŽƌŝŶ
this dynamic that it has being presented, as if [it was about] conservatives vs. progressives. I do 
ŶŽƚĨĞĞůĐŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞ ?ĞǀĞŶǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ P/ĂŵĂǁŽŵĂŶ ?/ĂŵŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞǇŽƵŶŐĞƐƚ 
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legislators, so that is not my perspective ? ? ?>Ğgislative power  W Partido Nacional member (id1), 
interview). 
 
There is a strong consistency across research and public opinion polls available that most of Uruguayan 
people position themselves against cannabis regulation. Confronted with the question:  ‘Ž you agree 
Žƌ ĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞ ǁŝƚŚ ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ ůĞŐĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ĞǀĞƌǇ ǇĞĂƌ ƐŝŶĐĞ  ? ? ? ? ? ŵŽƌĞ ƚŚĂŶ  ? ?A? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ
ƌĞƉĞĂƚĞĚůǇĂŶƐǁĞƌĞĚ P “ĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞ ? ?ƐŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞĚďĞĨŽƌĞ ?ƚŚŝƐĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐůĞŐĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ
is strongly generational: among the youth and the educated (WEIRD) people, support is twice as high 
compared to that among older generations (Bioidi et al. 2015). 
 
Notwithstanding the diffuse rejection of cannabis regulation at the level of public opinion, one of my 
main targets during fieldwork was to trǇ ƚŽĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚ ŝĨ ƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐ ƐƵĐŚĂ ƚŚŝŶŐ ĂƐĂ  ‘ŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞ ?
coalition opposing cannabis policy change. I could not find any evidence of a nontrivial degree of 
coordinated activity over time for a variety of actors, as the theory requires, or any co-organised public 
activity that could lead me to conclude that this conservative coalition existed. This does not mean 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞǁĞƌĞŶŽ ‘ŽƉƉŽƐŝŶŐĞŶƚƌĞƉƌĞŶĞƵƌƐ ?ĂƐ/ǁŝůůĚŝƐĐƵƐƐďĞůŽǁ ?ďƵƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĚŝĚŶŽƚƐĞĞŵƚŽ
perform as a coordinated group. According to some of my research participants, the status quo against 
cannabis reform was so deeply rooted among the general population and the mass media that it was 
not felt necessary to organise a strategic opposition to cannabis regulation. 
 
In his researcŚŽĨƚŚĞhƌƵŐƵĂǇĂŶĐĂƐĞ ?sŽŶ,ŽĨĨŵĂŶĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞĚůŝŬĞǁŝƐĞƚŚĂƚ P “Considering popular 
rejection of legalization, the opposition was surprisingly weak. There were no concerted efforts, 
organized  protests,  professional  campaigns  or  formation  of  a  rivalling   advocacy   coalition ?
(von Hoffmann, 2015, p. 91). Nevertheless, in this thesis, I contend the idea that once the Uruguayan 
secularisation process is taken into account, this weakness of the opposition to the reform should not 
be regarded as surprising as it first appears. 
 
According to the data gathered during fieldwork, the main opposition was publicly led by a sector of 
the Partido Nacional, strongly linked to both the Catholic and the Evangelist church and religious 
therapeutic communities for problematic drug users, with the lower chamber representatives 
Verónica Alonso and Gerardo Amarilla as the main moral entrepreneurs. At the hotspot of the public 
debate, a  ‘ƌĞĚ ůŝŐŚƚ ? turned on among the religious based political elite, as posed by an interviewed, in 
order to resist the imposition of a WEIRD cultural change at the legislative level. In fact, the 2015 
national election in Uruguay marked a conflict-ridden turning point regarding the relationship 
between religion and politics in the countƌǇ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŶĞǁƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?ĂŐĞŶĚĂĂƐƚŚĞŵĂŝŶĞŶŐŝŶĞĨŽƌŝƚ ?Ɛ
an Evangelical pastor, coordinator of the Eslacu-Beraca therapeutic community for problematic drug 
users, linked to the Partido Nacional stated in a media interview: 
 “In this election, among many believers a red light has turned on. Many pastors and Christian 
congregations are going to support more explicitly certain candidates and to engage politically 
 ? ? ? dŚĞ &ƌĞŶƚĞ ŵƉůŝŽ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ŚĂƐ ĂƉƉƌŽǀĞĚ Ă ŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨ ůĂǁƐ ? ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ ŐŽŝŶŐ ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ
cannabis legalisation, that impose a cultural change against the values that we defend ?
(Márquez, 15/15/2013). 
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However, as explained by a Uruguayan historian in the interview extract below, these religious based 
political elite has a relatively weak veto and lobbying power in Uruguay, which he related to hƌƵŐƵĂǇ ?Ɛ
early secularisation, reviewed in section 2.1. 
 “One of the historical legacy is the weakness of the Catholic conservative thought in Uruguay. 
That fact in some way enables the approval ŽĨĂƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨůĂǁƐ ?ŝƚ ?ƐŶŽƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐĞĂƌĞŶŽƚďĞŝŶŐ
discussed in other parts of the world, but in Uruguay this new generational common sense could 
be politically processed with less resistance ? ?,ŝƐƚŽƌŝĂŶ ?ŝĚ ? ? ) ? interview) 
 
An illustrative counterexample to gauge the importance of this finding for the installation of a conflict 
line between secular and confessional parties to politicize morality issues is the Argentinean case. 
According to my interviews with Argentinean activists, drug policy reform reached a political 
ŵŽŵĞŶƚƵŵŝŶƚŚŝƐĐŽƵŶƚƌǇǁŚĞŶ ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽƵƌƚĚĞĐůĂƌĞĚĚƌƵŐƵƐĞƌƐ ?ƉĞŶĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ
unconstitutional and, in 2012, a new Drug Agency chief started to call for a debate over drug policy 
reform to privilege a health focus over criminalisation. When a law to de-penalise drug consumption 
and cannabis personal cultivation was about to be discussed in parliament, the archbishop of Buenos 
Aires at the time -and current Pope- Jorge Bergoglio, along with other members of the Church, began 
a public campaign against the legislators supporting this law proposal. The influence of the Church 
was so significant that not only was the law proposal never considered, but also  W a few months later 
- ĂƉƌŝĞƐƚ ? ‘&ĂƚŚĞƌDŽůŝŶĂ ? ?ǁĂƐnamed the new head of the Drug Agency, aiming at restoring amnesty 
with this institution. Furthermore, on the day of his designation, former president Cristina Fernández 
ůŝƚĞƌĂůůǇĞŶƚƌƵƐƚĞĚŚŝŵƚŽůĞĂĚĂ “very active policy to look after our flock ? ?/ŶƚĞƌŶational civil society 
(id40), interview). Exploring the role of religious actors in the Uruguayan debate, a member of the 
Uruguayan NGO Proderechos reflected that: 
 “While we were campaigning for cannabis regulation I remember one time an Argentinian radio 
called me to have a small interview. At one point, they asked me what the reactions in Uruguay 
were when Bergoglio complained publicly about cannabis legalisation. To be honest, that 
question surprised me; I was dumbfounded, did not really know what to answer to the journalist. 
The thing is that, among the Uruguayan political elites, what a Pope has to say about politics is 
not really an argument that you could use to support ĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐ ? more likely it would be the other 
way around ? ?EĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŝǀŝůƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ(id18), interview). 
 
As posed by the interviewee, whereas in the Argentinian case the negative opinion about drugs reform 
of a religious based elite actor triggered a number of direct reactions across the political system 
blocking policy change, in Uruguay this type of discourse does not has the same veto power. 
Conversely, the public support of religious actors to a legal reform it might even been strategically 
used to discredit the proposal. 
 
Complementarily, as contrasted in my interviews with Brazilian political actors, in countries where 
religious institutions are powerful and widespread, it can also work as binding glue for political 
ĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶƐ ? dŚƵƐ ? ĨŽƌ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĐĂƐĞ ŽĨ ƌĂǌŝů ? ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ? ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞƐ ?
ĐŽŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ǀĂŶŐĞůŝƐƚůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞŐƌŽƵƉ ? Wgathering 373 of the 513 legislative representatives- 
ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇ ŚŝŶĚĞƌƐ  ‘ŶĞǁ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ? ƌĞĨŽƌŵƐ ? ŬĞĞƉŝŶŐ ĚƌƵŐ ƌĞĨŽƌŵ ŝƐƐƵĞƐ ŽƵƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞ ĂŐĞŶĚĂ ?
Diametrically opposed was his description of a reformers group in this country: 
 “Currently, there are very few politicians in Brazil openly supporting cannabis regulation. Even 
those who agree on it are extremely shy to talk about it, they are hardly articulated and they 
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don´t count with a strong political group to lean on ? ?/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŝǀŝůƐŽĐŝĞƚǇƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ
(id43), interview). 
 
On the contrary, in the Uruguayan case, every explicitly religious based political actor belongs to the 
same group within the Partido Nacional, with no unifying alliance across parties. When I explored the 
issue of the opposition to the Uruguayan reform in an interview, for example, a journalist noted that: 
 “The message against [cannabis regulation] is unarticulated. The only articulation that you may 
find are the evangelists, but they are dead. Many things unite and separate them and us: 
ĂďŽƌƚŝŽŶ ?ŐĂǇŵĂƌƌŝĂŐĞ ?ŵĂƌŝŚƵĂŶĂ ?&ŽƌƚŚĞŵŝƐƚŚĞƐĂŵĞŝŶ ƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞƚŚĂƚŝƐĂůůƉĂƌƚŽĨŽŶĞ
agenda, but they are hardly articulated ? ?:ŽƵƌŶĂůŝƐƚ ?ŝĚ ? ? ) ?ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ ) ? 
This lack of an organised, strategic conservative coalition made the opposition to the reform not only 
less visible but also less decisive, paving the way for the strategic use of the new rights agenda in the 
exacerbation of the conflict between secular and confessional parties to politicize morality issues. 
Thus, even though most Uruguayans remained firm in their opposition to the reform, there was not 
any  ‘ƉƵŶŝƐŚŵĞŶƚ ǀŽƚĞ ? for the politicians who supported it and, beyond that, 51% of Uruguayans opted 
ƚŽ ‘ƐĞĞǁŚĂƚŚĂƉƉĞŶƐ ?ŽŶĐĞthe reform received political approval, rather than actively trying to stop 
it (El Observador, 2014). Complementary, the lack of a conservative coalition allowed politicians to 
evaluate cannabis legalisation as a political decision that was part of the parƚŝĞƐ ?ďƌŽĂĚĞƌĂŐĞŶĚĂ ?
rather than a personal decision based on first principles. 
 
 
Additionally, only in my interviews with religious based civil society members the issue of cannabis 
consumption was explicitly framed appealing to the sanctity politics moral foundation, as a matter of 
perversion, as defined by the member of a religious based drug treatment institution quoted above. 
For the legislators opposing cannabis regulation, the issue of cannabis consumption was framed as a 
public health problem but never as a sin that should be directly punished. Their opinion was centred 
on the premise that the wider availability of cannabis after legalisation would increase the amount of 
cannabis consumed in the country and, consequently, the amount of other drugs consumed, as in the 
 ‘ŐĂƚĞǁĂǇ ŚǇƉŽƚŚĞƐŝƐ ? (Kandel et al., 1978; Cohen & Sas, 1997; MacCoun & Reuter, 2001). In some cases, 
ƚŚĞƌĞ ǁĂƐ ĂŶ ĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŵĞŶƚ ƚŚĂƚ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ ƵƐĞƌƐ ? ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ŵŝŐŚƚ ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞ ĂĨƚĞƌ
legalisation  Wfor example, in relation to the controlled quality of the legal product- but this was by far 
ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌĂĐƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞŐůŽďĂůůŽƐƐ ?ƐŝŶĂ ‘WĂƌĞƚŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐůĞŐĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĐŽƵůĚŶŽƚ
improve one party's situation without making another party's situation worse. As a member of the 
Partido Nacional explained in an interview: 
 “It has been argued that cannabis legalisation will increase the quality of the drug consumed and 
it will give legal guarantees to its users. None of these arguments, not all of them together 
surpass the social negative consequences that problematic drug use creates. Drugs are toxic and 
addictive substances that create multiple familiar, social, individual and collective health 
consequences that generate a huge cost to the country ? ?>ĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞWŽǁĞƌ W Partido Nacional 
member (id3), interview). 
 
Like the reformers, the opposition also framed cannabis regulation as circumstantially linked with 
harm reduction tools, a framework sponsored by the government that should likewise be rejected. 
Conversely, from this point of view, drug use harms should be principally prevented but not reduced. 
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As the main entrepreneur opposing the reform, a member of the lower chamber for the Partido 
Nacional stated in an interview: 
 “ ?>ĞŐĂůŝƐŝŶŐ ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ ?seems ĞǀĞŶ Ă ƌĞƐŝŐŶĞĚ ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞ  ? ? ? ? dŚĞ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ƐĂǇƐ P ƐŝŶĐĞ
prohibition has failed, we are going after legalisation. Prohibition may have failed in the ǁŽƌůĚ ?
ƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐŽĨƚŚĂƚ ?ƵƚŝĨǇŽƵĂŶĂůǇƐĞŝƚ ?ƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵŝƐŚĂƌŵƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?
and I feel that harm reduction may be an effective option to improve the life quality of certain 
ƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƚŝĐĚƌƵŐƵƐĞƌƐďƵƚĂŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚƌĞŐĂƌĚŝƚĂƐ ‘dŚĞ ?ƉƵďůŝĐĚƌƵŐƉŽůŝĐǇ ? ? ? ?/
think we need to go a step backwards attempting to reduce both drugs demand and supply and 
then may be also harm reduction, but certainly not only that ?  ?>ĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞPower  W Partido 
Nacional member (id1), interview). 
 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that religious beliefs and drug policy positions are not 
straightforward. There are certain religions, as the Rastafarian, where cannabis reaches the status of 
a holy herb, as a key vehicle for purity and virtuosity. Also within Christianity, the link between 
religiosity and drug policy options can be under question. The reaction of a Christian member of the 
Frente Amplio in the media is a good illustration of this phenomenon: 
 “too often I have been hearing that religious people are with the Partido Nacional or with the 
traditional parties, as if there were no Christian peŽƉůĞǀŽƚŝŶŐĨŽƌƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶƚĞŵƉůŝŽ ? ? ? ?>ĂǁƐ
like cannabis regulation, abortion depenalisation and equal marriage are very complex issues, of 
great sensitivity among citizens, among Christians and in the church, and we cannot talk about 
them in a light way. But Christianity as a political option should not be manipulated and reduced 
ƚŽĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨŵŽƌĂůŶŽƌŵƐĂďŽƵƚƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐďŽĚǇŽƌƐĞǆƵĂůŝƚǇ ? ?ZĞĚĂĐĐŝſŶ ? ? ? ? 07/10/2014). 
 
As was already discussed in previous sections, this secularised new rights agenda is a rather concrete 
output of the Uruguayan political process resulting from a concerted effort to install a conflict within 
the political system. Thus, as expected by moral policy theory (Engeli et al ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ƌĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐ
ǁŽƌůĚ ?ƚŚĞĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƉĂƌƚŝes in government is central to understand cannabis reform. In these 
cases, cannabis legalisation did not depended on an issue-ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ ?ĂƐŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ƐĞĐƵůĂƌǁŽƌůĚ ? ?
but an unifying tendency towards permissive regulation across the different sub-fields of victimless 
crimes could be observed when confessional parties are not in government. In the Uruguayan case, 
the Frente Amplio election opened a window for a wave of political secularisation mirroring the 
demographic transition reviewed in section 5.1. In this way, alongside cannabis, a number of victimless 
ĐƌŝŵĞƐ ?ůĞŐĂůĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬƐǁĞƌĞƌĞǀŝĞǁĞĚĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞƉĞƌŝŽĚ ? ? ? ?  W 2015. More specifically, in 2007, 
hƌƵŐƵĂǇ ďĞĐĂŵĞ ƚŚĞ ĨŝƌƐƚ >ĂƚŝŶ ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ƚŽ ĂƉƉƌŽǀĞ Ă  ‘ŽŶƐĞŶƐƵĂů hŶŝŽŶƐ ? ůĂǁ  ?>Ăǁ EǑ
18.246, 27/12/2007) to enhance the legal status of unmarried couples, independently of their sexual 
ŽƌŝĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? /Ŷ  ? ? ? ? ? ƚŚĞ ƉĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ĂƉƉƌŽǀĞĚ ƚŚĞ  ‘^ĞǆƵĂů ĂŶĚ ZĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝǀĞ ,ĞĂůƚŚ ? ůĂǁ  ?>Ăǁ EǑ
18.426, 01/12/2008) aimed at integrating sexual and reproductive teaching in the education system 
and to legalise abortion. However, in a highly controversial move president Vazquez (Frente Amplio) 
vetoed the article on abortion after it was approved, for going against his own personal and religious 
principles. Also in 20 ? ? ?ƚŚĞhƌƵŐƵĂǇĂŶƉĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚǀŽƚĞĚŝŶĨĂǀŽƵƌŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ZŝŐŚƚƚŽĂ'ĞŶĚĞƌ/ĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ?
law (Law N° 18620, 25/10/2009) consecrating the possibility for transgender people to change their 
/ĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƐ ?/ŶƚŚĞƐĂŵĞǇĞĂƌ ?ƚŚĞĂĚŽƉƚŝŽŶ ?ƐŵŽŶŽƉŽůǇǁĂƐŐŝǀĞŶƚŽƚŚĞƐƚĂte (taking it out from 
institutions such as the Church) including unmarried couples as possible adoptive parents. In practice, 
this implied the possibility for homosexual couples to adopt. During the second Frente Amplio 
administration, with President José Mujica in office, the delayed  ‘sŽůƵŶƚĂƌǇ Interruption of WƌĞŐŶĂŶĐǇ ?
law (Law N° 18987, 22/10/2012) that regulated abortion was given parliamentary approval for the 
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second time in 2012. In 2013 it was the turn of the  ‘ƋƵĂů DĂƌƌŝĂŐĞ ? law (Law Nº 19.075, 03/05/2013), 
which not only gave homosexual couples the right of marriage, but also made optional which of the 
ƉĂƌĞŶƚƐ ? last name is registered first, under the assumption that imposing the one of the father was a 
gender-biased practice. 
 
The analysis of the parties voting behind each of the above mentioned new rights legislations clearly 
reflect the reorganisation of the political parties described in this section: civil society lobbied the 
Frente Amplio  Wwhich had the parliamentary majority- to incorporate the topics in the legislative 
agenda. The Frente Amplio, not without strong internal disputes, ended up supporting the new rights 
agenda and satisfying its demands in its portfolio of reforms. The Colorado and the Independiente 
parties found themselves divided, leaving decision-making power up to each political member. Finally, 
the majority of the Partido Nacional systematically opposed the reforms. In this way, the new rights 
agenda played a key role exposing a conflict between a secular  “ƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞ ? block and a confessional 
 “ĐŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞ ?ŽŶĞ ?ĂůůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ŝƐƐƵĞƐ ŝŶƚŽƐŽĐŝĂůƉƌŽďůĞŵƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŶŝŶƚŽ
public problems  Wor matters of political controversy. 
 
In the context of this changing victimless crimes legal culture, each new detention of cannabis growers 
resounded publicly as never before, becoming a key motivation for the involvement of new activists. 
In this way, in February 2011, cannabis regulation reached a political momentum when the intentional 
non-ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƵŶĚĞƌƉŝŶŶŝŶŐĚĞĨĂĐƚŽĚĞƉĞŶĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƵƐĞƌƐĐůĂƐŚĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ “moral 
conviction ? ?>Ăǁ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ?ƌƚ ? ? ? )ŽĨĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇƉƵŶŝƚŝǀĞũƵĚŐĞ ?ŶŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƐƉĂƌŬĞĚďǇ
ĂŶĂŶŽŶǇŵŽƵƐŶĞŝŐŚďŽƵƌ ?ƐĐŽŵƉůĂŝŶƚůĞĚƚŽĐŽƵƌƚ ?ǁŚĞƌĞ the said judge sent two cannabis growers 
ƚŽŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌƐƚƉƌŝƐŽŶƐŝŶhƌƵŐƵĂǇ ?dŚĞĐĂƐĞŽĨ ‘ůŝĐŝĂĂŶĚDĂƵƌŝĐŝŽ ?ƋƵŝĐŬůǇďĞĐĂŵĞĂƐǇŵďŽůŽĨ
everything that was wrong in the Uruguayan illegal drugs law framework, allowing cannabis activism 
ƚŽ ĨŝŶĚ ŝƚƐ  ‘DĂƌƚǇƌƐ ? ? /Ŷ ĨĂĐƚ ? ƚŚĞ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨ ƚŚŝƐ ƚǇƉĞŽĨ  ‘ƚŝƉƉŝŶŐƉŽŝŶƚ ?ĞǀĞŶƚŚĂĚĂůƌĞĂĚǇďĞĞŶ
observed in other research on cannabis policy reform. In Jamaica, police abuse led to the tragic dead 
of Mario Deane of Rosemount, after suffering from serious head injuries he received at the Barnett 
Street Police Station in Montego Bay just hours after he was arrested for a cannabis cigar. As explained 
by a Jamaican researcher interviewed: 
 “It was this story that led to a general outcry against the draconian approach of the Dangerous 
Drug Act and ultimately led to greater public pressure for amending the law. Incidences such 
as this led to the objective of decriminalization of small quantities and the implementation of 
a miniscule fine of $500 ? ?/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŝǀŝůƐŽĐiety (id52), interview). 
 
In the Uruguayan case, Alicia, a well-known 70-year-old Argentinian cannabis activist, was denounced 
for having fifteen un-flowered plants. A few days later, the same fate was reserved to Mauricio, a 39- 
year-old father of two children who directly witnessed how the police violently took their father for 
having seven un-flowered plants in their garden. In this way, the unfairness of a cannabis prohibition 
that condoned its use but denied its users any legal means to access the plant, along with the flagrant 
irrationality of feeding an already overcrowded Uruguayan prison system with cannabis users, finally 
had a name and a face. A spontaneous protest in front of the Court House reflected the state of public 
indignation; cannabis activists felt that something needed to be done. As a specialised journalist 
pointed out in my interview: 
 “The tipping point that moved me to become more involved in the cannabis legalisation process 
you may say was the thing with Alicia and Mauricio. I went to visit them in prison, not as a 
journalist but as a visitor. I had to pass through two police reviews to enter into the place; I had 
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to bear all the police mistreatment, the long waiting. I saw the state of the jails, overcrowded, 
ƚŚĞ ǁĂůůƐ ĂůŵŽƐƚ ĨĂůůŝŶŐ ĚŽǁŶ ? ƚŚŝƐ ŵŽǀĞĚ ŵĞ ? ŵĂĚĞ ŵĞ ƚŚŝŶŬ ? ŚŽǁ ŚĂǀĞ ǁĞ ĂƌƌŝǀĞĚ Ăƚ
something like this? Why has a 70 year old lady ended up in a place like this? ? (Journalist (id33), 
interview). 
 
The criminalisation of Alicia and Mauricio is another good ĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨŚŽǁ ‘ĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůĞǀĞŶƚƐ ?ĂƌĞŶŽƚ
only important by themselves but also in their exploitation, with greater or lesser skill, by political 
actors. Confronted with this reality, cannabis activists decided to set their sights on the formulation 
of a new cannabis law that the lawmakers were more likely to support than to create. As a member 
of AECU, one of the most important cannabis activism groups in Uruguay reflected in the interview: 
 “Policy makers were telling us that we were very noisy complaining but we were missing any 
concrete proposal over the table. So that is what we did, we decided to put hands on a cannabis 
legalisation proposal ? ?EĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŝǀŝůƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?ŝĚ ? ? ) ? interview). 
 
dŚƵƐ ? Ă  ‘ĂŶŶĂďŝƐ ZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ĨŽƌ ŝƚƐ ŽŶƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶ ? ůĂǁ ƐƚĂƌƚĞĚ ƚŽ ďĞ ĂŐƌĞĞĚ ĂŵŽŶŐ Đŝǀŝů ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ
organisations and a cross party alliance amongst progressive members of the Frente Amplio, Partido 
Independiente and Partido Colorado. This law synthesises the main consensus within the reformers 
advocacy coalition that was leading the political process before the government irruption in the 
debate, which is the focus of the following chapter. As its main objective, the law was aimed at 
 “updating the legal framewoƌŬ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ ĐŽŶƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶ ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌƐ ? ? ? ?
accepting it as a common social habit ?  ?ĂŶŶĂďŝƐ ZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ĨŽƌ ŝƚƐ ŽŶƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶ ?  ? ? ? ? ? Ɖ ?  ? ) ?
Furthermore, the law attempted to resolve the legal contradiction that  “forces the citizens that desire 
to consume to infringe the law by not having any legal means to have access to it ? ?/ďŝĚ ?Ɖ ? ? )ĂŶĚƚŽ
 “avoid the judicial discretion that generates juridical insecurity ?  ?/ďŝĚ ? Ɖ ?  ? ) ďǇ ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŝŶŐ ĐůĞĂƌ
possession benchmarks. Additionally, by allowing cannabis personal cultivation, the law would help 
ƚŽĚŝŵŝŶŝƐŚƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĂĐƚŽĨĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐƵƐĞƌƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞďůĂĐŬŵĂƌŬĞƚ ?ůĞĂĚŝŶŐƚŽ “the double benefit of, on 
one hand, having certainty of what has been consumed and, on the other hand, avert the consumption 
of other, potentially more dangerous drugs ? ?/ďŝĚ ?Ɖ ? ? ) ?hŶĚĞƌƚŚŝƐƉƌŽďůĞŵĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐǇƚŽŽů
proposed was the legalisation of growing up to eight cannabis plants either domestically or in social 
cannabis clubs. In case this limit was exceeded, ŝƚ ƌĞŵĂŝŶĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ũƵĚŐĞ ?Ɛ ĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ĂƐĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ
whether the plants were used for commercial purposes  Wa criminally punishable offence- or for 
personal use. 
 
tŝƚŚĂ ‘ĂŶŶĂďŝƐZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌŝƚƐŽŶƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶ ?ůĂǁƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚďǇƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞŵĞŵďĞƌƐŽĨĂůŵŽƐƚ 
every political party, the Global Marijuana March - Uruguayan version of May 2012 decided to change 
its target. The taboo was finally broken and now it was time for it to become mainstream. Therefore, 
instead of congregating cannabis users on the outskirts of the city, as it was customary, cannabis 
activists marched for the first time from the central Liberty square to the legislative palace gates. That 
ĚĂǇ ?/ŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚĂďŝŐƐŝŐŶĐĂůůŝŶŐƚŽ “ĨƌĞĞƚŚĞŝŵƉƌŝƐŽŶĞĚĨŽƌƉůĂŶƚŝŶŐ PƚŚĞƉĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚŚĂƐƚŚĞĨůŽŽƌ ?
heading the march. That day, similar public activities were performed in different cities outside the 
capital Montevideo as well, widening the ŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ geographical reach. The recent important  ‘ŶĞǁ
ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?ǀŝĐƚŽƌŝĞƐĂĐŚŝĞǀĞĚ-one hundred years after BatlůĞ ?ƐƐĞĐƵůĂƌŵŽĚĞƌŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞ- put 
hƌƵŐƵĂǇĂƚƚŚĞǀĂŶŐƵĂƌĚŽĨƚŚĞĐŝǀŝůƌŝŐŚƚƐĂŐĞŶĚĂĂŐĂŝŶ ?ƉĂǀŝŶŐƚŚĞǁĂǇĨŽƌƚŚĞĂĐƚŝǀŝƐƚƐ ?ŽƉƚŝŵŝƐŵ ?
Yet, as commented by my research participants, these very conflicted political processes of the new 
rights agenda, sponsored by civil society, had taught one lesson: a long and winding road was surely 
ahead for legalisation to finally be reached. 
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Concluding remarks 
 
In conclusion, in this chapter, I started to construct the idea of the Uruguayan cannabis regulation as 
the result of overlapping and intersecting trajectories that marked tensions, dissonance and 
opportunities for cannabis reform to happen. I introduced the idea that the cannabis legalisation 
movement was initially an orphan, because it started to flourish organically and highly disarticulated 
as a demand. Further on, I characterised the cannabis problem as a generational conflict related with 
the polarised second demographic transition in Uruguay. Here, the accelerated secularisation process 
was interpreted as a secondary trace -a necessary but not sufficient condition- ŽĨĂŐĞŶĞƌĂůǀĂůƵĞƐ ?
change favouring an ethics of autonomy, with liberty as the key binding politics moral foundation. 
dŚƵƐ ?/ƐŚŽǁĞĚŚŽǁƚŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵŽĨƌĞƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶŽǀĞƌƚŚĞ “ĚĞǀŝĂŶƚ ?Ǉouth exceeded cannabis use as 
well as formal control institutions in Uruguay, and a number of victimless crimes behaviours such as 
abortion or LGBTI rights along with cannabis, started to be under question at the social arena. 
Moreover, for the Uruguayan case specifically, cannabis was framed by civil society as part of a wider 
 ‘ŶĞǁƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƌĞĨŽƌŵƚŚĂƚŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨǀŝĐƚŝŵůĞƐƐĐƌŝŵĞƐďĞǇŽŶĚĚƌƵŐƐ themselves. 
 
However, I also argued that within the political establishment, neither the left nor the right political 
ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ? ŶŽƌ ƚŚĞ ĞǆŝƐƚĞŶƚ Đŝǀŝů ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ŐƌŽƵƉƐ ? ŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞĚ ƚŚŝƐ  ‘ĐƵůƚƵƌĂů ĐŚĂŶŐĞ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞŝƌ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů
repertoire. Thus, the new rights agenda was largely neglected by most of the political elite. Within a 
political agenda dominated by the democratic transition and economic issues, the human rights 
defence was still directly linked  Wand restricted to- ƚŚĞ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ? ƉĞƌƐĞĐƵƚŝŽŶ ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ
dictatorship. At this stage, the political climate was not receptive, hence, was not possible to translate 
the individual issue into social problems and then into public problems  Wor matters of political 
controversy. 
 
Throughout the 2000s cannabis use normalised in the urban areas of the country, turning from a 
marginal reality to a relatively common habit among new generations. Confronted with the resilience 
of the exclusion of ´new rights´ topics such as cannabis, abortion or LGTBI rights by all political parties, 
ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ ĚĞĐĂĚĞ ǇŽƵŶŐ ĂĐƚŝǀŝƐƚƐ ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ ƚŚĞŝƌ ŽǁŶ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů  ‘ƐƚĂƌƚ-ƵƉƐ ? ?transforming cannabis 
activism as a new type of political entrepreneur. However, I also showed how for the section of the 
civil society that started to push for its legalisation, the problem of illegal cannabis was defined 
ũƵǆƚĂƉŽƐŝŶŐ  ‘ŝŶŶŽĐĞŶƚ ? ƵƐĞƌƐ ǁŚŽgrow cannabis for personal consumption against those guilty of 
making a business out of it. Thus framed, the political demand heavily relied on personal cultivation 
either domestic or in social cannabis clubs. 
 
Following, I showed how once the economic crisis started to be overcome and new battlefields were 
required on the electoral arena, through the new rights agenda a conflict between a progressive 
(secular) block and a traditional (religious) block was successfully installed by civil society. 
Consequently, the change in the systemic governing coalition associated with the Frente Amplio 
elections -with a tight legislative majority- of 2004, 2009 and 2014 opened a window for a wave of 
political secularisation, conforming to what the literature defines as a  ‘ƌĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐǁŽƌůĚ ?ĐĂƐĞŽĨŵŽƌĂů
politics change. In this way, I explained why, paradoxically, a social secularisation trend led to a 
renewed commitment of religious based political actors interested in resisting those changes. 
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Chapter 6. Greenhouse effect: the role of the executive power 
 
The previous chapter focused on the historical roots of the demand for cannabis regulation, 
emphasising the role of the rapid Uruguayan secularisation process from the 1990s onwards, as 
secondary trace of a wider values change. It analysed how the Frente Amplio victory of 2005, after the 
regional economic crisis (1999 - 2002), meant an opening of a political window, where the cultural 
ƐŚŝĨƚ ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ ĂŶ ĞƚŚŝĐƐ ŽĨ ĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇ ĂŶĚ  ‘ŶĞǁ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ? ĂŵŽŶŐ ǇŽƵŶŐĞƌ generations reinstated the 
conflict between secular and confessional lines in the party system, and thus became increasingly seen 
as an important electoral arena. In this context, a WEIRD people ƌĞĨŽƌŵĞƌƐ ? advocacy coalition pushed 
for cannabis regulation fundamentally based on moral principles such as liberty and care. Since the 
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉƌŽďůĞŵǁĂƐŵĂŝŶůǇĚĞĨŝŶĞĚĂƐŽŶĞĂďŽƵƚƵƐĞƌƐ ?ŚĞĂůƚŚĂŶĚƌŝŐŚƚƐďǇƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌŵĞƌƐ ?ƚŚĞůĂǁ
proposal excluded a market model, and included only personal cultivation mechanisms, either 
domestic or in social cannabis clubs. 
 
In this chapter, the analytical focus lies in tracing the attention shift that introduced cannabis into the 
macro political agenda in 2012. The analysis will proceed as follows: I will start by setting the scene of 
the executive power announcement to regulate cannabis, identifying the specific actors within the 
Uruguayan government that originally pushed for this reform. Following this, I will characterise this 
participation not as a mere involvement but as a surprising and conflictual irruption that created a 
 ‘ĐŚĂŽƚŝĐŵŽŵĞŶƚŽĨƉƵŶĐƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?dƌƵĞ ?:ŽŶĞƐ ? ?ĂƵŵŐĂƌƚŶĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? )ŝŶƚŚĞŽŶŐŽŝŶŐĚĞďĂƚĞ ?,ĂǀŝŶŐ
done that, I will discuss in some depth why there was such a strong emotional clash of positions by 
analysing the relationships between why, how and by whom cannabis became regulated. Having 
outlined this second stage in the cannabis regulation process, I will conclude by making the case for 
the inclusion of politics moral foundations as a suitable framework to define more precisely the 
advocacy ĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶƐ ? belief systems. Furthermore, I will contend that by engaging ,ĂŝĚƚ ?Ɛ (2012) moral 
theory it is possible to better grasp cross-cultural variations in drug policy change explanations more 
generally, a call already made by previous works in this field. 
 
 
6.1. A suitable enemy and a cultural surprise 
 
On the morning of the 13 May 2012, Uruguayans woke up to an impressive image that would be 
repeated ad infinitum in the mass media8; the CCTV cameras of the traditional  “La Pasiva ? restaurant, 
in the heart of Montevideo city, recorded the break-in of two young boys who, during a robbery, 
executed a restaurant worker at point blank. The Montevideo Police Chief quickly offered his view in 
the main news programmes; according to him, this violent robbery was not an isolated incident, but 
rather the template for many young and violent delinquents that are generally under the influence of 
drugs and alcohol. 
 
This event catalysed a remarkable discontent in Uruguayan society regarding public safety and crime 
ƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ P  “Brutal crime shocks Uruguay ?  ?/ŶĨŽďĂĞ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?  “Uruguayan society moved by La 
WĂƐŝǀĂ ?ƐĐŽůĚďůŽŽĚĞĚĐƌŝŵĞ ? ?ƐƉĞĐƚĂĚŽƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ƚŚĞŵĂƐƐŵĞĚŝĂǁĂƌŶĞĚ ?ŶƵŵď ƌŽĨ 
 
8 According to FOCO consultant, between the 13th and the 18th of May Channel 4 showed the video 44 times; 
Channel 10, 25 times; Channel 12, 23 times and Channel 5, 4 times. Between them, they accumulated 102 times 
in total, that is, almost once per hour throughout the week. 
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spontaneous demonstrations against violence spread through the country. Social media was full of 
ŚĂƌƐŚĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐ ?/ŶDŽŶƚĞǀŝĚĞŽ ?ĂůŽŽƐĞůǇŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĞĚŐƌŽƵƉŽĨ ‘KƵƚƌĂŐĞĚhƌƵŐƵĂǇĂŶƐ ?ĂƌƌĂŶŐĞĚ ?ǀŝĂ
Facebook, a public demonstration in front of the WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶĐǇ ?Ɛ building to  “express the indignation and 
impotence of the people, overwhelmed by this state of violence and feeling that what the government 
has been doing to stop it is far away from being effective ? ?hƌƵŐƵĂǇŽƐ/ŶĚŝŐŶĂĚŽƐ ? 14/05/2012). 
 
At the time, I was working on a project centred on desistance, re-entry and crime policy reform 
dynamics as part of the Criminology research group of the Faculty of Social Science, and I happened 
to witness this event. It was not a big demonstration for the country - around a hundred people were 
there - but, importantly, the rate of public figures present was remarkably high: I could identify 
representatives of every political party and of the National Workers Union (PIT-CNT). When asked 
about the ŵŽƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶďĞŚŝŶĚƚŚĞŝƌƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞĞǀĞŶƚ ?ƉĞŽƉůĞƐƉŽŬĞŽĨ P “the unbearable state 
of violence ? ?  “ƚŚĞ ĐƵůƚƵƌĂů ǀĂůƵĞƐ ? ĐůĂƐŚ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ hƌƵŐƵĂǇĂŶ ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? ? ĂŶĚ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂů ŝŶĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇ
 “that forgets about the victims of violence and overprotects the delinquents ?  ?&ŝĞůĚ ŶŽƚĞƐ ?
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?/ŶƚŚŝƐƐŵĂůůĂŶĚĨŽƌŵĞƌůǇ ‘hyper-integrated ?ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?ƚŚĞƐƉĞĞĚŽĨƚŚĞĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐĚƌƵŐƐ
and crime link issue hit particularly strongly, crosscutting social classes and political parties. 
 
Moreover, secondary data suggests that Uruguay represents a special, paradoxical case within the 
most violent continent in the world. According to the Latinobarometro, there is extremely low 
agreement that public policies targeting crime or drug trafficking are improving the situation (2% and 
3%), and a very low perception of public safety (15%); yet, Uruguay remains as one of the  ‘ŵŽƐƚ ƐĞĐƵƌĞ ?
places regarding victimisation rates in the region (Lagos and Dammert 2012). Meanwhile, public safety 
ŚĂƐĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚůǇďĞĞŶĚĞĨŝŶĞĚĂƐ ‘ƚŚĞŵĂŝŶ ƉƌŽďůĞŵŽĨƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ŝŶƉƵďůŝĐŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƉŽůůƐƐŝŶĐĞ ? ? ? ?
 ?WĂƚĞƌŶĂŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? )ĂŶĚĨƌŽŵ ? ? ? ?ŽŶ ?ŝƚŚĂƐďĞĞŶƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĞĚŝŶĨŝƌƐƚƉůĂĐĞŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚůǇŽĨƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ
political affinities. In 2011, drugs followed public safety as an important concern for 21% of the 
Uruguayans and since then, though declining, it remained among the first four problems (Factum, 
2014). Furthermore, the amount of time reserved for police news in the main Uruguayan TV news 
shows almost doubled between 2005 and 2009 (Silvera & Natalevich, 2012). 
 
As Aboal, Campanella and Lanzilotta (2012) show, there has been an increasing trend in all types of 
crime since 1985, with an accelerated jump in the recessive phase of the economy (1999  W 2004) that 
was not followed by a re-equilibration after the economic recuperation in 2004, when crime rates kept 
as high as during the economic crisis (see graphic below). For the period 2005  W 2010 (the first Frente 
Amplio administration) among crimes against property, only the violent variants increased; 65% 
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚĞƐĞǇĞĂƌƐ ?ǁŚŝůĞƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌƚǁŽŶŽŶǀŝŽůĞŶƚƚǇƉĞƐĚƌŽƉƉĞĚ ? ?A?ĨŽƌ ‘ƚŚĞĨƚƐ ? ?ĂŶĚ ? ?A?ĨŽƌ
 ‘ŽƚŚĞƌƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇ ? ?dŚĞƐĞƚǇƉĞƐŽĨĐƌŝŵĞƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƉƌŽ ĞƌƚǇĂƌĞĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇĐŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞ
urban regions of the country - Montevideo, Canelones and Maldonado-, more than doubling the rate 
compared to the rest of the country; 53.43 vs. 22.23 in 2010 (Aboal et al., 2012). Consequently, since 
2004 Uruguay has been living a particular situation of improving economic condition, better income 
distribution and increasing violent crime rates. 
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Figure 8. Crime, unemployment and GNP rates evolution, Uruguay (1990  ? 2010) 
 
Source: (Aboal, Campanella, & Lanzilotta, 2012, p. 10) 
References: 
Total crime 
Unemployment (right axis) 
GNP (left axis) 
 
 
According to my research participants, underpinning this state of affairs regarding public safety, there 
ǁĂƐĂ ‘ŵŽƌĂůƐŚŽĐŬ ?ƚŚĂƚhƌƵŐƵĂǇĂŶƐŽĐŝĞƚǇĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĚ ?ĂƐƚŚĞĨĞĂƌĂŶĚĂŶŐƵŝƐŚŽĨ ‘ƚŚĞƉĂƌĂĚŽǆŽĨ
ĐƌŝŵĞ ?  Wnamely, the paradoxical correlation of an improving economic situation and increasing violent 
crime rates- ĨŽƵŶĚ Ă ƐƵŝƚĂďůĞ ĞŶĞŵǇ  ?ŚƌŝƐƚŝĞ ?  ? ? ? ? ) ŝŶ  ‘Los Pastabaseros ?  ?ƚŚĞ ĨƌĞĞ ďĂƐĞ ĐŽĐĂŝŶĞ
users]. The free base cocaine users came to epitomize everything that was wrong in Uruguay, 
becoming cause and consequence of failure in an otherwise increasingly prosperous society. Free base 
cocaine is a crack-like drug that appeared in the Southern Cone markets around 2001-2002 in the 
context of the regional economic crisis (TNI, 2006). According to specialists, it came as a by-product 
ŽĨƚŚĞŶĞǁŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐŽĨĐŚĞŵŝĐĂůƉƌĞĐƵƌƐŽƌƐ ?ĐŽŶƚƌŽůƚŚĂƚĂĨĨĞĐƚĞĚĐŽĐĂŝŶĞƚƌĂĨĨŝĐŬŝŶŐ
dynamics. Free base cocaine is an intermediate stage of the cocaine production process, resulting in 
a cheaper, stronger and more toxic substance (Pascale, Negrín, & Laborde, 2010). By 2011, slightly 
more than 25% of the women and two out of five men declared to have committed the crime for 
which they were imprisoned under the influence of some drug; for 60% of the women and 47% of the 
men, the drug was free base cocaine (Vigna, 2012). 
  
The free base cocaine problem was politically important for the cannabis debate because it made drug 
policies climb up the political agenda, reframing drug use as something other than a lifestyle or value 
conflict. Thus, for example, the impact of free base cocaine in the political system was so important 
ƚŚĂƚŝŶ ? ? ? ?ĂƐƉĞĐŝĂů ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŽŶ ‘ĚĚŝĐƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌŝŵƉĂĐƚŝŶhƌƵŐƵĂǇĂŶƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?
was created specially to deal with this issue. As the parliamentary transcripts of the day register: 
 “There has not been in the last 50 years another phenomenon similar to free base cocaine in 
ƚĞƌŵƐŽĨŝƚƐĞĨĨĞĐƚƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƐŽĐŝĂůĐŽĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ ? ? ? ?&ĞĂƌĂŶĚĂŶŐƵŝƐŚƚĂŬĞŽǀĞƌƚŚĞƌĞŐƵůĂƌ 
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citizen who face the fact of living in an unsafe society, confronted by the possibility of being 
robbed, wounded or murdered by some of these boys who, in the desperation provoked by 
addiction, are compelled to attack others without weighting any consequence ?  ?ĄŵĂƌĂ ĚĞ
Representantes, 7/04/2010). 
 “we [the Partido Colorado] also feel that free base cocaine is an epidemic that goes forward and 
deteriorates society, as already happened in other European countries such as Spain, and their 
19 ? ?Ɛ  ‘ůŽƐƚ ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? / ?ŵ ƚĂůŬŝŶŐ ĂďŽƵƚ ǇŽƵŶŐ ƉĞŽƉůĞƚŚĂƚ ĐŽƵůĚ ŶŽƚ ĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞ ƚŚĞŝƌ
development in any aspect of their personal life, because it was truncated by addiction ? (Cámara 
de Representantes, 7/04/2010). 
As pointed out by the former Partido Colorado presidential candidate and current senator Pedro 
Bordaberry in the national election campaign: 
 “/ĚŽŶ ?ƚŶĞĞĚƚŽƚĞůůǇŽƵǁŚĂƚƚŚĞŝŶƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇƚŚĂƚǁĞĂƌĞůŝǀŝŶŐŵĞĂŶƐ ?ŶĚǁĞǁĂŶƚƚŽƚĞůůǇŽƵ
that it is possible to improve the situation. By doing only one thing, we will improve by 30, 40%... 
Do you know what it is? Kicking free base cocaine out of Uruguay: declaring war to free base 
cocaine ? ?WĂƌƚŝĚŽŽůŽƌĂĚŽŵĞĞƚŝŶŐ ? 17/10/2009). 
 
For the Frente Amplio senator and partner of former president Mujica, Lucía Topolansky: 
 “&ƌĞĞ ďĂƐĞ ĐŽĐĂŝŶĞ ? ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ ǁĂƐ ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞĚ ŝŶƚŽ hƌƵŐƵĂǇ ĚƵƌŝŶŐ :ŽƌŐĞ ĂƚůůĞ ?Ɛ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ
[Partido Colorado], and we should not forget about that, it is the cause of these crime rates ?
(Redacción 180, 14/05/2012). 
 
A doctor and cannabis reform activist specialised in drug treatment, reflected during the interview: 
 “Culturally, what started to happen was very rough for us. Uruguay has a long history of pacific 
ĐŽĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞƐĞ ǀŝŽůĞŶƚ ĐƌŝŵĞƐ ? ƚŚĞ ƚƵŵďůĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƐƚƌĞƚ ? dŚĞƐĞ types of crimes are 
typically linked to these types of substances, such as free base cocaine ?  ?ŽĐƚŽƌ  ?ŝĚ ? ? ) ?
interview). 
 
As the quotes above expose, the Uruguayan political elite mainly framed the problem of free base 
cocaine as a threat to ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?Ɛ stability and cohesion: as a factor breaking the ethics of the community 
by having negative effects towards  ‘ƐŽĐŝĂů ĐŽĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ ? ? as an  ‘ĞƉŝĚĞŵŝĐ that deteriorates ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? and 
ĂƐƚŚĞŵĂŝŶ ‘ĐĂƵƐĞŽĨǀŝŽůĞŶƚĐƌŝŵĞ ƌĂƚĞƐ ? ? 
 
As it was previously reviewed (section 2.3.1.), although the normalisation process of cannabis 
experienced in North America and Europe interacted in different ways with the moral shocks related 
with crack and heroin use in the 1980s and 1990s, a common factor observed in the literature is that 
ŝƚ ƵƐƵĂůůǇ ĂůůŽǁĞĚ  ‘ƚŚĞ ĚƌƵŐ ƉƌŽďůĞŵ ? ƚŽ ƌĞĂĐŚ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŐĞŶĚĂƐ ? dŚƵƐ ? ĨŽƌ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞĐĂƐĞ ŽĨ
Portugal, cannabis decriminalisation appeared as a by-product of a wider harm reduction strategy 
mainly concerned about hard drugs use (Van het Loo et al., 2002; Hughes, 2007). In the Dutch case, 
the market separation between soft and hard drugs became a key motivation for the public 
endorsement of the coffeeshops system (Cohen, 1994; Grund & Breeksema, 2013). 
 
Suitable moral enemies such as crack, heroin or free base cocaine and their consumers, may be useful 
to be feared and hence fought, uniting the other side, making it possible for priorities to change, 
focusing all attention on certain phenomena, and forgetting about other problems. However, as the 
criminologist Nils Christie (1986) notes, suitable enemies will not be defined in ways that threaten 
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centrally positioned and relatively powerful groups in society, who eventually can organise themselves 
and resist the negative labelling, objecting the definition of the problem as a real problem. Thus, by 
2011, 0.2% of the Uruguayan population  Wmostly composed of young lower class people- that declared 
to have used free base cocaine in the last month, might be a suitable enemy. However, the 4.9% - 
mostly composed of young middleclass and educated people- that declared to have used cannabis in 
the last month is less fitting (OUD, 2011). Thus, as explained by a member of the Judicial System, a 
 ‘ďŝĨƵƌĐĂƚĞĚ ? drug policy approach started to emerge. In the Uruguayan case, free base cocaine shifted 
the political ĞůŝƚĞ ?Ɛ attention to the drugs topic at the same time as reframing cannabis as a  ‘ůĞĂƐƚ ďĂĚ ?
ĚƌƵŐ ? /Ŷ ƚŚŝƐ ǁĂǇ ? ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ĐŽƵůĚ ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚ ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?Ɛ ĐŽŚĞƐŝŽŶ ďǇ ƉƵůůŝŶŐ ĂƉĂƌƚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŐŽŽĚ ?
ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐƵƐĞƌƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŽĨĨĞƌŝŶŐŽĨ ‘ďĂĚ ?ĚƌƵŐƐĂƐĨƌĞĞďĂƐĞĐŽĐĂŝŶĞŝŶƚŚĞďůĂĐŬ market. 
 “Paradoxically, when in Uruguay the whole discussion about harm and risk reduction started 
to develop, another discussion and drug paradigm was also beginning: we started a path to 
differentiate between good and bad drugs. The good drug was marihuana, the bad drug 
ǁĂƐĨƌĞĞďĂƐĞĐŽĐĂŝŶĞ ?ĂŶĚƐŽƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐǁŚĞƌĞǁĞƐŚŽƵůĚƚĂƌŐĞƚƚŚĞƉƵŶŝƚŝǀĞĂŵŵŽ ? ? ? ?
Even before cannabis legalisation, it was already very odd that in Uruguay somebody would 
go to prison for selling minor quantities of cannabis. Conversely, for free base cocaine there 
was a totally prohibitionist stance instilled among justice operators that used to frame and 
still frames free base cocaine as the mother of every public safety problem in the country ?
(Prosecutor Organised Crime Court (id16), interview). 
 
Moreover, as previously reviewed (section 5.2.), unlike free base cocaine users cannabis activism was 
made of a new type of organised political actor with lobbying capabilities, nucleated at the new rights 
agenda. As the Partido Colorado  ‘ĚĚŝĐƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞŝƌ ŝŵƉĂĐƚ ŝŶ hƌƵŐƵĂǇĂŶ ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞ
commission report noted with worry: 
 “In the first year and a half of ŵĞĞƚŝŶŐƐĂŶĚĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƐ ?ƚŚĞĐĞŶƚƌĂůĨŽĐƵƐŽĨƚŚĞ  ‘ĚĚŝĐƚ ŽŶƐ ?
Commission started to change from free base cocaine effects to cannabis personal cultivation 
as a harm reduction solution ? ?Partido Colorado; Addictions Legislative Commission, Minority 
report, 2011). 
 
Additionally, the drugs issue was reframed in Uruguay not only because of free base cocaine use but 
also because of drug trafficking dynamics themselves. Typically, the crimes that were linked with drug 
ŵĂƌŬĞƚƐŝŶhƌƵŐƵĂǇǁĞƌĞ ‘ǁŚŝƚĞĐŽůůĂƌ ? ?ĂƐa relatively important international money laundering hub 
(Sain, 2009; Derghougassian, 2009; Bagley, 2012; Durán-Martínez, 2015). Conversely, in recent years, 
public safety authorities were noticing with concern the rise of new violent ways of organised crime, 
leading to territorial disputes and score settlings in peripheral urban zones. According to the Attorney 
'ĞŶĞƌĂů ?Ɛ office: 
 “The violent confrontations between drug trafficking gangs have been generalised. Until 
now, the problem of contracted killers did not appear in the scenery of the common people. 
But this risk became concrete last Saturday, when this type of conflict unfolded on a public 
bus, and other passengers were used as a human shield. Most of these type of crimes 
remain unresolved. People form the neighbourhoods do not speak because they are scared 
of retaliations: it is the law of silence. The prosecutors of the Organized Crime Court have 
received life threats already ? ?şĂǌ ? 2015/06/05) 
 
According to the regional comparative data available provided by the UNODC, homicide rates in 
Uruguay are less than half the regional rate, but higher than in Argentina or Chile. Nevertheless, the 
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ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌŽĨ/ŶƚĞƌŝŽƌƌĞƉŽƌƚŽĨ ? ? ? ?ƐŚŽǁĞĚŚŽǁ ‘ŚŽŵŝĐŝĚĞ ?ŝƐƚŚĞƚǇƉĞŽĨĐƌŝŵĞƚŚĂƚincreased 
the most between 2011 and 2012 (by 35%) reaching the highest record since 1985, with 269 deaths 
(Ministerio del Interior, 2013). Score settlings were registered as a category of their own for the first 
time at national level in 2012 and immediately turned into the first cause of violent death in the 
country, followed by domestic violence for which Uruguay holds the shameful first place in South 
America (CEPAL, 2012). Within this context, the Uruguayan minister of the interior Eduardo Bonomi 
critically reflected in an interview: 
 “For a long time, the left centred its attention on the economic, political and social projects but 
left the problem of crime unattended. They believed that social and economic policies would 
restrain crime by resolving the inequalities in society, and acted in consequence.  ? ? ? It was not 
understood as necessary to elaborate public safety policies specifically, and when the topic was 
discussed it was in terms of tough or soft on crime but there were not any policies, strategies 
Žƌ ĞůĂďŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚĂĐƚŝĐƐ ?  ? ? ? ^ŝŶĐĞ  ? ? ? ? ? ŽƵƌ ǁŽƌŬ  ?ŝŶƚŚĞ DŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ ŽĨ /ŶƚĞƌŝŽƌ ? ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞ
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚ ŝŶ Ă ĚƵĂů ĚĞďĂƚĞ P ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ƌŝŐŚƚ ? ƚŚĂƚ ƵŶĂŶŝŵŽƵƐůǇ ĞŶĚŽƌƐĞĚ  “ƚŽƵŐŚ ŽŶ ĐƌŝŵĞ ?
policies that have already proved to be of little help. But also within the left, that was posing a 
public safety framework completely naïvely and inadequately ?  ?DŝŶŝƐƚƌǇ ŽĨ /ŶƚĞƌŝŽƌ  ?ŝĚ ? ? ) ?
interview). 
 
In this way, the scandalous La Pasiva murder of May 2012 catalysed the remarkable discontent in 
Uruguayan society regarding the paradoxical situation of improving economic condition, better 
income distribution and increasing violent crime rates. As the aforementioned comparative data 
available in Latin America shows, within the most violent continent in the world, Uruguayans are 
exceptionally worried about public safety  WĞǀĞŶ ŝĨ hƌƵŐƵĂǇ ƌĞŵĂŝŶƐ ŽŶĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŵŽƐƚ ƐĞĐƵƌĞ ?
places regarding victimisation rates  W and extremely critical about public policies targeting crime 
and drug trafficking. Within this context, free base cocaine use and drug trafficking dynamics 
ƐŚŝĨƚŝŶŐ ĨƌŽŵ ǁŚŝƚĞ ĐŽůůĂƌ ĐƌŝŵĞƐ ƚŽ ǀŝŽůĞŶƚ ƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĂů ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƐ ƌĞĨƌĂŵĞĚ  ‘ƚŚĞ ĚƌƵŐƐ ŝƐƐƵĞ ? ŝŶƚŽ
something other than a secularised lifestyles value conflict  Was discussed in Chapter 5. In this way, 
drugs climbed up ƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂŐĞŶĚĂŝŶĂďŝĨƵƌĐĂƚĞĚĨĂƐŚŝŽŶ ?ƌĞĨƌĂŵŝŶŐĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐĂƐĂ ‘ůĞĂƐƚďĂĚ ?
drug. 
 
 
A Strategy for Life and Coexistence 
 
To confront this lack of leadership regarding public safety that was threatening the Frente Amplio 
political project, almost one month after the La Pasiva scandal, on the 20th of June 2012, the Executive 
WŽǁĞƌ ‘WƵďůŝĐ^ĂĨĞƚǇĂďŝŶĞƚ ?- ĐƌĞĂƚĞĚďǇDƵũŝĐĂ ?ƐŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ? ? ? ? ?- 2015)- ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚĂ ‘^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ
for Life and Coexistence ?ĂƚĂƉƵďůŝĐĐŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ?dŚĞƌĞ ?ŝƚǁĂƐƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĚƚŚĂƚ “without any doubt we 
ĂƌĞ ůŝǀŝŶŐ ĨŽƌ ƐŽŵĞ ǇĞĂƌƐ ŶŽǁ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ  ‘ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ? ĂƐ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŝŽƌŝƚǇ ƉƌŽďůĞŵ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ
population ? ?WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶĐŝĂ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ) ?&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ?ŝŶƚŚŝƐĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů ƉƵďůŝĐŽƉŝŶŝŽŶĐŽŶƚĞǆƚĂŶĚĂĨƚĞƌ ? ?
years in government, the Frente Amplio ǁĂƐ ‘ĐƵůƚƵƌĂůůǇƐƵƌƉƌŝƐĞĚ ?(Robinson, 2014); 
 “in the context of a growing country, where more and more social groups have access to a wider 
pull of material and immaterial goods, where both indigence and poverty are being reduced, 
marginality persists and diverse forms of social anomie and transgression increase ?
(Presidencia, 2012, p. 3). 
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This cultural surprise relates to the gradual but resilient disjunction between expectations and 
perceived reality. The expectation was that after ten years of a left-wing government in a context of a 
growing economy the social and economic policies displayed favouring the most vulnerable groups 
within society should have restrained crime, turning Uruguay into a hyper integrated country one 
more time. However, the perceived reality was one of continuously increasing violence. Thus, the 
resilience of the paradox of crime ultimately reached critical mass, for it was further reasoned that 
the crime policies implemented until then were doubly lacking sound foundations. The problem was 
that, on the one hand: 
 “current crime policies have proven to be of little efficacy and with a clear tendency towards 
brutality and injustice ? (Presidencia, 2012, p. 7). Yet, on the other hand:  “for many years the left 
has had a mono-dimensional discourse that explained crimes almost as a direct product of the 
neoliberal policies developed in the region since the second half of the 20th century. Nowadays 
this explanation, although still relevant, is clearly not enough ? ?WƌĞƐŝĚencia, 2012, p. 3). 
 
dŚƵƐ ?ĂŶĂƌƌĂǇŽĨĨŝĨƚĞĞŶŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞƵƉĚĂƚŝŶŐŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ  “to defeat the fear in society ?  ?WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶĐŝĂ ?
2012, p. 1) was briefly exposed. This Strategy for Life and Coexistence included initiatives as diverse 
as the creation of a fund for the economic reparation of the victims of violent crimes and adjustments 
alongside a legal code pertaining to juvenile offenders (for a list of the fifteen proposals see annex 1). 
DŽƐƚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚůǇĨŽƌƚŚŝƐƚŚĞƐŝƐ ?ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐĚƌƵŐƐ ?ƚŚĞǇproposed: stiffening penalties for 
police corruption and free base cocaine trafficking; the inclusion in the national budget of an integral 
strategy against problematic drug use, especially of free base cocaine; the creation of specialized 
justice boards iŶ  ‘narcomenudeo ?  ?ƐŵĂůů ƚŝŵĞĚƌƵŐĚĞĂůŝŶŐ ? ?ĂŶĚ ?ƐƵƌƉƌŝƐŝŶŐůǇĞŶŽƵŐŚ ?ĂŵĂƌŝŚƵĂŶĂ
commercialisation state monopoly. The person responsible for presenting this last proposal was the 
DŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ ŽĨ ĞĨĞŶĐĞ ? &ĞƌŶĄŶĚĞǌ ,ƵŝĚŽďƌŽ ? ĂƌŐƵŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ  “the Uruguayan chancellery will fight 
internationally for cannabis legalisation in the region, because this war [on drugs] was won by the 
narcos ? ?&ĞƌŶĄŶĚĞǌ,ƵŝĚŽďƌŽ ?^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇĨŽƌ>ŝĨĞĂŶĚŽĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞWƌĞƐƐŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ? 20/06/2012). 
 
This event represented the first time that a member of the executive power publicly claimed their will 
to regulate cannabis in the country. According to the data collected, the aim to push forward cannabis 
regulation, while framing it as part of a wider Strategy for Life and Coexistence, came from a specific 
group within the government comprised of the Uruguayan president Mujica and two of his most 
trusted collaborators: the Minister of the Interior Eduardo Bonomi, and of National Defence, Eleuterio 
Fernández Huidobro. The three of them not only belong to the same political sector within the Frente 
Amplio, but also share a deep and long history together, which is important to highlight. Back in the 
1960s, Mujica, Bonomi and Fernández Huidobro counted themselves among the co-founders of the 
National Liberation Movement  ? ‘Tupamaros ? ) ?a left-wing urban guerrilla group set up in the 1960s, in 
reaction to the rough social and economic situation of the time. Their fight was against occidental 
liberal capitalist imperialism, primarily represented by the United States, and the diffident national 
political elite that systematically overlooked the national common interest, uncritically following the 
ŶŽƌƚŚĞƌŶƌŝĐŚĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ?ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂŐĞŶĚĂƐ ?'ĂƚƚŽ ? ? ? ?  ) ƐdƵƉĂŵĂƌŽ ?Ɛfront-runners, the three 
ŽĨƚŚĞŵǁĞƌĞŬĞƉƚŝŵƉƌŝƐŽŶĞĚĨŽƌŵĂŶǇǇĞĂƌƐĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞhƌƵŐƵĂǇĂŶĚŝĐƚĂƚŽƌƐŚŝƉ ?tŝƚŚĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ?Ɛ
recuperation, the Tupamaros integrated themselves into the recently founded Frente Amplio, as the 
Popular Participation Movement (MPP) sector, and quickly became one of the most supported and 
powerful groups within the party. Although updated to modern democratic politics, time did not stop 
them from retaining their particular way of understanding politics as a tool to change the extant power 
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relations. As reported in the  “General considerations on strategy and tactics ? white paper co-authored 
by the three of them and discussed at a MPP-FA national meeting, in their opinion: 
 “politics is not the art of the possible. If that was the case, politicians, even those who were left 
minded, would only need to be worried about administrating the course of events, and history, 
always alike, would repeat itself over and over again. Politics is the art of transforming what is 
necessary into what is possible ? ?DWWEĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƌĞĐƚŽƌĂƚĞ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
p. s/d). 
 
As I will argue throughout the rest of this chapter, for them, cannabis selling was necessary if the 
problem was going to be defined as one of illegal supply violence, and it was them who made it 
possible. 
 
 
6.2. 7KHJRYHUQPHQW¶V irruption 
 
hŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞŽƌŝŐŝŶŽĨ ƚŚĞĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞƉŽǁĞƌ ?ƐƉroposal to regulate cannabis and the possible 
linkages with the political process that civil society and legislators were leading -described in the 
previous chapter-, became one of the most challenging puzzles of my fieldwork activities, as I kept 
bringing up this topic in formal interviews and informal discussions that took place as part of my 
participant observation. In this section, I will propose that, contrary to how it has been characterised 
by most of the reviewed literature on the topic, the ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ attitude can be better characterised 
as an irruption, rather than simply a normal gradual involvement in the ongoing debate. This because 
it was sudden and highly controversial, significantly changing the parameters and actors involved in 
the political process. Furthermore, counterintuitively, it raised a number of conflicts even within the 
ƌĞĨŽƌŵĞƌƐ ? ĂĚǀŽĐĂĐǇ ĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ ? ƉƵƐŚŝŶŐ ĨŽƌ ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞ ůĞǀĞů ? ĐƌĞĂƚŝŶŐ Ă
 ‘chaotic moment of punctuation ?ĨŽůůŽǁĞĚďǇĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽnal turmoil and strong disputes over new 
dimensions of the debate becoming more salient -as suggested by Punctuated Equilibrium Theory, 
reviewed at the beginning of this thesis (chapter 3). 
 
The inclusion of a state monopoly for cannabis commercialisation within a wider Strategy for Life and 
Coexistence (SLC) was a top-down decision that took virtually everyone by surprise. According to a 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĂĚǀŝƐŽƌ ?ƚŚĞƉƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ ?ƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŽƌƐĚŝĚŶŽƚŬŶŽǁĂďŽƵƚŝƚ ?ŶŽƚĞǀĞŶƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽ
were co-sponsoring ƚŚĞ  ‘ĂŶŶĂďŝƐ ZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ĨŽƌ ŝƚƐ ŽŶƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶ ? ůĂǁ ďĞŝŶŐ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚ ? ^ĞďĂƐƚŝĂŶ
^ĂďŝŶŝ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ǁŚŽďĞůŽŶŐĞĚƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇƚŽƚŚĞƉƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ ?ƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŐƌŽƵƉ ?ƚŽůĚŵĞƚŚĂƚŚĞ “did 
not speak with [the Minister of Interior] Bonomi before their announcement [at the SLC] ? ?>ĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞ
power - Frente Amplio member (id5), personal communication). Within the executive power, the 
situation was similar. The head of the National Drugs Committee, Julio Calzada, also confirmed that 
the cannabis regulation proposal  “is not my decision. It was a decision of the Public Safety Cabinet and, 
ƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇ ?ŽĨƚŚĞWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞZĞƉƵďůŝĐ ? ? ?,ĞǁĂƐƚŚĞŽŶĞƚŚĂƚĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚĞĚƚŽƵƐƚŚĂƚŚĞŚĂĚ
made that decision, and that it was going to be announced the day of the Strategy for Life and 
Coexistence press conference ? (National Drugs Committee (id12), interview). Nor did the activists that 
were participating in the legislative debate know about it until some days before the SLC press 
conference, when the announcement was leaked to the national press. 
 
DŽƌĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚůǇ ?ƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůǁĂƐŶŽƚŽŶůǇƐƵƌƉƌŝƐŝŶŐďƵƚĂůƐŽŚŝŐŚůǇĐŽŶƚƌŽǀĞƌƐŝĂů ?
ĂŶĚǀĞƌǇƋƵŝĐŬůǇ “the fifteen proposals of the Strategy for Life and Coexistence ended up symbolically 
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summarised in ŽŶůǇ ŽŶĞ P ƚŚĞ ƐƚĂƚĞ ?Ɛ ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ ŵŽŶŽƉŽůǇ ?  ?EĂƚŝŽŶĂů Đŝǀŝů ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ  ?ŝĚ ? ? ) ? ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ ) ?
becoming the centre of worldwide public concern. Most of the Partido Colorado and Nacional 
members quickly went out to the national press to state their rejection. Even Jorge Batlle, the former 
Uruguayan president that proposed cannabis legalisation almost ten years before, distanced himself 
from Mujica in quite rough terms: 
 “The last surprise [of the government] ƚŚĂƚ ǁĞ ĂƌĞǀŝĐƚŝŵƐ ŽĨ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ Ă ƉŽƚŚĞĂĚ ?Ɛ
country, where the State will be a marihuana grower. This is not only a surprise, it is for the 
Guinness records ? ?ůKďƐĞƌǀĂĚŽƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? 
 
However, what I found especially intriguing and even counterintuitive is that the announcement was 
also highly controveƌƐŝĂůǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌŵĞƌƐ ?ĂĚǀŽĐĂĐǇĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶƉƵƐŚŝŶŐĨŽƌĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶĂƚ
the legislative level. All the non-Frente Amplio legislators co-sponsoring the cannabis use law analysed 
in the previous chapter expressed to me their rejection of the ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞ PĂŶŝĞůZĂĚŝŽ ?
for example, declared to me that:  “before I had my doubts, now / ?ŵ frankly pessimistic about whether 
legalisation will ever be reached ?  ?>ĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞ WŽǁĞƌ  W Partido Independiente member (id11), 
interview). For the Partido Nacional ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ >ƵŝƐ >ĂĐĂůůĞ WŽƵ ?  “ƚŚĞ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞ
involved a reversal in the political process, since they have thrown away some agreements that had 
already been reached among political parties ? ?>ĂĐĂůůĞWŽƵ ?ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? 7/11/2012). 
 
Among the sections of civil society pushing for cannabis legalisation, the feelings were mixed. I 
witnessed the discussions in Proderechos and in the National Coordination for Marihuana Legalisation 
-which brought together most of the cannabis activist groups in the country- about the need of 
confronting the executive power position publicly. In both cases, after a long, tense debate about the 
most politically useful terms in which to express their opinion, they ended up agreeing on a lukewarm 
support for the government, stating that: 
 
 “ǁĞĚŽǁĞůĐŽŵĞƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶ ?ďƵƚƚŚŝƐƐŚŽƵůĚďǇŶŽŵĞĂŶƐ
ďĞĐŽŵĞĂƌĞŐƌĞƐƐŝŶƚŚĞĚĞďĂƚĞ ? ? ?^ĞůĨĐƵůƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ^ŽĐŝĂůĂŶŶĂďŝƐůƵďƐĂƌĞƚŚĞƐƚĂƌƚŝŶŐ
point ? (Coordinadora Nacional por la Legalización de la Marihuana, press release, 20/07/ 2012). 
 
Others went further in their criticisms: Alicia Castilla, the influential Argentinian cannabis legalisation 
activist based in Uruguay referred to in the previous chapter (section 6.3), who herself suffered police 
harassment for having fifteen un-flowered plants - ƚŚƵƐďĞĐŽŵŝŶŐƚŚĞ  ‘ƚŝƉƉŝŶŐƉŽŝŶƚ ?ĞǀĞŶƚĨŽƌƚŚĞ
ĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĂŶŶĂďŝƐZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌŝƚƐŽŶƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶ ?ůĂǁ-, declared publicly: 
 “I never thought that I would find myself against a legalisation project. But that is the truth. 
Besides all the nonsense that has been told until now, besides all the incongruences and the 
pseudo-progressive language that Mujica has used, I think that fighting drug trafficking by 
legalising marijuana is a fallacy ? ?WĞƌĞŐŝů ? ? ? ? ? ) ? 
 
As previous works on the Uruguayan cannabis reform have noted, with the executive power 
participation in the debate, cannabis regulation broke into the national and international agenda. 
However, I argue that this agenda setting led to a surprising and conflict-ƌŝĚĚĞŶ ‘ĐŚĂŽƚŝĐŵŽŵĞŶƚŽĨ
ƉƵŶĐƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ? ĂƐ WƵŶĐƚƵĂƚĞĚ ƋƵŝůŝďƌŝƵŵ dŚĞŽƌǇ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐ ? ŚĞŶĐĞ ŵŽƌĞ
accurately characterised as an irruption than mere involvement. According to this theory, atypical 
changes break into the macropolitical agenda through communicational turmoil, usually as a 
disproportionate response to the specific event that triggered it  Win this case, the scandalous La Pasiva 
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murder-, fuelled by heightened attentiveness by the media and broader publics, and disputes over 
new dimensions of the debate becoming more salient. 
 
Still, while doing fieldwork, I noted how shocking it was for me to be observing not only a 
disagreement, but such a strong emotional clash between groups that were both a minority (let us 
remember that around 60% of the Uruguayans remain, until now, against any type of cannabis 
legalisation) and actually pushing for similar things. It did not matter if you were in favour or against 
cannabis regulation; as in a greenhouse effect, everyone was incensed. But why was this the case? 
 
In the next section, I will deal specifically with this question by empirically exploring the theoretical 
ƌĞĨŽƌŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĂĚǀŽĐĂĐǇ ĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ŚŝĞƌĂƌĐŚŝĐĂů ďĞůiefs system framework proposed in this 
thesis. I will argue that conflicts arose not only regarding whether cannabis should be legalised or not, 
but also about why and how to do it. Hence, it is an argument about the relevance of framing in policy 
change explanations; how political decisions are built and communicated are important factors for 
reform to happen. 
 
 
6.3. What is the problem? 
 
In the previous section, I contended that previous works on the case of Uruguay (Repeto, 2014; von 
Hoffmann, 2015) might have tended to provide an overly optimistic picture of the political process, 
neglecting some of the tensions that were involved. In this section, I attempt to develop this 
argument a step further by offering an analysis of the Uruguayan Reformers advocacy cŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ
hierarchically organised beliefs system. As already introduced at the beginning of this thesis, this is a 
ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇƚŚĂƚŚĂƐďĞĞŶƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂůůǇƵŶĚĞƌƐƉĞĐŝĮĞĚŝŶƚŚĞůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞ ?ďŽƚŚŝŶhƌƵŐƵĂǇĂŶĚĞůƐĞǁŚĞƌĞ ?
in part because, most of the time, researchers just assume it exists, yet they overlook its actual 
empirical derivations (Ripberger, Gupta, Silva, & Jenkins-Smith, 2014). Thus, the analysis will proceed 
as follows: I will start by briefly recalling the revised version of the advocacy coalition beliefs system 
ƚŚĂƚŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐƚŚĞƌŽůĞŽĨƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?ŵŽƌĂůĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚŝŶƐŽŵĞĚĞƉƚŚŝŶƚŚĞƚŚŝƌĚĐŚĂƉƚĞƌŽĨ
the thesis (section 3.1). For the empirical analysis, I will first focus on the executive power framing of 
cannabis regulation and, following this, I will contrast it to the ƌĞĨŽƌŵĞƌƐ ? advocacy coalition reactions, 
in order to explore possible sources of tension that can be found at each of the three levels (deep 
core, policy core and secondary aspects). 
 
The Advocacy Coalition Framework developed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) proposes that 
political processes are driven not only by individual actors but mainly by groups that coordinate 
actions over time, for atypical policy change to happen. Furthermore, these  ‘ĂĚǀŽĐĂĐǇ coalitioŶƐ ? share 
a hierarchically organised three level beliefs system that defines how the cannabis problem is framed 
and therefore the suitable solution to it. It was also argued that this framework can and should be 
ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞĚďǇĞŶŐĂŐŝŶŐǁŝƚŚ,ĂŝĚƚ ?ƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶ ŽĨƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?ŵŽƌĂůĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?,ĞŶĐĞ ?ƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚŽĨƚŚĞ
three levels was defined as a deep core, moral foundations level. The moral foundations are the 
driving factors, what personally moves people to engage in a public debate; the glue that unites and 
divides groups, binding and blinding political actors. Empirically, tensions at this level should be 
translated into different emphasis over values such as liberty, care, fairness, loyalty, authority and 
sanctity  Wshould a public policy aim at pursuing cannaďŝƐƵƐĞƌƐ ? ůŝďĞƌƚǇ ?^ŚŽƵůĚ ŝƚĂŝŵĂƚ ƌĞƐƚŽƌŝŶŐ
authority? 
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The second, near policy core level, is defined by the policy area within which the policy proposal is 
framed. At this level, tensions should translate empirically into different emphasis on the objectives 
that a model of cannabis regulation should pursue; is it framed as a public health, public safety, 
economic development or civil rights matter? Thirdly, the secondary, instrumental aspects level, is 
related to the regulation model design endorsed. Empirically, this should be translated into different 
positions over the concrete type of tools to be included in the law proposal; are self-cultivation 
mechanisms included? Should cannabis be commercialised? How? Because these beliefs are 
hierarchically organised, it is expected for the lower level of policy tools to be more susceptible to 
negotiation and change than the basic, core moral foundations. 
 
 
Executive power position 
 
Having identified the particular group leading the executive power proposal to regulate cannabis  W 
namely, Mujica, Fernández Huidobro and Bonomi- the empirical analysis of their position will rely on 
three main data sources. The Strategy for Life and Coexistence document itself, the public 
communications of presidĞŶƚ DƵũŝĐĂ ŝŶ  “The president talks to the country ? ƌĂĚŝŽ ĐĂƐƚƐ9, widely 
reproduced in the mass media, and my own interviews with the head of the Minister of Interior, 
Eduardo Bonomi, and other members of this Ministry, as discussed in the methodological chapter. 
 
A first finding worth highlighting is the degree of cohesion in issue framing. Many times before, I had 
read or listened to people calling for a more complex approach to the illegal drugs problem, endorsing 
differentiations between types of drug and drug users to understand the problem. Most of the time, 
this calling was associated with advocating for some type of policy reform, as a logical conclusion of 
ƐƵĐŚ Ă ŵŽƌĞ ĐŽŵƉůĞǆ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ?DĂĐŽƵŶ ĂŶĚ ZĞƵƚĞƌ ? ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ĐůĂŝŵ ƚŚĂƚ  “a compelling set of 
arguments for legalisation is necessarily very complex, making it difficult to communicate and difficult 
to accept ? ?DĂĐŽƵŶ ?ZĞƵƚĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ) ?ŽŶǀĞƌƐĞůǇ ?ƚŚĞhƌƵŐƵĂǇĂŶĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞƉŽǁĞƌƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŽ
regulate cannabis was simple and highly reiterative, similar to what Hurka and Nebel (2013) found in 
their Discourse Network Analysis of policy change after shooting rampages. As I will analyse in what 
follows, in the Uruguayan case, the framing was not necessarily about cannabis, it was certainly not 
abouƚĚƌƵŐƵƐĞ ?ŝƚǁĂƐŵŽƐƚůǇĂďŽƵƚŝůůĞŐĂůĚƌƵŐƐ ? supply. 
 
Even more, when Mujica occasionally referred to drug use,  ‘ƐĂŶĐƚŝƚǇ ? is heavily relied upon as a politics 
moral foundation in the framing of the issue by the executive power. According to Haidt (2012), the 
sanctity foundation relates to the understanding of life as supremely valuable, hence, the human body 
should not be seen as a playground to be used for fun, but as a temple to be protected. Thus, drug 
use is seen as degrading, a corruption of hƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ ?Ɛ ŽƌŝŐŝŶĂů ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ? DŽƌĞ ƉƌĞĐŝƐĞůǇ ? ĚƌƵŐ ƵƐĞ ŝƐ
ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚĂ “consumerist disease ? ?DƵũŝĐĂ ?Z ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? )ĂŶĚŝƚƐĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŝƐƵƐƵ ůůǇ
ĨƵůůŽĨĚĞƐĐĞŶĚŝŶŐŵĞƚĂƉŚŽƌƐ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐďĞŝŶŐ “ďƵƌŝĞĚŝŶƚŽ ? ?DƵũŝĐĂ ?Z ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?Žƌ “going down 
into ? (Mujica, RC, 24/01/2013) the vice. Mujica even goes as far as stating that  “we are far away from 
those that think that the use of any type of narcotic has any kind of benefit, as some people say ?
(Mujica, RC, 20/12/2012). When occasionally making any type of distinction between drugs, president 
Mujica always compared cannabis in particular or illegal drugs in general to alcohol and tobacco, in a 
 
 
9 dƌĂĐŬŝŶŐƚŚĞƐĞ ‘ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐƉĞĞĐŚĞƐ ?ĨŽƌ ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚ ? ? ? ? /ĨŽƵŶĚƐŝǆƉŝĞĐĞƐĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇƌĞĨĞƌƌŝŶŐƚŽĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ regulation 
(Mujica, RD 20/12/2012; 24/01/2013; 14/03/2013; 07/05/2013; 01/08/2013; 06/08/2013). 
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ŶĂƚƵƌĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĞĨĨŽƌƚƚŽŵĂŬĞƚŚĞĐĂƐĞƚŚĂƚ “we, humans as a genre, are weak and do things against 
our own health ? ?DƵũŝĐĂ ?Z ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?
 
It is easy to see a resemblance between this peculiar framing and the long-standing Uruguayan laity 
foundations of drug prohibition, described in section 2.1 of the thesis. In this regard, drug use is 
defined as something tolerated but necessary to control, relying on Science and the State as the 
ůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞĂĐƚŽƌƐƚŽůŽŽŬĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞĐŽŵŵŽŶŐŽŽĚďǇƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŶŐĂ ‘ƐŽĐŝĂůǀŝĐĞ ?-as the suitable middle 
road solution. Thus, users should not be punished but treated, for their own good: 
 “This is a battle for public ŚĞĂůƚŚ ? ? ? ?ĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞƐĐŽƵƌŐĞŝƐƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƐŽŝƚ ŝƐďĞƚƚĞƌ Ž ĞŐƵůĂƚĞ
cannabis, taking it out of the shadows, to identify its addicts and eventually treat them in cases 
of excessive consumption. ? ?DƵũŝĐĂ ?Z ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?
 
As with drug use, when talking about supply, no distinction is made regarding different drugs. In 
virtually every public appearance, Mujica would frame drug commerce as an economic phenomenon, 
with repression-oriented policies enhancing the high risk and profitable qualities of the market. It is a 
clear case of  ‘ůĞƐƐĞƌ of two ĞǀŝůƐ ? logic, where  “worse than the poison of addiction is the poison of drug 
trafficking ? ? ĂƐ ŚĞ ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŽƵƐůǇ ƌĞƉĞĂƚĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƌĂĚŝŽĐĂƐƚƐ ĂŶĂůǇƐĞĚ  ?DƵũŝĐĂ ? Z  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
24/01/2013; 14/03/2013; 07/05/2013; 01/08/2013; 06/08/2013). 
 
Thus, and appealing to the fairness moral foundation, the main rationality to regulate cannabis for the 
Uruguayan executive power was to encourage a regional discussion of prohibitionist drug policies. 
Here, cannabis regulation is endorsed as a by-product of concerns for cocaine trafficking and 
production. This fairness foundation is at odds with the disproportionality of the costs that the current 
international framework entails worldwide, where, as he defines: 
 “the highest consumption rates are in the US and in the rich industrialized areas of the 
world, but the War on Drugs has especially deformed the history of the poor countries [in 
ƚĞƌŵƐ ŽĨ ĐŽĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ ? ?  ? ? )Facts prove the constant and permanent failure of the 
repressive way. The only multinational corporations of clear Latin American origin that 
have been imposed on the world, are the ones related to cocaine trafficking ? ?DƵũŝĐĂ ?Z ?
24/01/2013). 
 
In fact, this is a position that has already been advocated by other regional leaders. The Latin American 
Commission on Drugs and Democracy, for example -composed by politicians, former presidents and 
cultural personalities of the continent- ? ĐŽŶƚĞŶĚĞĚ ŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ƚŚĂƚ  “violence and the organized crime 
associated with tŚĞ ŶĂƌĐŽƚŝĐƐ ƚƌĂĚĞ ĂƌĞ ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů ƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ŝŶ >ĂƚŝŶ ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ƚŽĚĂǇ ?  ? ? ? dŚĞ ŝŶ-depth 
revision of current drug policies is even more urgent in Latin America in light of their enormous human 
and social costs and threats to democratic institutions ?  ?>ĂƚŝŶAmerican Commission on Drugs and 
Democracy, 2009, p. 1). 
 
Thus, for the Uruguayan executive power the problem presents itself not as one of individual users, 
but from a community perspective. Accordingly, illegal drug trafficking involves the threat of a 
 ‘ƌĞďĞůůŝŽŶ ? ?as authors such as Garzón Vergara (2012) or Durán-Martinez (2016) have suggested. Here, 
ƚŚĞƚŚŝƌĚŬĞǇƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŵŽƌĂůĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶǀŽŬĞĚŝƐƚŚĞƌĞĐůĂŝŵŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞ^ƚĂƚĞ ?ƐĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĂ
criminal phenomenon that is seen to subvert the traditions, institutions and values that are perceived 
ƚŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐƚĂďŝůŝƚǇŝŶƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?/ŶDƵũŝĐĂ ?ƐƚĞƌŵƐ ?ŝůůĞŐĂůĚƌƵŐƚƌĂĨĨŝĐŬŝŶŐ “destroys the society, destroys 
its best customs and traditions ? ?DƵũŝĐĂ ?Z ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨŝƚƐƐƉŝůůŽǀĞƌ effects. 
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ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚŝƐǀŝĞǁ ?ĚƌƵŐƚƌĂĨĨŝĐŬŝŶŐŚĂƐ ?ĨŝƌƐƚůǇ ?ƐƉŝůůŽǀĞƌĞĨĨĞĐƚƐ ? “as a monumental economic fact 
enlarging corruption and illegal finances through money laundering ?  ?DƵũŝĐĂ ? Z ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?
Secondly, drug trafficking is seen to have spill over effects onto the crime world itself; this is getting 
ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇǀŝŽůĞŶƚďǇǁĂǇŽĨƚŚĞ ‘plata o plomo ? ?silver or lead, meaning money or bullet) (Mujica, 
RC, 20/12/2012) method in prisons. Here, people are given two options: accepting a bribe (silver) or 
facing assassination (lead). 
 
In this way, the structural  ‘ƉĂƌĂĚŽǆ of ĐƌŝŵĞ ? underpinning the public worry about public safety driving 
the executive power support to cannabis regulation, was framed at the micro level by appealing to 
two core politics moral foundations  Wnamely, authority and fairness-. Hence, at the near policy core 
level the problem was defined strongly emphasising the supply side, as a matter of crime policy 
reform. In other words, the main objective that cannabis regulation should obtain is the reduction of 
drug trafficking-related violence. Accordingly, in terms of policy design or instrumental aspects level, 
a state monopoly was proposed, since enabling a legal means of producing, distributing and selling 
cannabis was understood as the only way of truly competing with illegal trafficking. Furthermore, a 
ďƵǇĞƌƐ ? register and the implementation of purchase limits were proposed to restrain illegal re-selling 
and excessive consumption. Thus, the Uruguayan long-standing laity approach to drugs and other 
 ‘ƐŽĐŝĂůǀŝĐĞƐ ?ǁĂƐŽŶĐĞĂŐĂŝŶĐĂůůĞĚƵƉŽŶ ?ZĞůǇŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞ ‘ĐŝǀŝůĨĂŝƚŚ ?ŝŶĂƉĂƚĞƌŶĂůŝƐƚŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞ ?ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ
selling regulation was proposed as a social contract favouring new generations, independently of 
ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ĂĨĨŝŶŝƚŝĞs and ideologies. 
 
 
Tensions within the reformers advocacy coalition 
 
As proposed in this thesis, the paradox of crime was the main driver for the government breaking in 
ƚŚĞĚĞďĂƚĞďƵƚ ŝƚǁĂƐŶŽƚƚŚĞt/ZĞƌƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐŵĂŝŶŵŽƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶ ?KŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚƌĂƌǇ ?ƚŚĞhruguayan 
rapid secularisation within the context of the second demographic transition, was leading to the 
conformation of a  ‘ŶĞǁ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ? political coalition that was heavily defining the problem as one of ƵƐĞƌƐ ?
individual autonomy, rather than supplier-led social harms as emphasised by the executive. Thus, in 
this section I illustrate the main tensions found in each of the three Advocacy ŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ belief system 
levels -deep core, policy core and secondary aspects. This analysis is based on my own interviews and 
participant observation as well as the opinions expressed at the Planta tu Planta [Plant your Plant] 
cannabis ŐƌŽǁĞƌƐ ? forum; the most important cannabis ŐƌŽǁĞƌƐ ? forum in Uruguay, at the base of the 
ŵŽƐƚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐŐƌŽǁĞƌƐ ?association, AECU. 
 
When asked about how he reacted to the Strategy for Life and Coexistence, a member of the cannabis 
activism group Proderechos expressed his disappointment in these terms: 
 
 “ ?ĞĨŽƌĞ ƚŚĞ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ĂŶŶŽƵŶĐĞŵĞŶƚ ? ǁĞ ǁĞƌĞ ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ŽŶ Ă ĐĂŵpaign comparing 
cannabis regulation with abortion and LGTBI rights. We wanted to make the analogy with 
the progressive laws pushed forward at the beginning of the 20th century in Uruguay, which 
ǁĞƌĞ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵŵŽŶ ƐĞŶƐĞ ďĂĐŬ ƚŚĞŶ ?  ? ? ? ĂĐŚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞƐĞ ŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞƐ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ Ă
ďƌĞĂŬƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŝŶƚŚĞƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐĂďŽƵƚŽƚŚĞƌƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞĨƌĞĞĚŽŵ ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ
about marihuana used to be about freedom and rights, now it is about public safety and 
ŚĞĂůƚŚ ?(National civil society (id17), interview). 
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At the Plant your Plant forum, disappointment was the prevalent feeling. There, it was contended 
that: 
 “ ?dŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?will need to accept that growing cannabis is an act and manifestation of 
our culture, and that at a private level I WILL DO WHATEVER I WANT, because it is MY RIGHT. 
Therefore, CONTROLLING AUTHORITIES, you should know that in the WEKZ ? ^BOX that you 
are opening THERE IS A CULTURE, with IDENTITY and VALUES underpinning it. Instead of 
messing with our culture you could start by reviewing your own position and start grounding 
your pseudoscience in more believable arguments ?  ?WůĂŶƚĂ ƚƵ WůĂŶƚĂ ? ĨŽƌƵŵ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
emphasis in original) 
 
ŶĂůǇƐŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌŵĞƌƐ ?ĂĚǀŽĐĂĐǇĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐŵŽƌĂůĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ‘ŵĂƌŝŚƵĂŶĂůĞŐĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ǁĂƐ
defended primarily as a matter of liberty and care. Liberty, because cannabis prohibition is seen as a 
way of oppression, where the old and conservative generations in power impose their lifestyle onto 
others in a hypocritical way, as another member of this forum put it: 
 “I believe it is totally disrespectful and a subjugation of my constitutional rights to have this type 
of control differentiating alcohol and cannabis consumers ? (Planta tu Planta, forum, 
13/03/2014). 
 
Framed like this, cannabis regulation refers to the value of being treated equally as a citizen, 
independently of ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ drug of choice. The liberty moral foundation urges people to band together to 
oppose oppression:  “>ŝďĞƌƚŝĞƐ ?ŚŽƌŝǌŽŶ PhŶŝƚĞĚ&ŝƐƚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞhƌƵŐƵĂǇ ? ?was the name 
of the Proderechos ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽĂďŽǀĞďǇƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĞ ? “Cultivate your rights ?ŝƐĂƐůŽŐĂŶ
widely used in many of the Latin American versions of the Global Marijuana March celebrated in May 
ĞĂĐŚǇĞĂƌǁŽƌůĚǁŝĚĞ ?/ŶŚŝůĞ ? ? ? ? ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ƚŽƚŚŝƐƐůŽŐĂŶĂƐĞĐŽŶĚƐĞŶƚĞŶĐĞǁĂƐĂĚĚĞĚ P “No 
More Harms ? ? 
 
On top of liberty, care -ĂƐƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚŵĂŝŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŵŽƌĂůĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƵŶĚĞƌƉŝŶŶŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌŵĞƌƐ ?
advocacy coalition- ?ƌĞůĂƚĞƐƚŽƚŚĞŝĚĞĂƚŚĂƚĂƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐŝŶƚĞŐƌŝƚǇƐŚŽƵůĚďĞƉƌŽƚĞĐƚĞĚĂƐĂŵĂƚƚĞƌŽĨ
universal human rights; people deserve to be cared for independently of who they are, where they 
are from, or what they do. It is no coincidence that the main European-coined drug policy reform 
movement is called, precisely, harm reduction. As it is stated from its name, as a political movement 
harm reduction strategies deployed until now have heavily defined the problem of drugs as a matter 
of care and rights for its users. 
 
In fact, similar politics moral foundations were found in other WEIRD people advocacy coalitions 
ĞůƐĞǁŚĞƌĞ ?/ŶŚŝƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨ^ǁŝƐƐĚƌƵŐƉŽůŝĐǇĐŚĂŶŐĞ ?ǁŚĞŶƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌŵĞƌƐ ?ĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶĚĞĞƉ
ĐŽƌĞďĞůŝĞĨƐ ?<ƺďůĞƌŶŽƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ?  “harm reduction ĂĚǀŽĐĂƚĞƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƚŚĞ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇĂŶĚ
integrity to be more important than the respect of sociocultural norms: deviant individuals deserve 
help as does anyone else, but they should be free to use it or not ? ?<ƺďůĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ) ?ĞƐĐƌŝďŝŶŐ
the harm reduction advocacy coalition that pushed for drug decriminalisation reform in Portugal, 
Hughes arrived at the conclusion that:  “the primary objective of decriminalisation was to recognize the 
human rights of the drug user. It was therefore deemed ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇƚŽŵĞĞƚƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƐŽĨ
drug users to health and social care. While decriminalisation was also argued to increase the potential 
for social cohesion, the primary emphasis was upon liberal values ? ?,ƵŐŚĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? 236). 
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dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?ĂƚƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚůĞǀĞůŽĨƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌŵĞƌƐ ?ĂĚǀŽĐĂĐǇĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƉŽůŝĐǇĐŽƌĞ ) ?ƉƵďůŝĐŚĞĂůƚŚŵŝŐŚƚ
ďĞ Ă ĐŽŵŵŽŶ ŐƌŽƵŶĚ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞ ƉŽǁĞƌ ?Ɛ ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? ďƵƚ ĐƌŝŵĞ ƉŽůŝĐǇ ǁĂƐ ĂŵƵĐŚŵŽƌĞ
difficult frame to convey. At this level, tensions arose because most of the people taking part in the 
ĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƌĞũĞĐƚĞĚŵŽƐƚŽĨƚŚĞĐƌŝŵĞƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐƐƉŽŶƐŽƌĞĚďǇDƵũŝĐĂ ?ƐŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞĚďǇ “a 
conservative twist through the logic of a top-down penal populism, and a governance through crime ?
(Paternain, 2014, p. 1). In the case of cannabis regulation specifically, in my interviews it was likewise 
stated that: 
 
 “I do agree with the idea of cannabis regulation, but I did not agree with the way it was 
presented, within the Strategy for Life and Coexistence framework, along with the other 
proposals, as the stiffening of penalties for free base cocaine trafficking, for example ? (National 
civil society representative (id29), interview). 
 
In another interview: 
 “/ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĚƚŚĞ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇĨŽƌ>ŝĨĞĂŶĚŽĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŝŶĂǀĞƌǇĐŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚŽƌǇǁĂǇ ?/ƚĐĂŵĞƌŝŐŚƚ
ĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞ “>ĂWĂƐŝǀĂ ?ŚŽŵŝĐŝĚĞĂŶĚŝŶĂĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨĂƐƚƌŽŶŐƉƵŶŝƚŝǀĞƐƚƌĞĂŵ ?/ďĞůŝĞǀĞƚŚĂƚƚŚŽƐĞ
 ? ?ƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐĂŶĚƚŚĞƉƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ ?ƐŽǁŶĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞŽŶĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐŵĞĂnt a reluctance of the FA to 
discuss, through its government, the majority punitive common sense in the society. It was like 
ĐŽŶǀĞǇŝŶŐƚŚĞƐƚĂƚƵƐƋƵŽŝŵƉŽƐĞĚďǇƚŚĞŵĂƐƐŵĞĚŝĂ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚǁŝŶŐĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞŝŶŐĞŶĞƌĂů ?
(National civil society representative (id31), interview). 
 
Or as explained by another respondent: 
 “Many of the reasons why Uruguay is legalizing I do not support: against drug trafficking, for 
ƉĂƌĞŶƚƐ ƚŽ ŬŶŽǁ ǁŚĂƚ ƚŚĞŝƌ ŬŝĚƐ ĂƌĞ ĚŽŝŶŐ ? ŶŽ ǁĂǇ ? /ƚ ƌĂŝƐĞƐ ƚŚĞ ƐƚĂƚĞ ?Ɛ ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ĂŶĚ
paternalism, which is not good. ? ?^ŽĐŝŽůŽŐŝƐƚ ?ŝĚ ? ? ) ?ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ ) ? 
The head of the National Drug Committee at that moment, Julio Calzada, also recognised this problem: 
 “Among NGOs and scholars there was a clear position of not defining drug use as a criminal 
issue. It was ĂŚĞĂůƚŚƉŽůŝĐǇƉƌŽďůĞŵďƵƚŶŽƚĂĐƌŝŵĞƉŽůŝĐǇŽŶĞ ? ? ? ?dŚĞǁŚŽůĞ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇĨŽƌ>ŝĨĞ
and Coexistence was strongly criticised even within certain left wing circles, questioning why 
cannabis would be introduced as part of a public safety strategy ? ?EĂƚŝŽŶĂůDrugs Committee 
(id12), interview). 
Therefore, at the level of policy design, the most important source of tension found was the 
integration of personal cultivation mechanisms vs. a commercialisation system. For the reformers, 
self-ĐƵůƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐ ‘ĂŵƵƐƚ ? ŝĨĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐŵĞĂŶƚƚŽĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞƵƐĞƌƐ ?ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?&ŽƌƚŚĞ
executive power, commercialisation was needed if the aim was to economically compete with illegal 
drug trafficking. As it was stated in the press release from the National Coordination for Marihuana 
Legalisation -which brought together most of the cannabis activist groups in the country- following 
ƚŚĞ ‘ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŝƌƌƵƉƚŝŽŶ ? ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐĂĐƚŝǀŝƐŵĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌŵƐĞůĨ-cultivation and 
^ŽĐŝĂů ĂŶŶĂďŝƐ ůƵďƐ ǁĞƌĞ ƚŚĞ  ‘starting point ?  ?Coordinadora Nacional por la Legalización de la 
Marihuana, press release, 20/07/ 2012). 
 
The diagram below synthesises the beliefs system conflict just exposed. The reformers advocacy 
coalition position is represented in the right hand diagram, and the executive power approach in the 
left hand diagram. At the politics moral foundations first level, the executive power appeals were, 
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mainly, the reclaiming of the ^ƚĂƚĞ ?Ɛ authority against a criminal phenomenon  Willegal drug trafficking- 
that is seen to threaten stability in society, and the unfairness in the disproportion of the costs that 
ƚŚĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĚƌƵŐƉŽůŝĐǇĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬĐĂƵƐĞƐŝŶ>ĂƚŝŶŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?ŽŶǀĞƌƐĞůǇ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌŵĞƌƐ ?
advocacy coalition emphasises the user ?Ɛ liberty, understanding cannabis prohibition as oppression of 
individual autonomy and care, while attempting to reduce the harms that prohibition provokes to the 
ĚƌƵŐƵƐĞƌ ?ƐƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůŝŶƚĞŐƌŝƚǇ ?ƐĂŶƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞĚ ?ƚŚĞƐĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐŵŽƌĂůĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞĐĂƵƐĂůůy linked to 
different emphasis at the second beliefs level (policy core); whereas for the executive power the main 
ŵŽƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ƌĞŐƵůĂƚĞ ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ ǁĂƐ ƌĞĚƵĐŝŶŐ ĚƌƵŐ ƌĞůĂƚĞĚ ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ? ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĨŽƌŵĞƌƐ ? ĂĚǀŽĐĂĐǇ
coalition the primary goal should be ĞŶŚĂŶĐŝŶŐĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐƵƐĞƌƐ ?ŚĞĂůƚŚĂŶĚƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?&ŝŶĂůůǇ ?ĂƚƚŚĞƚ ŝƌĚ
ůĞǀĞů ŽĨ ƉŽůŝĐǇ ƚŽŽůƐ  ?ƐĞĐŽŶĚĂƌǇ ĂƐƉĞĐƚƐ ) ? ƚŚĞ ŵĂŝŶ ĐŽŶƚĞ ƚŝŽŶ ǁĂƐ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ Ă ƐƚĂƚĞ ?Ɛ
monopoly for cannabis production, distribution and selling  Windispensable for the executive power- 
and a legalised self-cultivation mechanism  WƚŚĞƐŝŶĞƋƵĂŶŽŶĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĨŽƌƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌŵĞƌƐ ?ĂĚǀŽĐĂĐǇ
coalition. 
 
 
&ŝŐƵƌĞ ? ?ĚǀŽĐĂĐǇŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƐŚŝĞƌĂƌĐŚŝĐĂůďĞůŝĞĨƐƐǇƐƚĞŵ 
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
 
dŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ? ƚŚĞĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞƉŽǁĞƌĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĨŽƌŵĞƌƐ ?ĂĚǀocacy coalition reached a remarkably wider 
array of political moral foundations than each of them did on their own. As I have argued, the Harm 
Reductionist reformers coalition was more restricted to the leftist moral domain of the Western, 
Educated, Industrialised, Rich and Democratic (or WEIRD) people, strongly appealing to the individual 
autonomy ethics and its freedom and care for drug users. Conversely, former president Mujica posed 
a pattern different than what expected by this theory, akin to a catch all moral discourse. In this regard, 
it is interesting to note here that the numbers available support the hypothesis that due to Mujica´s 
leadership the Frente Amplio widened its electoral base, formerly strongly associated with having 
more education and being of middle class (Selios & Vairo, 2012), which made Uruguayan political 
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ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ƚĂůŬĂďŽƵƚDƵũŝĐĂǲƐ  ‘WůĞďĞŝĂŶZĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ?  ?'ĂƌĐĠ ?  ? ?  ? ) ?&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ? /ƉƌŽƉŽƐĞ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ
moral conflict dynamics found in my research, between a civil society strongly appealing to Liberty 
and Care, and a government worried about widening the moral discourse to include not only the 
t/Z ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇ ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? ďƵƚ ƚŚĞ ĂƉƉĞĂů ƚŽ ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ǀĂůƵĞƐ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ
authority and fairness, is a promising starting point to understand crime policy change more generally, 
and deserves to be further considered by critical criminologists. For this matter, my theoretical 
ƉƌŽƉŽƐĂů ƚŽ ĚĞĨŝŶĞ ŵŽƌĞ ƉƌĞĐŝƐĞůǇ ƚŚĞ ĂĚǀŽĐĂĐǇ ĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶƐ ? ďĞůŝĞĨ ƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ ďǇ ĞŶŐĂŐŝŶŐ ,ĂŝĚƚ ?Ɛ
framework can be empirically useful to better grasp cross-cultural variations in drug policy change 
explanations, a call already made by others (Hughes, 2007; Swedlow, 2014). 
 
However, I also show how the confluence of different actors pushing for cannabis reform brought, as 
well, important tensions centred on how to define the problem and how to select the adequate policy 
tools to be deployed. As suggested by Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (1993), the government 
breaking in shifted public attention to cannabis regulation, allowing the topic to reach the macro- 
political agenda. Yet, since attention spans are limited, controversy over an issue is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for atypical reform to happen; if the citizens excluded from a monopoly  Wi.e. 
cannabis activism- remain apathetic, the institutional arrangement usually remains constant, and 
policy is likely to change only slowly and incrementally in a process of negative feedback. Hence, these 
tensions needed to be resolved for atypical policy change to happen. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter analysed how the cannabis debate broke into the macro political agenda and why it was 
so conflict ridden. Within the most violent continent in the world, there are notoriously higher levels 
of public criticism about public safety and crime in Uruguay compared to other Latin American 
countries, consolidating as a priority problem for the population. Furthermore, in a context of an 
economically prosperous society, the executive power authorities were culturally surprised. This 
cultural surprise related with the resilient disjunction between expectations and reality. The 
expectation was that ten years of left-wing policies favouring the most vulnerable groups within 
society should have restrained crime. However, the perceived reality was one of continuously 
increasing violence. Thus, this disjunction between expectation and reality ultimately reached critical 
mass, provoking a crisis in the way the left used to frame public safety policies. 
 
In this context of paradoxical correlation between economic growth, better income distribution and 
increasing violent crime rates, the political elites found a suitable enemy in free base cocaine, shifting 
their attention to the drugs topic, at the same time as reframing cannabis as a  “ůĞĂƐƚ ďĂĚ ? drug. Thus, 
Ă  ‘ďŝĨƵƌĐĂƚĞĚ ? ĚƌƵŐ ƉŽůŝĐǇ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ƐƚĂƌƚĞĚ ƚŽ ĞŵĞƌŐĞ ? ǁŚĞƌĞ ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ĐŽƵůĚ ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚ
ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?ƐĐŽŚĞƐŝŽŶĂƐĂŵĂƌŬĞƚƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƚŽŽů ?ďǇƉƵůůŝŶŐĂƉĂƌƚƚŚĞ ‘ŐŽŽĚ ?ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐƵƐĞƌƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ
ŽĨĨĞƌŝŶŐŽĨ  ‘ďĂĚ ?ĚƌƵŐƐĂƐĨƌĞĞďĂƐĞĐŽĐĂŝŶĞ ŝŶƚŚĞďůĂĐŬŵĂƌŬĞƚ ?ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐůǇ ?ĂƐƚĂƚĞŵŽŶŽƉŽůǇĨŽƌ
cannabis selling was proposed by a specific group within the Uruguayan executive power comprising 
former president Mujica and some of his closest collaborators, as part of a wider Strategy for Life and 
Coexistence. It was further contended that, in line to what would be expected by Punctuated 
Equilibrium Theory, at this moment, cannabis regulation broke onto the national and international 
agenda in a surprising and controversial way, creating a chaotic moment of punctuation in the ongoing 
debate. 
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Following, the analysis of the advocacy coalition belief system  Wintegrating more specifically the 
concept of political moral foundations- proved to be of use to better grasp the strong emotional clash 
ĨŽƵŶĚ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ ƌĞĨŽƌŵĞƌƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞ ƉŽǁĞƌ ?Ɛ ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ? tŚĞƌĞĂƐ ƚŚĞ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ
ĂƉƉĞĂůĞĚƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇĂŶĚƌĞŝƚĞƌĂƚŝǀĞůǇƚŽĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇǀĂůƵĞƐƐƵĐŚƵƐĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ?ƚŽĐŽŶĨƌŽŶƚ ‘ƚŚĞƌĞďĞůůŝŽŶ
of illegal drug ƚƌĂĨĨŝĐŬŝŶŐ ? ? ĂŶĚ ĨĂŝƌŶĞƐƐ ? ĚĞŶŽƵŶĐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĚŝƐƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ŽĨ ĐƵƌƌĞŶƚ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
drug policies arrangements, the reformers advocacy coalition framed cannabis regulation mainly as 
an autonomy problem, as a matter of liberty and care for its users. As anticipated, these politics moral 
foundations were causally linked to different emphasis about what the main objectives to regulate 
ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐƐŚŽƵůĚďĞ ?ĞŝƚŚĞƌƌĞĚƵĐŝŶŐĚƌƵŐƌĞůĂƚĞĚǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞŽƌĞŶŚĂŶĐŝŶŐĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐƵƐĞƌƐ ?ŚĞĂůƚŚĂŶĚ
rights. Finally, these different positions were related with the preferred policy tools to be included in 
the new legal framework. The main contention at this level was between including a ƐƚĂƚĞ ?Ɛ monopoly 
for cannabis production, distribution and selling  Windispensable for the executive power- and a 
legalised self-cultivation mechanism  WƚŚĞ ƐŝŶĞ ƋƵĂ ŶŽŶ ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĨŽƌŵĞƌƐ ? ĂĚǀŽĐĂĐǇ
coalition. In this way, I argued that by framing cannabis reform as a crime policy matter, the executive 
ƉŽǁĞƌ ?Ɛ breaking in expanded the borders of what was politically possible  Wnamely, the inclusion of a 
state-oriented commercialisation system. Moreover, I contended that with the proposed theoretical 
reformulation of Advocacy Coalition Framework it is possible to better grasp empirically cross-cultural 
variations in drug policy change explanations more generally. 
 
However, as it was discussed, the breaking of cannabis into the macro political agenda created a great 
deal of conflict and communication turmoil that needed to be resolved for cannabis policy change to 
happen. Hence, the next chapter of the thesis is dedicated to analysing the aftermath of the executive 
ƉŽǁĞƌ ?ƐďƌĞĂŬŝŶŐŝŶ ?DŽƌĞƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇ ?ŝƚǁŝůůĂĚĚƌĞƐƐƚŚĞŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚŽĨŶĞǁŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂĐƚŽƌƐ ?ĂƐ
well as the strategies deployed to cope with conflicts, enabling the political process to overcome the 
chaos. 
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Chapter 7. Overcoming chaos: international policy transfer dynamics 
 
dŚĞ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ŝƌƌƵƉƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĚĞďĂƚĞ ďƌŽƵŐŚƚ ĚĞĞƉ ĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂl process of 
cannabis reform: the mass media shifted their attention to the topic, new actors for and against the 
reform started to become involved, and consequentially the previous balance of powers broke down. 
However, confronted with the real possibility of regulating cannabis, which positioned stakeholders 
in the hotspot of reform at the international level, actors involved quickly realised that no one was 
completely certain of how to address this problem. Mass media was eager to delve into what the first 
national-level legal cannabis market would look like; however, the lack of specific answers about the 
adequate policy tools to be deployed exposed the lack of technical resources and knowledge 
accumulation around this matter. 
 
Confronted with ƚŚŝƐ ‘ĐŚĂŽƚŝĐŵŽŵĞŶƚŽĨƉƵŶĐƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ƐƵƌƌŽƵŶĚĞĚďǇĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĂůƚƵƌŵŽŝůĂŶĚ
strong disputes over what dimensions of the debate should become more salient, both civil society 
and the section of the government supporting cannabis reform knew that if they remained apathetic, 
cannabis regulation would hardly be achieved. Sebastian Sabini, a young legislator coming from the 
ƉƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ ?ƐƐĞĐƚŽƌĂŶĚĂŬĞǇƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĞŶƚƌĞƉƌĞŶĞƵƌĂŶĚďƌŽŬĞƌŽĨƚŚĞŶĞǁƌŝŐŚƚƐĂŐĞŶĚĂ ?ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĚ
this tension and explained to me that: 
 “After the SLC announcement I spoke with [the minister of Interior Eduardo] Bonomi and Lucia 
[Topolansky], Senator and partner of Mujica] about the self-cultivation issue. I explained to 
them that strategically we could not afford to be against the social movement and cannabis 
activism by leaving personal cultivation out, because actually they would be the only ones 
supporting a cannabis legalisation proposal. ?  ?>ĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞ ƉŽǁĞƌ  W Frente Amplio member, 
personal communication) 
 
As acknowledged by the Uruguayan Minister of the Interior himself, both civil society and government 
needed each other to pass through cannabis reform: 
 “dŚĞ problem was that when we decided to tread this road we found such dissimilar positions 
among the Ministries that we could ŶŽƚĞůĂďŽƌĂƚĞĂƉƌŽƉĞƌůĂǁ ?ƐƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůďƵƚĂŽŶĞĂƌƚŝĐůĞ
initiative for others to develop, based on the idea of cannabis ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ? (Ministry of Interior 
(id14), interview). 
 
Following this, how was an Executive Power one-ĂƌƚŝĐůĞĐĂůů ĨŽƌĂ  ‘^ƚĂƚĞĂŶŶĂďŝƐ Monopoly for its 
ĐŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇ ƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĞĚ ŝŶƚŽ Ă ĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝǀĞ ĨŽƌƚǇ-four articles legal 
framework, including provisions for both cannabis sale to individuals and self-cultivation mechanisms? 
As noted by previous works on cannabis regulation (Boidi et al., 2015; Pardo, 2014; Montañés, 2014; 
Room, 2014; Kilmer et al., 2013), a number of significant similarities and differences can be found 
between recent legalization frameworks. For example, the Uruguayan law approved in December 
 ? ? ? ?ďŽƌƌŽǁƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĂƐƋƵĞŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛ^ŽĐŝĂůĂŶŶĂďŝƐůƵďƐŵŽĚĞů ?ŽƚŚŽůŽƌĂĚŽĂŶĚhƌƵŐƵĂǇ
reforms allow the possession of up to six cannabis plants for domestic cultivation. Conversely, the 
main particularity of the Uruguayan case compared to other innovative experiences concerns the 
central role of the state in the regulation design, holding a register of cannabis users, issuing licences 
to grow cannabis for commercialisation as well as self-cultivation, and forbidding cannabis related 
advertisement. Are these just hazardous policy design coincidences? 
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In this chapter, I focus specifically on the international policy transfer dynamics found in the 
Uruguayan case, by which  “knowledge of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas 
in one political system ? ?ŽůŽǁŝƚǌ ?DĂƌƐŚ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? )ǁĞƌĞŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞĚŝŶƚŽƚŚĞĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐĚĞďĂƚĞ ?
informing and shaping the subsequent development of Uruguayan cannabis reform. I will explore the 
role of international elite networking dynamics in three key areas of the political process: policy 
design, political campaigning and the international conventions framework. Overall, I will argue that, 
from the moment of the government irruption in the debate, transnational drug policy reform 
networks gained importance as a causal contributor, which helps to explain why and how cannabis 
was regulated in Uruguay against a backdrop of an adverse majoritarian public opinion. 
 
 
7.1. Policy design 
 
International policy transfer processes were key for the development of the new Uruguayan cannabis 
policy design. One concrete example of this statement concerned the deliberate use of lessons of the 
regulation development programs previously deployed in the US states of Washington and Colorado. 
As it was already introduced at the beginning of this thesis (section 2.3.2.), in October 2012, that is, 
four months after the Strategy for Life and Coexistence press conference (where the Uruguayan 
government called for cannabis regulation for the first time), voters in Colorado and Washington (US) 
took governing authorities by surprise passing through referendums to legally regulate cannabis in 
these states. In Colorado, the possession of up to six plants for domestic cultivation is allowed and 
selling of small amounts of cannabis in a vertically integrated production system, where retailing shops 
must also produce at least 70% of the total quantity sold. In Washington, a tighter regulation system 
is at place, based on a three-tiered licence system for production, processing and retail of cannabis 
exclusively. In this state, personal production for self-consumption is not allowed in any form. As I 
explain below, in the international policy transfer dynamics found in these examples, most of the tools 
ƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌƌĞĚ ǁĞƌĞ ĂŝŵĞĚ Ăƚ ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŶŐ ĂŶ  ‘ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ? ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐƐĂůĞ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? ƚŚĂƚ ŝƐ ? Ă ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ƚŚĂƚ
incorporates all determinative information about product and price formation. 
 
As a member of Proderechos, the Drug Policy Alliance (DPA) invited me to present on the Uruguayan 
ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ Ăƚ ƚŚĞŝƌ  ‘ZĞĨŽƌŵ ŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ? ŚĞůĚ ŝŶ KĐƚŽďĞƌ  ? ? ? ? ? ĂŶĚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƌĂůůĞů ǁŽƌŬƐŚŽƉ ŽŶ
 ‘ZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŶŐ>ĞŐĂůĂŶŶĂďŝƐ ? ?ďŽƚŚ ŝŶĞŶǀĞƌ ?ŽůŽƌĂĚŽ ?h^ ) ?ůŽŶŐǁŝƚŚŵĞŵďĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞhƌƵŐƵĂǇĂŶ
government, such as the law entrepreneurs from the National Drugs Committee -Julio Calzada and 
Augusto Vitale-, and from Frente Amplio -Julio Bango and Sebastián Sabini-, we visited growing and 
retailing venues, public regulatory agencies, met numerous civil servants and private cannabis 
ĞŶƚƌĞƉƌĞŶĞƵƌƐ ? ĂŶĚ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚ ŝŶ ĚĞƉƚŚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŶƵƚƐ ĂŶĚ ďŽůƚƐ ? ŽĨ tĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ ƐƚĂƚĞ ?Ɛ ĂŶĚ ŽůŽƌĂĚŽ ?Ɛ
regulatory systems development. 
 
The analysis of these field notes points to two main recurring themes: the first was the shock of 
knowing, for the first time, what a developed cannabis legal market looks like. In many of the visits, 
the Uruguayan political actors expressed their surprise, highlighting in different ways the impressive 
level of professionalism and technological development of both ColŽƌĂĚŽ ?ƐĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇĂŶĚŝƚƐ
regulatory agencies. The second recurring theme concerned the reluctance of these actors to turn 
cannabis into a profit-oriented market -as seemed to be the case in Colorado-, questioning the role of 
private actors in the Uruguayan case. As the following quotation illustrates: 
 “This visit is very important because it really made an impression on us that it is possible to 
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develop a serious and efficient cannabis legal market, although probably through different 
means, more adapted to the Uruguayan reality ?  ?>ĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞWŽǁĞƌ- Frente Amplio member 
(id7), personal communication). 
 
In this case, the significant development of the US cannabis markets set an important stimulus for 
policy transfer to occur. The advantages and disadvantages of having a six plants limit for domestic 
cultivation as a matter of convention, the issuing of licences for cannabis producers, and the technical 
and technological  ‘ŬŶŽǁ-ŚŽǁ ? for cannabis growing and its control -i.e. tracking system  “ĨƌŽŵ seed to 
ƐĂůĞ ? ? ƐĂĨĞƚǇ ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐ ? ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝŶŐ ƉŽŝŶƚƐ ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ? ƚƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŝƐƐƵĞƐ ? ƉĂĐŬĂŐŝŶŐ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ- 
were all items under scrutiny. 
 
Conversely, the significant difference in the legal and political cultures, particularly regarding the role 
of the state, the role of private actors and their relationship, acted as a significant cultural limit to 
these transfer processes. On the one hand, as explained by the participants, US political culture is 
staunchly anti-state intervention in the economy, favouring business leadership and investment and 
ƉƌŝǀĂƚŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ĚĞůŝǀĞƌǇ ? ĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ ? ďŽƚŚ tĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ ĂŶĚ ŽůŽƌĂĚŽ ?Ɛ ůŽĐĂů ƌĞĨŽƌŵƐ ǁĞƌĞ
pushed forward within a national prohibitionist context, for these models were consciously assembled 
attempting to reduce and delimit the State interference in the local markets as much as possible. In 
terms of the regulation system development. As commented by a Colorado Regulatory task force 
member in an informal talk ĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞǁŽƌŬƐŚŽƉ ‘ZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŶŐ>ĞŐĂůĂŶŶĂďŝƐ ?ŚĞůĚŝŶ Denver: 
 “There is a strong awareness in United States about the importance of the private industry and 
the role that these people will have in a legal cannabis market. Even when the state remains as 
the main regulatory agency, the private entrepreneurs need to be included in the conversation 
from the very beginning ?  ?ŽůŽƌĂĚŽZĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌǇƚĂƐŬĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŵďĞƌ ?ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?
23/10/2013). 
 
On the other hand, Uruguay has historically had one of the most comprehensive welfare states in Latin 
America. Here, the political culture is highly interventionist, favouring public monopolies to deliver 
key services. Therefore, the longstanding Uruguayan laity foundations underpinning drug policy led to 
a strongly state-oriented regulation model with strong free commerce restrictions. The Uruguayan 
law, for example, bans any type of cannabis advertisement, and requires a pre-registration with the 
State for Uruguayan residents only, to have access to the product. The commercialisation schema is 
highly supervised by the state in terms of prices and type of strains available and the private licensees 
that grow cannabis for commercialisation are located in a shared public venue. 
 
These long-standing legal and political culture differences acted as important limits for policy transfer 
to happen. As noted by the Uruguayan former General Secretary of the National Drugs Committee, 
Julio Calzada, when comparing these models: 
 
 “In Washington and Colorado they cannot ban advertisement because of the constitutional rule 
of free speech protection. They cannot restrain cannabis business because constitutionally 
commerce is framed as a deal between citizens where the state cannot get in the middle. There 
are many issues where Uruguay has more legal freedom to regulate. In the Uruguayan law, we 
have completely banned any type of idea endorsing marijuana consumption. We attempt to 
deactivate any type of commercial relationship without the interference of the state, because 
we have as a criterion to de-marketise cannabis, so it does not have a commercial value based 
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on competition.  ? ? ? Thus, we are constructing a regulatory proposal that has to do with our own 
culture, with our institutions, with the strength of the Uruguayan state and its control 
capabilities. ? ?EĂƚŝŽŶĂůƌƵŐƐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞŵĞŵďĞƌ ?ŝĚ ? ? ) ? interview). 
 
Although the state restrictions against a profit-oriented cannabis market was one of the most widely 
supported elements of the new legal framework, according to some of my research participants, in 
too many areas, the Uruguayan government opted for an excessively restrictive and paternalistic 
approach to reassure domestic opponents and worried neighbouring governments. In fact, I found a 
recurring tension during the parliamentary negotiations centred on what to include in the written law 
and what to leave out to be defined through trial and error. The monopoly of cannabis retailing 
through pharmacies is a case in point. As I will discuss more in depth in chapter 10, this public centred 
approach to the cannabis market has not necessarily resulted in a more transparent, law-abiding 
implementation process. 
 “dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨĂƐƉĞĐƚƐƚŚĂƚŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞůĂǁŝŶŽƌĚĞƌŶŽƚƚŽ ‘ƐĐĂƌĞŽůĚ
ƉĞŽƉůĞ ? ? but they are not realistic, appealing to norms that later on will be very hard to 
empirically implement. This is not a smart nor a sensible thing to do, given the level of ignorance 
that we still have about the topic. And if you ĚŽŶ ?ƚ give your best, you are opening the doors to 
ƚŚĞďůĂĐŬŵĂƌŬĞƚ ?>Ğƚ ?ƐƉƵƚŝƚŝŶƚŚĞƌĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌǇĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ ?ŶŽƚŝŶƚŚĞůĂǁ ?ƐĐŽƌƉƵƐĂŶĚůĞƚ ?ƐďĞ
rigid in the controls and progressive in the enabling ?  ?EĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŝǀŝů ^ŽĐŝĞƚǇ ŵĞŵďĞƌ Ŷ ? ? ?
interview). 
 
Possibly the most contested element of the new legal framework was the registration scheme for 
cannabis users. Only registered Uruguayan residents older than 18 years are allowed to have access 
to legal cannabis. This register aims at restricting the limit of available legal cannabis to up to forty 
grams per month per person. It is protected by the Habeas Data law (no 18337), which establishes a 
relatively strict judicial procedure for access permissions. As discussed by my participants, this register 
was heavily rejected by cannabis users, because is the one aspect where the differing politics moral 
foundations reviewed in the previous chapter clash most heavily (see section 7.3.). Overall, people 
considered it a violation of personal freedom and privacy, as well as discriminatory because cannabis 
is currently the only recreational legal drug for which this type of registration is required. This finding 
was also highlighted in other research on the topic (see for example Bioidi et al, 2015), and poses an 
important question mark regarding the effectiveness of the law in its objective of constraining the 
ďůĂĐŬ ŵĂƌŬĞƚ ĂůŽŶŐƐŝĚĞ ĞŶĚŽƌƐŝŶŐ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ ĨƌĞĞĚŽŵ ? ƚ ƚŚĞ ƐĂŵĞ ƚŝŵĞ ? Ă ŶƵŵďĞƌ ŽĨ ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ
ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĚ ĂůƐŽ ƉŽŝŶƚĞĚ ƚŽ Ă ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ  ‘ŶĂƚƵƌĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ƉƌŽĐĞƐ ? ? ǁŚĞƌĞ ƚŚĞ ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů ŶƵŵďĞƌ Žf 
unregistered cannabis users would possibly decline over time. In addition, restricting the legal access 
only to Uruguayan residents was highly criticised because of leaving an open back door for diversions 
to tourists and because of violating the principles of human rights over which this law is supposedly 
based, limiting the right to legal cannabis only to Uruguayan residents. 
 
/Ŷ ƉĂƌĂůůĞů ƚŽ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂů ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ? ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ ŐƌŽǁĞƌƐ ?  ‘ĞůŝƚĞ ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ? ǁĂƐ ĨŽƵŶĚ ƚŽ ďĞ ŽĨ
importance for the regulatory ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ ĞŶĚŽƌƐĞĚ ? &Žƌ ƚŚŝƐ ? ƚŚĞ hƌƵŐƵĂǇĂŶ ŐƌŽǁĞƌƐ ? ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ
AECU played a key role as a transfer agent. Through AECU, Uruguayan governmental actors had access 
ƚŽŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ‘ŬŶŽǁŚŽǁ ?ŽǀĞƌŚŽǁƚŽĂĚĂƉƚŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐƚŽƚŚĞhƌƵŐƵĂǇĂŶĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ. As 
it was reflected in an interview: 
 “We contacted the two best cannabis growers in the world and we took them to talk with the 
people of the National Drugs Committee. And since we do not have a clue about cannabis 
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growing it was useful, they really listened. Before we talked to them, we were planning to 
organise the state production for commercialisation over 150 hectares, and afterwards we 
talked to them we decided it is going to be 20 hectares, using ŐƌĞĞŶŚŽƵƐĞƐ ?  ? ? ? There are people 
that have been growing cannabis for 30 years but in Uruguay this is a world that we discovered 
ůĂƐƚǇĞĂƌ ?ǁŚĞŶ ?ĨŽƌŵĞƌhƌƵŐƵĂǇĂŶƉƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ ?DƵũŝĐĂĐĂůůĞĚĨŽƌĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?(National 
Civil Society member (id22), interview). 
 
The analysis of the crucial role of AECU for cannabis ŐƌŽǁĞƌƐ ?  ‘ĞůŝƚĞ ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ? points to the relevance 
of mutual affinities between agents -in this case, a common cannabis growing history and culture- as 
a necessary condition for policy transfer to occur. Thus, for ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? ǁŚĞŶ ĂƐŬŝŶŐ ĂďŽƵƚ h ?Ɛ
brokerage role with international networks of growers, its former president explained: 
 “The thing that you need to understand is that [cannabis growing] is a world. There are people 
that appear in magazines, invited to cannabis cups. There is a show business of cannabis. Before 
ďĞĐŽŵŝŶŐŬŶŽǁŶĂƐĂŶĂĐƚŝǀŝƐƚ ? /ǁĂƐŬŶŽǁŶĂƐĂŐƌŽǁĞƌ ?   ? ?dŚĞƉĞŽƉůĞ ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ
ǁŽƌůĚƚƌĂǀĞůĂůŽƚ ?ŝĨǇŽƵŝŶǀŝƚĞƚŚĞŵĂŶĚǇŽƵŐŝǀĞƚŚĞŵƚŚĞŵŝŶŝŵƵŵ ‘ŐŽŽĚǀŝďĞƐ ?ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ
they come. Not only to Uruguay. We have coordinated most of their visits with growers from 
Argentina and Brazil, so we take them on the whole tour. With most of them, we had an 
epistolary relationship first. We were always interested in talking with ĞǀĞƌǇďŽĚǇ ? I ĚŽŶ ?ƚ know, 
we started sending mails to them in 2006, for example, asking for seeds. They sent us the seeds, 
so we started a conversation; we sent them data about how we were growing ƚŚĞŵ ? you show 
them the big fat buds that you managed to cultivate with their seeds and they become 
interested, they become your friends ? ?EĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝǀŝů^ŽĐŝĞƚǇƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ ?ŝĚ ? ? ) ? interview). 
 
Ɛ ƉŽƐĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĚ ? ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ ŐƌŽǁĞƌƐ ?  ‘ĞůŝƚĞ ŶƚǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ? ǁĂƐ ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ
because both transfer actors were involved in the cannabis culture. Both shared interests, cannabis 
seeds, sophisticated cultivation skills, and eventually a close personal relationship. This personal 
background was key for transfer dynamics, to fill in the stark lack of knowledge of Uruguayan political 
elite regarding cannabis cultivation. 
 
ĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ ? ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ ŐƌŽǁĞƌƐ ? ĞůŝƚĞ ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ǁĂƐ ŽĨŬĞǇ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ
Social Cannabis Clubs into the Uruguayan law and I could observe many instances of knowledge 
transfer of this experience during my fieldwork. Thus, for example, Martin Barriuso -president of the 
Cannabis Users Association Pannagh and former president of the Spanish Cannabis Associations 
Federation- came to Uruguay to present the Social Cannabis Clubs model in different public and 
ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ ŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ? /ŶƉƌŝů  ? ? ? ? ?ĂƉĂŶĞůŽŶ  ‘^ĞůĨĐƵůƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶ ŶĚĂŶŶĂďŝƐůƵďƐ ?ǁĂƐƉƵƚƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ
with Martín Barriuso (Spain), Oscar Pares (Spain) and Jorge Hernández (Mexico); it was co-sponsored 
by the National Drugs Committee, the University of the Republic and Proderechos. In parallel, 
meetings between these actors with Uruguayan civil society groups and governmental members 
were arranged by local political entrepreneurs. 
 
As discussed at the beginning of the thesis, Social Cannabis Clubs are non-profit associations 
originating in the Basque country, where a group of adult users collectively organise the production 
of limited amounts of cannabis exclusively for personal use. Overall, a large degree of heterogeneity 
regarding their concrete methods and venues of operation, cultivation techniques and distribution 
schemas has been reported in researches from countries such as Spain, Belgium, England France, 
Switzerland Argentina and Chile; ranging from very small clubs of dozens of members to very large 
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enterprises of hundreds (Barriuso, 2011; ENCOD, 2013; Decorte T. , 2015; Decorte, et al., 2017). Still, 
in noen of these countries cannabis clubs are formally regulated but, conversely, they develop in the 
legal grey zone of cannabis personal use decriminalisation. 
 
Even though the Uruguayan Executive Power originally rejected this type of bottom-up market 
ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ĨŽƌ ŐŽŝŶŐ ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ ƚŚĞ ^ƚĂƚĞ ?Ɛ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ? ƚŚĞĨĂĐƚ ƚŚĂƚ ĂŶŶĂďŝƐ ůƵďƐ ĂůŝŐŶ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ
Uruguayan politiĐĂůĞůŝƚĞ ?Ɛ ?ďŽƚŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂůĂŶĚĐŝǀŝůƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ )ƌĞũĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨĂƉƌŽĨŝƚ-oriented legal 
market paved the way for the activism lobby to successfully include this cooperative self-production 
mechanism within the law. Thus, the middle road solution for the government was the inclusion of a 
maximum of 45 members per social club in order to facilitate its control and restrain diversions to 
the black market, a problem that was discussed in the literature with reference to some large clubs 
made up of thousands of members in Spain (Pere, 2015; Decorte et al. ? ? ? ? ? ) ?&ƌŽŵƚŚĞŐƌŽǁĞƌƐ ?
perspective, the problem with the size allowed for cannabis clubs is, however, how to meet economic 
ǀŝĂďŝůŝƚǇǁŝƚŚŽƵƚďĞŝŶŐĂ ‘ƌŝĐŚƉĞŽƉůĞ ? club: 
³With forty-five people, the sum just does not add up. You would need for two or three clubs of 
forty-five members to share costs, assuring the security of the growing sites against robberies. 
This, if it is indoors. Outdoors you would need even more clubs working together. How many 
hours of work it takes you, depends on how automatized you managed to have this, this is to say, 
how heavy your start-up costs are. If the max allowed is ninety-nine plants, plus the mother 
plants that you need to have, make 200. It takes like four hours of work watering 200 plants. Add 
ƚŽƚŚĂƚĂůůƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌǁŽƌŬŶĞĞĚĞĚĨŽƌƚƌŝŵŵŝŶŐ ?ĚƌǇŝŶŐ ?ĐƵƌŝŶŐ ?ĚĚƚŽƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŵŽŶĞǇĨŽƌƚŚĞ
ƌĞŶƚ ?ĞůĞĐƚƌŝĐŝƚǇ ?ƐĂĨĞƚǇ ? /Ĩ ŝƚ ŝƐŽŶůǇŽŶĞĐůƵď ?ŽŶůǇĂƌŝĐŚƉĞŽƉůĞĐůƵďĐĂŶĂĨĨŽƌĚ ŝƚ ?  ?ĂŶŶĂďŝƐ
grower, (code) personal communication). 
 
In this way, through the elite networking mechanisms just discussed, the Uruguayan endogenous 
necessity to fill in the gaps of knowledge in order to develop a suitable legal regulation framework 
resulted in an exceptional political output. The Washington legal framework does not include any self- 
cultivation mechanism, Colorado allows domestic cultivation but not Cannabis Clubs, and in Spain 
Cannabis Clubs are sometimes tolerated but not legally regulated. In this context, the Uruguayan law 
stands up as the most extensive one, borrowing and complementing different tools from previous 
regulation designs. 
 
 
7.2. Political campaigning 
 
Another example of policy transfer found in my research involved the emulation of cannabis public 
campaigning skills from Washington and Colorado to Uruguay. This was directly facilitated by the dyad 
Proderechos and Drug Policy Alliance (DPA). Interestingly enough, this type of policy transfer was a 
 ‘ƐƵƌƉƌŝƐŝŶŐ ? ƌĞƐƵůƚ ŽĨ ƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐ  ‘ĞůŝƚĞ ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ? ĚǇŶĂŵŝĐƐ ? ĂƐ ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ĂĐƚŽƌƐ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ ? /Ŷ Ă
positive feedback process, collective action fostered more collective action (Pierson, 2004), and what 
started as a regulation design interchange bifurcated into a political campaigning one. In December 
2012, former president Mujica publicly announced that cannabis reform would only go ahead if 
supported by majority public opinion. However, as already remarked when analysing the opposition 
to reform, around 60% of the Uruguayans positioned themselves against cannabis regulation as 
showed by the opinion polls that followed this public statement. As explained by a high-level 
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Uruguayan government member, something needed to be done in order to confront this majoritarian 
adverse public opinion context: 
 “ǁĞĚŽŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞĂŵĂũŽƌŝƚĂƌŝĂŶƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŽĨƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ ?ŶĞŝƚŚĞƌĚŽǁĞŚĂǀĞĂŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂůƉƵďůŝĐ
ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶĨŽƌĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚǁĞǁŽŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞŽŶĞďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚŝƐŶŽƚŽŶůǇŝůůĞŐĂůďƵƚĂůƐŽ
ĨƌŽǁŶĞĚƵƉŽŶƚŽĚŽŝƚ ?(International Civil Society representative (id44), interview). 
 
This renewed political concern about public opinion was recognized as a problem by civil society 
representatives, who showed their will to use the changing international context to fill in a gap of 
knowledge within the ƌĞĨŽƌŵĞƌƐ ? coalition. Thus, the match between the Uruguayan Proderechos and 
the US-based Drug Policy Alliance was key, brokering between otherwise disconnected knowledge 
networks: 
 “/ŶĞĐĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ?DƵũŝĐĂƐĂŝĚƚŚĂƚŝĨ ? ?A?ŽĨƚŚĞƉĞŽƉůǁĞƌĞĂŐĂŝŶƐt cannabis legalisation 
they would drop the issue, and the day after all these public opinion polls cropped up showing 
that actually 60% of the Uruguayans were against it. Then we realised that a lot of very good 
work had been done, putting a cannabis regulation design together to write the law, but there 
was not any public opinion campaigning. And all this happened one month after the Washington 
and Colorado referendums. There, they did very extensive public opinion campaigns because 
they really needed each one of the votes for the referendums to pass. So we thought: why not 
put these two things together; connect the people involved in the campaigns there with people 
from inside and outside the Uruguayan government who could be involved in communication 
and public campaigning for this topic? ?  ?/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŝǀŝů ^ŽĐŝĞƚǇ ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ  ?ŝĚ ? ? ) ?
interview). 
 
As in other examples of policy transfer found, where for example cannabis ŐƌŽǁĞƌƐ ?  ‘ĞůŝƚĞ ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ?
was possible because both transfer actors were inǀŽůǀĞĚ ŝŶ Ă  ‘ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ ĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ? ? ƚŚĞ ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů
affinities between Proderechos and DPA are remarkable. In this example, both organisations are of a 
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ‘ĂĚǀŽĐĂĐǇ ?ƚǇƉĞ ?ĂƐŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐŐƌŽǁŝŶŐŐƌĂƐƐƌŽŽƚƐ ?>ŝŬĞǁŝƐĞ ?ƚŚĞƌŽůĞŽĨĞŵƉĂƚŚǇ
and trust  W facilitated by a  ‘ƌĞƐƵůƚƐĚƌŝǀĞŶ ?shared appeal - became an important enabler for valuable 
knowledge exchange between these political actors. As posed by representatives of both 
organisations when reflecting on some of the reasons why they started working together: 
 “ ?/ŶWƌŽĚĞƌĞĐŚŽƐ ?ǁĞǁĞƌĞĂďŽƵƚƚŽůĂƵŶĐŚĂĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶƚŚĂƚǁĞĂĐƚƵĂůůǇƌĞĂůůǇůŝŬĞĚ ?ĐŽŵƉĂƌŝŶŐ
cannabis legalisation with abortion and LGBT laws approvals, centered on freedom and rights. 
 ? ? ? we did the focus groups to test our messages: a disaster. People found the comparison even 
disrespectful; they would not understand why one would relate cannabis with abortion or LGBT 
issues. It did not really work out. To us,  ‘dŚĞ Convinced ĐƚŝǀŝƐƚƐ ? ? it was amazing, because it was 
this side of the topic that really appealed to us. But for the people far away from cannabis 
ůĞŐĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝƚǁĂƐŶŽŶƐĞŶƐŝĐĂů ?tŚĞŶƚŚĞƐĞĞǆƉĞƌƚƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞWƐĂǁƚŚĂƚǁĞƌĞĂůŝǌĞĚƚŚĂƚ ?
and we were willing to make it right in order to reach this other public, we started to dialogue 
ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ?(National Civil Society member (id17), interview). 
 
ƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚŝŶĚĞƉƚŚƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇ ?ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ? ) ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞt/Z ‘ĐŽŶǀŝŶĐĞĚĂĐƚŝǀŝƐƚƐ ? ?ůŝďĞƌƚǇĂŶĚĐĂƌĞ
ǁĞƌĞƚŚĞ  ‘ƌĞĂůĂƉƉĞĂůƐ ? ? ƚŚĞĐŽŵŵŽŶƐĞŶƐĞƌĞĂƐŽŶƚŽ ůĞŐĂůŝǌĞŵĂƌŝŚƵĂŶĂ ?dŚĞǇǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚeven 
understand why, for less WEIRD Uruguayans (the older generations), the secularized new rights 
ĂŐĞŶĚĂĚŝĚŶŽƚŵĂŬĞĂŶǇŵŽƌĂůƐĞŶƐĞ ?ŝƚǁĂƐ ‘ĞǀĞŶĚŝƐƌĞƐƉĞĐƚĨƵů ? ?/ŶĚĞĞĚ ?t/ZƉĞŽƉůĞĐĂŶĂůƐŽ
be pragmatic: 
106  
 “What impacted us the most was how  ‘ƌĞƐƵůƚƐ ĚƌŝǀĞŶ ? Proderechos was. When they told us about 
the other public campaigning they were planning to do, and that they did the focus groups and 
ƌĞĂůŝƐĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚŽƐĞĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐĚŝĚŶ ?ƚǁŽƌŬĂƚĂůů ?ƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚĂƐƐŽŽŶĂƐƚŚĞǇďĞĐĂŵĞĂǁĂƌĞŽĨ
thĂƚ ƚŚĞǇ ǁĞƌĞ ƌĞĂĚǇ ƚŽ ĐŚĂŶŐĞ ƚƌĂĐŬ ? ŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞůǇ ?  ? ? ? ŶŽƚŚĞƌ ƚŚŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ ŵĂĚĞ Ă ŐŽŽĚ
impression on us was that even being a pure social organisation, they had a great dialogue with 
the government, which was also very important, because this needed to be run in parallel, in an 
articulated fashion. So yes, if Proderechos would not have accepted, I do not think it would have 
ŚĂƉƉĞŶĞĚĂƚĂůů ?(International Civil Society representative (id44), interview). 
 
Thus, according to this DPA member, as in the growers networking example, the mutual institutional 
affinities were a necessary condition to engage in policy transfer. In this example, the shared social 
 “ĂĚǀŽĐĂĐǇ ?ƚǇƉĞŽĨŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚƐĚƌŝǀĞŶĂƉƉĞĂůĂŶĚƚŚĞĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ
where important enablers for policy transfer to occur. Furthermore, what exactly was transferred in 
ƚŚŝƐ ŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ŽĨ ĞŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ǁĂƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŬŶŽǁ ŚŽǁ ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ h^ ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵƐ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶŝŶŐ
technology; that is, the application of scientific knowledge to research public opinion for practical 
political purposes. 
 
In this way, with governmental collaboration, supported by the dyad Proderechos-DPA within the 
Reformers advocacy coalition, a close process of interchange coached by the main Washington and 
Colorado political campaigning entrepreneurs occurred. Furthermore, between the months of 
February 2013 and December 2013, several meetings and workshops were organised between these 
actors. As a member of Proderechos at that time, I had a thorough insight into the development of 
this process, participating in the events arranged. 
 
According to the data collected through participant observation, the public campaigning technology 
developed by DPA and adopted by Proderechos was based on a mixed methods research design that 
combined qualitative focus groups with a national based survey10. These were conducted in March 
and April of 2013. Through this research, the actors involved aimed at setting a benchmark for  “better 
understanding how to talk about marihuana, define the campaigning targets and collect information 
about their communication consumption habits ? ?ZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŵĞƐƐĂŐĞƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ
results, May 2013). The main conclusion reached was that people make judgments about cannabis 
without much information. This fact was reflected in results: 50% of the Uruguayans evaluated stated 
that they knew very little or nothing at all about cannabis use effects. Nevertheless, 66% also believed 
that cannabis use has great or considerably great risk for its users (Responsible Regulation; message 
training research results, May 2013). Yet importantly, the research findings suggested that cannabis 
regulation remained a dynamic debate; there seemed to be cracks in public opinion for political 
entrepreneurs to exploit: 
 “ůƚŚŽƵŐŚŝƚŝƐǀĞƌǇŚĂƌĚƚŽĚĞĞƉůǇĐŚĂŶŐĞƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐŵŝŶĚĂďŽƵƚĐannabis, you can make them 
care less about it. Furthermore, four out of ten Uruguayans were permeable to change their 
opinion favourably towards cannabis regulation based on a trained messaging ?  ?ZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞ
Regulation; message training research results, May 2013). 
 
Thus constructed, the targeted population was defined as those people that were willing to shift their 
opinion positively: the spontaneously undecided, the guided undecided and the ones permeable by 
 
10 The quantitative strategy adopted a quasi-experimental design where people was asked ex ante and ex post 
an stimuli regarding arguments, slogans, information, etc., what were their thoughts about cannabis. 
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messaging -reaching 41% of the Uruguayan population. This group was mainly formed by people 
between eighteen and thirty-nine years old, self-identified as at the centre of the political ideological 
spectrum. Furthermore, from the first conclusion reached, this messaging could not be simply a 
matter of giving information about marihuana legalisation, but rather to actually transfigure the 
 ‘ŝŵĂŐĞ ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƉƌŽďůĞŵ ? ƚŚĂƚ ŝƐ ? Ă ŵŝǆƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ ĞŵƉŝƌŝĐĂů ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ĞŵŽƚŝǀĞ ĂƉƉĞĂůƐ
cognitively attached to it (True, Jones, & Baumgartner, 2007). 
 
Hence, in what follows, I will discuss five central strategies that emerge from the analysis of the data 
ŐĂƚŚĞƌĞĚĨƌŽŵƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶĂďŽƵƚƚŚŝƐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨƚƌĂŶƐĨŝŐƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ŝŵĂŐĞ ?ŽĨƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů
problem: labelling; framing; the communication triangle; the definition of emissaries; and the 
definition of aesthetics. 
 
Thus, the first strategy was that in order to change the image attached to the political solution, it was 
found necessary to actually change the reference label, moving away from marihuana legalisation to 
cannabis regulation. The issue was that whereas marihuana legalisation was cognitively associated 
with a too lenient approach to cannabis consumption, cannabis regulation triggered more neutral 
associations among the targeted public: 
 “When we talked about regulation it was possible to move some positions, since it is associated 
with ideas of order and legislation and not with liberalisation, or consumption promotion, as 
with marihuana legalisation ? ?ZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŵĞƐƐĂŐĞƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚƌĞƐƵůƚƐ ? May 
2013). 
 
Despite being extremely similar concepts legally, as political solutions regulation and legalisation 
actually elicited opposing images among the targeted population, as either controlling or encouraging 
the already existent cannabis market. In fact, this particular cognitive twist was incorporated as a 
 ‘ĐƌŽƐƐ ĨĞƌƚŝůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? dynamic into the Uruguayan process. I define it as a cross fertilisation example and 
not purely as a policy transfer process because this labelling cognitive twist was not new within the 
Uruguayan coalition. Some groups of Uruguayan civil society, as AECU, had already intuitively arrived 
at the conclusion that it was necessary to stop talking about legalisation and start talking about 
regulation. Yet, other groups, including Proderechos, were reluctant to agree to this twist, because 
historically the cannabis movement identified with the idea of legalisation -which resounded with the 
liberty moral foundation that made moral sense to Proderechos. Within this context, the framing of 
regulation as part of a wider political campaigning technology, reinforced by the legitimacy of 
international actors and scientific knowledge, helped to spread the idea further, changing the 
behaviour within the coalition. Observing the changes in the name of the main cannabis activism 
coordination group over time  Wgoing from liberalisation to legalisation to regulation- is illustrative of 
ŝƚƐ ĚŝĨĨƵƐŝŽŶ ƉĂƚƚĞƌŶ P ĨƌŽŵ  “DĂƌŝŚƵĂŶĂ >ŝďĞƌĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ DŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ? ŝŶ DĂǇ  ? ? ? ? ? ƚŽ  “EĂƚŝŽŶĂů
Coordination for MĂƌŝŚƵĂŶĂ >ĞŐĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ŝŶ :ƵůǇ  ? ? ? ? ? ƚŽ  “EĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŽ  ĨŽƌ DĂƌŝŚƵĂŶĂ
ZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶKĐƚŽďĞƌ 2012. 
 
Secondly, regarding the framing strategy, it was understood that the content attached to the 
regulatory design mattered greatly to change public opinŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ŝŵĂŐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƉƌŽƉŽƐĂů ?
Furthermore, it was found that certain aspects of the law that were perceived as better than others 
among the targeted population. On one hand, the prohibitive aspects of the regulation framework, 
like not allowing the sale of cannabis to minors, driving under the influence, or indoor consumption, 
were the most valued. The use of tax revenues for health and educational campaigns, alongside 
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regulating medical cannabis, were positively valued as well. On the other hand, the self-cultivation 
mechanisms (both domestic and Cannabis Clubs) and the public register of cannabis users, were the 
least valued (Responsible Regulation; message training research results, May 2013). 
 
Additionally, through the study, the repertoire of arguments on cannabis regulation used in ŽůŽƌĂĚŽ ?Ɛ
campaign was adapted and tested in the Uruguayan context. Making it tougher for the black market 
to sell cannabis to minors and medical use of cannabis  Wespecially as a potential therapeutic tool in 
cocaine base treatments- were highly valued arguments. Also, cannabis regulation could be presented 
ĂƐĂ “ƐŝŵƉůĞĂĚũƵƐƚŵĞŶƚ ?ƚŽƌĞƐŽůǀĞƚŚĞĞǆŝƐƚĞŶƚůĞŐĂůĐŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚĂůůŽǁĞĚƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ
without providing any legal means to access it, thus separating cannabis from other illegal drug 
markets. Interestingly enough, the main governmental rationale, namely the War on Drugs failure for 
Latin America and cannabis regulation as a tool to reduce drug related violence, were the least popular 
arguments among the targeted population (Responsible Regulation; message training research 
results, May 2013). 
 
'ƌŽƵŶĚĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ƚŚĞ ƚŚŝƌĚ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚ ƚŚĞ ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ Ă  ‘ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ
ƚƌŝĂŶŐůĞ ? ? which was proposed to counter media opposition. The idea of a communication triangle had 
as its main objective to increase the degree of framing cohesion, enhancing the three best-valued 
aspects of the cannabis regulation image to solidify public support. Additionally, the triangle was an 
ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽĂŝĚƚŚĞůĂǁ ?ƐĞŶƚƌĞƉƌĞŶĞƵƌƐƚŽĂǀŽŝĚŵŝƐŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶƐĨƌŽŵĂŶĂĚǀĞƌƐĂƌŝĂůŵĂƐƐŵĞĚŝĂ- 
perceived by the actors as actively pursuing news framing against cannabis policy change. Thus, the 
main idea behind the communication triangle was that, irrespective of the questions or the wording 
posed by the eventual interlocutor, the aim of public opinion front-runners would always be to  ‘ƚŽƵĐŚ
ďĂƐĞ ?ŽŶŝĚĞĂƐĂŶĚĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐĐŽŶƚĂŝŶĞĚŝŶƚŚĞƚƌŝĂŶŐůĞ ?ƐŝŶƚŚĞ'ŽĞďďĞůƐ law: 
 “I quote Goebbels. He said something that is true: you lie once, you lie twice, you lie many times 
and people will end up believing you. Without lying, but when you start posing the same things, 
ŽǀĞƌĂŶĚŽǀĞƌĂŐĂŝŶ ?ĂŶĚĂŐĂŝŶ ?ZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?zŽƵŚĂǀĞĂůŝŶĞƚŚĂƚŝƐůŝŬĞĂĐonstant 
dropping that wears away a stone; it eventually leaves its mark. The whole idea of Responsible 
Regulation is based on accumulation ? ?:ŽƵƌŶĂůŝƐƚ ?ŝĚ ? ? ) ? interview). 
 
Thus, as for the Executive Power supply side position reviewed in chapter 5, I found a remarkably high 
degree of framing cohesion in the topics referred. Pursuing simplicity and a highly reiterative discourse 
based on the idea of cannabis control and regulation was understood as a winning strategy. 
 
Fourthly, a new image of cannabis regulation demanded suitable emissaries of the communication 
campaign. The conclusion thus arrived at was that a new group within the Reformers Coalition - 
Responsible Regulation- uniting both social organisations and public personalities, needed to be 
assembled in order to succeed with this campaigning technology. Furthermore, as explained by 
members of Proderechos, the actors involved could not be the ones typically associated with 
 “ŵĂƌŝŚƵĂŶĂůĞŐĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ŚŽůĚŝŶŐŽǀĞƌƚŚĞŝƌƐŚŽƵůĚĞƌƐƚŚĞ ‘ƉŽƚŚĞĂĚƐ ?ƐƚŝŐma, calling for their right to 
smoke: 
 “We needed to skew that bias to be able to start a conversation with the general population, for 
them to understand us with less preconceptions. For them to listen to us not as consumers but 
as people that had an idea, that wanted to dialogue ?  ?EĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŝǀŝů ^ŽĐŝĞƚǇŵĞŵďĞƌ  ?ŝĚ ? ? ) ?
interview). 
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Thus, members of Proderechos started a round of meetings: first with cannabis organisations to 
explain the reasons why Responsible Regulation was being built without including them, attempting 
to reduce potential conflicts within the coalition; secondly, with numerous public personalities and 
non-cannabis groups of civil society, to be members of Responsible Regulation -as professionals, 
artists, the main workers ĂŶĚhŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ^ƚƵĚĞŶƚƐ ?ƵŶŝŽŶƐ ?ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂůŐƌŽƵƉƐ ?ǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐŐƌŽƵƉƐ ?
child advocacy groups. Additionally, a doctor, two lawyers and a young activist woman were appointed 
as front-runners of the political campaign, centralising answers to mass media. 
 
Fifthly, not only the creation of a new task force but also the definition of suitable aesthetics was an 
important strategy followed. Thus, for example, the Responsible Regulation campaign conscientiously 
avoided to refer to any of the cannabis liberalisation symbols, as the colour green or the cannabis 
leaves. 
 
However, it is important to note here that the decision of leaving cannabis activism out following the 
general turn in problem definition and framing, emphasising Regulation and Control instead of Liberty 
and Care, was not free of controversy within the Uruguayan Reformers coalition. Conversely, as 
explained by a sociologist and activist interviewed, throughout the political process, a great deal of 
tension persisted regarding the Responsible Regulation campaign either seen as a pragmatic response 
to confront the current prohibitionist status quo or as an authoritarian alternative re-endorsing the 
punitive common sense regarding drugs: 
 “I would have joined another type of platform, one that politicians would not have accepted, but 
not Responsible Regulation. What I value the most is that this new movement managed to go 
down a few steps in the utopic demands and achieve things, which has a pro and a con that is 
ŝŶĚŝƐƐŽůƵďůĞĂƉƌŝŽƌŝ P ? ? ?zŽƵĐĂŶŶŽƚďĞŝŶfavour of Responsible Regulation, because it may be 
re-endorsing a punitive status quo regarding drugs, but you cannot be against it either, because 
ŝƚ ŵĂǇ ŚĞůƉ ƚŽ ƌĞŐƵůĂƚĞ ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƐ ĂŶ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ƐƚĞƉ ĨŽƌǁĂƌĚ ? KŶůǇ ƚŝŵĞ ǁŝůů ƚĞůů ? ?
(Sociologist (id35), interview). 
 
In this way, through the strategies of labeling, framing, the communication triangle, the definition of 
emissaries and aesthetics, Responsible Regulation aimed at changing the image associated with 
cannabis reform, enhancing the legitimacy of the new law within legislative members. In this case, 
>ŝďĞƌƚǇ ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ ƵƐĞ ǁĂƐ Ɛƚŝůů ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ Ă  ‘ƐŝŶĨƵů ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ? ĂŶĚ ? ĂƐ DĞŝĞƌ  ? ? ? ? ? )
ĂƌŐƵĞƐ ?ŶŽŽŶĞ ŝƐǁŝůůŝŶŐƚŽƐƚĂŶĚƵƉĨŽƌƐŝŶ ?dŚƵƐ ? “the only possible option is to change the social 
construction of the debate from sin to some other dimension; that is, to frame the issue in such a 
manner that opposition becomes legitimate and the redistributive nature of the policy becomes open 
and acknowledged ?  ?DĞŝĞƌ ?  ? ? ? ? ? Ɖ ?  ? ? ? ) ? dŚĞ ƌĞĚŝƐƚƌibutive focus was thus highlighted by the 
cognitive agreement of responsibly controlling an already existent market. In different instances of 
my participant observation, I could witness how Uruguayan politicians included this new language into 
their ƌĞƉĞƌƚŽŝƌĞ ? /Ŷ ĨĂĐƚ ? ĂƐ / ǁŝůů ƌĞǀŝĞǁ ůĂƚĞƌ  ?ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ  ? ? ) ? ŵŽƌĞ ƚŚĂŶ ƚŚƌĞĞ ǇĞĂƌƐ ĂĨƚĞƌ ƚŚĞ ůĂǁ ?Ɛ
approval, a state sponsored public campaign called ´To Regulate is to be Responsible´ was launched, 
which further illustrates the relevance of the policy transfer dynamics just described. Confronted with 
ƚŚĞ ŵĂƐƐ ŵĞĚŝĂ ŽǀĞƌ ĂŶĚ ŽǀĞƌ ? ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ĞŶƚƌĞƉƌĞŶĞƵƌƐ ĂƉƉĞĂůĞĚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚ  ‘ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ
ƚƌŝĂŶŐůĞ ?ďĂƐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞŝĚĞĂŽĨĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐƚŚĞĚĞŐƌĞĞŽĨĨƌĂŵŝŶŐ cohesion. 
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7.3. The international conventions arena 
 
Only a week after the Uruguayan government announced its intention to regulate cannabis (the 
 ‘^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇĨŽƌ>ŝĨĞĂŶĚŽĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ ?ƉƌĞƐƐĐŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ) ?ŽŶƚŚĞ ? ?ŽĨ:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞŚĞĂĚŽĨƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Yuri Fedótov, hurried to announce to the International Narcotics 
Control Board (INCB) the initiation of: 
 “ĂŶ ƵƌŐĞŶƚ ŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ  ? ? ? ƚŽ ĚĞďĂƚĞ ƚŚĞ ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ hƌƵŐĂǇĂŶ ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ ?  ? ? )If the 
Uruguayan government legalises cannabis, it would be a serious violation of the International 
ŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ ? ŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ ƚŚĂƚ hƌƵŐƵĂǇ ŚĂǀĞ ƐŝŐŶĞĚ ?  ? ? ?/ƚ ŝƐ ĚŝƐĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ hƌƵŐƵĂǇ ŝƐ
discussing this ? ?&ĞĚſƚŽǀ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? 
 
As authors such as Young (2003), Bewley-Taylor (2003), Youngers and Rosin (2004), K ?DĂůůĞǇ ? ? ? ? ? )
Jones and Newburn (2006) and Durán-Martínez (2016) have shown, international conventions 
diplomacy have played an important role for the endorsement of prohibitionist drug policies at the 
local level. Policy transfer strategies have ranged ĨƌŽŵ h^ ǀŝƐĂ ?Ɛ ƌĞǀŽĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ^ŽƵƚŚ ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ
governmental actors who were critical of prohibitionist practices (Durán-Martínez, 2016), to military 
and police drug control assistance programmes between US and South America (Youngers and Rosin, 
2004) to issue linkage -linking drug policy to other, usually economic cooperation programmes- 
(Bewley-Taylor, 2003). Furthermore, as the homeland of the three major cocaine producers in the 
world, South America has been a faithful follower of the International Drug Control Regime, and very 
little defection to it could be observed prior to 2009 (Durán-Martínez, 2016). 
 
In more recent years, international civil society started to play an important role in building up a 
stronger alternative position in this mainly hostile arena, thus far upholding international conventions. 
Hence, for example, virtually all Uruguayan political actors interviewed in my fieldwork highlighted 
ƚŚĞƌĞůĞǀĂŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘>ĂƚŝŶŵĞƌŝĐĂŶŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŽŶƌƵŐƐĂŶĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ?ĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚ
ƚŚĞ  ‘'ůŽďĂů ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŽŶ ƌƵŐƐ ĂŶĚ ĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ? ŽĨ  ? ? ? ? ? ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƌĞĨŽƌŵŝƐƚ ĂŝŵƐ ?
These commissions assembled well-known international leaders, ranging from former presidents and 
intellectuals to the ex-UN General Secretary, asking for a global drug policy paradigm shift. 
 
In this way, international civil society networking has been key for the expansion of the human rights 
framing from its narrower focus on the dictatorship/democracy transition to issues of drug policy in 
Latin America. As a case in point, a former member of Human Rights Watch Mexico  Wcurrently a highly 
critical voice against the Latin American War on Drugs- reflected in my interview: 
 “Some years ago I was working for Human Rights Watch in Mexico. I had to do a daily report on 
Human rights violations appearing in the news, and then I realised that most of them were linked 
ŝŶŽŶĞǁĂǇŽƌĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƚŽƚŚĞtĂƌŽŶƌƵŐƐ ? ? ? ?/ĂƐŬĞĚŵǇďŽƐƐŝĨ,ƵŵĂŶZŝŐŚƚƐtĂƚĐŚŚĂĚĂ
position on the topic, because they were actually working on so many related topics that you 
could not even start to talk about it without mentioning the drugs issue. But in that moment they 
ĚŝĚŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞĂƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ? ?/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŝǀŝůƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?ŝĚ ? ? ) ? interview). 
 
In the Uruguayan case, organisations such as the Dutch based Transnational Institute (TNI) and the US 
based Washington Office for Latin America (WOLA) were two key international actors found for this 
Human Rights shift to the drug problems, directly working with the political elite after the first Frente 
Amplio election of 2005. Thus, for example, in 2007 the  ‘/ŶĨŽƌŵĂů dialogue on drug ƉŽůŝĐǇ ? was 
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organised for the first time in Latin America. In terms of Punctuated Equilibrium Theory, the Informal 
ŝĂůŽŐƵĞƐĂƌĞĂ ‘ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐǀĞŶƵĞƐŚŝĨƚŝŶŐ ?ƚǇƉĞŽĨĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ?ĨŽƌĞůŝƚĞŶĞƚǁŽƌŬŝŶŐŽĨůŝŬĞ-minded political 
actors, creating alternative exchange platforms about drug policy reform. It has as its main objective 
to sit political elite level actors together and  “openly and anonymously interchange opinions regarding 
ƚŚĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĚƌƵŐƉŽůŝĐǇĚŝůĞŵŵĂƐĂŶĚƚŽĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĐŽŵŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐƚŽĂĚĚƌĞƐƐƚŚĞŵ ?
(TNI/WOLA, 2015, p. 1). Uruguay was not only the first country where this activity was organised but 
also the one that hosted many of the events. An organiser of this Informal Dialogues identified the 
Frente Amplio ?Ɛ election as an opening of a political window to push Latin American drug policy reform 
forward: 
 “When we decided to start doing the Informal Dialogues in Latin America we knew that Uruguay 
ǁĂƐƚŚĞƉůĂĐĞƚŽƐƚĂƌƚ ?DŝůƚŽŶZŽŵĂŶŝǁĂƐĂůƌĞĂĚǇĂƚƚŚĞŚĞĂĚŽĨƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶƚĞŵƉůŝŽ ?ƐEĂƚŝŽŶĂů
Drugs Committee, embracing a highly critical discourse towards international conventions, 
talking about the necessity of harmonising them with human rights principles, and we wanted 
to support that position ? ?/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŝǀŝůƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?ŝĚ ? ? ) ?ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂů communication). 
 
As Punctuated Equilibrium theory suggests, strategic venue shifting activities are important. Changing 
the authoritative venues to debate drug policy may help to break the former policy monopoly, re- 
framing the images attached to the problem and making new solutions available. Thus, for example, 
whereas a large part of the cannabis reform proposals are taking place in the Occidental world, in 
other parts of the planet a harsh punitive approach to drug markets, which may include death penalty 
for trafficking offenses, is still vigorously endorsed. By strategically selecting the participating actors, 
the disagreements about how to understand drug policy can be enhanced or reduced according to 
particular interests. The engagement of political actors in this type of strategic venue shifting activities 
is mainly motivated by the significant blockage in formal settings  Wdescribed by my research 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐĂƐ ‘tĂƌŽŶtŽƌĚƐ ?ĂƌĞŶĂƐ ?/ŶƐƵĐŚĂƌĞŶĂƐ ?ƚŚĞŵĂŝŶŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞŽĨŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĚŝƉůŽŵĂĐǇ
is to assure that certain ideas  Wsuch as drugs regulation or cannabis rescheduling- remain excluded 
from discussion, rather than elaborating an inclusive debate on international drug policy (TNI/WOLA, 
 ? ? ? ? ) ?/Ŷ&ĞĚſƚŽǀ ?ƐǁŽƌĚƐƋƵŽƚĞĚĂďŽǀĞ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞ/EŝƚǁĂƐ ĚŝƐĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚhƌƵŐƵĂǇǁĂƐ ‘ĞǀĞŶ
ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŶŐƚŚŝƐ ? ?,ĞŶĐĞ ?ƚŚĞƐĞŚĂƌŵŽŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĞǀĞŶƚƐĂůůŽǁĞĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂĐƚŽƌƐto compare and contrast 
different approaches to the topic, synchronising positions alternative to the prohibitionist approach 
consecrated in formal international forums. 
 
A key factor that helps to understand why this critical human rights turn in Latin American civil society 
was possible is the opening of Open Society Foundation (OSF) Global Drug Policy Program in 2008. 
Open Society Foundation is a well-known philanthropist financing institution founded by the 
Hungarian George Soros in 1993. Since then, the Open Society has been the main financing entity 
shaping a harm reduction/human rights agenda towards drug policy problems in Latin America, a 
framing that most of the existent financing entities used to reject. As a member of the OSF Latin 
American programme explained in an interview: 
 “Drugs has a special role because OSF was kind of the first big organisation or foundation in 
stating that drug policy needed to change and to finance civil society organisations working on 
this topic who could not find any support anywhere else. Even the traditional human rights 
organisations, when it came to drugs they would say:  ‘ǁĞůů ? that is a complicated issue, we cannot 
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ? ?ŶĚKƉĞŶ^ŽĐŝĞƚǇŶŽ ?ŝƚǁĂƐƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚďŝŐŽŶĞŝŶŚĂǀŝŶŐĂƐƚƌĂŝŐŚƚĨŽƌǁĂƌĚƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝŶ
that, if you are going to talk about human rights, you needed to question and criticise the War 
on Drugs ? ?/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŝǀŝůƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?ŝĚ ? ? ) ? interview). 
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Uruguayan cannabis reform was widely supported by Open Society because it was the first time that 
a government in office openly asked for a review of international conventions that included drugs 
regulation. In this critical position Uruguay was not alone, though it accidentally began to lead in this 
ĚƌƵŐƐ ĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ  ‘ŶĞǁ ĚĞĂů ? ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ŵŽmentum. Thus, for example, in July 2013, the American 
States Organisation secretary general Miguel Insulza visited Uruguay to present a report called 
 “^ĐĞŶĂƌŝŽƐ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽďůĞŵ ŽĨ ĚƌƵŐƐ ŝŶ >ĂƚŝŶ ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ? Ăƚ Ă ƉƌĞƐƐ ĐŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ? ƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚŝƐ
OrganisatioŶ ?dŚŝƐƌĞƉŽƌƚďĞĐĂŵĞƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚůǇĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĚƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?Ɛ
regulation of illegal drug markets as a possible scenario in Latin America. As Diego Cánepa, president 
of the Uruguayan National Drugs Committee presented it at the ƉƌĞƐƐĐŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ?ƚŚĞ “K ?ƐƌĞƉŽƌƚ
ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƐƚŚĞůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇŽĨƚŚĞhƌƵŐƵĂǇĂŶĚĞďĂƚĞĂŶĚWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚDƵũŝĐĂ ?ƐƉƌŽƉŽƐĂů ?ŽĨĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ
regulation] to fight drug trafficking ? ?WƌĞƐƐĐŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? 
 
Overall, the causal importance of the international conventions arena in this case is hard to grasp. 
International actors and the INCB particularly, did played an active role aimed at blocking policy 
change. Hence, diplomatic lobbying was deemed important to be endorsed by Uruguayan political 
elite both at the governmental and at the activist level. Under the hotspot of the international 
debate, politicians  ‘ƉůĂǇĞĚƚŚĞǀŝĐƚŝŵĐĂƌĚ ?ƚŽĞŶŚĂŶĐĞƚŚĞůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇŽĨƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌŵďǇĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŝŶŐ
the disproportionality of the costs that the current international framework entails worldwide. At 
the same time, the idiosyncratic nature of the Uruguayan experiment was continuously highlighted. 
Here, the longstanding laity approach to drugs was appealed to, arguing for the national State as the 
legitimate actor to look after the common good by regulating a  ‘ƐŽĐŝĂů ǀŝĐĞ ? -as the laity suitable 
middle road solution for social conflicts. The result of these tensions was a heavily bureaucratic legal 
formula. The Uruguayan state reserved for itself a highly interventionist role in the regulatory model, 
while have remained considerabily unaccountable during the implementation stage regarding both 
process and results indicators. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
Throughout this chapter, I presented different instances of  ‘ĞůŝƚĞ ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ? of transnational activists, 
governmental members, civil servants, scholars, and cannabis growers in three areas of the political 
process: policy design, political campaigning and international conventions. 
 
Some examples of policy transfer found involved the emulation of regulation and public campaigning 
practices from the US states of Washington and Colorado. As it was analysed, some of these processes 
were directly sponsored by the government, whereas others were bottom up, led by civil society and 
cannabŝƐ ŐƌŽǁĞƌƐ ? ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? dŚƵƐ ? ƉŽůŝĐǇ ƚŽŽůƐ ƌĞůĂƚĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŶŐ ĂŶ  ‘ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ? ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ
market were transferred, as the six plants limit for domestic cultivation, the issuing of licences for 
ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ ƉƌŽĚƵĐĞƌƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂů ĂŶĚ ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂů  ‘ŬŶŽw-ŚŽǁ ? ĨŽƌ ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ ŐƌŽǁŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ ŝƚƐ
ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ?ŝ ?Ğ ?ƚƌĂĐŬŝŶŐƐǇƐƚĞŵ “ĨƌŽŵƐĞĞĚƚŽƐĂůĞ ? ?ƉĂĐŬĂŐŝŶŐ ŶĚƐĂĨĞƚǇ standards). 
 
Other example of emulation concerned the transference of US referendums political campaigning 
 ‘ŬŶŽǁŚŽǁ ? ?ĂƐĞĚŽŶƐŽĐŝĂůƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĂƉƵblic campaign was launched based on the general idea that 
people make judgments about cannabis without much information, and yet the potential for its 
ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŐŶŝƚĞĚ Ă ĚǇŶĂŵŝĐ ĚĞďĂƚĞ ǁŝƚŚ ĐƌĂĐŬƐ ŝŶ ƉƵďůŝĐ ŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ ƚŽ ďĞ ĞǆƉůŽŝƚĞĚ ? dŚƵƐ ? Ă  ‘ĨŝǀĞ
strategiĞƐ ? ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶŝŶŐ ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ ǁĂƐ ĚĞƉůŽǇĞĚ ŝŶ ŽƌĚĞƌ ƚŽ ĐŚĂŶŐĞ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŝŵĂŐĞ ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů
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problem: labelling; framing; the communication triangle; the definition of emissaries; and the 
definition of aesthetics.  
 
Lastly, through  ‘ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ venue ƐŚŝĨƚŝŶŐ ? activities, elite networking was also found to be important in 
reducing resistance to change within the international conventions arena, contributing to legitimise 
reformist aims. These type of activities helped to break the prohibitionist policy monopoly, endorsing 
a harm reduction and human rights shift to drug problems in Latin America, making new solutions 
available. 
 
The analysis of the different examples of policy transfer found highlight the important role of mutual 
affinities, empathy and trust in enabling valuable knowledge interchange between political actors. 
Thus, for example, either a common cannabis growing history and culture or a  ‘ƌĞƐƵůƚƐĚƌŝǀĞŶ ?ƐŚĂƌĞĚ
appeal were some of the conditions remarked upon by participants who engaged in this type of 
ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ?,ĞŶĐĞ ?ƚŚĞĂǀĂŝůĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨ  ‘ƐƵŝƚĂďůĞŵĂƚĐŚĞƐ ?ĞŵĞƌŐĞĚĂƐĂƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚĂŶĂůǇƚŝĐĂůĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶƚŽ
understand how policy transfer can occur. 
 
Conversely, long-standing legal and political culture differences acted as important limits for policy 
transfer to happen. Thus, more particularly, the role of the state, the role of private actors and their 
relationship emerged as a key variable to understand some of the most remarkable policy design 
differences between recent regulation models implemented. In the Uruguayan case, the resilience of 
the laity approach to drugs resulted in a legal framework that accommodates a highly interventionist 
state as the central organiser of the selling schema. 
 
KǀĞƌĂůů ?ƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ŝƌƌƵƉƚŝŽŶ ŝŶƚŚĞĚĞďĂƚĞ ?ƚƌĂŶƐŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĚƌƵŐƉŽůŝĐǇƌĞĨŽƌŵŶĞƚǁŽƌŬƐ
gained importance as a causal contributor, helping to explain why cannabis was regulated in Uruguay, 
against a backdrop of a majority adverse public opinion. They helped to change the image attached to 
cannabis reform, to defend the Uruguayan initiative in a rather hostile international conventions 
arena, and to fill in the gaps of knowledge in order to develop a suitable regulation framework, which 
actually resulted in an exceptional political output that included domestic cultivation, Social Cannabis 
Clubs and a selling scheme. 
 
In the following chapter, I will present further evidence on the circumstances under which these 
different types of actors  Wnamely, Uruguayan civil society, legislative power, executive power, and 
transnational networks- conflated at the micro level to make cannabis regulation happen, as well as 
the main derivations that can be expected for the implementation of this controversial law. 
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Chapter 8. Linking streams: a network analysis 
 
Throughout this thesis, I have characterised Uruguayan cannabis regulation not as a cumulative, 
relentless learning process but rather as a discontinuous story, marked by breaks, principled conflicts 
ĂŶĚƐƵĚĚĞŶƐŚŝĨƚƐ ?&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ?ďǇĂŶĂůǇƐŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ZĞĨŽƌŵĞƌƐ ?ĂĚǀŽĐĂĐǇĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶŚŝĞƌĂƌĐŚŝĐĂůďĞůŝĞĨƐ ?
system, I showed how different types of actors had clashing positions when defining the problem of 
illegal cannabis and the suitable solutions to it, helping to explain why, counterintuitively, the civil 
society and executive power confluence in regulating cannabis was so conflict-ridden in the 
Uruguayan case. Further on, I showed how, despite being the first country in the world to regulate 
cannabis, the rapidly changing international context was an important additional causal contributor 
to the domestic debate. More specifically, I presented evidence on how the success of Colorado and 
Washington referendums in creating legal cannabis regulation systems in October 2012 -four months 
ĂĨƚĞƌ ƚŚĞhƌƵŐƵĂǇĂŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĐĂůů ƚŽ ƌĞŐƵůĂƚĞĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ-, sped up the political momentum for 
cannabis reformers. This further aided tŚĞ hƌƵŐƵĂǇĂŶ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ ŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵƐ ŽĨ  ‘ĞůŝƚĞ
ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ?ĨŽƌƉŽůŝĐǇĚĞƐŝŐŶĂŶĚĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶŝŶŐ ‘ĞŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ ?ǁŚŝůƐƚƌĞĚƵĐŝŶŐƌĞƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞƚŽ
change in the international conventions arena. 
 
Since most political processes have been led by groups of actors coordinating actions over time rather 
than isolated individuals, an increasing interest can be seen in the use of Advocacy Coalition 
Framework to analyse drug policy change around the world. Thus, for example, Kübler reported the 
importance of the conformation of an advocacy coalition for the Swiss harm reduction reform (2001). 
In their comparative researches, Hughes (2007) and Zampini (2015) also pointed to the relevance of 
the concept of advocacy coalitions for understanding drug policy atypical change. Furthermore, Von 
Hoffmann (2015), Castro (2014) and Repetto (2014) have also found evidence of this type of dynamic 
in their analysis of the Uruguayan case (Kubler, 2001; Hughes, 2007; Zampini, 2015; von Hoffmann, 
2015). However, this is a theory that has been relatively weakly formalised in previous works. 
 
In line with what Honeycutt and Strong (2012) have contended in their research on health advocacy 
coalitions, in this thesis I propose that, given its focus on the links between political actors rather than 
on the actors themselves, social network analysis provides a fruitful innovative insight into advocacies 
coalitions. In theory, advocacy coalitions are defined as a group or network of actors coordinating 
actions over time to make atypical policy change happen. Hence, as outlined in the methods chapter, 
in this research a network analysis is proffered by tracking down evidence of joint participation of 
political actors in cannabis regulation-related activities. The main assumption here is that the shared 
participation in these meetings is understood as an indicator of actors coordinating actions over time. 
In this way, network diagrams comprise information that can hardly be grasped by other means. 
Therefore, network analysis aids to explore not only who the main actors involved in the Uruguayan 
cannabis reform were but also how they networked, as a system of clusters in the wider context of a 
given structure of relationships. 
 
Thus, the distance between the actors in the network diagrams presented below is proportional to 
the weight attributed to: 
(i) the number of shared events: the more events the actors shared the closer they get. 
(ii) the role of the actor in each event: if both actors participated as speakers or organisers in 
the same activity, they appear closer than people that were invited as passive participants. 
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In this way, the closer the actor appears in the diagram, the more meetings they shared. Actors that 
neither shared meetings nor organised actions together (such as public demonstrations or congresses 
on the topic) are not connected by any links. It is important to highlight at this point that this is no 
assertion that no other actors pushing for cannabis legalisation were involved; certainly, there were 
others. However, according to the data that I could gather in my interviews and participant 
observation, these actors did not coordinate their actions with others throughout this period, as the 
theoretical premise of Advocacy Coalition requires. 
 
Throughout the period under consideration (February 2011 - December 2013), three different but 
ƌĞůĂƚĞĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŽƵƚƉƵƚƐǁĞƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞhƌƵŐƵĂǇĂŶƉĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ PƚŚĞ “cannabis regulation for 
its consumption ?ůĂǁŽĨĞĐĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?ƐƉŽŶƐŽƌĞĚďǇĐŝǀŝůƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? ƚŚĞ “cannabis monopoly for its 
selling ? law of August 2012, sponsored by the government and, finally, the approved  “cannabis market 
ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?law of December 2013. Thus, I provide three network diagrams, focusing on each of the 
three differentiated periods, relating the evidence found about the evolution of the coalition 
throughout time to key external factors that played a role in the cannabis debate. 
 
In this way, four types of actors were found within the Uruguayan coalition in accordance to with the 
sampling categories (section 4.3). At some point in the process, national civil society representatives, 
legislative power members, executive power members and international civil society representatives 
coordinated actions over time to make cannabis regulation possible. Furthermore, an ever-increasing 
degree of coalition cohesiveness can be observed throughout the period analysed, reflected by the 
comparison of the number of links connecting actors in each of the diagrams. In other words, the 
number of cannabis related events as well as the number of actors involved in the coalition continued 
to grow during the time period under scrutiny. This finding might seem obvious, since it might be 
expected that more actors would get involved as the voting day drew closer; yet, some important 
qualitative differences can be observed in each of the three periods, which allows for further 
discussion of some of the findings developed in this thesis. 
 
 
8.1. First period 
 
ĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞ ?ƐŝƌƌƵƉƚŝŽŶŝŶ:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ? ?ŵŽƐƚcannabis related events were organised by civil 
society members. More specifically, the four events analysed are: the Informal Dialogues on drug 
policy of February 2011, the global marihuana march of May 2011 and 2012, and the National Debate 
on Drugs of 2011. 
 
As already introduced (see section 7.3.), the Informal Dialogues on Drug Policy is a periodic event 
organised in different countries of the world since 2004 by the Washington Office for Latin America 
(WOLA) and the Transnational Institute (TNI). In Latin America, it has been arranged roughly annually 
since 2007. In terms of Punctuated Equilibrium Theory, it is a  ‘ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ venue ƐŚŝĨƚŝŶŐ ? type of activity, 
for elite networking of like-minded political actors, creating alternative exchange platforms about drug 
policy reform in order to skew the rule of silence of the War on Words international forums. It aims 
to encourage free exchange of ideas and ensures confidentiality. In order to respect this 
confidentiality agreement about the participants, here, only the organisers are considered. By 2011, 
this activity was co-sponsored by TNI, WOLA and the National Drugs Secretary, hence, it is understood 
ĂƐĂŶŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŽƌŽĨƚŚĞƐĞƚŚƌĞĞĂĐƚŽƌƐ ?ĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŶŐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐŽǀĞƌƚŝŵĞƚŽĨĂǀŽƵƌĚƌƵŐƉŽůŝĐǇ reform. 
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However, in my interviews and participant observation, I found that regarding the content of this 
forum, and unlike issues such as harm reduction strategies, cannabis regulation was a relatively 
marginal topic on the agenda. 
 
The National Debate on Drugs of 2011 was a congress-like activity organised in the Montevideo city 
hall by Proderechos, El Abrojo and IELSUR and sponsored by the National Drugs Secretary. None of 
these three organisations can be characterised as orthodox cannabis activism. Proderechos had a wide 
political agenda related to new rights issues, mainly abortion regulation, LGTBI rights and drug policy 
reform, ultimately aimed at updating the ůĞĨƚ ?Ɛ political repertoire. El Abrojo and IELSUR are illustrative 
examples of the Human Rights shift towards the illegal drugs problems already described (section 
8.3.). Created in 1984 and 1988 respectively, IELSUR and El Abrojo were direct reactions to the 
Uruguayan dictatorship, aimed at denouncing Human Rights violations committed during this period. 
Only later did they incorporate drug policy into their agenda. Furthermore, with the opening of a drugs 
programme in 1995, El Abrojo became a key policy transfer actor of the Harm Reduction approach. 
Although sympathetic to the cause, for both organisations, cannabis legalisation was not a priority. 
 
Unlike the Informal Dialogues and the National Debate on Drugs, cannabis legalisation was the explicit 
target of the global marijuana march of May 2011 and 2012. As introduced at the beginning of this 
thesis (see section 5.1.) the global marijuana march is an annual rally for cannabis legalisation held 
every May at different locations across the globe since 1999. It was around this happening that the 
first three cannabis activism organisations were created in Uruguay, conforming a new type of political 
actor: the formerly introduced Proderechos ? ƚŚĞ ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ ŐƌŽǁĞƌƐ  ‘Asociación de Estudios del 
Cannabis ?  ?h )  ?ĂŶŶĂďŝƐ ^ƚƵĚǇ ƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ? ĂŶĚLiberalisación del Cannabis [Cannabis 
Liberalisation]. According to the data gathered, although part of the coalition, the relationship 
between these three organisations was, in most cases, tense. Disagreements and disputes about how 
and where to organise this march were frequent. As a case in point, whereas in 2011 Proderechos and 
AECU were the main organisers of the global marihuana march, for 2012 Cannabis Liberalisation was 
the only one sponsoring the event. Hence, Cannabis Liberalisation appears in the diagram (Figure 10), 
but no links connect this actor with the coalition. 
 
Lastly, Sebastian Sabini, a young member of parliament from the Frente Amplio -and more specifically, 
ĨƌŽŵDƵũŝĐĂ ?ƐƐĞĐƚŽƌ- was the only legislative power representative assisting at these events during 
the first period considered, from February 2011 to Jun 2012. As the Figure 10 below shows, during 
ƚŚŝƐƉĞƌŝŽĚ/ĨŽƵŶĚŶŝŶĞŬĞǇĂĐƚŽƌƐĂƐƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌŵĞƌƐ ?ĂĚǀŽĐĂĐǇ coalition. 
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Figure 10. Network analysis first period (Feb. 2011 - Jun 2012) 
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What the network diagram allows is to provide further evidence of the different roles performed 
within the ĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ ? ‘AECU ?ǁĂƐƚŚĞŵĂŝŶďƌŽŬĞƌǁŝƚŚŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂŶĚŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐŐƌŽǁĞƌƐ ?
 ‘Proderechos ? brokered with political and academic actors in the coalition, and Cannabis Liberalisation 
had a more isolated position, more strictly defined by their organisation of the Global Marijuana 
March. The wide brokerage led by Proderechos was partly possible because of the Open Society 
Foundation funding, which enhanced Proderechos ? ůŽbbying and organisational capabilities. As I 
showed in Chapter Five, together these organisations formed a new type of political actor directly 
ƉƵƐŚŝŶŐ ĨŽƌ  ‘ŵĂƌŝŚƵĂŶĂ ůĞŐĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ƚŽ ďĞ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞů ŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞ ĂŐĞŶĚĂ ? DŽƌĞ ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇ ? Ăůů
agreed that cannabis self-cultivation should be included as the main policy tool in a new law proposal. 
 
On top of these three ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? activism, identified as lying within the  ‘ŚĂƌĚ ĐŽƌĞ ? of the coalition, 
harm reduction related organisations such as  ‘El Abrojo ? and  ‘IELSUR ? also began to get involved in the 
process, but from a satellite position. 
 
Although evidence was found of international civil society involvement in the Coalition, their role in 
cannabis regulation events was still very limited at this period. More particularly, the Washington 
Office for Latin America (WOLA) and Transnational Institute (TNI) lobbied the political system directly 
(both legislative and executive power) and kept somewhat unengaged with national civil society. 
Lastly, as evident in the Figure 10, among the political system, only one legislative member 
(Sebastián Sabini) stood out as a political entrepreneur for cannabis regulation. He was the only 
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representative of the legislative power present in cannabis related activities, and he was one of the 
main promoters of the cannabis regulation law presented in parliament during this period. According 
to the data gathered, he had the important virtue of brokering between dissimilar actors as cannabis 
activists, international civil society, Frente Amplio and non-Frente Amplio legislators. Sebastian Sabini 
ŚĂƐĂůƐŽďĞĞŶ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚĂƐĂĐĞŶƚƌĂůƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĞŶƚƌĞƉƌĞŶĞƵƌŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŶĞǁƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?ĂŐĞŶĚĂ  ?ƐĞĞƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ
5.1.) among the political establishment by others (Sempol, 2013) 
 
Nevertheless, it is not only the presence, but also the absence of actors in the network that can be 
significant. Thus, besides the individual brokerage of Sabini with the new rights activism, political party 
groups were not yet involved in the coalition between February 2011 to June 2012, which confirms 
the role of cannabis activism as a political start up (section 5.2.) and the difficulties faced in introducing 
the ŶĞǁƌŝŐŚƚƐĂŐĞŶĚĂŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ? repertoire. 
 
 
8.2. Second period 
 
This state of affairs abruptly changed somewhat after the Life and Coexistence Strategy 
announcement of the executive power, proposing a cannabis state monopoly (Jun 2012  W Feb 2013). 
In this period, two key events were the creation of a National Coordination for Marihuana Legalisation, 
in July 2012, and the formation of a top-ĚŽǁŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐƉŽŶƐŽƌĞĚĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ “ĚǀŝƐŽƌǇ
'ƌŽƵƉ ? ?
 
The National Coordination for Marihuana LegĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŝƐĂƌĞĐŽŶĨŝŐƵƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐ ‘ŚĂƌĚĐŽƌĞ ?
of the coalition composed by Proderechos, AECU and Cannabis Liberalisation. Compared to the 
previous diagram (Figure 10), a finding worth highlighting is that after DƵũŝĐĂ ?Ɛ proposal and with the 
topic in the media hotspot, the reformers coalition  ‘ŚĂƌĚ ĐŽƌĞ ? widened its network significantly. More 
specifically, three new types of actors can be observed: first, within the context of the generational gap 
of positions towards cannabis, the issue finally broke through the political system, boosted by youth 
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ? ŐƌŽƵƉƐ ? ^ĞĐŽŶĚ ? ǁŚĞƌĞĂƐ ƵŶƚŝů ƚŚĂƚ ŵŽŵĞŶƚ ĚĞŵĂŶĚ ĨŽƌ ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ ƌĞĨŽƌŵ ǁĂƐ
strongly based in the capital city Montevideo, an incipient movement could now be observed 
elsewhere in the country, as organisations not based in Montevideo joined the hard core activism, 
helping to spread support towards cannabis regulation throughout the territory. Thirdly, for the first 
time other relevant social actors not necessarily identified as drug policy reform activists got involved, 
such as the National Workers Union (PIT-CNT), and Ovejas Negras, the most important LGBT activist 
group in the country. From The National Coordination for Marihuana Legalisation, civil society 
orchestrated lobbying and mobilisation efforts aimed at keeping cannabis regulation on the political 
agenda, holding weekly meetings throughout the period analysed. Since they shared participation in 
these meetings, a link connects each actor with the other. This is understood as an indicator of a 
network of actors coordinating actions over time. The actors involved in the National Coordination 
for Marihuana Legalisation meetings appear in green, on the left of the second diagram (Figure 11). 
 
dŚĞŽƚŚĞƌŬĞǇĞǀĞŶƚ ĨŽƵŶĚ ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐƉĞƌŝŽĚǁĂƐ ƚŚĞ ĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ƐƉŽŶƐŽƌĞĚ  ‘ĚǀŝƐŽƌǇ
'ƌŽƵƉ ? ? ĂƉƉŽŝŶƚĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ EĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƌƵŐƐ ŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚ ŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ DŝŶŝƐƚƌŝĞƐ ?
Frente Amplio members, scholars, and representatives of civil society. This group had as their main 
objective the outlining of a blueprint for a legal cannabis regulation framework, holding weekly 
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meetings throughout the period analysed. On top of WOLA and TNI, already present in the first period, 
I found a number of international actors progressively being incorporated into the domestic debate 
ĂƐƐƉĞĐŝĂůŐƵĞƐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĂĚǀŝƐŽƌǇŐƌŽƵƉ ? ?ƚŚĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƚŝŶDĞĚŝĐĂůĂŶĚdŚĞƌĂƉĞƵƚŝĐƵƐĞƐŽĨĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ
Manuel Guzman, and the drug policy think tanks DPA and Transform. Thus, on the right side of the 
second diagram, the actors that appear linked together with each other were all members of the 
EĂƚŝŽŶĂůƌƵŐƐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ‘ĚǀŝƐŽƌǇ 'ƌŽƵƉ ? ? 
 
 
Figure 11. Network analysis second period (Jun 2012  ? Feb 2013) 
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Proderechos and AECU were the only two social organisations found participating in both groups  Wthe 
bottom up Cannabis Regulation National Coordination and the top down advisory group. Therefore, 
they appear as nodes in the middle of the picture, connecting the system. As the diagram shows, they 
had an important brokerage role within the advocacy coalition, linking two political spaces otherwise 
disconnected. Furthermore, they guaranteed bridges for resources and information flow within the 
ĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ ? ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ŬĞĞƉŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĐŚĂŽƚŝĐ ŵŽŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ƉƵŶĐƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ŽƉĞŶĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞ
irruption (see chapter 7) within acceptable limits, for the coalition not to fragment. As explained by a 
member of the main cannabis growers association (AECU): 
 “tĞƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĂƚĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚǁĞĚŽĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞŽŶŵĂŶǇƉŽŝŶƚƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞƉŽǁĞƌ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?
which explains why we are not going to support the proposal openly, we will not publicly 
declare to be against it either, and become an obstacle. Our position is to try to change some 
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of the content in direct conversations with the ones involved and not through the mass media. 
Perhaps what horrifies us the most is the total improvisation over which some decisions are 
being made, an improvisation too close to irresponsibility ?  ?EĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŝǀŝů ^ŽĐŝĞƚǇ ŵĞŵďĞƌ
(id23), personal communication). 
 
Thus, when comparing the first with the second period diagram, a finding worth highlighting is that, 
confronted with the communicational turmoil opened by the executive irruption (see chapter 7) 
cannabis activism was far away from remaining apathetic. In fact, activist groups multiplied their 
coordination efforts. The lobbying and mobilisation labour of civil society was an important factor in 
keeping the topic on the agenda. After the ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ involvement in the debate, activists redouble 
their efforts to keep the political momentum going on a track full of potholes. As explained by 
members of cannabis activism groups interviewed in formal and informal talks, lobbying activities 
were arranged to explain and disseminate the idea of cannabis regulation amongst MPs and Senators. 
Paid and unpaid public campaigns were set up, targeting both the general public and the people 
already sympathetic to the cause, to balance the controversial Executive Power supply side definition 
of the problem, reassuring that cannabis users and cultivation for personal use remained at centre 
stage. Lastly, working very closely with mainstream mass media  Wa mass media perceived by the actors 
involved as the main opposition to the reform W allowed actors to inject a wide range of inputs and to 
establish customized relations with journalists covering the topic, offering alternative views and 
framings to present the law proposal. Thus, as proposed by Multiple Streams Theory, civil society 
entrepreneurs were like surfers, ready to paddle for riding the Executive Power wave, using forces 
beyond their control to push cannabis reform forward (Kingdon, 1995). 
 
To complement this, the establishment of the ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ advisory group had the virtue of focusing 
lobbying and mobilisation efforts more efficiently behind a single proposal, easing coordination 
problems. Gathering different interests pushing for cannabis regulation around the same table 
allowed these actors to resolve policy design clashes before, rather than after, the parliamentary 
process. As shown in interviews with Latin American activists and politicians, in most countries of the 
continent where several law proposals to regulate cannabis were presented at the same time in 
parliament, there was nowhere near the same level of coordination between actors. However, as 
refleĐƚĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬ ĚŝĂŐƌĂŵ ũƵƐƚ ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚ ? ƚŚĞ ĨĂĐƚ ƚŚĂƚ ŶŽďŽĚǇ ďƵƚ ŽŶĞ  ‘ůŽǁ ƉƌŽĨŝůĞ ?
representative of the Public Health Ministry, and only Frente Amplio representatives appear as 
members of the reformers coalition, is additional evidence of the difficulties for the National Drugs 
Committee and civil society to diffuse the commitment towards cannabis regulation across the state. 
 
Proderechos ǁĂƐŽŶĞŽĨ ƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĂůŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐĐĂůůĞĚƚŽƚŚĞEĂƚŝŽŶĂůƌƵŐƐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ  ‘ĚǀŝƐŽƌǇ
'ƌŽƵƉ ? ?ƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬŝŶŐƚŚe task of setting the blueprint for cannabis regulation; my colleagues elected 
Martín Collazo and myself as the ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ representatives for this space. Thus, we could observe 
first-hand not only the significant lack of information about the topic, but actually the strong 
difficulties for the National Drugs Committee Secretary to summon people from key Ministries as 
Education, Public Health, Interior or Social Development to partake to the ůĂǁ ?Ɛ implementation. This 
level of apathy is meaningful, and even more so if one takes into account that representatives of these 
Ministries  Walong with six others -, were theoretically obliged to assist the National Drugs Committee 
as formal permanent members11. 
 
11 Formal permanent members of the National Drugs Committee: representatives of the national secretary 
against money laundering and financing of terrorism, and of the Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs, Economy, 
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In fact, in order to confront this lack of interest within the different ministries, the definition of 
governmental brokers and entrepreneurs within the Reformers advocacy coalition was of key 
ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞ ?ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞĚĂƚĂĐŽůůĞĐƚĞĚ ?ĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŝƌƌƵƉƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞƚŽƉ-down stream 
to regulate cannabis began to be led by members of the National Drugs Committee and Frente Amplio 
legislative members. More specifically, the lawyer and president of the National Drugs Committee, 
Diego Cánepa, was appointed to cover international press and relations; the sociologist and National 
Drugs Committee´s general secretary Julio Calzada was appointed as the main public entrepreneur at 
national level; and Augusto Vitale, psychologist, was the inside man brokering among all political 
actors working on the topic. From then on, these three actors became key pieces of the cannabis 
reform architecture. Once the call to regulate cannabis was made by Mujica, these members of the 
National Drugs Committee showed remarkably high levels of personal and professional commitment 
to the reform proposal. In an informal interview with a criminologist researching the topic, he 
suggested that these political decisions were also reflected in his mass media analysis: 
 “I wanted to see who in the executive power was leading the cannabis regulation initiative, 
because for me it was not clear at all. The results of the mass media analysis do show a clear 
evolution: President Mujica is the first that starts speaking about this and he remains active 
throughout the period. The first minister that defended it was the Minister of Interior, Bonomi, 
but later on his appearances talking about the topic diminish and the protagonist roles within 
the executive power started to be taken by more technical profiles: Diego Cánepa and Julio 
Calzada ?(Scholar, personal communication, 15/09/2014) 
 
The definition of governmental brokers and entrepreneurs was important for increasing the degree 
of framing cohesion. Additionally, it reflects how the debate polarised, and along with the Executive 
Power entrepreneurs nucleated in the National Drugs Committee, more Frente Amplio legislative 
entrepreneurs were involved as well: including not only Sebastian Sabini but also Julio Bango; a 
representative of the second most numerous group within the Frente Amplio  WThe Socialist Party-. 
 
 
8.3. Third period 
 
The third diagram presented (Figure 12) comprises information about the shared participation of 
actors in seven events. The first two are the National Drugs Committee ´Advisory group´ meetings 
and the National Coordination for Marihuana Legalisation meetings described in the previous 
section. Thus, these actors continued coordinating actions throughout this period by regularly 
attending meetings. 
 
Other events considered include the workshop on ´strategic communication on cannabis´ organised 
in February 2013 by the National Drugs Committee, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Uruguay 
(FESUR), Drug Policy Alliance (DPA), Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) and Open Society 
Foundation (OSF). The arrangement of this event is understood as an indicator of coordination of 
activities between these actors over time; hence, these actors are included in the reformers coalition. 
In fact, these actors also co-sponsored other events considered in this period, such as the Workshop 
about Cannabis Implementation in Montevideo (September, 2013) and ´Launching Legal Marijuana: 
Regulatory Challenges and Options´ in Colorado, US (October 2013). 
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Lastly, Figure 12 below comprises information about the meeting of actors who put together the 
´Responsible Regulation´ campaign, which was the result of the emulation of public campaigning skills 
from Washington and Colorado to Uruguay, facilitated by the dyad Proderechos and Drug Policy 
Alliance (DPA) analysed in depth in section 8.2. 
 
Thus, the cluster of light and dark green nodes on the right of the diagram shows all members of the 
National Coordination for Marihuana Legalisation. The actors appearing on the left were all guests of 
the Advisory group of the government. The ones in green at the top were members of the Responsible 
Regulation campaign. 
 
 
Figure 12. Network analysis third period (Feb 2013  ? Dec 2013) 
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Several points are important to note from this diagram. First, compared to the previous ones, it 
highlights the involvement of new international actors during the third period under consideration 
(Feb 2013  W Dec. 2013). The growth in the number of international actors sharing meetings with 
members of the Uruguayan government is significant; this can be interpreted as further evidence of 
the increasing causal importance of international policy transfer dynamics reviewed in chapter eight. 
Moreover, I found evidence of a number of meetings where actors such as Alisson Holcomb, Rick 
Ridder and Joannie Braden, who were involved in the Colorado cannabis regulation campaigns, 
124  
participated. Another trace of the increased importance of Drug Policy Alliance as a policy transfer 
agent is the fact that it is the international actor appearing as closest to the Uruguayan National Drugs 
Committee  Wthat is, the actor that shared the most meetings and/or co-organised the most cannabis 
related events. 
 
Conversely, what may come as a surprise is the sustained apathy of different Uruguayan ministries 
invited to the advisory group. As already noted earlier in this thesis, it was a minority group within 
government, working hand in hand with national and international civil society, which managed to 
push cannabis reform forward. As I will analyse in more depth in the following chapter, this finding 
helps to understand why the implementation process of the new law has been, above all, tense, slow 
and extremely cautious. 
 
In fact, the notorious involvement of international actors in the domestic debate became one of the 
main reasons given by the opposition to reject cannabis reform. The argument here concerned the 
ƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇŽĨƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƉůĂĐŝŶŐhƌƵŐƵĂǇĂƐĂ  ‘ƚĞƐƚŝŶŐŐƌŽƵŶĚ ?ĨŽƌĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ?&ŽƌƚŚĞ
opposition, by agreeing with this reform, the Frente Amplio converted into the political arm of national 
and international pressure groups. For some members of the Partido Nacional, for example: 
 “/ďĞůŝĞǀĞƚŚŝƐŝƐĐŽŵŝŶŐŽƵƚŽĨƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞ ?ĂŶĚ/ĂŵŶŽƚƚĂůŬŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞŽŶĞƐƚŚĂƚĐŽŶƐƵŵĞ
cannabis in Uruguay, I am talking about a regional and international pressure. I believe we are 
part -and I really hope I am wrong- ?ŽĨĂĐĞƌƚĂŝŶŬŝŶĚŽĨ ? ‘ŽŬ ?ůĞƚƵƐƐĞĞǁŚŝĐŚĐŽƵŶƚƌǇĐĂŶďĞ
ůĞƐƐ ?ůĞƚƵƐƚƌǇĂŶĚƐĞĞǁŚĂƚŚĂƉƉĞŶƐ ?ƚŚŝƐĚŝĚǁŽƌŬ ?ƚŚŝƐĚŝĚŶŽƚ ? ? ?ƵƚƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽƚĂŶǇƉůĂŶ
B, or a study to see what might happen, seems like half improvised ? (Legislative Power  W Partido 
Nacional member (id1), interview). 
 
 “[Cannabis legalisation] is part of a new way of ideological imperialism: you do what I do not 
dare to do in my own country, so I can see if it works. We are missing a strong government with 
the conviction to say no. At the same time, I believe that the FA has been internally pressured 
by certain sectors, linked to the party, who lobbied for this to be approved ? ?>ĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞ Power 
 W Partido Nacional member (id3), interview). 
 
This contrast between national sovereignty and international imperialism was an argument commonly 
used by both, those supporting and opposing cannabis reform. As already discussed (section 7.3.) 
actors such as the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) played an active role opposing 
Uruguayan reform. Further on, it has been a normal costume for politicians to ´play the victim´ of 
overvalued international pressures, just like many Latin American leaders have been doing over the 
past few years, identifying the War on Drugs international framework as the culprit of drug policy 
failures, but failing to endorse significant reforms at the local level. For the opposition, to frame 
Uruguayan cannabis reform as a testing ground for foreign interests was convenient to build the image 
ŽĨĂǁĞĂŬŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?/ŶƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĞ ?ƐǁŽƌĚƐƋƵŽƚĞĚĂďŽǀĞ ?ƚŚĞFrente Amplio should just have 
said no. 
 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the involvement of international actors was not free of 
controversy even within the reformers coalition. During fieldwork, I observed tensions constantly 
emerging related to the influence and role of international actors. In a participant observation event, 
organised by the Uruguayan government, for example -the International Workshop on Medical and 
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Therapeutic cannabis uses- civil society representatives critically pointed to the wrongful evaluation 
of national capabilities to favour Western knowledge: 
 “They brought all these people from Europe and United States to talk about medical cannabis 
and they had the person that knows more about medical cannabis in Uruguay among the public. 
Raquel Peyraube was the first one pushing for this. She has been invited in numerous seminars 
around the world. She is the only one that really knows our reality but no, since she is 
hƌƵŐƵĂǇĂŶ ? ůĞƚ ?ƐĂƌƌĂŶŐĞĂtŽƌŬƐŚŽƉŽŶDĞĚŝĐĂůĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐĂŶĚ ůĞƚ ƚŚĞŐƌŝŶŐŽƐŽǁŶƚŚĞŵŝĐ
 ?ŐƌŝŶŐŽ ŝƐ Ă ǁŝĚĞůǇ ƵƐĞĚ ĚĞƌŽŐĂƚŽƌǇ ůĂďĞů ƚŽ ƌĞĨĞƌ ƚŽ ŶŽƌƚŚĞƌŶ ǁŚŝƚĞ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ? ?  ?ŝǀŝů ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ
representative, field notes, 10/04/2014). 
 
Also in the interviews conducted, the use of Western knowledge as a legitimating tool to provide 
credibility to the regulation proposal was often denounced: 
 “/ĨǇŽƵďƌŝŶŐĂŐƌŝŶŐŽ ?'ƌŝŶŐŽůĂŶĚŝĂŵĂŬĞƐĂŶŝŵƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?(laugh) they will listen to you in 
another way. But if the politicians, the common folks look at you, and you are just a Uruguayan, 
ƚŚĞǇǁŽƵůĚƚŚŝŶŬ PŶŽ ?ƚŚŝƐŐƵǇŝƐƚĂůŬŝŶŐŶŽŶ-sense ? ?,ĞŵƉĞŶƚƌĞƉƌĞŶĞƵƌ ?ŝĚ ? ? ) ? interview). 
 “Many of us have a highly critical position about these international conferences on monitoring 
and evaluation. It felt like it was a missed opportunity because it was not thought through, and 
there was no formal nor informal leadership behind it, guiding the process in order to generate 
the conditions to actually elaborate a concrete monitoring and evaluation strategy, capitalising 
on the human, scientific and professional resources coming from abroad.  ? ? ? Looking backwards 
I do have serious doubts if all these has really been something else than a ůĂǁ ?Ɛ technical-political 
legitimisation rather hollow strategy ?  ?ĂŶŶĂďŝƐ DŽŶŝƚŽƌŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ ǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶ ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ
member (id20), interview). 
 
As I analysed in depth in Chapter 8, international actors and activism networks did play an important 
brokerage role, encouraging policy lesson-drawing and advocacy efforts. The point to be made here, 
however, is that what the network diagram cannot show is the tensions involved during the political 
process. As with the executive power ´irruption´, both agreements and disagreements were frequent 
within the advocacy coalition among different types of actors (namely, government, national and 
international civil society). In fact, from the data gathered through participant observation, in the 
Uruguayan case it is hard to overstate the importance of the brokerage role played by a set of actors 
for the coalition not to fragment. As one research participant defined it, the prevalent feeling 
throughout this process was that everything was always about to collapse. In this regard, the 
establishment of legislative and governmental referents  W Sebastian Sabini, Julio Bango and Julio 
Calzada- and civil society brokers  W DPA, AECU or Proderechos- appeared as essential for increasing 
the degree of framing cohesion and erasing coordination costs, keeping the conflicts between 
different interest groups within tolerable limits. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
In this chapter, I provided an event-based network analysis of the Uruguayan reformers coalition. 
Thus, three network diagrams were introduced comprising information about the shared participation 
of political actors in different cannabis-related events. In this way, four types of actors were found 
within the Uruguayan coalition in accordance to the sampling categories; National civil society 
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representatives, Legislative power members; Executive power members and International civil society 
representatives, who coordinated actions over time to make cannabis regulation possible in the 
Uruguayan case. 
 
ĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞ ?ƐŝƌƌƵƉƚŝŽŶŝŶ:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ? ?ĐŝǀŝůƐŽĐŝĞƚǇŵĞŵďĞƌƐǁĞƌĞůĞĂĚŝŶŐƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĚĞďĂƚĞ
on cannabis. The four events analysed were: an elite networking activity - the Informal Dialogues on 
drug policy of February 2011; public demonstrations - the global marihuana march of May 2011 and 
2012- and a seminar-like activity, the National Debate on Drugs of 2011. From analysing these events, 
a  ‘ŚĂƌĚ ĐŽƌĞ ? of the coalition was identified: Proderechos; the cannabis growers association AECU, and 
the Cannabis Liberalisation group. This hard core composed by cannabis activism as a new type of 
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ĂĐƚŽƌ ĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇ ƉƵƐŚŝŶŐ ĨŽƌ  ‘ŵĂƌŝŚƵĂŶĂ ůĞŐĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ƚŽ ĨŝŐƵƌĞ ŽŶ ƚhe political agenda. 
Accordingly, cannabis self-cultivation was the main policy tool agreed to be included in a new law 
proposal. On top of these three organisations, harm reduction related organisations such as  ‘El Abrojo ?
ĂŶĚ ‘IELSUR ?ĂůƐŽďĞŐĂŶƚŽŐĞƚinvolved in the process, but from a satellite position. Meanwhile, the 
Washington Office for Latin America (WOLA) and Transnational Institute (TNI) lobbied the political 
system directly (both legislative and executive power) and kept somewhat unengaged with national 
civil society. Conversely, the absence of political parties groups representatives at this time (Feb 2011- 
June 2012), further confirms the role of cannabis activism as political starts ups and the difficulties 
faced for introducing cannabis in ƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ? repertoire. 
 
ĨƚĞƌ ƚŚĞ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ĂŶŶŽƵŶĐĞŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ Ă ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ ƐƚĂƚĞ ŵŽŶŽƉŽůǇ  ?:ƵŶ  ? ? ? ?  W Feb 2013), two 
streams can be identified composing the coalition. On one hand, a top-down sponsored cannabis 
ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ‘ĚǀŝƐŽƌǇ'ƌŽƵƉ ?ĂŝŵĞĚat outlining a blueprint for a legal cannabis regulation framework. 
This advisory group was made up of National Drugs Committee members, Frente Amplio members, 
scholars, and representatives of civil society. On the other hand, a bottom-up lobbying group, the 
National Coordination for Marihuana Legalisation, was set up in July 2012. Accordingly, after the 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ŝƌƌƵƉƚŝŽŶ ? ƚŚĞ ƌĞĨŽƌŵĞƌƐ ĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ  ‘ŚĂƌĚ ĐŽƌĞ ? ǁŝĚĞŶĞĚ ŝƚƐ ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬ ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇ ƚŽ
include three new types of actors: youth political parties ?ŐƌŽƵƉƐ ?ŶŽŶ-Montevideo based activism 
groups and non-cannabis reformers groups, as the Uruguayan Labour Union (PIT-CNT). Thus, whereas 
the bottom up stream allowed civil society to orchestrate lobbying and mobilisation efforts aimed at 
keeping cannabis regulation on the political agenda, the top-down stream allowed focusing those 
lobbying and mobilisation efforts more effectively behind a single proposal, easing coordination 
problems, and resolving policy design clashes before, rather than after, the parliamentary process. 
 
The third period analysed (Feb 2013  W Dec 2013) highlights the significant increase in the number of 
international actors sharing meetings with members of the Uruguayan coalition, which was 
interpreted as further evidence of the increasing causal importance of international policy transfer 
dynamics in the Uruguayan case. Besides the  ‘ĚǀŝƐŽƌǇ 'ƌŽƵƉ ? meetings and the National Coordination 
for Marihuana Legalisation meetings, a new lobbying group, Responsible Regulation, was formed, and 
three strategic international workshops on political communication and cannabis regulation 
implementation issues took place. In this period, international actors and activism networks played an 
important brokerage role within the coalition, encouraging policy lesson-drawing and advocacy 
efforts. 
 
Throughout the period analysed, one common factor found was the continuous presence of tensions 
between and within groups, as well as the key importance of the brokerage role played by a set of 
actors for the coalition not to fragment. Thus, for example, the establishment of clear Frente Amplio 
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legislative and governmental referents -as Sebastian Sabini, Julio Bango and Julio Calzada- and civil 
society representatives  Was AECU or Proderechos- appeared essential for erasing coordination costs 
and keeping the conflicts within tolerable limits. Conversely, an important finding regarding the most 
notorious members of the Uruguayan advocacy coalition that pushed for cannabis regulation was the 
sustained apathy from the different Uruguayan ministries that formed the National Drugs Committee. 
As argued throughout this thesis, it was a minority group within government working hand in hand 
with national and international civil society who managed to push cannabis reform forward. Hence, in 
the following chapter I will delve into the main derivations that this peculiar political process brought 
for the implantation of the new cannabis law. 
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Chapter 9. Expectations vs. Reality: a new policy venue? 
 
If this analysis of the Uruguayan regulation case has been at all truthful, it should not come as a 
surprise to the reader that, until the very last moment, when the law was put to a parliamentary vote, 
the prospect for cannabis reformers was highly uncertain. The lower chamber was composed by 50 
representatives of the Frente Amplio, 30 representatives of the Partido Nacional, 17 of the Partido 
Colorado and 2 of the Partido Independiente. In the upper chamber, 16 places were for the Frente 
Amplio, 9 for the Partido Nacional and 5 for the Partido Colorado. In this scenario, even as president 
Mujica remained one of the main supporters of the law, it was not completely certain that the Frente 
Amplio  Wwith slim legislative majority- would unanimously vote for the project. The Partido 
Independiente was divided. The support for cannabis regulation from both the Partido Colorado and 
Nacional members was even less likely. 
 
Even though the first voting session, on July 2013, lasted ten hours while the second, in the upper 
chamber, on December 2013, more than twelve, no law review was introduced throughout the 
different legislatives debates. As mentioned in an informal conversation with a lawyer and legislative 
advisor of the Frente Amplio, the issue was that, if a modification to the original proposal had been 
introduced in any of the chambers, the new version needed to return to the previous chamber to be 
voted afresh. Thus, despite technical errors successively identified by the authors, since the political 
agreements achieved thus far were so precarious, almost no on-site negotiation margin remained. 
Ultimately, in a parliamentary room overcrowded by an odd mix of journalists from all around the 
world, dreadlocks, hippies and suit and tie people, only the Frente Amplio representatives raised their 
hand to make cannabis regulation a new element of the Uruguayan drug policy framework. It was 
approved with 50 votes in favour and 49 against in the lower chamber and with 16 votes in favour and 
14 against in the upper chamber. 
 
However, especially within such morally controversial topics as cannabis regulation, not only is 
negotiating and achieving compromises during the legislative process atypically difficult, but even 
when a new political output is reached, the link between the rule and the role of the law is expected 
to be particularly precarious (Euchner et al 2013). Since cannabis regulation potentially interferes with 
individual core values, such as liberty, authority and care, reformers are met with the challenge of 
monitoring and sanctioning compliance for a broad range of actors with diverse and conflicting values, 
whilst dealing with the absence of a set path for the new objectives of the law to be achieved. 
 
Thus, before concluding my empirical analysis of the Uruguayan regulation case, I will review the main 
developments during the first three years of implementation of the law. I will start by introducing 
some general aspects of the new legal framework, its objectives and policy tools, and discuss some 
issues for adressing its effective evaluation. Following that, I will review the framework for 
recreational use of cannabis in its three access mecanisms: domestic cultivation, social cannabis clubs 
and pharmacies. Further on, I will analyse the main advances and blockages found for the regulation 
of legal cannabis for medical and therapeutic purposes. I will conclude by arguing that the secrecy 
regarding the implementation rationale and the lack of responsiďůĞĂĐƚŽƌƐ ?ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĂďŝůŝƚǇǁĞĂŬĞŶĞĚ
legal certainty under the new framework. Legal certainty ensures that those subject to the law can 
regulate their conduct and that they are protected from the arbitrary use of state power. 
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9.1. Law 19172 general framework 
 
A first problem to note about the new cannabis legal framework is the low degree of precision 
achieved as a guide for policy reform. As it was already introduced at the beginning of this thesis, the 
Uruguayan law no 19172 states as its objectives to: (1) reduce drug trafficking related violence, 
ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŶŐ ƚŽ Ă ďĞƚƚĞƌ ƐŽĐŝĂů ĐŽĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ ?  ? ? ) ƉƌŽŵŽƚĞ ĚƌƵŐƐ ƵƐĞƌƐ ? ŚĞĂůƚŚ ?  ? ? ) ĞŶĚŽƌƐĞ Ă ĨĂŝƌ
enforcement of the law; aiming at a more adequate proportionality between offense and punishment. 
To achieve these goals, four policy tools were included in the new legal framework: cannabis market 
ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ƚŽĞĚƵĐĂƚĞ ? ƌĂŝƐĞ ĂǁĂƌĞŶĞƐƐ ĂŶĚ ƉƌĞǀĞŶƚ ƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƚŝĐ ĚƌƵŐ ƵƐĞ ? ĚƌƵŐ ƵƐĞƌƐ ? ƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚ ?
rehabilitation and social integration, and police action over illegal drug markets (FESUR, 2015). The 
law remains unclear about how the different policy tools and objectives included are linked; it does 
not clearly define the actors, agencies and institutions responsible for its implementation, and does 
not include any estimated timeframe for its development. No correlated budget was assigned. Thus, 
similarly to what others have found for moral policy change (Euchner, Heichel, Nebel, & Raschzok, 
2013), the compromises in the political process were accommodated by a rather vague and open legal 
formula, which later implied additional policy design weaknesses affecting its implementation. 
 
In this regard, in many instances during fieldwork, I observed a generalized state of scepticism 
regarding the actual possibility for the law to accomplish such goals and how to account for them. 
Although there was a strong agreement across my data about the importance of an evidence-based 
policy making, the answers were much fuzzier when exploring more concretely what this framework 
should look like and the steps that needed to be taken in order to generate data. No baseline was 
agreed among policy makers, civil servants or scholars about expectations for change, as well as its 
direction and measurement. Furthermore, research participants suggested that the lack of a 
monitoring and evaluation culture is a structural weakness permeating through the Uruguayan state 
in different policy fields. 
 
Thus, for example, many of the specialists interviewed argued that the new framework holds a low 
degree of causal accuracy for its evaluation. How is cannabis production related with drug trafficking 
violence and, more broadly, what will the impact of cannabis regulation on illegal drugs markets be? 
Although there is still a significant lack of knowledge regarding the actual ways of organisation, the 
limited data available indicates that the cannabis market is highly segmented. It is based on a larger 
number of participants than other illegal drug markets, and therefore the profit is expected to be less 
concentrated. Cannabis production ranges from small-scale home-growing plant cultivation sites, to 
large-scale industrial-like farms. Some segments are better characterised by undefined limits between 
dealers and friends in semi-private networks, whereas other open-air segments involve more unstable 
and impersonal relationships (Wilkins & Sweetsur, 2006; Potter, 2006; Costa & De Rauwe, 2008; 
Decorte, 2010; Chatwin & Potter, 2015; Decorte, et al., 2017). 
 
Further on, the connection of cannabis trafficking with violence as well as the potential impact of its 
regulation are hard to grasp. A first challenge for this is related to the way that the output is defined 
and how to estimate the contribution of cannabis illegal trafficking to the total amount of violence, if 
any. In a sense, how violent a market can be depends largely on how this output is operationalized. 
Because of practical difficulties for data collection and the type of information available in secondary 
sources, the rule of thumb among scholars that attempt to address this issue is relying on homicides 
as a proxy for violence (Brownstein, Crimmins, & Spunt, 2000; Ousey & Lee, 2002; Brownstein & 
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Taylor, 2007; Snyder & Durán-Martinez, 2009; Andreas & Wallman, 2009; Reuter, 2009; Rivera, 2015; 
'ĂƌǌſŶ ?  ? ? ? ? ) ? EŽŶĞƚŚĞůĞƐƐ ? ŝƚ ŚĂƐ ĂůƐŽ ďĞĞŶ ĂƌŐƵĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ  “the divisiveness and intrusiveness of 
corruption, disorder, personal violence other than life-threats and the wrecking of inner-city 
communities also merit discussion ? ?DĂĐŽƵŶ ?ZĞƵƚĞƌ ? 2001, p. 102). 
 
The international drug trade is widely considered to be both the largest and most violent sector of the 
illicit global economy. Still, empirical studies consistently show that illegal drug markets are generally 
peaceable. Only occasionally do specific markets exhibit high levels of violence. In a research study on 
the Copenhagen open street-level cannabis market  W ‘ŚƌŝƐƚŝĂŶŝĂ ? W, for example, Moeller and Hesse 
(2013) found a significant increase in the number of charges for homicide and attempted homicide in 
the period after its crackdown in 2004. For the authors, this finding was  “surprising, because cannabis 
markets are not known to be violent internationally and Copenhagen has a low per capita homicide 
rate ? (Moeller & Hesse, 2013, p. 217). Therefore, they concluded that the value of the market and the 
degree of market stability are potential antecedents to the use of competitive violence by criminal 
groups, independently of social context. Still, a further complication in evaluating the impact of 
cannabis regulation on violence is how to incorporate the change in the opportunity costs of police 
resources after regulation, as well as the potential interaction with other types of crimes (Benson, 
Leburn, & Rasmussen, 2001) 
 
It can also be argued that many of the technical challenges discussed to evaluate the relationship 
between cannabis and violence are also relevant when it comes to addressing the improvements in 
ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐƵƐĞƌƐ ?ŚĞĂůƚŚ ?/ŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨŵĞĂƐƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞŽƵƚƉƵƚ ?ŵŽƐƚŽĨƚŚĞĞǆŝƐƚŝng research that tries to 
relate drugs and health uses proxy variables such as use prevalence, drug-related deaths or drug 
related HIV/AIDS infections (Hughes & Stevens, 2010; MacCoun & Reuter, 2001). Except for use 
prevalence rates, none of these variables are suitable for evaluating the impact of cannabis regulation, 
since all the research available shows that cannabis is not correlated with lethal overdoses or HIV/AIDS 
infections (Murray, Morrison, & Henquet , 2007). Regarding use prevalence rates, a first challenge that 
needs to be considered is the potential reduction in the ´dark figure´ of drug use after regulation, that 
is, under the new legal framework people may feel more willing to report truthfully their cannabis 
consumption habits (Stevens, 2007). Secondly, and beyond quantitative terms, changes in the quality 
of the substance after regulation need to be considered in order to compare what the impact might 
be on the user´s health. Additionally, as for violence, it is not well known how cannabis may interact 
with the use of other legal and illegal drugs; as a substitute or complement (Kandel, Kessler, & 
Margulies, 1978; Cohen & Sas, 1997; MacCoun & Reuter, 2001; Reiman, 2009; Lucas, et al., 2013). 
Hence, the possibility of isolating the effects ŽĨĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĞƵƐĞƌ ?ƐŚĞĂůƚŚ ?ĐŽŶƚƌŽůůŝŶŐ
for potential confounders, is difficult to achieve. 
 
The bottom line in this debate is that, as evident in the Portuguese drug policy reform (see section 
2.3), the evaluation of drug policy options is a process based on a complex mixture of organisational 
goals, moral beliefs, and rational analysis that concerns how the problems are defined in different 
places and institutions (Newcombe, 1992). In the Uruguayan case, this was translated in the difficulties 
ŝŶ ŵŽǀŝŶŐ ĨƌŽŵ Ă  ‘ƉƌŽŚŝďŝƚŝŽŶŝƐƚ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ? ƚŚĂƚ ƌĞůŝĞƐ ĂůŵŽƐƚ ĞǆĐůƵƐŝǀĞůǇ ŽŶ ƵƐĞ ? ƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ
seizure rates as the cornerstones for drug policy evaluation, to a  ‘ŚĂƌŵ and risk assessment ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ? ?
aiming at grasping and ordering different types of cannabis use and supply. Additionally, this highlights 
the point that there are always value judgements involved in policy making, concerning: (i) the 
identification of the types of harms (and benefits) that should matter for evaluation; (ii) the relative 
weight given to each category of harm and its socio-demographic distribution; (iii) the standard of 
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proof used to judge whether the evidence regarding an alternative regime is sufficient to justify a 
change in policy; and (iv) the burden of proof that applies when the evidence is ambiguous or 
incomplete (MacCoun & Reuter 2001:319). 
 
Ultimately, according to some of the research participants, in the Uruguayan case the main aim should 
be to develop process indicators to account for the processes that contribute to the achievement of 
outcomes, rather than the outcomes themselves. As I will introduce in the following sections, the 
numbers available in Uruguay tend to point to the accuracy of cannabis regulation as a market 
separation tool, although evaluating the impact of this policy on violence and health in the short, 
middle and long term remain technically difficult to be achieved. 
 
 
9.2. Recreational cannabis 
 
Although the law commanded the development of its regulatory framework within ninety days of 
approval, it took five months for the Uruguayan Executive Power to set the first cornerstone of the 
legal system. As throughout the political process, prominence was given to the recreational use of 
cannabis and in May 2014, the regulatory blueprint on domestic cultivation, cannabis clubs and selling 
was issued (Nº 120/014) along with the constitution of the new Cannabis Control and Regulation 
Institute (IRCCA). Still, the IRCCA faced important challenges from the get go. 
 
To begin with, the government was rather blind regarding how the Uruguayan cannabis black market 
was already working and, hence, how to economically compete with it. The preferred ways of access, 
different types of strains, the THC/CBD proportions available and the related prices were all unknown 
variables to Uruguayan authorities. 
 
^ƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚ ƐƚƵĚŝĞƐ  ?DŽŶŝƚŽƌ ĂŶŶĂďŝƐ ?  ? ? ? ? ) ŚĂǀĞ ƉŽŝŶƚĞĚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƌĞůĞǀĂŶĐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ
emphasis on the retailing market system to economically compete with illegal cannabis trafficking. In 
2014, it was calculated that the 55,200 existent regular cannabis users demanded up to 80% of the 
supply available: 44 tons per year. Further on, the surveys confirmed that most of the frequent users 
(68%) had access to compressed cannabis bought from international trafficking networks - ‘El 
Paraguayo ?- and only 33% was produced locally as cannabis buds in its natural state. In the VI National 
Drug Use Household Survey (Uruguayan Observatory on Drugs, 2014) a question regarding the ease 
of buying other drugs in the places where people most commonly purchased cannabis was introduced. 
Another type of illegal drug was usually offered to 55% of regular cannabis users when buying 
cannabis; cocaine was offered to 96.6%, and free base cocaine to 36.5%. Additionally, almost one out 
of two cannabis buyers declared that violent robbery and life-threatening risks were perceived when 
buying cannabis (FESUR, 2015). These findings give an important insight into the cannabis market 
organisation. In the Uruguayan case, a limited group of frequent cannabis users demand most of the 
cannabis consumed; 80% according to the existing estimates. Before regulation, most of these 
frequent users were found not to be growing their own cannabis, but purchasing a low-quality type 
from international trafficking networks instead. An important subgroup of these frequent users 
declared to be usually exposed to violence threats and the offering of other drugs (especially, cocaine 
and free base cocaine) when buying cannabis, which supports the relevance of cannabis regulation for 
drug markets separation. Conversely, most of the experimental and occasional users acquire cannabis 
from frequent buyers in semi-private networks, characterised by social dealing, or blurred boundaries 
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between dealers and friends. To add to this, research participants identified no operational cannabis 
open-air market. 
 
 
Figure 13. Most common way of accessing cannabis in the last six months, Uruguay (2016) 
 
^ŽƵƌĐĞ PDŽŶŝƚŽƌĂŶŶĂďŝƐ ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? 
 
 
 
In order to obtain access to legal cannabis, the law includes a registration scheme, which allows 
Uruguayan residents older than 18 years old to choose between domestic cultivation, social cannabis 
clubs and acquiring cannabis through pharmacy sale. These legal ways of access are mutually 
exclusive; one must choose to be registered for only one of these by presenting their ID and proof of 
residence at post offices located throughout the country. 
 
ŵŽŶŐƚŚĞƚŚƌĞĞ ?ĂůŵŽƐƚŽŶĞǇĞĂƌĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞ ůĂǁ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽǀĂů ŝŶƵŐƵƐƚ  ? ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐ
ŐƌŽǁĞƌƐ ?ƌĞŐŝƐƚĞƌǁĂƐƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƚŽďĞŽƉĞŶĞĚ ?&ƌŽŵƚŚĂƚƉŽŝŶƚŽŶ ?hƌƵŐƵĂǇĂŶƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚƐĐĂŶĂƐŬƚŽďĞ
legally allowed tŽŐƌŽǁƵƉ ƚŽ ƐŝǆƉůĂŶƚƐƉĞƌŚŽƵƐĞŚŽůĚ ?ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽĂĐƚŝǀŝƐƚƐ ?ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂƌŽƵŶĚ
10,000 people in Uruguay regularly grew their own cannabis in 2013. Roughly the same number was 
reported in an officially sponsored survey conducted in 2014: 11,000 people, predominantly between 
the ages of 30 and 44, living in Montevideo. This represented 11% of the total population that declared 
to have consumed cannabis in the past 30 days (FESUR, 2015). According to the Cannabis Control and 
Regulation Institute (IRCCA) web page, by July 2017, the approved licences for domestic cultivation 
were 6930. 
 
Two months later, in October 2014, the social cannabis clubs register opened. Through a rather 
heavy bureaucratic procedure, which may take up to one year, adult Uruguayans can constitute 
cannabis clubs as non-profit organisations of at least 15 and no more than 45 members, registered 
first by the Ministry of Education and Culture, and then by the Cannabis Control and Regulation 
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Institute. The name selected for the non-profit organisation must include the expression  ‘ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ 
ĐůƵď ?ŝŶŝƚ ?/ŶƚŚŝƐƌĞŐĂƌĚ ?hƌƵŐƵĂǇƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐĂŶĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ?ďĞŝŶŐƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚĐŽƵŶƚƌǇǁŝƚŚĂƚŝŐŚƚ
regulatory framework for cannabis clubs. Compared to other experiences (Barriuso, 2011; Pere, 
2015; Decorte T. , 2015; Decorte, et al., 2017), the Uruguayan law restricts cannabis clubs to the 
sole purpose of producing cannabis for its members, establishing criteria for the number of 
members and plants allowed, safety protocols, and restrictions for the clƵďƐ ? ůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ
facilities. During fieldwork, Uruguayan authorities related the rather restrictive framework allowed 
to the particular political process that led to cannabis regulation: 
 “the law defines a rather restrictive framework for cannabis clubs. It was what it could be 
achieved in that political context; hopefully, we will be able to improve it and make it more 
flexible in the future ?  ?ǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞ WŽǁĞƌ  W National Drugs Committee (id13), personal 
communication). 
 
As was previously discussed (see section 7.3 and 8.1) the introduction of social cannabis clubs in the 
ŶĞǁhƌƵŐƵĂǇĂŶĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬǁĂƐ ƚŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐŐƌŽǁĞƌƐ ?ĞůŝƚĞŶĞƚǁŽƌŬŝŶŐĂŶĚ
activism lobby. The Uruguayan Executive Power originally rejected this type of bottom-up market 
ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ĨŽƌŐŽŝŶŐŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ ƚŚĞ^ƚĂƚĞ ?Ɛ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ?ǇĂŶĂůǇƐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĨŽƌŵĞƌƐĂĚǀŽĐĂĐǇĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ
belief system, I showed how, unlike the executive´s insistence on a selling scheme, domestic 
cultivation and social cannabis clubs were a must for cannabis activism. Thus, the middle road solution 
for the government was the inclusion of a tight regulatory framework for cannabis clubs. 
 
After a slow start, in July 2016, the registered clubs climbed to seventeen and according to the 
Cannabis Control and Regulation Institute (IRCCA) web page, by July 2017, there were 63 clubs 
registered. As reported by the research participants, due to the heavy start-up costs, most of the clubs 
work close to the upper limit of 45 members, which would amount to 2835 people. Most of the clubs 
charge a fee and a monthly payment; yet, many of them have faced important difficulties in achieving 
economic sustainability while guaranteeing monthly supply. Additionally, the risk of robberies has 
been reported as one of their most important threats. 
 
DŽƌĞ ƚŚĂŶ ƚŚƌĞĞ ǇĞĂƌƐ ĂĨƚĞƌ ƚŚĞ ůĂǁ ?Ɛ ĂƉƉƌŽǀĂů ? ďǇ DĂǇ  ? ? ? ? ? ƚŚĞ ƌĞŐŝƐƚĞƌ ĨŽƌ ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ ĂĐƋƵŝƌŝŶŐ
through pharmacy sale finally opened. At the same time, a state sponsored public campaign called ´To 
Regulate is to be Responsible´ was launched. This further substantiates the relevance of the policy 
transfer dynamics reviewed in section 7.2. in which international and national civil society assembled 
a public campaign called Responsible Regulation. On the first day, 539 people registered, and 
according to the Cannabis Control and Regulation Institute (IRCCA) web page, by July 2017, the 
registrations to legally purchase cannabis in pharmacies rapidly climbed up to 6797. 
 
Already in August 2014, the government decided on the location for cannabis cultivation facilities for 
its commercialisation and requested bids from private licensees for production. Thus, 10 hectares 
were assigned to grow cannabis for pharmacy sales, to meet the demand of an estimated 150,000 
users. However, due to disagreements between the former National Drugs Committee authorities and 
the new board regarding the ůŝĐĞŶƐĞĞƐ ? selection protocols, the IRCCA spent 14 months obtaining and 
verifying the financial records of over 20 initial applicants for cannabis private production. In October 
2015, two licences were issued to the International Cannabis Corp (ICC), and Simbiosys  Wboth backed 
by local and foreign investors; one from the UK and the other from Argentina- to initially produce up 
to two tons of cannabis annually, which would represent roughly 2% of the estimated demand. By 
February 2016, that is, more than two years after the ůĂǁ ?Ɛ approval, the cultivation of the two strains 
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selected by the government finally began. Yet, as forecasted by a number of people, the plan of giving 
the exclusivity of cannabis sales to pharmacies proved to be a problematic one. 
 
Firstly, the Uruguayan Chemistry and Pharmacies Union declared to be against the sale of cannabis in 
pharmacies on principle, because pharmacies should be regarded as health centres and cannabis was 
against health. The lack of information from the IRCCA, and fear of robberies and illegal drug trafficking 
retaliations were additional reasons given for the repeated delays. Thus, by March 2017 the research 
available on the topic (Monitor Cannabis, 2016) points to only a small number of pharmacies currently 
on the scheme. These had initially presented their request to incorporate cannabis to their stock, and 
are highly concentrated in the metropolitan area of Montevideo and Canelones, leaving a large part 
of the Uruguayan territory unattended. According to Uruguayan authorities, the retail level cost of 
one gram was fixed at 1.30 dollars, of which 70% goes to producers, 20% to pharmacies, and 10% to 
the IRCCA. Initially, only two different strains, labelled Alpha 1 and Beta 1 strains were available, which 
are sold in a five-gram sealed packet. By using a fingerprint reader, the registered acquirers are 
allowed to buy up to two packets (10 grams) of cannabis per month. Both strains have a THC content of 
just 2 percent, which is tantamount to the THC levels found in the Uruguayan illegal cannabis market 
previous regulation, according to the specialists consulted in my research. Thus, both strains hold 
much lower THC levels than the ones found in the legal recreational cannabis schemas in Colorado 
and Washington US states (NBC news, 23/03/2015) and in the Dutch coffeeshops (Pijlman et al., 2005). 
 
Overall, in terms of process indicators, after ŵŽƌĞ ƚŚĂŶ ƚŚƌĞĞ ǇĞĂƌƐ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ůĂǁ ?Ɛ ĂƉƉƌŽǀĂů ? ƚŚĞ
Uruguayan new framework for recreational use of cannabis is still distant from being fully displayed. 
On one hand, and conversely to the pessimistic expectations of many of the actors involved in the 
political process, the short-term reactions of Uruguayan residents to the registration scheme was of 
relative compliance. From the estimated 11,000 cannabis growers, in a time span of almost three years 
(August 2014  W July 2017) there are currently 6,930 registered domestic growers and 63 cannabis 
clubs, which might collectively amount to 2,835 people. Alongside this, the registrations to legally 
purchase cannabis rapidly raised to 6,797 in a few weeks. These findings appear to support the power 
of cannabis regulation as a market separation tool. On the other hand, although the numbers available 
ŚĂǀĞĐŽŶĨŝƌŵĞĚƚŚĞƌĞůĞǀĂŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŽŶƚŚĞƌĞƚĂŝůŝŶŐŵĂƌŬĞƚƐŚĂƌĞƐǇƐƚĞŵƚŽ
economically compete with illegal cannabis trafficking, it is still highly uncertain when the legal 
production will meet this demand. 
 
 
9.3. Medical cannabis 
 
Even though medical cannabis users were not an interest group involved in the Uruguayan reformers 
coalition as portrayed in this thesis, the new legal framework establishes that it is allowed: 
 “to cultivate cannabis for the elaboration of therapeutic products for medical use. In these cases, 
the planting and growing must be allowed by the Public Health Ministry and will remain subject 
to its control ? ? ?>Ăǁ ? ? ? ? ? ?Art. 5.A) 
 
More specifically, are responsibilities of this Ministry the monitoring and evaluation of the law, the 
approval of medical cannabis research licences, and the acknowledgment of cannabis as a product for 
medical use, through its inclusion as an element of the permitted Uruguayan pharmacopoeia. In this 
way, although Public Health Ministry representatives were not part of the reformers coalition, this 
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Ministry still largely retained their decisive role in the new medical cannabis framework. According to 
my findings, this Ministry became one of the main blockers in the implementation of legal access to 
cannabis for medical purposes. 
 
Thus, if the implementation of the legal system for recreational use of cannabis has been, overall, 
tense and slow, the implementation of a system for its medical use has proved to be an even more 
problematic endeavour. As already introduced at the beginning of this thesis (section 2.2.), doctors, 
psychiatrists and lawyers have historically stood as three pillars of the Uruguayan longstanding 
prohibitionist approach to drugs. In fact, the Uruguayan Society of Psychiatry, together with the 
Uruguayan Society of Youth and Childhood Psychiatry, figured as two of the most notorious voices 
questioning cannabis regulation. Thus, for example, one-ŵŽŶƚŚ ĂĨƚĞƌ ƚŚĞ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ
announcement of their will to regulate cannabis, in July 2012, a press release signed by these 
Associations claimed that: 
 “from the gathered scientific information available, it is clear that from a medical stand point 
ĞǀĞƌǇĂĐƚŝŽŶĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚŝŶŐĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐƵƐĞŝƐǁƌŽŶŐ ? ? ?ƚŚĞƚƌƵƚŚƚŚĂƚƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞƐŚŽǁƐŵƵƐƚ
be the centre of every debate about marijuana ? ?^Wh ?^hW/ ? ? ? ? ? ) ? 
 
According to a high member of the Psychiatry society consulted in an informal talk, the main problem 
for the psychiatrist union was not cannabis regulation in itself, as much as feeling that their policy 
monopoly was being challenged by an outsider interest group; namely, cannabis users: 
 “[Our public declaration] was not necessarily against the regulation. We wanted to make the 
point that cannabis is not an innocuous drug, because many people were talking in too light a 
way about it. Furthermore, I think the most important problem for us was not being consulted 
by the government before making the announcement ?  ?WƐǇĐŚŝĂƚƌŝƐƚ ƵŶŝŽŶ ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ ?
personal communication, July 2012). 
 
Thus, for example, it took more than one year after the approval of the law for the Uruguayan 
Executive Power to agree on a regulatory framework for medical uses (Nº 46/015, February 2015). 
From this moment on, only a limited group of doctors have been involved with this use, mainly based 
around the Uruguayan Society of the Endocannabinoid System. This group of professionals refer to a 
significant increase in the appointments for cannabis medical use, especially from 2014 on. Although 
the actual demand is hard to estimate, it highly exceeds the 62 approved licences reported by the 
Public Health Ministry by May 2017. Furthermore, since this Ministry has not included cannabis in its 
natural state as part of the allowed pharmacopeia, only cannabis-based registered products, which 
are difficult to import and highly expensive, can be legally used in Uruguay. Hence, most of these 
medical users buy the cannabis oil on the Uruguayan black market (Monitor Cannabis, 2017). In fact, 
this institutional blockage was behind the decision of medical users to organise pressure groups, such 
as Batar Foundation, aimed at guaranteeing access to cannabis oil for kids with West syndrome and 
drug-resistant epilepsy, two diseases for which, as reported by their own parents, cannabis has 
consistently shown good results. 
 
Several issues were identified by research participants in order to develop the medical cannabis 
industry further in Uruguay. One relates with the international and regional medico-legal conventions 
and restrictions to the possibility of registering cannabis as a therapeutic product. It has also been 
reported that the procedure for obtaining a licence for medical cannabis research is heavily 
bureaucratic, excessively long and highly demanding. In fact, until this moment, the Public Health 
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Ministry has not approved any of the licences asking permission for clinical investigation of production 
of cannabis for medical purposes. Additionally, cannabis is not a subject currently included in the 
Uruguayan medical training. 
 
Still, one of the most criticised aspects found regarding the entire implementation of both, 
recreational and medical cannabis, is the secrecy with which the Uruguayan government decided to 
undertake this process. Thus, for example, the criteria for the selection of the strains, the private 
production licensees and seed banks, along with the implementation timeline, remained largely 
unknown. Furthermore, key regulatory agencies as the IRCCA and the Specialised Unit in Monitoring 
and Evaluation within the Public Health Ministry have remained generally unaccountable. As cases in 
point, more than three years after the lĂǁ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽǀĂů ?ƚŚĞ/Z ?ƐEĂƚŝŽŶĂůĚǀŝƐŽƌǇŽƵŶĐŝů ?ĂŬĞǇ
institution aimed at supporting and ensuring transparency -composed of members of the Ministries, 
scholars, and representatives of cannabis clubs, growers and sellers- was never called in session. The 
^ƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐĞĚ hŶŝƚ ŝŶ DŽŶŝƚŽƌŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ ǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ǁŚŽ ŵƵƐƚ ĞůĂďŽƌĂƚĞ ĂŶŶƵĂů ƌĞƉŽƌƚƐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ůĂǁ ?Ɛ
progression for the parliament, has only been issued once in three years and it has been kept out of 
ƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ ?ƐƌĞĂĐŚ ?&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ?ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝƐ still needed to meet an estimated demand of 
forty-four tons of cannabis consumed annually by Uruguayan residents. Accordingly, it can be argued 
that the new legal framework has been characterised by a low legal certainty, because it does not 
provide those subject to it with the full ability to regulate their conduct in accordance with the law. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
In this chapter, I have discussed how many of the political difficulties to pass through cannabis reform 
continued after the approval of the law, threatening the legal certainty of Uruguayan citizens and 
creating a climate of uncertainty. I started arguing that compromises of the political process were 
accommodated by a rather vague and open legal formula, which later implied additional policy design 
weaknesses. The new legal framework states as its objectives to reduce drug trafficking-related 
ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ?ƚŽƉƌŽŵŽƚĞĚƌƵŐƐƵƐĞƌƐ ?ŚĞĂůƚŚĂŶĚƚŽĞŶĚŽƌƐĞĂĨĂŝƌĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞůĂǁ ?/ŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽ
achieve these goals, four policy tools were envisioned; to educate and prevent problematic drug use; 
ĚƌƵŐ ƵƐĞƌƐ ? ƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚ ? ƌĞŚĂďŝůŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ƐŽĐŝĂů ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ĂŶĚ ƉŽůŝĐĞ ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ŽǀĞƌ ŝůůĞŐĂů ĚƌƵŐ
markets. However, the new law remains largely unclear about how the different policy tools and 
objectives included are expected to be linked, about the policy governance that defines the relevant 
actors, agencies and institutions responsible for its implementation, and the estimated 
implementation timeframe and correlated budget. Furthermore, although the importance of an 
evidence-based policymaking was largely agreed upon, scepticism prevails about the technical 
ƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨĂĐƚƵĂůůǇĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŶĞǁůĂǁ ?Ɛ objectives. 
 
Furthermore, the government was rather blind regarding how the Uruguayan cannabis market was 
already working and, hence, how to economically compete with it. The estimated demand for 
recreational and medical use, the preferred ways of access (self-cultivation vs. selling), preferences 
between different types of strains, the THC/CBD proportions available and the related prices were all 
unknown variables to Uruguayan authorities. Subsequent studies have generally support for the 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŚǇƉŽƚŚĞƐŝƐƐƚƌĞƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨĂůĞŐĂůƐĞůůŝŶŐƐĐŚĞŵĞƚŽĐŽŵƉĞƚĞǁŝƚŚŝůůĞŐĂů
cannabis trafficking. In Uruguay, most of the cannabis consumed was cheap and of low quality, bought 
by a limited group of frequent users to international trafficking networks. However, between the three 
legal ways of accessing cannabis included in the regulatory framework  Wnamely, domestic cultivation, 
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social cannabis clubs and selling through pharmacies- the implementation of a retailing system has 
proven to be a track full of potholes. Significant progress is still needed to meet an estimated demand 
of forty-four tons of cannabis consumed annually by Uruguayan residents. 
 
If the implementation of legal recreational cannabis has been slow, the implementation of legal 
medical use of cannabis has been even more problematic. This fact was related to the key importance 
of the Public Health Ministry in the new schema and the absence of representatives of this Ministry in 
the reformers coalition that made cannabis regulation possible. One of the main blockers found in this 
regard is the difficulty of including cannabis derivate products, such as cannabis oil, as part of the 
allowed Uruguayan pharmacopeia. Hence, only cannabis based registered products, which are difficult 
to import and highly expensive, can be legally used in Uruguay. In this regard, the new law does not 
represent a significant change in the policy so far, because the import of cannabis registered medicines 
was already legal before regulation. 
 
Overall, it can be argued that the new legal framework has been characterised by a low legal certainty, 
because it does not provide those subject to it with the full ability to regulate their conduct in 
accordance with the law. Largely, the Uruguayan government has operated with a high degree of 
secrecy regarding both process and results indicators, remaining mostly unaccountable. Thus, for 
example, in order to have access to legal cannabis, the law includes a registration scheme, which 
allows Uruguayan residents older than 18 years to choose between three mutually exclusive options: 
domestic cultivation, social cannabis clubs and cannabis buying from pharmacies. Although the law 
commanded the elaboration of the regulatory framework within 90 days, it took almost one year for 
the cannabis domestic ŐƌŽǁĞƌƐ ? and social cannabis ĐůƵďƐ ? registers to open and more than three years 
for cannabis sale in pharmacies to begin. However, the criteria for the selection of the two strains 
initially available to be acquired, the criteria for the selection of the two private production licensees 
and seed banks, along with the implementation timeline, have remained largely unknown. In terms of 
medical use of cannabis, the Public Health Ministry has not approved any of the licences asking 
permission for clinical investigation of production of cannabis for medical purposes. Cannabis remains 
mostly excluded as a subject in the Uruguayan medical training. The numbers available highlight that 
this low legal certainty has, up until this moment, resulted in the consolidation of a grey market, 
composed by cannabis buyers, Uruguayan non-residents and medical users. 
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Chapter 10. Conclusions 
 
Drug markets are one of the largest illegal economies worldwide. Among all drugs, cannabis stands 
out as the illegal drug that attracts most users. In Uruguay, 9.3% of the population declares to have 
used cannabis in the last twelve months, which amounts to 161,000 people, and 6.5% in the last thirty 
days. In comparison, only 1.6% of the Uruguayans declared to have used cocaine in the last twelve 
months and the number is even lower for amphetamine-type stimulants (such as ecstasy), 0.4% in the 
last twelve months. This is not only a local reality. According to the World Health Organization, about 
147 million people, that is, 2.5% of the world population, have consumed cannabis in the last year 
compared with 0.2% who have consumed cocaine and the 0.2% who have consumed opiates. 
Cannabis use accounts for 73% of the total illegal drug use. Half of all drug seizures worldwide are 
cannabis seizures and the geographical spread of those seizures is global, covering practically every 
country of the world. By 2017, cannabis is by far the most widely produced psychoactive drug (WHO, 
2017). 
 
These specificities help to understand why there is a greater policy divergence in the way of controlling 
cannabis than with other psychoactive substances. Moreover, whereas an increasing punitiveness has 
been the norm for other illegal drugs enforcement, regarding cannabis an opposite trend from soft to 
hard defections from this approach has been observed. Within this tendency, the Uruguayan cannabis 
regulation of 2013 constitutes a paradigmatic case because of being the first country in the world in 
legally regulating every aspect of this market at a national level. Hence, the analysis of this policy 
change may enhance our understanding of drug policy-making in two main ways. Firstly, from a critical 
criminology perspective, it represents a unique and infrequent opportunity to study why a behaviour 
ceased to be labelled as a crime by the state. Secondly, from a drug policy analysis perspective, this 
case study is also relevant since the Uruguayan example may inform political leaders contemplating 
whether and how to legally control cannabis. Therefore, insights gained from this atypical policy 
change might be fruitful for global learning, by adding knowledge about different methods and 
contexts of cannabis markets regulation. 
 
Nevertheless, if one takes a closer look into the Uruguayan case, a criminological paradox arises. On 
ŽŶĞ ŚĂŶĚ ? Ă ǁŝĚĞƌ ƚƌĞŶĚ ŽĨ  ‘ƉĞŶĂů ƉŽƉƵůŝƐŵ ? ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚ ŶŽƚŽŶůǇ ĨŽƌ hƌƵŐƵĂǇ ďƵƚ ĂůƐŽ ĨŽƌ
several countries in the region. Authors such as Dammert and Arias (2007), de la Torre and Alvarez 
(2011) and Paternain (2014) have consistently noted a general trend towards increasing penalties at 
the same time as labelling more behaviours as crimes. On the other hand, a number of behaviours, 
usually referred to as victimless crimes, have been liberalised in Uruguay. Victimless crimes are 
behaviours where there is no easy way to define whom is the offender and whom is the victim, 
because there is a mutual agreement between both sides to engage in this act (Braithwaite, 1989; 
Meier & Geis, 1997). Furthermore, as explained by Uruguayan historians, this country had historically 
ďŽƌŶĞĂŶĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ ‘ůŝďĞƌĂů ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽƚŚŝƐƚǇƉĞŽĨďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌƐ ?ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐůǇ ?ŚŽǁĐĂŶǁĞĞǆƉůĂŝŶ
Uruguayan cannabis reform whilst making sense of such a paradox? 
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10.1. Who was involved in the Uruguayan cannabis regulation 
debate: actors and networks 
 
Throughout this thesis, I have argued that four type of actors were of key importance for the approval 
of the new cannabis law. At some point in the process, national civil society representatives, legislative 
power members, executive power members and international civil society representatives 
coordinated actions over time to make cannabis regulation possible. However, I showed as well how 
each of them were particularly important in different stages of the process. 
ĞĨŽƌĞ ƚŚĞ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ŝƌƌƵƉƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĚĞďĂƚĞ ? ŝŶ :ƵŶ  ? ? ? ? ? ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů Đŝǀŝů ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ǁĂƐ ƚŚĞ ŵĂŝŶ
interest group pushing for cannabis reform. Analysing the period from 2004 to 2012 most of the 
cannabis-related events found were organised by a  ‘ŚĂƌĚ ĐŽƌĞ ? of cannabis activist organisations. This 
hard-core activism coordinated actions with harm reduction organisations also involved in the 
Uruguayan reformers coalition but from a satellite position. However, I also introduced the idea that, 
at the beginning, the Uruguayan legalisation endeavour was an orphan, since it started to flourish 
organically and highly disarticulated as a demand. The growth of public demonstrations around 
cannabis indicate a clear pattern of exponential expansion, which presented itself as a surprise even 
to its own organisers. It was surprising that marijuana demonstrations would attract such large crowds 
amongst the Uruguayan youth, transforming into one of the biggest public happenings in the country. 
These mass mobilisation events helped to normalise cannabis use, breaking the former image of its 
users as deviant, sick people in need to be treated, an image that was prevailing towards the end of 
the 1990s. Hence, as expected by Punctuated Equilibrium theory, it was not until mobilisation 
occurred and new participants became interested in the debate, that the agreed-upon images and 
authoritative venues became contested. In this case, cannabis activist was the new type of political 
actor constituƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ?ĂƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƐƚĂƌƚƵƉƐǁŝƚŚĂŶŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐ ‘ĞůĞĐƚŽƌĂůƐŚĂƌĞ ?ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ
expansion of cannabis use among the urban youth, pushed for cannabis personal cultivation to reach 
the legislative agenda. Whereas doctors, lawyers and police forces have historically had the leading 
role in shaping Uruguayan legal frameworks, in December 2013, cannabis activism was of key 
importance in the formulation of the new law. 
 
However, it was not cannabis activism but the Uruguayan executive power who made cannabis 
regulation to break into the macro political agenda. Furthermore, as expected by Punctuated 
ƋƵŝůŝďƌŝƵŵƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?ŝƚĚŝĚŝƚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĂ ‘ĐŚĂŽƚŝĐŵŽŵĞŶƚŽĨƉƵŶĐƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶƚŚĞĚĞďĂƚĞ ?ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞĚ
as communicational turmoil, fuelled by heightened attentiveness of the media and broader publics, 
and disputes over new dimensions of the debate becoming more salient. Hence, the involvement of 
the Executive Power in the debate abruptly changed the political process, allowing the reformers 
ĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ ‘ŚĂƌĚĐŽƌĞ ?to widen its network significantly. More specifically, three new types of actors 
were found: first, within the context of the generational gap of positions towards cannabis, the issue 
ďƌŽŬĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ďŽŽƐƚĞĚďǇǇŽƵƚŚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?groups. Second, organisations 
not based in the capital city of Montevideo joined the hard-core activism, helping to spread support 
towards cannabis regulation throughout the territory. Thirdly, for the first time, other relevant social 
actors not necessarily identified as drug policy reform activists got involved, such as the National 
Workers Union (PIT-CNT), or Ovejas Negras, the most important LGTBI activist group in the country. 
Additionally, the involvement of new international actors and the growth in the number of 
international actors sharing meetings with members of the Uruguayan government is significant; in 
particular, actors involved in the Colorado and Washington (US) cannabis regulation campaigns of 
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October 2012. In this way, transnational drug policy reform networks gained importance as a causal 
contributor, helping to explain why and how cannabis was regulated in Uruguay. They helped to 
change and legitimate the image attached to cannabis reform, to fill in the gaps of knowledge in order 
to develop a suitable legal regulation framework, which actually resulted in an exceptionally 
outreaching political output that included domestic cultivation, Social Cannabis Clubs and a selling 
scheme. 
 
Unlike cannabis personal cultivation, which had been agreed upon by civil society organisations and 
progressive members of a cross party alliance, from the ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ irruption on cannabis regulation 
transformed into a Frente Amplio-supported proposal. Furthermore, the brokerage role of Frente 
Amplio legislative representatives  Was Sebastian Sabini and Julio Bango- and of the National Drugs 
Committee secretary appeared as a necessary condition for erasing coordination costs and keeping 
the constantly arising conflicts within tolerable limits. As argued in this thesis, a minority group within 
the Uruguayan government, working hand with hand with national and international civil society, 
were the ones that managed to push cannabis reform forward. 
 
Although a majority of the population favoured the cannabis policy status quo, the opposition to the 
reform was performed in a highly unarticulated way. Thus, I could not find any trace of coordinated 
activity over time opposing cannabis regulation. The main resistance to cannabis atypical change was 
publicly led by a sector of the conservative Partido Nacional, strongly linked to both the Catholic and 
the Evangelist church and religious therapeutic communities for drug users. Nevertheless, the 
empirical analysis of the political debate showed that it was more conflict-ridden than would be 
expected by policy change theories; there was not only a disagreement between cannabis legalisers 
and prohibitionists. What I found was a strong emotional clash between different actors within the 
Uruguayan debate due to the different motivations to regulate cannabis, and different positions on 
how to do it. 
 
 
10.2. Why was cannabis regulated in Uruguay; policy framing 
 
A first important point rising from my research is the utility of differentiating the problem, the solution 
and the political process in policy change analysis, as Multiple Streams theory suggests (Kingdon, 
1995). In the Uruguayan case, the way the problem of illegal cannabis was framed effectively appeared 
to have significant connotations for the solution building process, being correlated with different 
policy designs options. 
 
More specifically, for Uruguayan civil society, the individual problem of cannabis ƵƐĞƌƐ ? criminalisation 
translated into a public problem as part of a wider victimless crimes reform movement. Thus, the 
ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ‘ŶĞǁƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?ĂŐĞŶĚĂŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞĚƚŚĞŝƐƐƵĞƐŽĨĂďŽƌƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ>'d/ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?ĂŵŽŶŐŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?
strongly appealing to an ethics of autonomy. From this point of view, liberty and care were the two 
binding politics moral foundations. Liberty, because cannabis prohibition is seen as a way of 
oppression, where the old and conservative generations in power impose their lifestyle onto others 
in a hypocritical way. Marihuana legalisation symbolised a rebellion against the  ‘ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚĂďůĞ ĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ ? ?
as a broader stand against a hierarchical and arbitrary public order where, for example, heterosexual 
relationships or drinking alcohol were honourable but homosexual relationships or cannabis use were 
tolerated, at best. Alternatively, care, as the second main political moral foundation underpinning the 
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ƌĞĨŽƌŵĞƌƐ ?ĂĚǀŽĐĂĐǇĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƌĞůĂƚĞƐƚŽƚŚĞŝĚĞĂƚŚĂƚĂƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐŝŶƚĞŐƌŝƚǇƐŚŽƵůĚďĞƉƌŽƚĞĐƚĞĚĂƐĂ
matter of universal human rights. From this point of view cannabis regulation was endorsed as a harm 
reduction tool, aimed at protecting young people. Framed like this, cannabis regulation refers to the 
ǀĂůƵĞŽĨďĞŝŶŐƚƌĞĂƚĞĚĞƋƵĂůůǇĂƐĂĐŝƚŝǌĞŶ ?ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚůǇŽĨŽŶĞ ?ƐĚƌƵŐŽĨ choice. 
 
Conversely, for the Uruguayan government the problem of illegal cannabis was defined from a 
community perspective, related with the systemic violence associated with the illegal trade. Appealing 
to the fairness moral foundation, the main rationality to regulate cannabis for the Uruguayan 
executive power was the disproportionality of the costs that the current international framework 
ĞŶƚĂŝůƐǁŽƌůĚǁŝĚĞ ?dŚƵƐ ?ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚĂƐĂ  ‘ůĞƐƐĞƌŽĨ ƚǁŽĞǀŝůƐ ? ůŽŐŝĐ ?ĂƐĂďǇ- 
product of concerns for cocaine trafficking and production. The other key political moral foundation 
invoked by Uruguayan government was the reclaiming of the ^ƚĂƚĞ ?Ɛ authority against the rebellion of 
the illegal drugs trade. Here, cannabis illegal commerce was defined as an economic phenomenon, 
with repression-oriented policies enhancing the high risk and profitable qualities of the market. 
 
In this way, cannabis regulation was framed as both a demand and a supply-side problem. Moreover, 
these politics moral foundations were causally linked to different emphasis about what the main 
objectives to regulate cannabis should be; either reducing drug related violence or enhancing cannabis 
ƵƐĞƌƐ ? health and rights. Accordingly, in terms of policy design or instrumental aspects level, the main 
public contention was between including a ƐƚĂƚĞ ?Ɛ monopoly for cannabis production, distribution and 
selling  Windispensable for the executive power- and a legalised personal cultivation mechanism  Wthe 
sine qua non condition for the reformerƐ ?ĂĚǀŽĐĂĐǇ coalition. 
 
 
10.3. How was regulated; specifying drug policy change theories 
 
Having discussed the different actors involved and the correlated framings composing the political 
process, my research thesis contributes to the on-going debate about drug policy making in three main 
ways. Firstly, it provides evidence about what interacting structural variables might be relevant to 
understand cannabis policy change more precisely. Secondly, it confirms the importance of the 
concept of advocacy coalitions, offering two ways to improve this framework in future research. 
Thirdly, it aligns with the hypothesis of the  ‘ĐŚĂŽƚŝĐ moment of ƉƵŶĐƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ? leading to atypical change 
and points to the relevance of policy framing to overcome chaos. 
 
Regarding the structural or macro level variables found at play, the analysis of the Uruguayan case 
points to the long lasting importance of religion in drug policy making. Thus, as it was explained in this 
thesis, religious factors were important for the Islamic rooted Egyptian government success in 
introducing cannabis (or  ‘/ŶĚŝĂŶ ,ĞŵƉ ? ) cultivation in the Geneva Second Opium Convention of 1925. 
In this critical conjecture, cannabis was assimilated in the international framework, with heroin and 
cocaine, as highly addictive substances with particularly dangerous properties and hardly any 
therapeutic value, subject to the highest repressive measures. Religious factors have also been 
reported in previous works, as part of the causal configuration that intervened in the instauration of 
tĂƌŽŶƌƵŐƐƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐďǇƚŚĞŚƌŝƐƚŝĂŶƌŽŽƚĞĚh^ĐŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞ ‘ŶĞǁƌŝŐŚƚ ? ?ŽŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƌǇƚŽƚŚŝƐ ?
authors such as Grund and Breeksema (2013) and Engeli et al (2013) have also showed the importance 
of a structural change from a society organized along religious lines to a more secular social order, at 
ƚŚĞďĂƐĞŽĨƚŚĞEĞƚŚĞƌůĂŶĚƐ ?ƐŚŝĨƚƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƐĞĐƵůĂƌŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?Ɛ-which resulted in the 
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instauration of the cannabis coffeeshops, among others victimless crimes reform (Grund and 
Breeksema 2013). 
 
The main conclusion reached exploring the sources of the cannabis problem for the section of civil 
society that started to push for its legalisation and managed to add cannabis cultivation for personal 
ƵƐĞƚŽƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂŐĞŶĚĂ ?ǁĂƐƚŚĂƚhƌƵŐƵĂǇĐĂŶďĞƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚĂƐĂ ‘ƌĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐǁŽƌůĚ ?ĐĂƐĞŽĨŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇ
politics, as suggested by Engeli et al. (2013). Unlike the rest of the Latin American countries, for the 
Uruguayan case specifically, a polarised second demographic transition was correlated with a rapid 
and accelerated secularisation process from the latter half of the 1990s onwards. Thus, I contended 
that this macro social transformation can explain the fact that not only cannabis but a wider victimless 
type of behaviours started being addressed both in the social and political arenas. The data available 
on public opinion in Uruguay further supports this stand, showing that the positions of the Uruguayans 
regarding topics such as abortion regulation, LGTBI rights and cannabis regulation are structurally 
ƐŚĂƉĞĚ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇ ƐƚĂďůĞ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŝŵĞ ? dŚĞƌ ŝƐ Ă ǀĞƌǇ ůŽǁ ůĞǀĞů ŽĨ  ‘ŶŽ ŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ ?
compared to other issues, and whereas in other topics respondents take their time to reflect, in these 
cases the answers are instantaneous. Hence, answers are more often based on pre-established moral 
positions than on rational judgments. Additionally, there is a strong generational gap defining these 
pre-established positions: support for cannabis regulation, abortion regulation and gay marriage is 
strongly associated with being below 40 years of age, having higher education, and living in urban 
areas; the secularised youth. Thus, the accelerated secularisation process was interpreted as a 
secondary trace -a necessary but not sufficient condition- ŽĨĂŐĞŶĞƌĂůǀĂůƵĞƐ ?ĐŚĂŶŐĞĨĂǀŽƵƌŝŶŐĂŶ
ethics of autonomy, widening electoral support for a liberty-based new rights political agenda. 
 
Still, as expected by moral politics literature, the shift towards permissiveness posed more of a puzzle 
than a simple shift. Firstly, the reorganisation of the Uruguayan political parties was considered an 
intermediate variable through which a conflict line between secular and confessional parties was 
present in order to politicize morality issues (Engeli, Green-Pedersen, & Thorup Larsen, 2013). In the 
case of Uruguay, the long-standing bipartisanism was reformulated into a new type of bipartisanism, 
ďĂƐĞĚŽŶƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĂƚŝĐĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶĂĐŽŶĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂů ‘ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ?ďůock (Partido Colorado and 
Nacional )ĂŶĚĂƐĞĐƵůĂƌ ‘ƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞ ?ŽŶĞ ?Frente Amplio). In this context, the election of the Frente 
Amplio with legislative majority -and an overrepresentation of Frente Amplio preferences among the 
ŶĞǁ ƐĞĐƵůĂƌŝƐĞĚ ǀŽƚĞƌƐ ? ŐĞŶĞration-, constituted a political window for advancing secularisation. 
However, I found that it was not until a new type of political actor was constituted, the cannabis 
activist, that personal cultivation managed to reach the legislative agenda. 
 
Additionally, the secularisation process made the opposition to the reform less visible, less articulated, 
and less decisive. Thus, I found that whereas in countries such as Argentina and Brazil the lobby and 
veto power of religious based political elites has been key for effectively hindering victimless crimes 
reforms, in Uruguay, notwithstanding the diffuse rejection of cannabis regulation at the level of public 
opinion, a  ‘ŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞ ? coalition opposing cannabis change never fully formed. Additionally, the lack 
of a conservative coalition enabled politicians to evaluate cannabis regulation as a political decision, 
ƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ĂŐĞŶĚĂ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĂƐĂƉĞƌƐŽŶĂů ?ĨŝƌƐƚƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞĚ choice. 
 
Lastly, at the policy design level, I showed how the laity approach to drugs prevailed and, as with other 
victimless crimes regulations of the period, the Uruguayan new legal framework includes a protagonist 
role for a paternalistic State -especially through the Public Health Ministry-, attempting to achieve a 
ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚĞĚ ‘ŵŝĚĚůĞƌŽĂĚ ?ƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶĨŽƌƐŽĐŝĂů conflicts. 
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For all these reasons, I argue that criminological research should consider addressing more thoroughly 
the role of religion and secularisation in drug policymaking processes, a variable relatively neglected 
in existing literature. 
 
Additionally, the Uruguayan case points to the relevance of contexts of economic growth and 
increasing crime rates for governmentally-led agenda setting in drug policy. The main conclusion 
reached in this regard was that a cultural surprise related with the resilience of the  ‘ƉĂƌĂĚŽǆ of ĐƌŝŵĞ ?
made the political elite shift their attention to the drugs problem. After the regional economic crisis 
of 2002 -one of the most important ones in the history of Uruguay-, a paradoxical correlation could 
be observed between an increasingly prosperous society, better income distribution, and increasing 
violent crime rates. Thus, by 2016, secondary data shows that Uruguay represents a special, 
paradoxical case within the most violent continent in the world, because of the extremely critical 
opinion of Uruguayan citizens regarding poor public safety conditions, held independently of political 
affinities. In this paradoxical context, drug use and commerce become suitable moral enemies for the 
increasing violence in otherwise prosperous societies. However, suitable enemies are not expected to 
be defined in ways that threaten centrally positioned and relatively powerful groups in society, who 
eventually can line up behind and object to the definition of the problem as a problem. Accordingly, 
in the cases of the Netherlands and Uruguay, the market separation between  ‘ŶŽƌŵĂůŝƐĞĚ  ? soft drugs 
and hard drugs became a key motivation for the public endorsement of a cannabis selling legal 
scheme. Therefore, a  ‘ďŝĨƵƌĐĂƚĞĚ ? drug policy approach started to emerge, where cannabis regulation 
could protect ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?Ɛ cohesion as a market separation tool, by pulling apart the  ‘ŐŽŽĚ ? cannabis users 
ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŽĨĨĞƌŝŶŐŽĨ ‘ďĂĚ ?ĚƌƵŐƐĂƐĨƌĞĞďĂƐĞcocaine in the black market. In this context, I argue that 
what should be expected is that cannabis regulation will be achieved, whilst repression towards other 
illegal drugs intensifies. 
 
This research also aligns with previous works regarding the necessity of including an international 
dimension in an explanatory account of national drug policy changes. The main conclusion reached 
around this matter was that the role of international actors became of key importance to overcome 
ƚŚĞ  ‘ĐŚĂŽƚŝĐ ŵŽŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ƉƵŶĐƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ƚŚĂƚ ƉƵƚ ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ŵĂĐƌŽ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ĂŐĞŶĚĂ ? DŽƌĞ
specifically, I found that international policy transfer dynamics were an important causal contributor 
in three aspects of the political process. 
 
Firstly, at the policy design level, govĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂůŶĞƚǁŽƌŬŝŶŐĂŶĚĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐŐƌŽǁĞƌƐ ?ĞůŝƚĞŶĞƚǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ
was found to be of importance for filling in the knowledge gaps so as to develop a suitable legal 
framework, borrowing and complementing different tools from previous regulation designs. Most of 
tŚĞŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌƌĞĚƌĞůĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŵĂŬŝŶŐŽĨĂŶ  ‘ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ?ƐǇƐƚĞŵŽĨƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĂƚ ŝƐ ?Ă
system that incorporates all determinant information about product and price formation. Issues such 
as the six plants limit, the technical and technological know-how for cannabis growing and its control 
-ŝ ?Ğ ?ƚƌĂĐŬŝŶŐƐǇƐƚĞŵ ‘ĨƌŽŵƐĞĞĚƚŽƐĂůĞ ? ?ƐĂĨĞƚǇƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐ ?ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝŶŐƉŽŝŶƚƐĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƚƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚĂƚŝŽŶ
issues, packaging information- ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ ƐŽĐŝĂů ĐůƵďƐ ? ƐĐŚĞŵĞ ? ǁĞƌĞ Ăůů ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ
transferred items. 
 
For this, the accumulated experience around the regulation model transferred set an important 
stimulus for emulation to occur. At the micro level, the existence of agents with mutual affinities 
within the reformers coalition was found to be necessary as an intermediate variable for policy 
transfer to occur. A Human Rights approach to drug policy, a cannabis growing history and culture, 
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ĂŶĚĂƌĞƐƵůƚƐĚƌŝǀĞŶĂĚǀŽĐĂĐǇĂƉƉĞĂůǁĞƌĞƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞƐŚĂƌĞĚĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐƐĨŽƵŶĚŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƐƵitable 
ŵĂƚĐŚĞƐ ?ďĞƚǁĞĞŶŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂŶĚŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂĐƚŽƌƐĞŶŐĂŐĞĚŝŶƚŚŝƐƚǇƉĞŽĨƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ? 
 
Conversely, the significant difference in the legal and political cultures, particularly regarding the role 
of the state, the role of private actors and their relationship, acted as a significant limit to these 
transfer processes. Thus, for example, the US anti-state intervention political tradition favoured a 
relatively complex privatisation schema for legal cannabis. Conversely, the Uruguayan welfare 
tradition resulted in a state centred schema. Moreover, as explained in this thesis, Washington, 
Colorado and the Basque Country local reforms were pushed forward within a national prohibitionist 
context. Therefore, these models were consciously assembled attempting to reduce and delimit, as 
ŵƵĐŚ ĂƐ ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ? ƚŚĞ ^ƚĂƚĞ ?Ɛ ŝŶƚĞƌĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ůŽĐĂů ŵĂƌŬĞƚƐ ? ŽŶǀĞƌƐĞůǇ ? ƚŚĞ hƌƵŐƵĂǇĂŶ
longstanding laity drug policy foundations led to a governmentally regulated model with high 
commerce restrictions. The Uruguayan law, for example, bans any type of cannabis advertisement, 
requires a pre-registration with the State for Uruguayan residents only to have access to the product, 
sets a monthly 40 grams maximum of cannabis to be legally consumed and a 45-maximum number of 
members per social club. 
 
Secondly, in my research, I found that what started as a regulation design emulation dynamic 
bifurcated into a new political campaigning one. In this instance, what was transferred was the know 
how of the Colorado and Washington (US) referendums campaigning technology -that is, the 
application of scientific knowledge to research public opinion for practical political purposes. I found 
that this campaigning technology was based on five strategies: to change the cognitive label attached 
to the solution proposal, moving from marijuana legalisation to cannabis regulation; to highlight the 
most supported aspects of the regulatory design to be endorsed; to test a repertoire of arguments for 
ǁŚǇ ƚŽ ƌĞŐƵůĂƚĞĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ ? ƚŽĚĞĨŝŶĞĂ  ‘ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ƚƌŝĂŶŐůĞ ? ŝŶŽƌĚĞƌ ƚŽ ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞ ƚŚĞĚĞŐƌĞĞŽĨ
framing cohesion, enhancing the three best-valued aspects of cannabis regulation public opinion 
image; to define specific aesthetics and emissaries of the communication campaign. The conclusion 
thus arrived was that a new framing within the Reformers Coalition -Responsible Regulation-, needed 
to be assembled in order to perform this campaigning technology. The final goal of this campaign was 
to highlight the redistributive impact of cannabis regulation by responsibly controlling an already 
existent market. 
 
Thirdly, policy transfer dynamics were important for the legitimation of the reformist aims in the 
ŵĂŝŶůǇ ŚŽƐƚŝůĞ ĂƌĞŶĂ ŽĨ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĚƌƵŐ ƉŽůŝĐǇ ĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ ? dŚƵƐ ? ĨŽƌ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?  ‘ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ǀĞŶƵĞ
shiftŝŶŐ ? ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ ǁĞƌĞ ĂƌƌĂŶŐĞĚ ĨŽƌ ĞůŝƚĞ ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ŽĨ ůŝŬĞ-minded political actors, creating 
alternative exchange platforms about drug policy reform in order to skew the rule of silence of the 
 ‘tĂƌŽŶtŽƌĚƐ ?ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĨŽƌƵŵƐ ? 
 
In this way, through the mechanisms of elite networking and strategic venue shifting, international 
actors and resources were important factors helping to legitimate the image attached to cannabis 
reform and to fill in the gaps of knowledge within the Uruguayan coalition in order to develop a 
suitable legal regulation framework. 
 
More broadly, this research confirms the relevance of the concept of advocacy coalitions to 
understand cannabis policy change. Still, in this thesis, I proposed a theoretical and a methodological 
innovation to this theory, gaining in formalisation at the same time as better accounting for cross- 
cultural variations in drug policy debates. 
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dŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂůůǇ ? ƚŚŝƐ ǁĂƐ ĚŽŶĞ ďǇ ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŶŐ ,ĂŝĚƚ ?Ɛ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ŵŽƌĂů ĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ƚŽ
operationalize more precisely the advocacy ĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ deep core beliefs. Thus, in the Uruguayan case, 
I empirically showed how moral biases affected the framing of cannabis, in such a way that the 
executive power and civil society confluence in regulating cannabis encompassed a remarkably wider 
array of politics moral foundations than each of them would have done on their own. This larger moral 
base appealed not only to the individual users´ autonomy values -such as liberty and care-, but also to 
community values -such as endorsing authority against illegal drug trafficking and fairness regarding 
the disproportionality of the international drug control framework. 
 
Methodologically, I proposed network analysis as a tool to enhance the formalisation of this 
framework. Thus, looking for evidence of coordination over time within the coalition I produced a 
series of network diagrams by tracking down traces of joint participation of political actors in cannabis 
regulation-related activities. This strategy allowed me to analyse further who the actors pushing for 
cannabis regulation were, how they clustered and cohered in a system of relationships, as well as the 
degree of coalition cohesiveness through time. 
 
Lastly, unlike what would be expected by Advocacy Coalitions and Multiple Streams theories, this 
research points to the relevance of chaotic moments of punctuation, as described by Punctuated 
Equilibrium theory, for cannabis to break into the macro political agenda. In this case, the regulated 
sale of cannabis was proposed as part of a wider Life and Coexistence strategy that came as a 
disproportionate response to a high-profile murder. Thus, it was the involvement of actors formerly 
excluded from the drug policy monopoly, as transnational and national activism networks, that 
allowed capitalising upon this emerging opportunity, triggering a process of positive feedback, thus 
making cannabis reform possible. For this, at the micro level, I found that a necessary element was 
the definition of political brokers, easing coordination problems and increasing the degree of framing 
cohesion. 
 
 
10.4. Derivations to the implementation stage 
 
As expected by moral politics literature (Euchner et al 2013), not only it was negotiating and achieving 
compromises atypically difficult ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ hƌƵŐƵĂǇĂŶ ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ? ďƵƚ ĂůƐŽ ĂĨƚĞƌ ƚŚĞ ůĂǁ ?Ɛ
approval the link between the rule and the role of the law has been particularly precarious. First, I 
ŶŽƚĞĚŚŽǁƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚƚĞŶƐŝŽŶƐĂŶĚĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƐƚŚĂƚĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞĚƚŚĞůĂǁ ?ƐĐŽƌƉƵƐŶĞŐŽƚiations were 
resolved by accommodating a rather vague and open legal formula, which later implied additional 
policy design weaknesses affecting its implementation. The new cannabis legal framework has a low 
degree of precision as a guide for policy reform: remains unclear about how the different policy tools 
and objectives included in the law are linked; it does not clearly define the actors, agencies and 
institutions responsible for its implementation, and does not include any estimated timeframe for its 
development. Finally yet importantly, no correlated budget is assigned. 
 
Nevertheless, the Uruguayan model contains a heavily bureaucratic legal formula. To have access to 
legal cannabis, Uruguayan residents older than 18 must choose to register as a domestic grower, a 
social cannabis club member or a cannabis buyer by presenting their ID and a proof of residence at 
post offices located throughout the country. To change from one option to another, a person is obliged 
to wait in between for three months. Domestic growers are required to register each of the seeds 
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cultivated in the Ministry of Livestock Agriculture and Fisheries before starting to grow. The process 
of forming and registering a cannabis social club may take up to one year; first, it needs to be 
registered at the Ministry of Education and Culture and then at the ad hoc Institute for Cannabis 
Regulation and Control (IRCCA). Additionally, the Uruguayan law restricts cannabis clubs to the sole 
purpose of producing cannabis, having a minimum of 15 and a maximum of 45 members. In order to 
sell cannabis, retailers need to incorporate a fingerprint reader to control the ID of the user. The 
process of obtaining cannabis for medical and therapeutic use is even slower and more bureaucratic. 
The data available tends to show that these types of obstacles have resulted in the consolidation of 
an alternative grey market, composed by unregistered cannabis buyers, Uruguayan non-residents and 
medical users. 
 
Another set of implications for the implementation stage derived from the political process regard the 
institutional design and governance of the new cannabis policy. As I have argued in this thesis, a 
minority group within the Uruguayan government, working hand with hand with national and 
international civil society were the ones that managed to push cannabis reform forward, against a 
backdrop of a majoritarian adverse public opinion. Conversely, I found a sustained apathy from some 
key Uruguayan executive power representatives (as Public Health, Education and Culture or Interior 
Ministries) hindering involvement in the reformers coalition, a finding that helps to understand why 
the implementation process of the new law has been, above all, tense, slow and extremely cautious. 
Firstly, there are issues related with the Institute for Cannabis Regulation and Control (IRCCA), 
especially created by the law. The IRCCA is a key institution in the new framework: it has the 
responsibility of regulating the growth, cultivation, harvest, production, acquisition, storage, 
commercialisation, distribution and consumption of cannabis. It is also in charge of promoting harm 
and risk reduction activities related with problematic cannabis consumption. Lastly, it also undertakes 
the important role of monitoring compliance with the law throughout the Uruguayan territory. 
Despite the extreme importance of this institution, the IRCCA does not have a concordant budget and 
many of its members are honorary. Secondly, the Public Health Ministry largely retained their decisive 
role in the institutional governance of cannabis policy. Responsibilities of this Ministry are the 
monitoring and evaluation of the law, the approval of medical cannabis research licences, and the 
acknowledgment of cannabis as a product for medical use. This design is problematic, given that 
doctors, psychiatrists and lawyers have historically conformed as three pillars of the Uruguayan 
longstanding prohibitionist approach to drugs. Furthermore, not only Public Health Ministry 
representatives were not part of the reformers coalition, but also stood as one of the main blockers 
to the implementation of legal access to cannabis for medical and therapeutic purposes. 
 
Hence, one of the most criticised aspects found regarding the entire implementation of both, 
recreational and medical cannabis, is the secrecy with which the Uruguayan government decided to 
undertake this process. Thus, for example, the criteria for the selection of the strains, the private 
production licensees and seed banks, along with the implementation timeline, remained largely 
unknown. Furthermore, key regulatory agencies as the IRCCA and the Specialised Unit in Monitoring 
and Evaluation within the Public Health Ministry have remained generally unaccountable. As cases in 
point, more thaŶƚŚƌĞĞǇĞĂƌƐĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞůĂǁ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽǀĂů ?ƚŚĞ/Z ?ƐEĂƚŝŽŶĂůĚǀŝƐŽƌǇŽƵŶĐŝů ?ĂŬĞǇ
institution aimed at supporting and ensuring transparency -composed of members of the Ministries, 
scholars, and representatives of cannabis clubs, growers and sellers- was never called in session. The 
^ƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐĞĚ hŶŝƚ ŝŶ DŽŶŝƚŽƌŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ ǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ǁŚŽ ŵƵƐƚ ĞůĂďŽƌĂƚĞ ĂŶŶƵĂů ƌĞƉŽƌƚƐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ůĂǁ ?Ɛ
progression for the parliament, has only been issued once in three years and it has been kept out of 
ƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ ?ƐƌĞĂĐŚ ?&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ, significant progress is still needed to meet an estimated demand of 
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forty-four tons of cannabis consumed annually by Uruguayan residents. Accordingly, it can be argued 
that the new legal framework has been characterised by a low legal certainty, because it does not 
provide those subject to it with the full ability to regulate their conduct in accordance with the law. 
 
Lastly, the Uruguayan cannabis regulation political process exposed how blind the Uruguayan 
government was regarding illegal drugs markets functioning, hence, how to economically compete 
with them. The preferred ways of access, the different types of cannabis strains, THC/CBD proportions 
available and the related prices were all unknown variables to Uruguayan authorities. This lack of data 
was translated in difficulties in move from a  ‘ƉƌŽŚŝďŝƚŝŽŶŝƐƚ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ? that relies almost exclusively on 
use, prosecutions and seizure rates as the cornerstones for drug policy evaluation, to a  ‘ŚĂƌŵ and risk 
ĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ? ?ĂŝŵŝŶŐ at grasping and ordering different types of cannabis use and supply. 
The numbers available tend to support the power of cannabis regulation as a market separation tool, 
if fully displayed. However, evaluating the impact of this policy on violence and health in the short, 
middle and long term remain technically difficult to be achieved. 
 
 
10.5. Recommendations and future research agenda 
 
The analysis of the Uruguayan case points to certain derivations for how to improve the way in which 
cannabis policymaking is made. As it was discussed in the thesis, drug policy cannot be understood as 
a merely rational debate, where evidence is weighted and evaluated and political outputs depend on 
the information available. Conversely, it is an arena dominated by value biases and emotions. People 
make judgments spontaneously and without much information. Yet, everybody has an opinion. 
Nevertheless, there are always cracks in public opinion for political entrepreneurs to exploit. Thus, a 
strategic political framing appears as a key factor to change the image attached to different policy 
options. This strategic framing implied discipline, simplicity and order in the messages, enhancing the 
degree of cohesiveness in the rationale to regulate cannabis. Additionally, this strategic framing 
involved verbal and non-verbal cognitive elements. It concerned decisions about a series of messages 
and delivery tactics including: why regulating cannabis, how to do it, aesthetics attached, emissaries 
and metaphorical associations. One example of the former was the rhetorical shift from marijuana 
legalisation to cannabis regulation, because marijuana legalisation was cognitively attached to the 
freedom of using cannabis, whereas cannabis regulation triggered associations regarding control and 
order. 
 
Furthermore, culture is always a matter of conflict. As the Uruguayan debate shows, emotional clashes 
arise not only between those endorsing cannabis legalisation and those supporting the prohibitionist 
status quo, but also because of the presence of different reasons motivating cannabis regulation 
efforts and different positions on how to do it. As I contended in the thesis, Harm Reduction as a 
political movement is restricted to the moral domain of the Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich 
and Democratic (or WEIRD) people, strongly appealing to freedom and care for drug users. Hence, it 
will fall short of consolidating as an alternative to the War on Drugs politics and its appeal to values 
such as loyalty, authority and reciprocity. Furthermore, in this thesis, I have argued that the moral 
conflict dynamics found between a WEIRD civil society and a government worried about widening the 
moral discourse to include not only the individual autonomy perspective, but also community values 
such as authority or reciprocity, is an important point to address crime policy change more generally. 
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Critical criminology can make a significant contribution to public debates by studying how different 
moral foundations are strategically linked to justice decisions. 
 
In this way, different actors are expected to define the problem of illegal cannabis in different ways, 
and will have different power of imposing those definitions onto others. In this case, for example, it 
was the governmental supply side definition of the problem that installed the cannabis debate into 
the macro political agenda. Hence, political debates should aim to ´divide and conquer´; identifying 
different audiences and addressing them in a customised fashion. Morality bind and blinds; moral 
diversity within a coalition is not costless, but it can be workable. In this regard, in the Uruguayan case 
the definition of legislative and governmental entrepreneurs and civil society brokers was essential 
for increasing the degree of framing cohesion and erasing coordination costs, keeping the constant 
conflicts between different interest groups within tolerable limits. Thus, for example, gathering 
different actors pushing for cannabis regulation around the same table allowed the resolution of policy 
design clashes before, rather than after, the parliamentary process, focusing demand-side lobbying 
and mobilisation efforts more efficiently behind a single proposal. 
 
Therefore, in terms of future research agenda, three main programmes should be developed to 
enhance our understanding of the Uruguayan case in particular and of cannabis policymaking in 
general. The first involves the monitoring of the implementation of the law. A matrix of process 
indicators needs to be defined regarding the different ways of accessing cannabis (namely, domestic 
cultivation, social cannabis clubs, and pharmacies sales) for recreational and medical purposes. Thus, 
for example, it is important to evaluate the evolution of the number of people registered under each 
of the three legal ways of accessing cannabis, number and distribution of registering and retailing 
points, the quality and THC/CBD proportions of the strains available, estimated quantity available and 
price, and public revenue through taxes, among others. Complementary to this, qualitative research 
will aid in identifying sources of progress and blockages for the full implementation of the law, 
affecting the integrity of the policy. Low policy integrity may be caused by factors such as weak 
program structure, lack of knowledge and insufficient training of the actors involved, organisational 
ďĂƌƌŝĞƌƐ ĂŶĚ ƐƚĂĨĨ ƌĞƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ůĂǁ ?Ɛ ĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ĐŚĂŶŐĞƐ ĚƵĞ ƚŽ Ă ŶĞǁ
administration in power, low communication of decision making rules, and weak control mechanisms 
for public actors. Lastly, what cannabis regulation means for its users should also be explored; how it 
may change consumption practices, beliefs and desires around cannabis, affecting the affiliation to 
the law. Given the highly controversial context of approval, and the large number of people involved 
in its implementation, serious threats to cannabis policy integrity should be expected overall. 
 
^ĞĐŽŶĚůǇ ?ƚŚĞĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ƚŚĞ ůĂǁ ?ƐŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐƐŚŽƵůĚďĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞĚĂƐǁĞůů ?dŚĞŶew law 19172 
defines as its three objectives: to reduce drug trafficking related violence, contributing to a better 
ƐŽĐŝĂůĐŽĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ ?ƚŽƉƌŽŵŽƚĞĚƌƵŐƐƵƐĞƌƐ ?ŚĞĂůƚŚ ?ƚŽĞŶĚŽƌƐĞĂĨĂŝƌůĂǁ ?ƐĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ĂŝŵŝŶŐĂƚĂ
more adequate proportionality between offense and punishment. As was discussed in this thesis, to 
ĚŝƐĞŶƚĂŶŐůĞƚŚĞŝŵƉĂĐƚŽĨƚŚĞůĂǁ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽǀĂůĨƌŽŵƚŚŽƐĞŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐƌĞŵĂŝŶƐĂƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůůǇĐŚĂůůĞŶŐŝŶŐ
task. A first issue would be to improve the way the output of interest is defined  Wdrug trafficking 
ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ?ĚƌƵŐƵƐĞƌƐ ?ŚĞĂůƚŚĂŶĚůĞŐĂůƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ- in a way that is relevant to this policy. Because 
of practical difficulties for data collection and the type of information available in secondary sources, 
previous research has largely relied on variables such as homicides and overdoses to evaluate different 
drug policy regimes, a framework with low internal validity regarding cannabis. The data available in 
Uruguay shows that through the previous prohibitionist framework, most of the frequent users had 
access to compressed cannabis bought from international trafficking networks, and only a minority 
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produced cannabis locally. Additionally, another type of illegal drug was usually offered when buying 
cannabis, particularly, cocaine and free base cocaine, which points to the relevance of cannabis 
ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ĨŽƌ ĚƌƵŐ ŵĂƌŬĞƚƐ ? ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? dŚƵƐ ? ĨŽƌ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? ƚŽ ĞǀĂůƵĂƚĞ ƚŚĞ ŝŵƉĂĐƚ ŽĨ ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐ
regulation on drug trafficking violence, variables such as the evolution of assaults and robberies in the 
illegal drug market hot spots, as well as in the legal cannabis retailing points can be considered. The 
price of other illegal drugs sold in the Uruguayan market can provide an important insight to consider 
the interactions between cannabis and other illegal drugs trafficking networks. The evaluation of 
ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĞƵƐĞƌƐ ?ŚĞĂůƚŚŵĂǇďĞĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞĚďǇĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŝŶŐĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶƐƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĞ
proportion of problematic users, the amount of negative side effects crisis, medical uƐĞƌƐ ? ŚĞĂůƚŚ
improvements, traffic and labour accidents related with being under the influence of cannabis. Lastly, 
to address the impact of cannabis regulation on legal proportionality would involve researching the 
ũƵĚŝĐŝĂůƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐďĞŚŝŶĚƚŚĞůĂǁ ?ƐĞŶĨŽrcement. In this regard, it is important to note that the new 
cannabis framework establishes a purchase limit of forty grams per month and six plants for domestic 
cultivation; however, it also states that even in the cases where these limits are surpassed, it is the 
ũƵĚŐĞ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚƚŚĞĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŽĨĂĐƌŝŵĞŝŶĂĐĐŽƌĚĂŶĐĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŐĂƚŚĞƌĞĚ evidence. 
 
Thirdly, the Uruguayan case should be researched from a comparative perspective in order to explore 
further the causes and consequences of different cannabis regimes. The advent of different policy 
models in a wider range of national settings will aid in the development of macro-level theories 
identifying particular social conditions that can explain cannabis policy divergence over place and 
time. Thus, the different causal configurations behind cannabis policy change must be explored, aiding 
to disentangle the role of converging local, national and international factors in the explanation of this 
legal change. Complementary to this, comparative research can inform global policy learning, 
considering information about advantages and disadvantages of different types of policy designs 
endorsed. Thus, the information about whether to legally regulate cannabis or not can be 
complemented with information about what type of design should be selected, in what context. What 
ĂƌĞƚŚĞĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞƐĂŶĚĚŝƐĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞƐŽĨ ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐĂĐŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐǇƐƚĞŵĐŽŵƉĂƌĞĚƚŽƵƐĞƌ ?Ɛ
side approaches relying on domestic cultivation and social cannabis clubs? What are the derivations 
of including a registration schema only for national residents? And what impact might different roles 
of the state and private actors have for the development of the cannabis market in different national 
ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚƐ ? ŝ ?Ğ ? ƚŚĞ  “ůŝďĞƌĂů ? ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶof US states, the state-centred Uruguayan experience, or the 
Dutch coffeeshops systematic application of discretion? Thus, Uruguayan cannabis regulation can be 
productively exploited for global learning by enhancing the accountability of drug control policies. As 
the serious knowledge gaps faced throughout the Uruguayan political process exposed, we are only 
just getting to grips with how cannabis markets in particular and illegal drug markets in general work 
and, more importantly, how to intervene in them. As also noted by international researchers, the data 
available is scarce, disaggregated and very hardly comparable. Thus, the controversy around different 
cannabis models might open a political window to endorse drug policy evaluation globally. 
149  
Bibliography 
Aboal, D., Campanella, J., & Lanzilotta, B. (2012). Costos del crimen en Uruguay. Montevideo: Centro 
de Investigaciones Económicas - Uruguay. 
Adams, J. (1998). The Wrongs of Reciprocity. Fieldwork among Chilean Working-Class Women. 
Journal of Contemporary Ethnography , 219-241. 
Alvariza, R., & Cruz, J. (2014). Secularizacion, laicismo y reformas liberales en Uruguay. Revista de 
Estudios Juridicos, n14: 1 - 16. 
Alvesalo-Kuusi, A., & Whyte, D. (2018). Researching the Powerful: A Call for the Reconstruction of 
Research Ethics. Sociological Research Online, 23(1):136  W152. 
Amenta, E. (2009). Making the most of a Historical Case Study: Configuration, Sequence, Casing, and 
the US Old-age Pension Movement. In D. S. Byrne, The SAGE Handbook of Case Methods. Los 
Angeles: SAGE. 
Andreas, P., & Nadelman, E. (2006). Policing the Globe: Criminalization and Crime Control in 
International Relations. USA: Oxford University Press. 
Andreas, P., & Wallman, J. (2009). Illicit markets and violence: what is the relationship? Crime Law 
Soc Change , 225 W229. 
Ashton, H. (2001). Pharmacology and effects of cannabis: a brief review. British Journal of Psychiatry, 
101-106. 
Astorga, L., & Shirk, D. (2010). Drug Trafficking Organizations and Counter-Drug Strategies in the 
U.S.-Mexican Context. Evolving Democracy. 
Axinn, W., Pearce, L., & Ghimire, D. (1999). Innovations in Life History Calendar Applications. Social 
Science Research , 243 W264. 
Bagley, B. (2012). Drug trafficking and organized crime in the Americas: Major trends in the Twenty- 
First century. Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Center. 
Baratta, A. (1986). Criminología crítica y crítica del derecho penal: Introducción a la sociología 
jurídico-penal. Siglo xxi. 
Bardazano, G. (2012). Sobre la justificación de las decisiones judiciales relativas a la interpretación 
del artículo 31 de Decreto Ley 14.294 en su redacción dada por la Ley 17.016: se presume 
culpable. In Varios, Aporte Universitario al Debate Nacional sobre Drogas. Montevideo: 
Fundación de Cultura Universitaria. 
Bardazano, G. (2014). Respuestas estatales a los usuarios de sustancias psicoactivas en Uruguay: 
entre la alternativa y la profundizacion de la guerra contra las drogas. In C. /. WOLA, En 
busca de los derechos: Usuarios de drogas y las respuestas estatales en América Latina. 
Mexico: Drogas y Derecho. 
Barran, J. P. (1995). Medicina y sociedad en el Uruguay del Novecientos. Montevideo: Banda 
Oriental. 
Barriuso. (2011). Los clubes sociales de cannabis en España. Una alternativa normalizadora en 
marcha. Serie reforma legislativa en materia de drogas. 
150  
Baumgartner, F., & Jones, B. (1993). Agendas and instability in American politics. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 
Becker, H. (1963). Outsiders. Studies in the Sociology of Deviance. London: Free Press. 
Beittel, J. (2012). DĞǆŝĐŽ ?ƐƌƵŐdƌĂĨĨŝĐŬŝŶŐKƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐ P^ŽƵƌĐĞĂŶĚ^ĐŽƉĞŽĨƚŚĞZŝƐŝŶŐsŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ? 
Washington: Congressional Research Service. 
Benard, A. (2007). The Material Roots of Rastafarian Marijuana Symbolism. History and 
Anthropology, 89-99. 
Bennett, W. (1989). Restoring authority. New Perspectives Quarterly. 
Benson, B., Leburn, I., & Rasmussen, D. (2001). The impact of drug enforcement on crime: an 
investigation of the opportunity cost of police resources. Journal of Drug Issues, 989-1006. 
Bewley-Taylor, D. (2003). Challenging the UN drug control conventions: problems and possibilities. 
International Journal of Drug Policy, 171-179. 
Bewley-Taylor, D., Blickman, T., & Jelsma, M. (2014). Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition. 
Amsterdam/Swansea: Transnational Institute and Global Drug Policy Observatory. 
Blatter, J., & Blume, T. (2008). In Search of Co-variance, Causal Mechanisms or Congruence? Towards 
a Plural Understanding of Case Studies. Swiss Political Science Review, 315 W56. 
Blickman, T. (2014). Cannabis policy reform in Europe. Bottom up rather than top down. 
Transnational Institute: Series on Legislative Reform of Drug Policies, 28. 
Boekhout van Solinge, T. (1999). Dutch drug policy in a European context. Journal of Drug Issues, 29 
(3): 511-528. 
Borgatti, S., Everett, M., & Johnson, J. (2013). Analyzing Social Networks. London: SAGE. 
Bowen, G. A. (2009). Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method. Qualitative Research 
Journal, 27 - 40. 
Braithwaite, J. (1989). Crime, Shame and Reintegration. Cambridge University Press. 
Brohl, B., Pabon, D., & Sederberg, C. (2013). Washington cannabis regulatory framework. In 
Implementando la marihuna legal, desafíos y opciones para su regulación. Denver: Oficina 
en Washington para Asuntos Latinoamericanos (WOLA) and Drug Policy Alliance (DPA). 
Retrieved from Oficina en Washington para Asuntos Latinoamericanos (WOLA) and Drug 
Policy Alliance (DPA). 
Brownstein, H., & Taylor, B. (2007). Measuring the stability of illicit drug markets: Why does it 
matter? Drug and Alcohol Dependence , S52 WS60. 
Brownstein, H., Crimmins, S., & Spunt, B. (2000). A conceptual framework for operationalizing the 
relationship between violence and drug market stability. Contemporary Drug Problems, 867- 
890. 
Buxton, J., Haden, M., & Mathias, R. (2008). The Control and Regulation of Currently Illegal Drugs. In 
K. Heggenhougen, & S. Quah, International Encyclopedia of Public Health (pp. vol. 2:7-16). 
San Diego: Academic Press. 
151  
Byrne, D. (2009). Case-based methods: Why we need them; what they are; how to do them. In D. 
Byrne, & C. Ragin, The SAGE handbook of case-based methods (pp. 1-13). Los Angeles: SAGE. 
Caetano, G. (2013). Laicidad, ciudadanía y política en el Uruguay contemporáneo: matrices y 
revisiones de una cultura laicista. Cultura y Religion, 7(1). 
Campbell, H. (2005). Drug trafficking stories: Everyday forms of Narco-folklore on the U.S. WMexico 
border. International Journal of Drug Policy, 326 W333. 
Cao, L., & Zhao, Z. R. (2012). The impact of culture on acceptance of soft drugs across Europe. 
Journal of Criminal Justice, 296-305. 
Capoccia, G., & Kelemen, D. (2007). The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and 
Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism. World Politics, 341-369. 
Carstairs, C. (2005). The stages of the international drug control system. Drug and Alcohol Review, 
57-65. 
CEPAL. (2012). Informe anual 2012. Santiago de Chile: Naciones Unidas. 
Chatwin, C. (2016). Mixed Messages from Europe on Drug Policy Reform: The Cases of Sweden and 
the Netherlands. Journal of Drug Policy Analysis. 
ŚĂƚǁŝŶ ? ? ? ?WŽƚƚĞƌ ?' ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ůƵƌƌĞĚŽƵŶĚĂƌŝĞƐ PdŚĞƌƚ ĨŝĐŝĂůŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘ ‘hƐĞ ? ?ĂŶĚ
 ‘ ‘^ƵƉƉůǇ ? ?ŝŶƚŚĞh ?< ?ĂŶŶĂďŝƐDĂƌŬĞƚ ?Contemporary Drug Problems, 536-550. 
Christie, N. (1986). Suitable Enemies. In H. &. Bianchi, Abolitionism. Amsterdam: Free University 
Press. 
ůĂƌŬ ?d ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ‘tĞ ?ƌĞKǀĞƌ-ZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞĚ,ĞƌĞ ? ?ǆƉůŽƌŝŶŐĐĐŽƵŶƚƐŽĨZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ&ĂƚŝŐƵĞǁŝƚŚŝŶ
Qualitative Research Engagements. Sociology, 953 W970. 
Cohen, P. (1994). The case of the two Dutch drug policy commissions. An exercise in harm reduction 
1968-1976. 5th International Conference on the Reduction of Drug related Harm. Toronto: 
Universiteit van Amsterdam. 
Cohen, P., & Sas, A. (1997). Cannabis use, a stepping stone to other drugs? The case of Amsterdam. 
In L. Böllinger, Cannabis Science. From Prohibition to Human Rights (pp. 49-82). Frankfurt am 
Main: Peter Lang Eurpaïscher Verlag der Wissenschaften. 
Cohen, S. (1972). Moral Panics and Folk Devils: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers. London: 
MacGibbon and Kee. 
Collier, D. (2011). Understanding Process Tracing. Political Science and Politics, 823-30. 
Costa, C., & De Rauwe, P. (2008). Modelling disorganized crime: the cannabis market. Bulletin on 
Narcotics, 79-100. 
Crick, E., Cooke, M., & Bewley-Taylor, D. (2014). Selling cannabis regulation: Learning From Ballot 
Initiatives in the United States in 2012. Retrieved from Policy Brief 6, November. Global Drug 
Policy Observatory, Swansea University Abertawe: 
http://www.swansea.ac.uk/media/Selling%20Cannabis%20Regulation.pdf 
Da Costa, N. (2011). El fenómeno de la laicidad como elemento identitario. El caso Uruguayo. Civitas- 
Revista de Ciencias Sociales, 207-220. 
152  
De Armas, G. (2009). Debilitamiento del efecto demofráfico y consolidación de un nuevo sistema de 
partidos: evidencia de las elecciones 2009 en Uruguay. Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Política, 
v.18 - n.1. 
De Kort, M. (1994). The Dutch Cannabis Debate, 1968 W1976. Journal of Drug Issues, 417-427. 
De Simone, M. (2014). Crimen Organizado en Argentina. Una mirada con perspectiva democrática y 
desde los derechos humanos. Buenos Aires: Asociacion Civil por la Igualdad y la Justicia - La 
otra trama. 
Decorte, T. (2010). The case for small-scale domestic cannabis cultivation. International Journal of 
Drug Policy, 271 W275. 
Decorte, T. (2015). Cannabis Social Clubs? (CSCs) in Belgium: Organizational strengths and 
weaknesses, and threats to the model. International Journal of Drug Policy, 26(1): 122-130. 
Decorte, T., Pardal, M., Queirolo, R., Boidi, M. F., Sánchez Avilés, C., & Parés, O. (2017). Regulating 
Cannabis Social Clubs: A comparative analysis of legal and self-regulatory practices in Spain, 
Belgium and Uruguay. International Journal of Drug Policy, 44-56. 
Del Olmo, R. (1989). Drogas: distorsiones y realidades. Nueva Sociedad, 81-93. 
Derghougassian, K. (2009). El Crimen Organizado en el Cono Sur Un Mapeo de las Transacciones 
Ilícitas en Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay y Chile. Bogotá: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. 
Desmond Arias, E. (2006). Trouble en Route: Drug Trafficking and Clientelism in Rio de Janeiro 
Shantytowns. Qualitative Sociology, 427 W445. 
Dolowitz, D., & Marsh, D. (2000). Learning from Abroad: the Role of Policy Transfer in Contemporary 
Policy-Making. Governance: An International Journal of Policy Administration, 13(1), 5-24. 
Dorn, N. (1992). Clarifying policy options on drug trafficking: Harm minimization is distinct from 
ůĞŐĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ?/ŶZ ?E ?W ?K ?,ĂƌĞ ?The Reduction of Drug-Related Harm. London: Routledge. 
Durán-Martínez, A. (2015). From acquiescence to rebellion? South America and the Global Drug 
Control Regime. In A. Idler, & J. C. Garzón, The International Drug Control Regime in the 
Twenty-first Century. Lynne Rienner Press. 
Edberg, M. (2001). Drug Traffickers as Social Bandits. Culture and Drug Trafficking in Northern 
Mexico and the Border Region. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 259 - 277 . 
Eisner, M. (2015). How to reduce homicides by 50% in the next 30 years. Rio de Janeiro: Igarapé 
Institute. 
EMCDD. (2017). European Drug Report. Trends and Developments. Lisbon: European Monitor Centre 
for Drugs and Drug Addiction. 
EMCDDA. (2016). European Drug Report. Lisbon: European Monitor Centre for Drugs and Drug 
Addiction. 
ENCOD. (2013). What is a Cannabis Social Club? Set of principles derived from the Encod General 
Assembly in Bermeo, Spain, from 21 to 23 June. Retrieved from http://www.cannabis-social- 
clubs.org/what_is_a_Cannabis-Social-Club 
153  
Engeli, I., Green-Pedersen, C., & Thorup Larsen, L. (2013). The puzzle of permissiveness: 
understanding policy processes concerning morality issues. Journal of European Public 
Policy, 20:3. 
Escohotado, A. (1983). Historia General de las Drogas. Madrid: Alianza. 
Escohotado, A. (2005). Aprendiendo de las drogas. Madrid: Anagrama. 
Euchner, E., Heichel, S., Nebel, K., & Raschzok, A. (2013). &ƌŽŵ ‘ŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇ ?ƉŽůŝĐǇƚŽ ‘ŶŽƌŵĂů ?ƉŽůŝĐǇ P
framing of drug consumption and gambling in Germany and the Netherlands and their 
regulatory consequences. Journal of European Public Policy, 20(3):372-3. 
Factum. (2014). Principales problemas del pais. Montevideo: Factum. 
Fajnzylber, P., Lederman, D., & Loayza, N. (2002). What causes violent crime? European Economic 
Review, 1323-1357. 
Felbab-Brown, V., & Trinkunas, H. (2016). UNGASS 2016 in Comparative Perspective: Improving the 
Prospects for Success. Washington: Foreign Policy at Brooking Institution. 
FESUR. (2015). Evaluación y monitoreo de la regulación del mercado de cannabis en Uruguay : una 
propuesta conceptual y metodológica. Retrieved from FESUR: http://library.fes.de/pdf- 
files/bueros/uruguay/11600.pdf 
FESUR. (2015). Modulo sobre Cannabis en la ENCDH. Montevideo: FESUR. 
Freeman, T., van der Pol, P., Kuijpers, W., Wisselink, J., Das, R., Rigter, S., . . . Lynskey, M. (2018). 
Changes in cannabis potency and first-time admissions to drug treatment: A 16-year study in 
the Netherlands. Psychological Medicine, 1-7. 
Galain, P. (2014). Reglamentar o prohibir? Cuestiones abiertas ante la regulacion juridica del 
cannabis en Uruguay. Revista Penal . 
Gallup. (21/10/2015). In U.S., 58% Back Legal Marijuana Use. Retrieved from 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/186260/back-legal-marijuana.aspx 
Garat, G. (2012). Marihuana y otras yerbas. Prohibición, regulación y uso de drogas en Uruguay. 
Montevideo: Debate. 
Garat, G. (2013). Un siglo de políticas de drogas en Uruguay. Montevideo: FES. 
Garat, G. (2016). Paraguay: la tierra escondida. Examen al mayor productor de cannabis de América 
del Sur. Montevideo: FESUR. 
Garcé, A. (2010). Uruguay 2009: From Tabaré Vázquez to José Mujica. Revista de Ciencia Política, 
v.30 n.2. 
Garland, D. (2001). The culture of control: crime and social order in contemporary society. Oxford: 
O.U.P. 
Garza, R., & Simmons, R. (2013). Washington regulatory framework. In Implementando la marihuna 
legal, desafíos y opciones para su regulación. Denver: Oficina en Washington para Asuntos 
Latinoamericanos (WOLA) and Drug Policy Alliance (DPA). 
Garzón-Vergara, J. (2008). Mafia & Co. Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars. 
154  
Garzón-Vergara, J. (2016). ¿Cuál es la relación del crimen organizado y el homicidio en América 
Latina? Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Igarapé. 
Gatto, H. (2004). El cielo por asalto: el Movimiento de Liberación nacional (Tupamaros) y la izquierda 
uruguaya (1963-1972) . Montevideo: Taurus. 
Gaviria, A. (2000). Increasing returns and the evolution of violent crime: the case of Colombia. 
Journal of Development Economics, 1 W25. 
Goertz, G., & Mahoney, J. (2009). Scope in Case Study Research. In D. S. Byrne, The SAGE Handbook 
of Case-Based Methods. Los Angeles: SAGE. 
Goode, E., & Ben-Yehuda, N. (1994). Moral Panics: Culture, Politics, and Social Construction. Annual 
Review of Sociology, 149-171. 
Green, B., Kavanagh, D., & Young, R. (2003). Being stoned: a review of self-reported cannabis effects. 
Drug and Alcohol Review, 453 W460. 
Grund, J.-P., & Breeksema, J. (2013). Coffee Shops and Compromise. Separated Illicit Drug Markets in 
the Netherlands. New York: Open Society Foundations. 
Guerra-Doce, E. (2015). The Origins of Inebriation: Archaeological Evidence of the Consumption of 
Fermented Beverages and Drugs in Prehistoric Eurasia. Journal of Archaeological Method 
and Theory, 751 W782. 
Haidt, J. (2012). The Righteous Mind. Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion. New 
York: Vintage Books. 
Harding, S. (1992). After the Neutrality Ideal: Science, Politics, and "Strong Objectivity". Social 
Research, 567-587. 
Harrison, J., MacGibbon, L., & Morton, M. (2001). Regimes of Trustworthiness in Qualitative 
Research: The Rigors of Reciprocity. Qualitative Inquiry, 323-345. 
Hathaway, A. (2001). Shortcomings of harm reduction: toward a morally invested drug reform 
strategy. International Journal of Drug Policy, 125-137. 
Hathaway, A. (2003). Cannabis effects and dependency concerns in long-term frequent users: a 
missing piece of the public health puzzle. Addiction Research & Theory, 11(6). 
Hawdon, J. (2001). The role of presidential rhetoric in the creation of a moral panic: Reagan, Bush, 
and the War on Drugs. Deviant Behavior, 419-445. 
Hill, M. (2009). The Public Policy Process. London: Pearson Education Limited. 
Hughes, C. (2007). Overcoming Obstacles to Reform: Making and Shaping Drug Policy in 
Contemporary Portugal and Australia. PhD thesis. 
Hughes, C., & Stevens, A. (2010). A resounding success or a disastrous failure: Re-examining the 
interpretation of evidence on the Portuguese decriminalisation of illicit drugs. Drug and 
Alcohol Review, (31):101-113. 
Hulsman, L. (1986). Critical criminology and the concept of crime. Contemporary Crises, 63-80. 
Hunt, N., & Stevens, A. (2004). Whose Harm? Harm Reduction and the Shift to Coercion in UK Drug 
Policy. Social Policy and Society, 333-342. 
155  
ICPS. (2016). World Prison Population List. London: International Centre for Prison Studies. 
Infobae. (17/05/2012). Crimen brutal indigna a Uruguay. pp. 
http://www.infobae.com/2012/05/17/1050367-crimen-brutal-indigna-uruguay. 
Jacobsson, G. (2015). Motion-emotion metaphors in English, Swedish and Spanish: A cross-linguistic 
comparison. Lund: Lund University - Centre for Languages and Literature. 
Jelsma, M. (2015). Brookings. Retrieved from 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/04/global-drug- 
policy/felbabbrown-trinkunasungass-2016-final-2.pdf 
John, B., & Taylor, M. (2009). Evade, Corrupt, or Confront? Organized Crime and the State in Brazil 
and Mexico. Journal of Politics in Latin America, 3-29. 
John, P. (1998). Analysing Public Policy. Continuum International Publishing Group. 
Jones, T., & Newburn, T. (2006). Policy Transfer and Criminal Justice. Exploring US Influence Over 
British Crime Control Policy. Open University Press. 
Kandel, D., Kessler, R., & Margulies, R. (1978). Antecedents of Adolescent Initiation into Stages of 
Drug Use: A Developmental Analysis. Journal of Youth and Adolescence, Vol. 7, No. 1. 
Keane, H. (2003). Critiques of harm reduction, morality and the promise of human rights. 
International Journal of Drug Policy, 227-232. 
Keck, M. E., & Sikkink, K. (1999). Transnational advocacy networks in international and regional 
politics. International Social Science Journal, 89-101. 
Kendell, R. (2003). Cannabis condemned: the proscription of Indian hemp. Addiction, 143-151. 
Kenney, M. (2007). The Architecture of Drug Trafficking: Network Forms of Organisation in the 
Colombian Cocaine Trade. Global Crime, 233-259. 
Kilmer, B. (2017). New developments in cannabis regulation. Lisbon: European Monitoring Centre for 
Drug and Addiction. 
Kingdon, J. (1995). Agendas, alternatives and public policies. New York: Longman. 
Kleiman, M. (2016). Legal Commercial Cannabis Sales in Colorado and Washington: What Can We 
Learn? Journal of Drug Policy Analysis. 
Koopmans, F. (2011). Going Dutch: Recent drug policy developments in the Netherlands. The Journal 
on Global Drug Policy and Practice. 
Korf, D. (2002). Dutch coffee shops and trends in cannabis use. Addictive Behaviors , 851 W866. 
Korf, D. (2008). An open front door: the coffee shop phenomenon in the Netherlands. Lisbon: 
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Addiction. 
Korf, D., Riper, H., & Bullington, B. (1999). Windmills in Their Minds? Drug Policy and Drug Research 
in the Netherlands. Journal of Drug Issues, 451-472. 
Kübler, D. (2001). Understanding Policy Change with the Advocacy Coalition Framework: an 
application to Swiss drug policy. Journal of European Public Policy, (8:4) 623-641. 
156  
Kurzban, R. D. (2010). Sex, drugs and moral goals: reproductive strategies and views about 
recreational drugs. Proceedings of The Royal Society B. 
Labrousse. (2006). La cooperación en materia de drogas entre la Unión Europea y América Latina. 
Asociación Proyecto Hombre. 
Lagos, M., & Dammert, L. (2012). La seguridad ciudadana. El problema principal de America Latina. 
Chile: Corporacion Latinobarometro. 
Lai, G. (2012). Drugs, crime and punishment. Proportionality of sentencing for drug offences. 
Amsterdam: International Institute. 
Lanzaro, J. (2004). Fundamentos de la democracia pluralista y estructura política del estado en el 
Uruguay. Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Política, (14). 
Lanzaro, J. (2010). Uruguay: un gobierno social democrático en América Latina. Revista Uruguaya de 
Ciencia Política. 
Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy. (2009). Drugs and Democacry: Towards a 
Paradigm Shift . Latin American Comission on Drugs and Democracy. 
Latinobarometro. (2013). Informe 2013. Santiago de Chile: Latinobarometro. 
Latinobarometro. (2013). Las religiones en tiempos del Papa Francisco. Santiago de Chile: 
Corporacion Latinobarometro. 
Leeuw, E., & Haen Marshall, I. (1994). Introduction. In E. Leuw, & I. Haen Marshall, Between 
Prohibition and Legalization: The Dutch Experiment in Drug Policy. Amsterdam / New York: 
Kugler Publications. 
Legard, R., Keegan, J., & Ward, K. (2003). In-depth Interviews. In J. Ritchie, & J. Lewis, Qualitative 
Research Practice. A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers (pp. 138-169). 
Thousand Oaks: SAGE. 
Li, H. (1973). An archaeological and historical account of cannabis in China. Economic Botany, 437 W 
448. 
López, S. (18/11/2016). La edad de los líderes. Retrieved from Razones y Personas: 
http://www.razonesypersonas.com/2016/11/la-edad-de-los-lideres_18.html 
Lucas, P., Reiman, A., Earleywine, M., McGowan, S., Oleson, M., Coward, M., & Thomas, B. (2013). 
Cannabis as a substitute for alcohol and other drugs: A dispensary-based survey of 
substitution effect in Canadian medical cannabis patients. Addiction Research and Theory, 
435 W442. 
Lundström, R. (2011). Between the exceptional and the ordinary: A model for the comparative 
analysis of moral panics and moral regulation. Crime Media Culture, 7(3) 313  W332. 
Lupsha, P. (1995). Transnational Narco-Corruption and Narco Investment: A Focus on Mexico. 
Transnational Organized Crime, 84-101. 
>ǇŶĐŚ ?D ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?dŚĞŽƌŝǌŝŶŐƚŚĞƌŽůĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ǁĂƌŽŶĚƌƵŐƐ ?ŝŶh^ƉƵŶŝƐŚŵĞŶƚ ?dŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂů
Criminology, 16(2) 175 W199. SAGE 
157  
MacCoun, R., & Reuter, P. (1997). Interpreting Dutch Cannabis Policy: Reasoning by Analogy in the 
Legalisation Debate. Science, (278)533. 
MacCoun, R., & Reuter, P. (2001). Drug War Heresies. Learning from Other Vices, Times, & Places. 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Madras, B. (2015). Update of Cannabis and its medical use. World Health Organisation. 
Mahoney, J. (2012). The Logic of Process Tracing Tests in the Social Sciences. Sociological Methods & 
Research, 570 W597. 
Marchesi, A., & Yaffé, J. (2010). La violencia bajo la lupa: una revision de la literatura sobre violencia 
y politica en los sesenta. Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Politica, 19(1). 
Marín, I. (2008). La cultura "cannabica" en España (1991-2007). Granada: Universidad de Granada. 
Márquez, M. (15/15/2013). Ofensiva cristiana en el mundo de la política. La República, pp. 
http://www.republica.com.uy/ofensiva-cristiana-en-el-mundo-de-la-politica/412873/. 
Martínez, A. T. (2013). Laicidad y secularización. Mexico D. F.: Instituto de investigaciones jurídicas. 
McRobbie, A., & Thornton, S. L. (1995). Rethinking 'Moral Panic' for Multi-Mediated Social Worlds. 
The British Journal of Sociology, 559-574. 
Meier, K. (1999). Drugs, Sex, Rock, and Roll: A Theory of Morality Politics. Policy Studies Journal, 
(27:4)681-695. 
Meier, R., & Geis, G. (1997). Victimless Crime?: Prostitution, Drugs, Homosexuality, Abortion. 
Roxbury Publishing Company. 
DĞũŦĂ ? ? ? ? Restrepo, P. (2013). Bushes and Bullets: Illegal Cocaine Markets and Violence in 
Colombia. Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes. 
Méndez, J. (2013). Torture Report, Uruguayan Mission. Vienna: United Nations. 
Mill, J. S. (1859). On Liberty. London: Longman, Roberts, & Green Co. 
Ministerio del Interior. (2013). Informe y memoria anual. Montevideo: Gobierno del Uruguay. 
Miraglia, P. (2015). Drugs and Drug Trafficking in Brazil: Trends and Policies. Washigton: Brookings - 
Improving Global Drug Policy: Comparative Perspectives and UNGASS 2016 Series. 
Mjoset, L. (2009). The Contextualist Approach to Social Science Methodology. In D. S. Byrne, & C. 
Ragin, The SAGE Handbook of Case-Based Methods. Los Angeles: SAGE. 
Moeller, K., & Hesse, M. (2013). Drug market disruption and systemic violence: Cannabis markets in 
Copenhagen. European Journal of Criminology, 206-221. 
Monitor Cannabis. (2016). A tres años de su aprobación. Seminario evaluación y monitoreo de la 
regulación del cannabis. Montevideo: Monitor Cannabis. 
Monitor Cannabis. (2017). Informe de dificultades en la implementación de la regulación del 
cannabis de uso médico en Uruguay. Montevideo: Facultad de Ciencias Sociales - UdelaR. 
Montañés, V. (2014). Rompiendo el hielo. La regulación del cannabis en Países Bajos, Colorado y 
Uruguay. Donostia/San Sebastián: Fundación Renovatio. 
158  
Mooney, C., & Schuldt, R. (2008). Does Morality Policy Exist? Testing a Basic Assumption. Policy 
Studies Journal, 199 W218. 
Mora, F. (1996). Victims of the balloon effect: Drug trafficking and U.S. policy in Brazil and the 
Southern Cone of Latin America. The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies, 115. 
MPP National Directorate - Strategy commission. (19/02/2006). Consideraciones generales sobre 
estrategia y táctica. Montevideo: MPP. 
Murray, R., Morrison, P., & Henquet , C. (2007). Cannabis, the mind and society: the hash realities. 
Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 885-895. 
Nelken, D. (2010). Comparative Criminal Justice: Making Sense of Difference. Sage. 
Newcombe, R. (1992). The reduction of drug-related harm: A conceptual framework for theory, 
ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞĂŶĚƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ?/ŶW ?K ?,ĂƌĞ ?Z ?EĞǁĐŽŵďĞ ? ?DĂƚŚĞǁƐ ? ?ƵŶŝŶŐ ? ? ?ƌƵĐŬĞƌ ?The
Reduction of Drug-Related Harm. London: Routledge. 
Nixon, R. (1971). The American Presidency Project website. Retrieved from 
http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.timeline.php?timelineID=000026 
Nowak, M. (2009). Torture Report, Uruguayan Mission. Vienna: United Nations. 
OEA. (2013). El problema de drogas en las Américas: estudios. Producción y oferta de drogas, 
fármacos y precursores químicos. Washington DC: Organización de Estados Americanos. 
OEA. (2013). Escenarios para el problema de drogas en America Latina 2013 - 2025. Cartagena de 
Indias: Organizacion de Estados Americanos. 
OEA. (2015). Informe del Uso de Drogas en las Américas, 2015. Washington, DC: OEA - CICAD. 
OEDT. (2015). Estadísticas 2015. Alcohol, tabaco y drogas ilegales en España. Madrid: Observatorio 
Español de la Droga y las Toxicomanías. 
Olson, E., Shirk, D., & Selee, A. (2010). Shared Responsibility: U.S.-Mexico Policy Options for 
Confronting Organized Crime. Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Center. 
O'Malley, P. (1999). Volatile and contradictory punishment. Theoretical Criminology, 3(2), 175-196. 
OUD. (2011). 5ta Encuesta Nacional en Hogares sobre consumo de drogas. Montevideo: 
Observatorio Uruguayo de Drogas, Junta Nacional de Drogas. 
Ousey, G., & Lee, M. (2002). Examining the conditional nature of the illicit drug market - himicide 
relationship: a partial test of the theory of contingent causation. Criminology, 73-102. 
Pardo, B. (2014). Cannabis policy reforms in the Americas: A comparative analysis of Colorado, 
Washington, and Uruguay. International Journal of Drug Policy. 
Pascale, A., Negrín, A., & Laborde, A. (2010). Cocaine base paste: experience from the Montevideo 
Poison Control Center. Adicciones, 227-232. 
Paternain, R. (2014). Políticas de seguridad en el Uruguay: desafíos para los gobiernos de izquierda. 
Cuestiones de Sociología, nº 10. 
Pauly, B. (2008). Harm reduction through a social justice lens. The International Journal of Drug 
Policy, 4-10. 
159  
Pellegrino, A. C. (2008). De una transición a otra: la dinámica demográfica del Uruguay en el siglo XX. 
In B. Nahum, El Uruguay del siglo XX: La sociedad (pp. 11 - 43). Montevideo: Banda Oriental. 
Pere, D. (2015). Clubes sociales de cannabis: normalización, neoliberalismo,oportunidades políticas y 
Peters, G., & Woolley, J. T. (1971, 06 17). The American Presidency Project. Retrieved from Richard 
Nixon: Remarks About an Intensified Program for Drug Abuse Prevention and Control: 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3047 
Pierson, P. (2004). Politics in Time. History, institutions, and social analysis. Oxford: Princeton 
University Press. 
Pijlman, F., Rigter, S., Hoek, J., Goldschmidt, H., & Niesink, R. (2005). Strong increase in total delta- 
THC in cannabis preparations sold in Dutch coffee shops. Addiction Biology, 171  W 180. 
Pollack, H. (2008). Moral, Prudential, and Political Arguments about Harm Reduction. Contemporary 
Drug Problems, 211-239. 
Potter, G. (2006). Weed, Need and Greed: Domestic Marijuana Production and the UK Cannabis 
Market. PhD thesis, University of Sheffield. 
Presidencia. (2012). Estrategia por la vida y la convivencia. Retrieved from 
http://medios.presidencia.gub.uy/jm_portal/2012/noticias/NO_E582/Estrategia.pdf 
Ragin, C. (1987). The comparative method: moving beyond qualitative and quantitative strategies. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Ramchand, R., Liccardo, R., & Iguchi, M. (2006). Racial differences in marijuana-ƵƐĞƌƐ ?ƌŝƐŬŽĨĂƌƌĞƐƚŝŶ
the United States. Drug and Alcohol Dependence, 264 W272. 
Real de Azua, C. (1964). El impulso y su freno: tres décadas de batllismo y las raíces de la crisis 
uruguaya. Montevideo: Banda Oriental. 
Real de Azua, C. (1984). Uruguay, una sociedad amortiguadora? Montevideo: Banda Oriental. 
Reiman, A. (2009). Cannabis as a substitute for alcohol and other drugs. Harm Reduction Journal, 
6:35. 
Repeto, L. (2014). Regulacion del cannabis: ¿un asunto de seguridad? Entrada y mantenimiento en 
agenda de un problema de politica publica. Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Politica, 23(1). 
Responsible Regulation; message training research results. (May 2013). Montevideo: Equipos Mori 
Consultores - Proderechos. 
Reta, A. (1973). Enfoques juridicos. Revista de la Asociación de Psiquiatría y Psicopatología de la 
Infancia y Adolescencia, 50-58. 
Reuter, P. (2009). Systemic violence in drug markets. Crime Law Soc Change. 
Ripberger, J. T., Gupta, K., Silva, C. L., & Jenkins-Smith, H. C. (2014). Cultural Theory and the 
Measurement of Deep Core Beliefs Within the Advocacy Coalition Framework. Policy Studies 
Journal, 509-527. 
Ritter, A. (2009). Methods for comparing drug policies ? The utility of composite Drug Harm Indexes. 
International Journal of Drug Policy, 475 W479. 
160 
 
Rivera, M. (2015). The sources of social violence in Latin America: An empirical analysis of homicide 
rates, 1980-2010. Peace Research, 84-99. 
ZŽďŝŶƐŽŶ ?Z ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ƵůƚƵƌĞĂŶĚ>ĞŐĂůWŽůŝĐǇWƵŶĐƚƵĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞ^ƵƉƌĞŵĞŽƵƌƚ ?Ɛ'ĞŶĚĞƌ
Discrimination Cases. Policy Studies Journal, 555-589. 
Robles, G., & Calderón, G. (2015). The Economic Consequences of Drug Trafficking Violence in 
Mexico. Sanford: Stanford University. 
Rolles, S. (2014). Cannabis policy in the Netherlands: moving forwards not backwards. London: 
Transform. 
Romaní, O. (2005). La cultura del cannabis treinta años después... unas reflexiones personales. 
Revista Española de Drogodependencias, 263-282. 
Sabatier, P., & Jenkins-Smith, H. (1993). Policy change and learning: an advocacy coalition approach 
Theoretical Lenses on Public Policy. Westview Press. 
Sain, M. (2009). El crimen organizado en el Cono Sur y Brasil: tendencias y respuestas. Tijuana: 
^ĞŵŝŶĂƌŝŽ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂĐŝŽŶĂů “/ŶŝĐŝĂƚŝǀĂDĠƌŝĚĂǇĞůĐƌŝŵĞŶŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂĚŽ PĚŝĂŐŶſƐƚŝĐŽǇĚĞƐĂĨşŽƐĞŶ
ůĂƐŵĠƌŝĐĂƐ ? ?
Sanjurgo, D. (2013). Analisis del proyecto de ley. La conveniencia de regular el mercado de cannabis 
en Uruguay. . Madrid: Universidad Autonoma de Madrid. 
Scheerer, S. (1978). The new Dutch and German Laws: social and political conditions for 
criminalization and decriminalization. Law & Society Review, 585-606. 
Scheerer, S. (1997). Political Ideologies and Drug Policy. European Journal on Criminal Policy and 
Research, 94-105. 
Schur, E., & Bedau, H. (1974). Victimless Crimes: Two Sides of a Controversy. Englewood Cliffs: 
Prentice-Hall. 
Selios, L., & Vairo, D. (2012). Elecciones 2009 en Uruguay: permanencia de lealtades políticas y 
accountability electoral. Opinion Publica, vol.18 no.1. 
Sempol, D. (2013). De los baños a la calle. Historia del movimiento lésbico, gay, trans uruguayo 
(1984-2013). Montevideo: Random House Mondadori. 
Silva, D. (2013). La aprobacion de la ley de regulacion y control del mercado de marihuana. Revista 
de Derecho Penal . 
Silvera, L., & Natalevich, M. (2012). La crónica policial en los informativos de televisión. Dixit. 
Snyder, R., & Durán-Martinez, A. (2009). Does illegality breed violence? Drug trafficking and state- 
sponsored protection rackets. Crime Law Soc Change, 253-273. 
SPU / SUPIA. (2012). La Sociedad de Psiquiatría del Uruguay y la Sociedad Uruguaya de Psiquiatría de 
la Infancia y la Adolescencia ante el proyecto de legalizar la venta de marihuana. 
http://www.spu.org.uy/declaracion-marihuana.pdf. 
Stake, R. (2005). Qualitative case studies. In N. K. Denzin, & Y. Lincoln, The Sage handbook of 
qualitative research (pp. 443-466). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
161 
 
Stevens, A. (2007). When two dark figures collide: Evidence and discourse on drug-related crime. 
Critical Social Policy, 27(1). 
Stevens, A. (2011). Telling policy stories: An ethnographic study of the use of evidence in policy- 
making in the UK. Journal of Social Policy, 40:2 (237-255). 
Stimson. (2000). Methadone and Beyond: expanding and exploring drug treatment options. 
Methadone Alliance Conference. London: http://www.ukhra.org/stimsonspeech.html. 
Stone, D. (2000). Non-Governmental Policy Transfer: The Strategies of Independent Policy Institutes. 
Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration, 45 W62. 
Sutton, J. E. (2010). A review of the life-events calendar method for criminological research. Journal 
of Criminal Justice, 1038 W1044. 
Swedlow, B. (2014). Advancing Policy Theory with Cultural Theory: An Introduction to the Special 
Issue. Policy Studies Journal, 465-483. 
Tansey, O. (2007). Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for Non-probability Sampling. 
Political Science & Politics, 765-772. 
Telleria Escobar, L. (2014). Bolivia y la despenalización de la hoja de coca como estrategia de cambio. 
URVIO - Revista Latinoamericana de Seguridad Ciudadana, 95-107. 
Thoumi, F. (2002). Illegal Drugs in Colombia: From Illegal Economic Boom to Social Crisis. The Annals 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 102-116. 
TNI. (2006). El paco bajo la lupa. Amsterdam: TNI. 
TNI/WOLA. (2015). Diálogo Informal sobre Políticas de Drogas. Nuevos enfoques para el siglo XXI. 
Montevideo: TNI/WOLA. 
True, J., Jones, B., & Baumgartner, F. (2007). Punctuated-Equilibrium Theory Explaining Stability and 
Change in Public Policymaking. In P. Sabatier, Theories of the Policy Process. Westview Press. 
UNODC. (2009). A Century of International Drug Control. Vienna: United Nations. 
UNODC. (2013). Global Study on Homicide. Vienna: United Nations. 
UNODC. (2015). International Drug Control Conventions. Retrieved from 
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/commissions/CND/conventions.html 
Ureña, J. M. (2012). Terminological metaphors in marine biology. An English-Spanish contrastive 
analysis from an experientialist perspective. In F. MacArthur, J. L. Oncins-Martínez, M. 
Sánchez-García, & A. M. Piquer-Píriz, Metaphor in Use. Context, culture, and communication 
(pp. 239-260). Amsterdam / Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company. 
Valdomir, S. (2015). "Alguien tiene que ser el primero". La iniciativa uruguaya sobre el cannabis: un 
modelo regional? Nueva Sociedad. 
van het Loo, M., van Beusekom, I., & Kahan, J. (2002). Decriminalization of Drug Use in Portugal: The 
Development of a Policy. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 
49-63. 
162 
 
van Ooyen-Houben, M., Bieleman, B., & Korf, D. (2015). Dutch coffee shops, tourists and the local 
market. 9th Annual conference of the International Society for the Study of Drug Policy 
(ISSDP). University of Gent, Belgium. 20  W 22 of May. 
Van Swaaningen, R., & Zaitch, D. (1996). >ĂƉŽůşƚŝĐĂĚĞ “ƚŽůĞƌĂŶĐŝĂ ?ĐŽŵŽĐŽŶƚƌŽůƐŽĐŝĂů ?ůĨƵƚƵƌŽĚĞů
modelo holandés sobre drogas en el contexto europeo. In X. Arana, & R. del Olmo, Normas y 
ĐƵůƚƵƌĂƐĞŶůĂĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐĐŝſŶĚĞůĂ “ƵĞƐƚŝſŶƌŽŐĂ ? ?Barcelona: Editorial Hacer. 
Varela, C. (2008). Demografía de una sociedad en transición. Montevideo: UNFPA. 
Vigna, A. (2012). Análisis de datos del I Censo Nacional de Reclusos, desde una perspectiva de Género 
y Derechos Humanos. Montevideo: Inmujeres - Ministerio del Interior. 
Vigorito, A., & Pellegrino, A. (2005). La emigración uruguay durante la crisis de 2002. Montevideo: 
Instituto de Ciencias Economicas. 
von Hoffmann, J. (2015). The International Dimension of Drug Policy Reform in Uruguay. ISSDP 
Conference (p. 24). Gent: ISSDP. 
von Hoffmann, J. (2015). dŚĞWŽůŝƚŝĐƐŽĨƌƵŐWŽůŝĐǇZĞĨŽƌŵ P “>ĞŐĂůŝǌŝŶŐ ?ĂŶŶĂďŝƐŝŶhƌƵŐƵĂǇ ? 
Oxford University.: Master thesis. 
tĂůƐŚ ?: ? ? ?ZĂŵƐĞǇ ?' ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?hƌƵŐƵĂǇ ?ƐƌƵŐWŽůŝĐǇ PDĂũŽƌ/ŶŶŽǀĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?DĂũŽƌŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐ ? 
Improving Global Drug Policy: Comparative Perspectives and UNGASS 2016. 
Wasserman, S., & Faust, K. (1994). Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications. Cambridge 
and New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Weems, L. (2006). Unsettling Politics, Locating Ethics Representations of Reciprocity in Postpositivist 
Inquiry . Qualitative Inquiry, 994-1011. 
Weintraub, S. (1992). Western Hemisphere Free Trade: Getting from Here to There. BID. 
WHO. (2017, 04 26). Cannabis, facts & figures. Retrieved from 
http://www.who.int/substance_abuse/facts/cannabis/en/ 
Wilkins, C., & Sweetsur, P. (2006). Exploring the structure of the illegal market for cannabis. De 
Economist, 547-562. 
Wilson, J., & Kelling, G. (1982). Broken Windows. Retrieved from The Atlantic Online: 
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/print/198203/broken-windows 
WOLA / TNI. (2010). Sistemas sobrecargados: Leyes de drogas y cárceles en Amárica Latina. 
Disponible online: https://www.tni.org/es/publicacion/sistemas-sobrecargados-leyes-de- 
drogas-y-carceles-en-america-latina: TNI / WOLA. 
Yaffe, J. (2001). El intervencionismo Batllista: estatismo y regulación en Uruguay (1900-1930). 
Montevideo: FCEA - Documento de trabajo. 
Yaffé, J. (2010). Economia y dictadura en Uruguay, una vision panoramica de su evolucion y de sus 
relaciones con la economia internacional (1973-1984). Revista Historia, 13-35. 
Yaffé, J. (2013). Consolidación y transformación partidaria. Institucionalización, liderazgo y capacidad 
de adaptación en el Frente Amplio de Uruguay. Perfiles Latinoamericanos, (41). 
163 
 
Young, J. (1971). The Drugtakers: the Social Meaning of Drug Use. London: Judson, McGibbon and 
Kee. 
Zaitch, D. (2001). Traquetos. Amsterdam: Universitiet van Amsterdam. 
Zaitch. (2009). Reducción de daños, seguridad y tráficode drogas ilícitas. Cuadernos de Seguridad, 
51-80. 
Zaluar, A. (1996). Violence Related to Illegal Drugs, "Easy Money" and Justice in Brazil: 1980-1995. 
Vienna: United Nations. 
Zampini, G. (2015). Morality Plays a Comparative Study of the Use of Evidence in Drug and 
Prostitution Policy in Australia and the UK. Canterbury: University of Kent - PhD thesis. 
 
 
 
 
Legislative documents 
Cámara de Representantes. (7/04/2010). Diario de Sesiones. Montevideo: Gobierno del Uruguay. 
Cannabis Regulation for its Consumption (2011), ante proyecto de Ley presentado por Sebastian 
Sabini, Nicolás Nuñez, Fernando Amado y Daniel Radío en la comision de Adicciones y su 
impacto en la Sociedad Uruguaya. 
Law 14294. (1974). Sustancias Ilegales. Montevideo: Republica Oriental del Uruguay - Poder 
legislativo. 
Law 9692. (1937). Monopolio del estado para la importacion de estupefacientes. Montevideo: 
Republica Oriental del Uruguay - Poder legislativo. 
Law N° 18620. (25/10/2009). Regulacion del derecho a la identidad de genero, cambio de nombre y 
sexo registral. IMPO. Retrieved from: http://www.impo.com.uy/bases/leyes/18620-2009 
Law N° 18987. (22/10/2012). Interrupcion voluntaria del embarazo IMPO. Retrieved from: 
http://www.impo.com.uy/bases/leyes/18987-2012 
Law Nº 18.246. (27/12/2007). Unión concubinaria. IMPO. Retrieved from 
http://www.impo.com.uy/concubinato/ 
Law Nº 18.426. (01/12/2008). Salud sexual y reproductiva. IMPO. Retrieved from: 
http://www.impo.com.uy/bases/leyes/18426-2008 
Law Nº 19.075. (03/05/2013). Matrimonio igualitario: IMPO. Retrieved from: 
http://www.impo.com.uy/matrimonioigualitario/ 
Nº 120/014. (06/05/2014). Decreto Reglamentario cannabis recreativo. Montevideo: Uruguayan 
Executive Power. 
Nº 128/016. (02/05/2016). Decreto reglamentario uso de drogas en ambientes de trabajo. 
Montevideo: Executive Power of Uruguay. 
Nº 372/014. (16/12/2014). Decreto reglamentario cannabis industrial. Montevideo: Uruguayan 
Executive Power. 
164 
 
Nº 46/015. (04/02/2015). Decreto reglamentario cannbis científico y terapéutico. Montevideo: 
Uruguayan Executive Power. 
 
 
 
 
Public activities manifestos 
Cannabis Liberalisation Movement - 2008 GMM manifesto. (03/05/2008). Global Marijuana March 
Manifesto - Uruguay. Montevideo. 
Coordinator for Sexual Diversity - Diversity Parade manifesto. (25/09/2009). Proclama Marcha de la 
Diversidad - Uruguay. Montevideo. 
Uruguayos Indignados. (14/05/2012). Proclama de la marcha por la seguridad. 
 
 
 
 
News 
Díaz, J. (05/06/2015). La mala noticia del fiscal de Corte y el sicariato en Uruguay. El Observador 
Retrieved from: https://www.elobservador.com.uy/la-mala-noticia-del-fiscal-corte-y-el- 
sicariato-uruguay-n651870 
El Observador. (24/04/2014). Mayoría de uruguayos quiere mantener ley que regula marihuana. El 
Observador. Retrieved from: https://www.elobservador.com.uy/mayoria-uruguayos-quiere- 
mantener-ley-que-regula-marihuana-n277058 
El Observador. (21/08/2012). ĂƚůůĞ PƉƌŽǇĞĐƚŽĚĞůĞŐĂůŝǌĂĐŝſŶĚĞůĂŵĂƌŝŚƵĂŶĂ “ĞƐƉĂƌ ĞůůŝďƌŽ
GƵŝŶĞƐƐ ? ?El Observador. Retrieved from: https://www.elobservador.com.uy/batlle- 
proyecto-legalizacion-la-marihuana-es-el-libro-guiness-n230808 
Espectador. (13/05/2012). Sociedad conmovida por crimen a sangre fría en La Pasiva. El Espectador. 
Retrieved from: http://www.espectador.com/sociedad/239071/sociedad-conmovida-por- 
crimen-a-sangre-fria-en-la-pasiva 
Montevideo Portal. (05/05/2008). Batlle a favor de despenalizar drogas. Montevideo Portal. 
Retrieved from: http://www.montevideo.com.uy/auc.aspx?61409. 
NBC. (23/03/2015). Colorado Marijuana Study Finds Legal Weed Contains Potent THC Levels. NBC 
news Retrieved from: http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/legal-pot/legal-weed- 
surprisingly-strong-dirty-tests-find-n327811 
Peregil, F. (2012, 10 28). Uruguay se abre a la marihuana. El País. Retrieved from: 
http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2012/10/26/actualidad/1351276832_100775. 
html 
Redacción 180. (07/10/2014). Los cristianos que votan al Frente Amplio. 180 Retrieved from: 
http://www.180.com.uy/articulo/51348_Los-cristianos-que-votan-al-Frente-Amplio. 
The Economist. (18/12/2013). ĂƌƚŚ ?ƐŐŽƚƚĂůĞŶƚ. Retrieved from: 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21591872-resilient-ireland-booming-south- 
sudan-tumultuous-turkey-our-country-year-earths-got 
165 
 
Annexes 
 
1. Interviews and key informants 
Id Category Name Position Place and date Source 
 
1 
 
Legislative Power 
 
Verónica Alonso 
Partido Nacional, Drugs 
comission. 
Montevideo, 
11/11/2014 
 
Primary 
 
2 
 
Legislative Power 
 
Pablo Iturralde 
Partido Nacional, Drugs 
comission. 
Montevideo, 
03/11/2014 
 
Primary 
 
3 
 
Legislative Power 
 
Javier García 
Partido Nacional, Drugs 
comission. 
Montevideo, 
07/11/2014 
 
Primary 
 
4 
 
Legislative Power 
 
Fernando Amado 
 
Partido Colorado 
Montevideo, 
07/11/2014 
 
Primary 
 
5 
 
Legislative Power 
 
Sebastian Sabini 
Frente Amplio, 
Drugs comission 
Montevideo, 
regular contact 
 
Primary 
 
6 
 
Legislative Power 
 
Lucia Topolansky 
 
Frente Amplio 
Montevideo, 
18/12/2013 
 
Documentary 
 
7 
 
Legislative Power 
 
Julio Bango 
Frente Amplio, 
Drugs comission 
Montevideo, 
regular contact 
 
Primary 
 
8 
 
Legislative Power 
 
Romina Napiloti 
 
Frente Amplio member 
Montevideo, 
regular contact 
 
Primary 
 
9 
 
Legislative Power 
 
Nicolás Nuñez 
Frente Amplio, 
Drugs comission 
Montevideo, 
regular contact 
 
Primary 
 
10 
 
Legislative Power 
 
Daniela Payssé 
 
Frente Amplio member 
Montevideo, 
19/03/2015 
 
Primary 
 
11 
 
Legislative Power 
 
Daniel Radio 
Partido Independiente, 
Drugs comission 
Montevideo, 
10/10/2014 
 
Primary 
 
12 
 
Executive Power 
 
Julio Calzada 
National Drugs Committee 
General Secretary 
Montevideo, 
regular contact 
 
Primary 
 
13 
 
Executive Power 
 
Augusto Vitale 
National Drugs Committee / 
IRCCA 
Montevideo, 
regular contact 
 
Primary 
 
14 
 
Executive Power 
 
Eduardo Bonomi 
 
Ministry of Interior 
Montevideo, 
08/09/2014 
 
Primary 
 
15 
 
Executive Power 
 
Charles Carrera 
 
Ministry of Interior, adviser 
Montevideo, 
regular contact 
 
Primary 
 
16 
 
Judicial Power 
 
Carlos Negro 
Prosecutor Organised Crime 
Court 
Montevideo, 
06/08/2014 
 
Documentary 
 
17 
National civil 
society 
 
Sebastian Aguiar 
Proderechos / Responsible 
Regulation 
Montevideo, 
regular contact 
 
Primary 
 
18 
National civil 
society 
 
Martin Collazo 
Proderechos / Responsible 
Regulation 
Montevideo, 
regular contact 
 
Primary 
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19 
National civil 
society 
 
Camilo Collazo 
Proderechos / Responsible 
Regulation 
Montevideo, 
regular contact 
 
Primary 
 
20 
 
National civil 
society 
 
Gustavo Robaina 
Scholar, Cannabis 
Monitoring and Evaluation 
programme 
 
Montevideo, 
regular contact 
 
Primary 
 
21 
National civil 
society 
 
Bolivar Moreira 
 
Proderechos 
Montevideo, 
15/02/2014 
 
Documentary 
 
22 
National civil 
society 
 
Juan Vaz 
 
AECU 
Montevideo, 
regular contact 
 
Primary 
 
23 
National civil 
society 
 
Laura Blanco 
 
AECU 
Montevideo, 
regular contact 
 
Primary 
 
24 
National civil 
society 
 
Julio Rey 
 
Movida Cannábica Florida 
Montevideo, 
regular contact 
 
Primary 
 
25 
National civil 
society 
 
Álvaro Calistro 
 
Red de Usuarios de Drogas 
Montevideo, 
regular contact 
 
Primary 
 
26 
National civil 
society 
 
REMAR 
 
Drug treatment institution 
Montevideo, 
05/02/2015 
 
Documentary 
 
27 
National civil 
society 
 
Guillermo Castro 
 
Drug treatment institution 
Montevideo, 
06/02/2015 
 
Primary 
 
28 
National civil 
society 
 
ESALCU-Beraca 
 
Drug treatment institution 
Montevideo, 
06/02/2015 
 
Documentary 
 
29 
National civil 
society 
Gianella 
Bardazzano 
IELSUR / Responsible 
Regulation 
Montevideo, 
regular contact 
 
Primary 
 
30 
National civil 
society 
 
Martín Fernández 
 
IELSUR 
Montevideo, 
regular contact 
 
Primary 
 
31 
National civil 
society 
 
Rafael Sanseviero 
 
FESUR 
Montevideo, 
25/11/2014 
 
Primary 
 
32 
National civil 
society 
 
Raquel Peyraube 
 
Responsible Regulation 
Montevideo, 
regular contact 
 
Primary 
 
33 
 
Professional 
 
Guillermo Garat 
 
Journalist 
Montevideo, 
17/10/2014 
 
Primary 
 
34 
 
Professional 
 
Aldo Marchesi 
 
Historian 
Montevideo, 
05/02/2014 
 
Documentary 
 
35 
 
Professional 
 
Rafael Bayce 
 
Sociologist 
Montevideo, 
05/08/2014 
 
Primary 
 
36 
 
Professional 
 
Jorge Suarez 
vice president Uruguayan 
Pharmacies Union 
Montevideo, 
05/08/2013 
 
Primary 
 
37 
 
Professional 
Fabrizio 
Giamberini 
 
Latin American Hemp 
Montevideo, 
21/08/2013 
 
Primary 
 
38 
 
Professional 
 
Guzmán Castro 
 
Political Scientist 
Via Skype, 
17/11/2015 
 
Primary 
39 Professional Gabriel Dacoste Political Scientist Montevideo, Primary 
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    20/11/2014  
 
40 
International civil 
society 
 
Alejando Corda 
 
Intercambios, Argentina 
Via Skype, 
12/06/2015 
 
Primary 
 
41 
International civil 
society 
 
Alejando Sierra 
 
THC, Argentina 
Via Skype, 
15/06/2015 
 
Primary 
 
42 
International civil 
society 
 
Pablo Ascolani 
 
AREC, Argentina 
Via Skype, 
07/06/2015 
 
Primary 
 
43 
International civil 
society 
 
Emilio Nabas 
 
Activist, Brazil 
Via Skype, 
07/07/2015 
 
Primary 
 
44 
 
International civil 
society 
 
Hannah Hetzer 
Policy manager of the 
Americas at the Drug Policy 
Alliance (DPA), US 
 
Montevideo, 
regular contact 
 
Primary 
 
45 
International civil 
society 
 
Ira Glasser 
American Civil Liberties 
Union, US 
Denver, 
23/10/2013 
 
Documentary 
 
46 
International civil 
society 
 
Jorge Hernandez 
 
Activist, Mexico 
Via Skype, 
05/06/2015 
 
Primary 
 
47 
International civil 
society 
 
Anonimous 
 
Colombian government 
Via Skype, 
3/07/2015 
 
Primary 
 
48 
 
International civil 
society 
 
Pedro Abramovay 
Open Society Foundation, 
regional director of Latin 
America & the Caribbean 
 
Denver, 
26/10/2013 
 
Documentary 
 
49 
International civil 
society 
 
Rebeca Lerer 
Global Commission on Drug 
Policy 
Denver, 
23/10/2013 
 
Documentary 
 
50 
International civil 
society 
 
Sergio Sanchez 
 
Universidad de Chile 
Via Skype, 
05/06/2015 
 
Primary 
 
51 
International civil 
society 
Fernando 
Belauzaran 
 
Mexican government 
Via Skype, 
18/06/2015 
 
Primary 
 
52 
International civil 
society 
 
Vicki Hanson 
 
Scholar, Jamaica 
Via email, 
17/06/2015 
 
Primary 
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2. Topics guide 
 
1) BACKGROUND; how you got involved in the cannabis debate? Since when? 
 ? Personal and professional interest 
2) PROBLEM DEFINITION; what you think was the problem of cannabis use and commerce in 
Uruguay? 
 ? Arguments 
 ? Problem to whom? Social distribution of prohibition costs 
 ? Users image 
 ? Importance and link to other problems 
 ? Controversiality; normalization, freedom, religión, moral issues. 
 ? Authority venues (Science and evidence) 
3) POLITICAL PROCESS: Do you remember the day that the Executive Power presented their Strategy 
for Life and Coexistence  W marijuana legalisation proposal? How do you lived it? 
 ? Emotions 
 ? Frente Amplio, coalitions y subgroups (similarities and differences) 
 ? Brokers, translators and entrepreneurs 
 ? Activities and strategies 
 ? Target populations 
 ? Mass media 
 ? International context and policy transfer 
 ? Uruguay; historical and structural characteristics 
4) SOLUTION DEFINITION; There were four different laws aiming to regulate cannabis between 2005 
and 2013 (Lacalle, Tati et al, Executive Power, ƉƉƌŽǀĞĚůĂǁ ) ?tŚǇƐŽŵĂŶǇ ?tŚĂƚĂƌĞƚŚĞŵĂŝŶ
similarities and differences among them? 
 ? Objectives 
 ? Actors 
 ? Interests 
 ? Lessons drawn, other experiences; blockers and facilitators 
 ? Link to other policies (drugs, crime, economy) 
5) IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION; What do you think are the main strengths and weaknesses 
in order to implement the approved law? 
 ? Short and long term obstacles and challenges 
 ? Success and failure indicators 
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3. Time line 
 
 
2011 
Jan Feb March April May Jun 
 
Informal Dialogs on 
Drugs Policies, 
Montevideo 
Alicia and Mauricio 
prosecution 
 
Calzada's 
appointment at the 
SND 
Global Marijuana 
March 
 
2011 
July Augost Sept Oct Nov Dec 
Bill on domestic 
cultivation and 
cannabis clubs 
National Drugs 
Debate 
    
2012 
Jan Feb March April May Jun 
   
OEA VI Summit of the 
Americas. 
Global Marijuana 
March (legislative 
palace congregation) 
Executive power 
announcement of 
ƚŚĞ “^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇĨŽƌ>ŝĨĞ
and ŽĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ ? 
2012 
July Augost Sept Oct Nov Dec 
National Coalition for 
Marijuana legalisation  
SND consultant group  
 
 
SND International Conferences on 
Marijuana Regulation series 
Washington y 
Colorado marijuana 
legalisation ballots 
 
Values parade 
 
  
2013 
Jan Feb March April May Jun 
 
Cannabis strategic 
communication 
workshop 
 
Informal Dialogs on 
Drugs Policies, 
Maldonado 
 
Executive power 
proposal introduced at 
deputies Special 
Commission on Drugs 
"Responsible 
Regulation" 
campaign is 
launched at the 
Teatro Solis 
"Por vos por todos" 
campaign is launched 
at the Legislative 
Palace 
2013 
July Augost Sept Oct Nov Dec 
Lower chamber vote 
OEA Report 
Released in 
Montevideo 
 Marijuana 
regulation 
Workshop, 
Montevideo 
Mujica, Soros 
and Rockefeller 
meet at New 
York 
 
Marijuana regulation 
Workshop, Denver 
Marijuana bill approval 
in the upper chamber 
Health commission 
Upper chamber 
vote 
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4. Network analysis 
 
Sampling frame: list of participants in significant events 
 
 
Event 
1
st
 period: 
Feb 2011  ? Jun 
2012 
2d period: 
Jun 2012  ? Feb 
2013 
3d period: 
Feb 2013  ? Dec. 
2013 
Informal Dialogues 
Feb 2011 
x 
  
Global Marihuana March; 
May 2011 
x 
  
National Debate on Drugs; 
Aug 2011 
x 
  
Global Marihuana March; 
May 2012 
x 
  
Experts advisory group SND  x X 
Marihuana legalisation/regulation 
National Coordinator 
 
x X 
Workshop on strategic communication 
Feb 2013 
  
X 
Informal Dialogues; 
Feb 2013 
  
X 
Responsible Regulation   X 
Workshop on Implementation  W Mdeo   X 
Workshop on Implementation  W Denver; 
Oct 2013 
  
X 
 
 
 Weights (triangulated with participant observation + interviews): 
Workshops: Organisers, international speakers, Uruguayan participants. 
Groups: active (participants in meetings) and passive members 
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5. Strategy for Life and Coexistence 
1. Reparations to victims of crime through a compensation fund 
2. Raising penalties for police corruption and trafficking pasta base 
3. Making adjustments to the current legal code pertaining to juvenile offenders 
4. ďĂŶĚŽŶŝŶŐƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐǁŚŝĐŚĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůŝǌĞďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌƐĞĞŶĂƐ “ĨĂŝůƵƌĞ ?ĂŶĚŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶŝŶŐƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ
which impact insecurity 
5. Attention to people affected by problematic drug use, particularly of pasta base and cocaine 
6. Creating specialized judicial mechanisms for the small-scale illicit drug trade 
7. Legalization and control of marijuana sales, as well as state production of the drug 
8. Extending restrictions on exposing children to violence to news programs 
9. Promoting dialogue with the media to self-monitor information on violence and safety 
10. Creation of a specialized laboratory for drug testing and improving police efficiency 
11. Strengthening a conflict mediation system in certain areas and schools in parts of Montevideo 
12. Training youth mediators to effectively deal with internal problems in schools 
13. New public areas aimed at fostering coexistence through sporting, cultural and recreational 
activities 
14. Creating a database of domestic violence allegations 
15. Improving education and control of safe driving in all the ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛ cities 
